Event Notification Report for May 4, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
05/03/2000 - 05/04/2000
** EVENT NUMBERS **
36861 36959 36960 36961 36962 36963 36964 36965 36966 36967 36968 36969
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other |Event Number: 36861 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: PPG ARCHITECTURAL FINISHES, INC |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/03/2000|
|LICENSEE: PPG ARCHITECTURAL FINISHES, INC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:20[EDT]|
| CITY: PITTSBURGH REGION: 1 |EVENT DATE: 04/03/2000|
| COUNTY: ALLEGHENY STATE: PA |EVENT TIME: [EDT]|
|LICENSE#: AGREEMENT: N |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/03/2000|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |VERN HODGE (FAX) NRR |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JOSEPH KARAS | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|CCCC 21.21 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| 10 CFR PART 21 REPORT |
| |
| "This notification is being made by PPG Architectural Finishes, Inc (PPG) |
| concerning relatively small quantities of a silicon stainless steel enamel |
| coating used inside primary containment supplied to a single utility which |
| is a NRC nuclear power plant licensee. The coating was not appropriately |
| controlled such that its formulation changed from that which was originally |
| supplied. The utility has been informed and is working with PPG. Further |
| investigation is being conducted which may result in the withdrawal or |
| modification of this notification. Written notification in accordance with |
| 10 CFR � 21.2 1(d)(3)(ii) will follow." |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1640 ON 05/03/00 BY JOSEPH M. KARAS, PPG INDUSTRIES, INC TO |
| JOLLIFFE * * * |
| |
| Exterior silicone stainless steel enamel coating #8674 qualified for Coating |
| Service Level I Exposure in 1980 by PPG Industries, Inc, Keeler & Long |
| Division, was supplied as a commercial grade item (not included in the |
| supplier's Quality Assurance Program) to Duke Energy Company Nuclear |
| Facilities, Catawba, McGuire and Oconee. This coating is being used inside |
| containment on piping that is contained by mirror insulation which should |
| minimize the potential for paint chip fouling of sump pumps thereby |
| interfering with the operation of Emergency Core Cooling Systems in the |
| event of a DBA incident. |
| |
| The NRC Operations Officer notified the R2DO Bob Haag and NRR Vern Hodge (by |
| fax). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36959 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: DRESDEN REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/03/2000|
| UNIT: [] [] [3] STATE: IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:31[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3 |EVENT DATE: 05/03/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 09:46[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: DAVID GRONEK |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/03/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: WILLIAM POERTNER +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |BRUCE BURGESS R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION | |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
| | |
|3 A/R Y 100 Power Operation |0 Hot Shutdown |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REACTOR SCRAM AND ESF ACTUATION |
| |
| Unit 3 auto scrammed from 100 percent power at 0946 CDT on 5/3/00. Reactor |
| protection power supplies (120VAC) were being transferred at the time of the |
| reactor scram. All rods fully inserted into the core. The exact cause of |
| the scram is unknown at this time. Licensee investigation into the cause of |
| the scram continues. All systems responded as expected. A Group 2 and |
| Group 3 isolation signal also was received during the scram as expected. |
| The unit is stable at hot shutdown conditions. |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been notified. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36960 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SAN ONOFRE REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/03/2000|
| UNIT: [] [2] [3] STATE: CA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:20[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-3-LP,[2] CE,[3] CE |EVENT DATE: 05/03/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 08:25[PDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: CLAY WILLIAMS |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/03/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: WILLIAM POERTNER +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |WILLIAM JOHNSON R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
|3 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS |
| |
| This notification is for San Onofre Units 2 and 3 and is being made in |
| accordance with 10CFR5072(b)(1)(ii)(B) for the condition of the Salt Water |
| Cooling (SWC) System and the Shutdown Cooling System potentially being |
| outside their design basis. This condition exists for both Units 2 and 3. |
| |
| The SWC system consists of two separate, 100% capacity safety related |
| cooling water trains for each unit. Each train consists of two 100% capacity |
| pumps. The pumps aligned to the critical CCW loops are automatically started |
| upon receipt of a safety injection actuation signal and all essential valves |
| are aligned to their post accident positions. Although not specifically |
| stated, the accident analyses for Unit's 2 and 3 assumes that once these |
| valves have been placed in their safety-related positions that they would |
| remain in that position until intentionally realigned by plant personnel. |
| Recently, the licensee discovered that the air/trip valves for pneumatic |
| actuators for the saltwater cooling pump discharge valves were leaking a |
| small amount of air and questioned whether this could cause these valves to |
| be inoperable under postulated accident conditions. |
| |
| The pneumatic actuators receive their air supply from the non-safety-related |
| instrument air system, which would not be available following a Loss of |
| Offsite Power (LOOP) event. The actuator vender indicated that under such |
| conditions, the accumulators for the actuators would gradually loose |
| pressure and would not forcibly hold these valves in their safety related |
| positions. The licensee recognized that hydrodynamic forces inside the pipes |
| could cause these valves to close. Because these valves do not have manual |
| hand wheels and it may take some time for operators to diagnose this |
| condition, restore instrument air, and reopen the valves, the licensee |
| declared the valves inoperable until corrective actions were implemented. |
| The valves were blocked open to ensure they will remain in their |
| safety-related positions during postulated accident conditions. |
| |
| A similar condition exists for the pneumatic actuator for the component |
| cooling water outlet valves for the shutdown cooling heat exchangers. The |
| licensee restored operability to these valves by engaging manual hand wheels |
| which lock the valves open due to increased closing drag. |
| |
| The Resident Inspector will be notified. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36961 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: POINT BEACH REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/03/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [2] [] STATE: WI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:40[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP |EVENT DATE: 05/03/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 10:45[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: DON POPP |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/03/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: WILLIAM POERTNER +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |BRUCE BURGESS R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|DDDD 73.71 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 1 HOUR SECURITY REPORT |
| |
| Unescorted protected area access granted inappropriately. Immediate |
| compensatory measures taken. |
| |
| The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| |
| Contact the Headquarters Operations Center for additional details |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Hospital |Event Number: 36962 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: VETERANS AFFAIRS |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/03/2000|
|LICENSEE: VA MEDICAL CENTER BIRMINGHAM AL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:06[EDT]|
| CITY: BIRMINHAM REGION: 2 |EVENT DATE: 05/03/2000|
| COUNTY: STATE: AL |EVENT TIME: 10:00[CDT]|
|LICENSE#: 01-00648-02 AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/03/2000|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |ROBERT HAAG R2 |
| |JOHN HICKEY NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: GARY WILLIAMS | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: WILLIAM POERTNER | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|BAAA 20.1906(d) SURFACE CONT/ EXT RAD | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| RECEIPT OF A PACKAGE WITH SURFACE CONTAMINATION GREATER THAN LIMIT |
| |
| On May 3, 2000, at approximately 10:00 am, a box of radiopharmaceuticals |
| containing approximately 68 mCi of Technetium-99m Sestamibi from Birmingham |
| Central Pharmacy was received. A nuclear medicine technologist performed |
| the procedure for incoming packages which included a wipe and survey of the |
| box. The meter survey did not indicate any contamination, however, the wipe |
| of the outside of the box indicated contamination of about 178 dpm/cm2. The |
| package was emptied and surveyed again. A contaminated spot on the outside |
| of the box was located by the meter survey. Rewipe of the area indicated |
| 606 dpm/cm2 which exceeds the regulatory limit of 22 dpm/cm2. According to |
| a spectrum made of the contaminated wipe sample, the radionuclide is |
| Technetium-99m. The contamination was in an area on the side of the box away |
| from the carrier handle. The pharmacy has been contacted. The Pharmacy wipe |
| test data arriving with the package did not indicate contamination. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other |Event Number: 36963 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: WA DEPT OF RADIATION PROTECTION |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/03/2000|
|LICENSEE: NEORX CORP |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:40[EDT]|
| CITY: SEATTLE REGION: 4 |EVENT DATE: 05/02/2000|
| COUNTY: STATE: WA |EVENT TIME: [PDT]|
|LICENSE#: WN-L0114-1 AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/03/2000|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |WILLIAM JOHNSON R4 |
| |JOHN HICKEY NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: TERRY C. FRAZEE | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: WILLIAM POERTNER | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POTENTIAL SKIN OVEREXPOSURE |
| |
| A worker was extracting a small amount of Holmium 166 from a vial containing |
| 400 millicuries per milliliter of solution. As the syringe needle was |
| extracted from the vial septum, small droplets were sprayed into the |
| worker's face. Initial estimate was 0.5 microcuries of contamination on |
| forehead, cheeks and lips. The worker was wearing safetyglasses. The worker |
| was decontaminated on site and residual contamination was noted on forehead |
| and right cheek (0.6 millirem per hour), lips (0.3 millirem per hour), and |
| left cheek (0.08 millirem per hour) . Possible internal contamination was |
| indicated by nasal and saliva samples. Worker was sent to the University |
| of Washington Nuclear Medicine department for further assessment. An |
| on-site investigation by the state Department of Health, Division of |
| Radiation Protection will be conducted. Washington State incident number |
| WA-00-016. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other |Event Number: 36964 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: GEOTECH |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/03/2000|
|LICENSEE: GEOTECH |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:24[EDT]|
| CITY: MAPLE SHADE REGION: 1 |EVENT DATE: 05/03/2000|
| COUNTY: STATE: PA |EVENT TIME: 08:00[EDT]|
|LICENSE#: 29-28286-02 AGREEMENT: N |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/03/2000|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |NIEL DELLA GRECA R1 |
| |BRIAN SMITH NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: CARL DINICOLANTONIO | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: WILLIAM POERTNER | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|BAB1 20.2201(a)(1)(i) LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| STOLEN TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE |
| |
| On April 27, 2000 a technician was involved in an automobile accident in |
| Philadelphia, Penn. At that time the gauge was stored in the trunk of the |
| vehicle. When police arrived on the scene the technician was arrested. |
| The technician informed the police that the gauge was in the trunk and |
| showed the gauge to the police officers. After the technician was arrested |
| the vehicle was stolen. The vehicle was recovered on April 29, 2000. The |
| gauge was not in the trunk when the vehicle was recovered. The device |
| contained 8 mCi of Cs-137 and 40 mCi of Am-241. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 36965 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/03/2000|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:50[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 05/03/2000|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 12:38[CDT]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/03/2000|
| CITY: PADUCAH REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: McCRACKEN STATE: KY |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-1 AGREEMENT: Y |BRUCE BURGESS R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707001 |JOSEPHINE PICCONE NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+CHARLES MILLER IRO |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JIM UNDERWOOD | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 4 HOUR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 REPORT - LOSS OF 1 OF 2 CONTINGENCY CONTROLS - |
| |
| Annual visual inspections of the cylinder wall, valve, and plug which are |
| credited for double contingency in Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation |
| (NCSE) 1493-03 have not been performed for fissile 12A (MD-type) UF6 |
| cylinders stored in Room 144 of Building C-710. Scenario 8 of NCSE 1493-03 |
| takes credit for the annual visual inspections required by Nuclear |
| Criticality Safety Approval (NCSA) GEN-03 to ensure cylinder integrity is |
| maintained. However, NCSA GEN-03 states that the inspections are required |
| for cylinders in "cylinder storage yards". Because the cylinders are not |
| located In the cylinder storage yards, the annual inspections were not |
| performed for the fissile 12A MD cylinders. |
| |
| SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENT: |
| One of the controls relied upon for double contingency was not implemented. |
| However, based on followup visual inspections, the process parameter. |
| moderation, was not lost, |
| |
| POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED [BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR]: |
| In order for a criticality to be possible, the cylinder would have to be |
| breached and large quantities of water would have to be introduced. Upon |
| discovery of the problem, the cylinder was inspected and determined to be |
| acceptable. Because the cylinder was not breached, a criticality resulting |
| from this event is not possible. |
| |
| CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC): |
| Double contingency for this scenario Is established by Implementing two |
| Independent controls on moderation. |
| |
| ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS): |
| 419 pounds in the form of UF6 at an enrichment of 4.46 wt % U-235. |
| |
| NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: |
| The first leg of double contingency relies on moderation control by |
| prohibiting the use of water or steam to heat the fissile 12A MD cylinders. |
| This control prevents the entry of large quantities of water into the |
| cylinders. This control was not violated and the first leg of double |
| contingency was maintained, |
| |
| The second leg of double contingency relies on a second control on |
| moderation by crediting an annual cylinder inspection to identify corrosion |
| and cylinder damage in order to maintain the integrity of the cylinders and |
| prevent the introduction of moderating material. The annual cylinder |
| inspections were credited but not performed. Therefore, double contingency |
| was not maintained. |
| |
| One of the two controls on moderation credited for double contingency was |
| not implemented, therefore double contingency was not maintained. |
| |
| CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: |
| The NCSE/A will be revised to include annual visual inspection of fissile |
| 12A MD cylinders. |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been notified of this event. |
| |
| PGDP Problem Report No. ATRC-00-2499; PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2000-037 |
| Responsible Division: Production Support |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other |Event Number: 36966 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: ARIZONA RADIATION REGULATORY AGENCY |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/03/2000|
|LICENSEE: MAYO CLINIC/MEDICAL CENTER |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:59[EDT]|
| CITY: SCOTTSDALE REGION: 4 |EVENT DATE: 05/03/2000|
| COUNTY: STATE: AZ |EVENT TIME: 11:00[MST]|
|LICENSE#: AZ 07-448 AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/03/2000|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |WILLIAM JOHNSON R4 |
| |JOSEPHINE PICCONE NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: DANIEL H. KUHL | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NAGR AGREEMENT STATE | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| AGREEMENT STATE REPORT- Missing Indium-111 capsules at Mayo Clinic/Medical |
| Center, Scottsdale, AZ |
| |
| On 05/01/00, a standing order of three capsules, each capsule containing 100 |
| microcuries of Indium-111, was misplaced at the Mayo Clinic/Medical Center, |
| Scottsdale, AZ (AZ License #07-448). The missing capsules have not been |
| located as of 1100 MST on 05/03/00, as reported to the Arizona Radiation |
| Regulatory Agency (ARRA) by the AZ licensee's Radiation Safety Officer |
| (RSO). The RSO is planning an investigation into the events leading to the |
| loss and will file a report with the ARRA within 30 days. This isotope has |
| a half-life of 67 hours. |
| |
| The ARRA has notified NRC Region 4, Mexico, and the states of Colorado, |
| Nevada, Utah, New Mexico and California of this event (ARRA First Notice |
| #00-4). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36967 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: NINE MILE POINT REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/03/2000|
| UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 22:27[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5 |EVENT DATE: 05/03/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 22:15[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: TONY PETRELLI |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/04/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |NIEL DELLA GRECA R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ASHU 50.72(b)(1)(i)(A) PLANT S/D REQD BY TS | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |96 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| UNIT 2 TECH SPEC REQD SHUTDOWN DUE TO 2 CONTAINMENT PURGE VALVES FAILING |
| THEIR LLRT- |
| |
| The licensee is shutting Unit 2 down from 100% power in accordance with Tech |
| Spec 3.6.3.A, 12 Hour Shutdown LCO, due to containment purge valves |
| #CPS*AOV-104 & 106 failing their local leak rate test #N2-ISP-CPS-Q001. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| |
| * * *UPDATE ON 05/04/00 AT 0002 ET BY M. ERON TAKEN BY MACKINNON * * * |
| |
| Licensee exited Technical Specification 3.6.3.A at 2350 ET after manual |
| Containment Purge Supply valve, 2CPS-V6, an upstream valve to #CPS*AOV-104 & |
| 106 was leak tested and verified closed. Lowest reactor power level reached |
| was 92%. R1DO (Della Greca) notified. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this update by the licensee. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 36968 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/03/2000|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 23:39[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 05/03/2000|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 09:00[EDT]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/03/2000|
| CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |BRUCE BURGESS R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707002 |JOSEPHINE PICCONE NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: SISLER | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| MODERATION CONTROL LOST (NO FREE LIQUIDS) WHILE MASS CONTROL WAS |
| MAINTAINED. |
| |
| |
| NRC BULLETIN 91-01 24 HOUR NOTIFICATION |
| |
| On 05/03/2000 at 0954 hours a violation of a contingency control designated |
| in NCSA-PLANT018.A02 was identified. During dry active waste (DAW) sorting |
| operations a Chemical Operator discovered two plastic bags containing 3M |
| cloth saturated and dripping with oil. This is in violation of |
| NCSA-PLANT018.A02 requirement #1a, which states the following in regards to |
| placing items in a DAW drum: "The items shall contain no free liquid (ie., |
| not dripping or saturated with liquid)." |
| |
| This constituted the loss of one control of the double contingency |
| principle. Moderation control was lost (no free liquids) while mass control |
| (no visible uranium) was maintained. |
| |
| This condition was corrected under Nuclear Criticality Safety Engineering |
| guidance when the material was removed from the DAW drum and handled per the |
| applicable NCSA. |
| |
| SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: |
| |
| The safety significance of this event is low. Two bags of 3M cloth |
| contaminated with lube oil were found DAW drum during sorting operation. |
| The NCSE evaluates a DAW material saturated with liquid. The drum of DAW |
| material did not have any items in it that had visible amounts of uranium |
| beyond fixed stains/films. Also NCSA-PLANT054.A03 has controls on lube oil |
| and data used in the NCSE for this NCSA shows that the uranium concentration |
| in lube oil (even lube oil spills) is less than 50ppm uranium-235. |
| |
| POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): |
| |
| For criticality to occur with DAW material there would have to be visible |
| uranium on the items placed in the DAW drum. |
| |
| CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.): |
| |
| The controlled parameters in this NCSA are moderation (no free liquids) and |
| mass (no visible uranium). |
| |
| ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS): |
| |
| The highest enrichment for DAW material in the X-326 building is 100%. The |
| form of the material in DAW is uranyl fluoride and uranyl tetrafluoride |
| contamination. The amount of mass involved is less than 350 grams which is |
| the safe mass value of 100% enriched uranyl tetrafluoride solution. |
| |
| NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES |
| |
| The failure in this case is moderation. The NCSA requires that material |
| that is saturated or dripping is to be disposed of in favorable geometry |
| containers or under other specific NCSAs. |
| |
| CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: |
| |
| The oil saturated 3M cloth was transferred to an NCSA-PLANT054.A03 approved |
| storage container, at which time compliance with NCSA-PLANT018.A02 was |
| restored. |
| |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 36969 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/04/2000|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 05:46[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 05/03/2000|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 08:00[EDT]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/04/2000|
| CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |BRUCE BURGESS R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707002 |JOSEPHINE PICCONE NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: SISLER | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| ACCUMULATION OF SLUDGE CONTAINING HEAVY METALS CONTAINS AN ACCUMULATION |
| POINT ON/IN THE LID. |
| |
| NRC BULLETIN 91-01 24 hour notification |
| |
| On 5/3/00 at 0800 hours it was discovered that a NCSA-0705_027.A003 control |
| was not in place. The sludge tub used for accumulating heavy metal |
| (including uranium) sludge had an unsafe/unfavorable geometry molded into |
| the design. The unfavorable dimensions created by the raised lip is 7.75" by |
| 37" by 2". This could have resulted in the potential accumulation, of an |
| unsafe volume on the sludge tub lid had a leak developed In a nearby system |
| containing uranium-bearing solution. |
| NCSA-705_027.A003 requirement #17 states "Geometrically unfavorable |
| containers shall not be left uncovered while unattended in the heavy metals |
| precipitation process area or on the mezzanine in the area of the heavy |
| metals precipitation raffinate storage (HMPRS)". This was a loss of one |
| control (geometry/volume) in the double contingency principle for the afore |
| mentioned NCSA. The second control (physical integrity of nearby |
| uranium-bearing systems) was maintained throughout the event. |
| At the direction of the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS), the requirements |
| for the NCS anomalous condition were initiated. At 1015 hours compliance was |
| regained by covering the molded design |
| |
| SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: |
| |
| On May 3, 2000, it was discovered that the sludge tub used for accumulating |
| sludge containing heavy metals (including uranium) contains an accumulation |
| point on/in the lid. That accumulation point is created by a raised lip and |
| has unfavorable geometric dimensions (7.75" by 37" by 2"). This is a |
| violation of NCSA-0705_027 and NCSA-0705_076. This could have resulted in |
| the potential accumulation of an unsafe volume of solution on/in the sludge |
| tub lid had a leak developed in a nearby system which contain |
| uranium-bearing solution. No uranium-bearing material was involved in the |
| violation, since the remaining barrier to criticality (i.e., the physical |
| integrity of nearby uranium-bearing systems) was maintained. Therefore, the |
| safety significance of this event is low. |
| |
| POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): |
| |
| If a leak had developed in a nearby uranium-bearing system such that the |
| solution could have accumulated on/in the sludge tub lid, an unsafe geometry |
| of solution could have resulted. If the leaking solution had contained a |
| sufficient amount of uranium, the resulting configuration could have been |
| sufficient for a criticality to occur. It should be noted that the allowed |
| safe geometry and volume limits established In NCSA-0705_076 are based on |
| potentially moderated, UO2F2 and water solution which contains uranium |
| enriched to 100 wt%. |
| |
| |
| CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.): |
| |
| The parameter which was violated during this upset was the geometry of |
| potential accumulation present in the sludge tub Iid (i.e., the volume in |
| which uranium-bearing solution could have accumulated in the event of a |
| leak). The physical integrity of the nearby systems containing |
| uranium-bearing material was maintained. |
| |
| ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS): |
| |
| No uranium bearing material was actually introduced into the lid of the |
| sludge tub. |
| |
| |
| |
| NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES |
| |
| NCSA-0705_076.A00 and NCSA-0705_027 take credit for the physical integrity |
| of Systems which contain uranium-bearing material and that unsafe |
| volume/geometry containers are either modified, covered, or oriented to |
| prevent an unsafe configuration from resulting In the event of a leak. The |
| lid of the sludge tub observed was not protected from a potential |
| accumulation and it had been left unattended. |
| |
| |
| |
| CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: |
| |
| At 0800 hours, a NCS anomalous condition was initiated. |
| |
| At 1015 hours compliance was re-established |
| |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, March 24, 2021
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, March 24, 2021