Event Notification Report for February 18, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
02/17/2000 - 02/18/2000
** EVENT NUMBERS **
36604 36663 36701 36702 36703 36704 36705 36706
!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36604 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: COMANCHE PEAK REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/19/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [2] [] STATE: TX |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:46[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 01/19/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 14:24[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: DON CERNY |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/17/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |LINDA SMITH R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| DISCOVERY THAT UNIT SPECIFIC LOADS WERE ON COMMON BUSES |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: |
| |
| "FSAR section 1A(B) for compliance to [Regulatory] Guide 1.81 states that |
| [the Comanche Peak] design complies with the provisions of Revision 1 of |
| this [regulatory] guide. Contrary to the above, unit specific [118-volt AC] |
| loads fed from common buses XEC1-1 and XEC2-1 were shared between two |
| units." |
| |
| The licensee stated that affected loads involve a lot of different equipment |
| and systems but did not specify which equipment or systems. The licensee |
| also stated that the units are not currently in any technical specification |
| limiting conditions for operation as a result of this issue because the |
| loads are now aligned to an alternate power supply. Corrective actions have |
| not yet been determined. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. |
| |
| *************** UPDATE AT 1412 ON 02/17/00 FROM SCOTTY HARVEY TO LEIGH |
| TROCINE *************** |
| |
| The licensee is retracting this event notification based upon the following |
| text, which is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: |
| |
| "After a further review of the condition (event #36604) reported on January |
| 19, 2000, [the licensee] did not identify any deviation from the design |
| basis requirements of the plant as defined in 10CFR50.2." |
| |
| "The basic premise of the conservative reporting of this condition was that |
| some unit specific DC [See note 1] and AC (118-volt AC) loads fed from |
| common buses were shared between two units and that this condition may not |
| be in compliance with the design basis of the plant. Although, it was |
| deemed that the statements in the FSAR may not be clear and that CPSES may |
| not be in verbatim compliance with every aspect of Regulatory Guide 1.81. |
| The plant's as-built configurations maintained their ability to perform |
| their specified safety functions and were not in a condition outside of the |
| design basis as defined in 10CFR50.2. Therefore, this condition is not |
| reportable under the auspices of 10CFR50.72/73. Accordingly, this report |
| described in event [#36604] is hereby retracted." |
| |
| "[NOTE 1: The licensee] believe[s] that the DC unit specific loads do not |
| meet the specific requirements of the [regulatory guide (RG)]. However, |
| [the licensee] believe[s] that this is technically [okay] and ... would |
| justify this as an exception to the RG. The AC loads do not meet the RG as |
| well, but [the licensee is] proposing changing some of the power sources and |
| installation of an Automatic Bus Transfer as well." |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations |
| officer notified the R4DO (Marschall). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36663 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SOUTH TEXAS REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/05/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: TX |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:54[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 02/04/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 20:59[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: GREG JANAK |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/17/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |CLAUDE JOHNSON R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NLTR LICENSEE 24 HR REPORT | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 2 TRAINS OF ESSENTIAL CHILLED WATER INOPERABLE |
| |
| On 02/04/00 at 2059 CST, Essential Chiller 12C was declared inoperable due |
| to tripping after being started at 2056 CST on 02/04/00. This resulted in |
| an entry into Technical Specification 3.7.14. Investigation revealed that |
| Essential Chiller 12C tripped on high condenser pressure which was caused by |
| not having cooling water flow properly aligned. Found Essential Cooling |
| Water valve EVV-3025 to be closed, when it's required position is throttled |
| to maintain Essential Cooling Water flow. The valve alignment was restored |
| to normal and Essential Chiller 12C was declared operable at 2358 CST on |
| 02/04/00. |
| |
| The investigation revealed that EVV-3025 was closed at approximately 1121 |
| CST on 02/02/00 as indicated on integrated computer system trends. At that |
| time Essential Chilled Water Train "B" was inoperable for planned |
| maintenance and remained inoperable until 1527 CST on 02/02/00. This |
| resulted in 2 trains of Essential Chilled Water being inoperable for 4 hours |
| and 6 minutes which placed the plant in Technical Specification 3.0.3 (did |
| not require plant shutdown). |
| |
| A Licensee Event Report will be submitted within 30 days. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1708 ON 2/17/00, BY MORRIS RECEIVED BY WEAVER * * * |
| |
| Upon further evaluation, it has been determined that Train 'B' of Essential |
| Chilled Water was operable prior to the point in time when Train 'C' of |
| Essential Chilled Water was rendered inoperable, and thus the event is not |
| reportable and therefore should be retracted. |
| |
| Following maintenance, at 0814 CST hours on February 2, 2000, the 12B |
| Essential Chiller was placed in service, and at 1100 CST hours |
| post-maintenance testing was completed. Also by this time, the 'B' Train of |
| Essential Cooling Water and the #12 ESF Diesel Generator had already been |
| declared operable. Additionally, although post-maintenance testing was not |
| signed-off as complete until 1237 CST hours for the 'B' Train Essential |
| Chilled Water air handling unit, the unit was in service and the |
| post-maintenance testing (completed at approximately 1014 CST hours) |
| verified that the air handling unit had been capable of performing its |
| function since the completion of its associated maintenance work. In |
| summary, although the 12B Essential Chiller was not administratively |
| considered operable until 1527 CST hours on February 2, 2000, following |
| final paperwork close-out, it was fully capable of performing its intended |
| design function at 1100 CST hours. |
| |
| Thus, when the 12C Essential Chiller was rendered inoperable at 1121 CST |
| hours, the 'B' train of Essential Chilled Water (including necessary support |
| equipment) was fully capable of performing its design function (i.e.. |
| operable). Since the 'B' train of Essential Chilled Water was therefore |
| operable when the 'C' train was made inoperable, only one train of Essential |
| Chilled Water was inoperable at a time, and Technical Specification 3.0.3 |
| was not entered. |
| |
| The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector of this event retraction. |
| The Operations Center notified the R4DO(Tapia). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 36701 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/17/2000|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:19[EST]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 02/16/2000|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 12:00[EST]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/17/2000|
| CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |BRUCE JORGENSEN R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707002 |SCOTT MOORE NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: RICK LARSON | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| NRC BULLETIN 91-01 REPORT |
| |
| "On 2/16/00 at 1200 Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified of a loss |
| of one control spacing, in NCSA-0710_006.A01 for the X-710 laboratory |
| facility. During a walk down of proposed revision to the NCSA laboratory |
| personnel discovered that a vertical spacing requirement for storage racks |
| was not being maintained. This was a violation of one control of the double |
| contingency controls established by this NCSA. The other control geometry |
| was maintained through. To regain compliance the containers stored in the |
| affected storage racks were removed and the storage racks were tagged out of |
| service by 1530 hrs. |
| |
| "SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: |
| |
| "The safety significance of this event is very low. The smallest actual |
| spacing between storage clusters was approximately 11.25 inches. Since each |
| storage bin is 5"x 5", and the tallest arrangement of containers in a bin is |
| approximately 4 inches, the extra inch gap results in adequate spacing |
| between the containers. Also, the enrichment of the containers stored in the |
| bins is limited by PORTS certification to less than 20% versus the 100% |
| enrichment analyzed in the NCSE. |
| |
| "POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): |
| |
| "If all the bins were over loaded with containers and the bins were adjacent |
| and all the containers were filled with the analyzed limit of 100% enriched |
| material, a spacing violation with a person carrying a polybottle might |
| cause a criticality. |
| |
| "CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.): |
| |
| "Geometry and Spacing were the controlled parameters. The spacing control |
| was lost when the vertical distance between storage bins was found to be |
| less than 12 inches. |
| |
| "ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS |
| LIMIT AND % WORST): |
| |
| "The amount of material is variable depending on whether 2S, 1S or 990 cold |
| traps are considered. The enrichment is analyzed to 100%, although the |
| PORTS' operating certificate limits the cascade to 20%. The form of the |
| material in the containers is UF6. The percent worst case of critical mass |
| is not known, however, at 100% enrichment a single 2S cylinder can contain |
| more than the minimum critical mass. In reality, at 5% enrichment, it would |
| require over 20 25 cylinders to have more than minimum critical mass. |
| |
| "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: |
| |
| "Geometry and spacing were controlled. The spacing control was lost because |
| the storage bins were not the correct vertical distance apart. |
| |
| "CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: |
| |
| "At 1530 hrs, all controls were regained." |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Other Nuclear Material |Event Number: 36702 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: U.S. ARMY |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/17/2000|
|LICENSEE: U.S. ARMY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:48[EST]|
| CITY: CAMP LE JEUNE REGION: 2 |EVENT DATE: 02/02/2000|
| COUNTY: STATE: NC |EVENT TIME: [EST]|
|LICENSE#: 12-00722-06 AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/17/2000|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |BRUCE JORGENSEN R3 |
| |SCOTT MOORE NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+KENNETH BARR R2 |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JEFF HAVENNER | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|BAB2 20.2201(a)(1)(ii) LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| LOSS OF SEALED SOURCE CONTAINING 30 mCi OF TRITIUM |
| |
| The licensee reported the loss of a small tritium source from a mortar |
| system assigned to the U.S. Marine Corps School of Infantry at Camp Le |
| Jeune, NC. A scale index lamp (a plastic arrow containing 30 mCi of tritium) |
| became detached from an M-64 mortar sight unit while the mortar unit was |
| being used on a firing range. The source was discovered to be missing after |
| the unit had been moved from the firing range. The licensee stated that the |
| source could not be located. This source poses no threat to the public as |
| access to the firing range is controlled. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36703 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: DIABLO CANYON REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/17/2000|
| UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: CA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:39[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 02/16/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 07:59[PST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: MICHAEL CRAIG |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/17/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |CHARLES MARSCHALL R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NLTR LICENSEE 24 HR REPORT | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| LICENSEE 24-HOUR REPORT DUE TO EXCEEDENCE OF LICENCED POWER LIMIT |
| |
| "On February 16, 2000, at 0759 PST Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP) exceeded |
| the Operating License reactor core power of 3411 megawatts by greater than 2 |
| percent. At 0757 PST with Unit 2 at nominal full reactor power a load |
| transient bypass (LTB) signal was initiated diverting main feedwater around |
| the normal feedwater heaters into the steam generators. During the resultant |
| sudden temperature decrease, reactor power peaked at 103.8% and exceeded the |
| nominal full power for a total of six minutes. |
| |
| "The transient was initiated by utility maintenance personnel during the |
| scheduled performance of instrumentation calibration of circuits associated |
| with the LTB. Technicians performing a calibration inadvertently disturbed |
| an input circuit creating an invalid LTB initiate signal. |
| |
| "The feedwater temperature was rapidly reduced approximately 45 to 50 |
| degrees F. The Final Safety Analysis Report Update Chapter 15, 'Accident |
| Analyses,' Condition II, 'Faults of Moderate Frequency,' Section 15.2.11, |
| 'Sudden Feedwater Temperature Reduction,' provides bounding analysis for |
| this event. The FSAR Update concludes that for temperature drops of less |
| than 73 degrees F that the reactor will remain in operation and the reactor |
| will not go below the minimum DNBR. FSAR Update Section 15.2.11.1 analysis |
| specifically identifies the inadvertent actuation of the LTB as an |
| initiating event bound by the analysis.) |
| |
| "The DCPP Unit 2 Operating License DPR-82, Condition 2.C(1) authorizes PG&E |
| to operate Unit 2 at reactor core power levels not in excess of 3411 |
| megawatts thermal (100% rated power). DPR-82, Condition 2.G, 'Reporting,' |
| requires Emergency Notification System reporting within 24 hours and a |
| written followup report within 30 day in accordance with the procedures |
| described in 10 CFR 50.73(b), (c), and (e). This event will be reported as |
| Licensee Event Report (LER) 2-00-001." |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Other Nuclear Material |Event Number: 36704 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: NC DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/17/2000|
|LICENSEE: FROELING & ROBERTSON, INC. |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:55[EST]|
| CITY: RALEIGH REGION: 2 |EVENT DATE: 02/04/2000|
| COUNTY: STATE: NC |EVENT TIME: [EST]|
|LICENSE#: 092-0353-6 AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/17/2000|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |KENNETH BARR R2 |
| |JOHN HICKEY NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: J. MARION EADDY | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NAGR AGREEMENT STATE | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE LOST DURING SHIPPING |
| |
| The following information was submitted by the State of North Carolina via |
| facsimile: |
| |
| "Froeling & Robertson, Inc (F&R). (N.C. License No. 092-0353.6) shipped one |
| Troxler Model 3411-B nuclear gauge (s/n 9220) from the Raleigh, NC office to |
| their Chesapeake, VA. Office (NRC License No. 45-08890-02) on 04 February |
| 2000 via FedEx. As of today's date, the gauge has not been delivered to the |
| Chesapeake office. |
| |
| "FedEx is conducting a search of the Raleigh, NC, hub, as well as tracking |
| the package at other FedEx hubs in the area. F&R has notified all of its |
| branch offices of the occurrence. |
| |
| "North Carolina has assigned log number ICD-00-03 to this incident." |
| |
| *************** UPDATE AT 1341 ON 02/17/00 FROM J. MARION EADDY TO LEIGH |
| TROCINE *************** |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the North |
| Carolina Division of Radiation Protection: |
| |
| "UPDATE on Loss of a Troxler Model 3411-B Moisture/Density Gauge NC Log No. |
| ICD-00-03." |
| |
| "[The] North Carolina Division of Radiation Protection received a call from |
| the Radiation Safety Officer for FedEx this afternoon. The gauge (Troxler |
| Model 3411-B s/n 9220) was located at Troxler Electronic Laboratories |
| Research Triangle Park Office." |
| |
| "North Carolina is continuing to investigate this incident." |
| |
| The NRC operations officer notified the R2DO (Barr) and NMSS EO (Piccone). |
| |
| Call the NRC operations officer for a contact telephone number |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36705 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: POINT BEACH REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/17/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [2] [] STATE: WI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:30[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP |EVENT DATE: 02/17/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 10:00[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JOHN SELL |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/17/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |BRUCE JORGENSEN R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| DISCOVERY OF CABLING NOT ROUTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPENDIX 'R' |
| REQUIREMENTS |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: |
| |
| "During the Appendix 'R' rebaselining project, it was discovered that in |
| both units' containment's redundant [safety-related] instrumentation cabling |
| was routed [within] 20 [feet] of each other. This is not in accordance with |
| Appendix 'R' requirements as described in Section iii.g.2. Due to strict |
| administrative controls, there is minimal fire risk in these areas." |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 36706 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/17/2000|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:23[EST]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 02/16/2000|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 16:00[EST]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/17/2000|
| CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |BRUCE JORGENSEN R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707002 |JOSIE PICCONE NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+JOSEPH GIITTER IRO |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: STEVE MAY | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| NRC BULLETIN 91-01 RESPONSE (24-HOUR REPORT) |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Portsmouth |
| personnel: |
| |
| "On 02/18/00 at 1600, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified of a |
| loss of one control parameter, geometry, in NCSA-0705_100.A01 for the X-705 |
| decontamination facility. During a boroscope inspection of the 'A' |
| pre-evaporator loop condenser/condenser tubing, a problem with three tubes |
| were observed. Two tubes have sections missing below the tube sheet, and |
| one tube was crimped such that it did not make a seal against the tube |
| sheet. After discovery of the problem, the pre-evaporator condenser was |
| isolated for repair." |
| |
| "The second control parameter of NCSA-0705_100.A01, volume, was maintained |
| throughout the inspection." |
| |
| "There was no loss of hazardous/radioactive material or radioactive |
| radiological contamination exposure as a result of this event." |
| |
| "SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: "During a boroscope inspection of the 'A' |
| pre-evaporator loop condenser/condenser tubing, a problem with three of the |
| tubes was observed. Two of the tubes had sections missing below the tube |
| sheet, and one of the tubes was crimped such that it did not make contact |
| with (seal against) the tube sheet. Per discussion with the system |
| engineer, these failures indicate that the integrity of the tubes could no |
| longer be assured. This is a loss of passive barrier 2(PB2) counted upon in |
| NCSA-0705_100.AOI to maintain double contingency. Since there is no |
| indication that the verification of the cooling water flow was lost, any |
| intermixing of the solutions would have resulted in water entering the tube |
| side of the condenser and getting pumped with condensed solution to overhead |
| storage. Since the downstream components from the tube side of the |
| condenser are evaluated for uranium-bearing solutions, the addition of water |
| to the solution would be bounded by the original solution (i.e., the |
| original solution would be diluted by the water). Therefore, the safety |
| significance of the event is low." |
| |
| "POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): Given the failure of the condenser tubes |
| integrity, if the pressure of the shell side had been lower (water not |
| valved in) the condensed gas (uranium-bearing solution) could have been |
| discharged along with the pathway that the process water normally takes. |
| This stream leads to the storm sewer system, which has not been analyzed for |
| an accumulation of uranium-bearing material. If the material had settled |
| out/been deposited in an unfavorable location in the sewer system, a |
| criticality could have resulted." |
| |
| "CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.): |
| The parameters being controlled under this NCSA were geometry and volume. |
| By taking credit for the integrity of the condenser tubes and verifying the |
| flow of the cooling water on the shell side, the resulting condensed |
| uranium-bearing solution is maintained in a safe geometry environment. Loss |
| of condenser tube integrity meant only the pressure differential of the |
| cooling water prevented the uranium-bearing solution from entering a system |
| not designed for handling that material." |
| |
| "ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS |
| LIMIT AND % WORST): The system is analyzed for up to 100 wt% U235. Since |
| the secondary control for keeping the uranium-bearing solution in a |
| geometrically favorable system was maintained, (the check on the cooling |
| water), no material was actually introduced into the storm sewer system." |
| |
| "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: Based on the visual inspection of the |
| tube/tube sheet interface, at least three tubes appear to have failed such |
| that intermixing of the solution is possible. This represents a loss of a |
| passive barrier (P82 in the NCSA) credited for meeting the double |
| contingency principle for the operation." |
| |
| "CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: |
| At 1730, [the] A, B, and C post-evaporator condensers and 'A' pre-evaporator |
| condenser are tagged out of service. Water and steam are isolated from the |
| condensers." |
| |
| Portsmouth personnel notified the NRC resident inspector and Department of |
| Energy site representative. |
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Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, March 24, 2021
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, March 24, 2021