Event Notification Report for December 9, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
12/08/1999 - 12/09/1999
** EVENT NUMBERS **
35790 36392 36430 36495
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 35790 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/03/1999|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:44[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 06/02/1999|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 16:30[CDT]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/08/1999|
| CITY: PADUCAH REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: McCRACKEN STATE: KY |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-1 AGREEMENT: Y |DAVID HILLS R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707001 |DON COOL NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: THOMAS WHITE | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|OCBA 76.120(c)(2)(i) ACCID MT EQUIP FAILS | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| THREE SPRINKLER SYSTEMS DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO CORRODED HEADS (24-hour |
| report) |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Paducah: |
| |
| "On 06/02/99 at 1630 CDT, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified |
| that numerous sprinkler heads were corroded, affecting 16 sprinkler systems |
| in C-337 and one system in C-333, such that the ability of the sprinklers to |
| flow sufficient water was called into question. Subsequently, these |
| sprinkler systems were declared inoperable, and TSR-required actions |
| establishing roving fire patrols were initiated. This deficiency was |
| detected during scheduled system inspections conducted by Fire Protection |
| personnel. Currently, functionality of the sprinkler heads has not been |
| fully evaluated by Fire Protection personnel, and the remaining cascade |
| buildings are currently being inspected, and if necessary, this report will |
| be updated to identify any additional areas. It has been determined that |
| this event is reportable under 10CFR76.120(c)(2) as an event in which |
| equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed." |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been notified of this event by Paducah |
| personnel. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1022 EDT ON 06/04/99 FROM CAGE TO TROCINE * * * |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Paducah: |
| |
| "Two sprinkler heads on system D-1 in C-337 and two sprinkler heads on |
| system 27 in C-335 were identified to also be corroded. These were |
| identified to the PSS on 06/03/99 at 1600 CDT and 1601 CDT, respectively, |
| and determined to require an update to this report by the PSS. It has been |
| determined that this event is reportable under 10CFR76.120(c)(2) as an event |
| in which equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed." |
| |
| Paducah personnel notified the NRC resident inspector of this update. The |
| NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Hills) and NMSS EO (Combs). |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 2152 EDT ON 06/17/99 FROM WALKER TO POERTNER * * * |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Paducah: |
| |
| "Three sprinkler heads on system C-15 and five sprinkler heads on system B-8 |
| in C-333 were identified to also be corroded. The PSS was notified of this |
| condition at 1300 CDT on 06/17/99 and determined that an update to this |
| report was required. It has been determined that this event is reportable |
| under 10CFR76.120(c)(2) as an event in which equipment is disabled or fails |
| to function as designed." |
| |
| Paducah personnel notified the NRC resident inspector of this update. The |
| NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Madera). |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1440 EDT ON 06/18/99 FROM UNDERWOOD TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * * |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Paducah: |
| |
| "Two sprinkler heads on system C-15 and one sprinkler head on system B-8 in |
| C-333 were identified to have corrosion. The PSS was notified of this |
| condition at 1350 CDT on 06/18/99. The area of the fire patrol for system |
| C-15 was expanded to include the two heads identified as corroded. The one |
| head on system B-8 was in the area already being patrolled. The PSS |
| determined that an update to this report was required." |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this update by Paducah |
| personnel. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Madera). |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1315 EDT ON 06/25/1999 FROM WALKER TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * * |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Paducah: |
| |
| "Two sprinkler heads on system D-8 and three sprinkler heads on system D-7 |
| in C-337 were identified to have corrosion. The PSS was notified of the |
| condition on system D-8 at 0125 CDT on 06/25/99 and at 1019 CDT on 06/25/99 |
| for system D-7. Both systems were immediately declared inoperable and LCO |
| fire patrol actions were implemented. It was determined that an update to |
| this report was required." |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this update by Paducah |
| personnel. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Jordan). |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 2119 EDT ON 07/30/99 FROM CAGE TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * * |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Paducah: |
| |
| "Five sprinkler heads and one sprinkler piping tee on C-337 system D-7 were |
| identified to have corrosion. The PSS was notified of these corroded system |
| parts and declared the system inoperable at 0931 CDT on 07/30/99. LCO |
| required fire patrols of the affected area were initiated. The PSS |
| determined that an update to this event report was required." |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this update by Paducah |
| personnel. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Wright). |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1655 EDT ON 07/31/99 FROM WHITE TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * * |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Paducah: |
| |
| "Two sprinkler heads on C-337 System D-1 were identified to have corrosion. |
| The PSS was notified of these corroded system parts and declared the system |
| inoperable at 1155 CDT on 7/31/99. LCO required fire patrols of the |
| affected area were initiated. The PSS determined that an update to this |
| report was required." |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this update by Paducah |
| personnel. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Wright). |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1546 EDT ON 08/10/99 FROM WHITE TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * * |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Paducah: |
| |
| "Two sprinkler heads on C-337 system C-15 were identified to have corrosion. |
| The PSS was notified of these corroded system parts and declared the system |
| inoperable at 1130 CDT on 8/10/99. LCO required fire patrols of the |
| affected area were initiated. The PSS determined that an update to this |
| report was required." |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this update by Paducah |
| personnel. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Burgess). |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1154 EDT ON 08/22/99 FROM WALKER TO POERTNER * * * |
| |
| Four adjacent sprinkler heads on the C-333 building System B-1 were |
| identified to have corrosion. The PSS was notified of the corroded system |
| parts and declared the system inoperable at 0918 CDT on 08/22/99. LCO |
| required fire patrols were initiated. |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector will be notified by Paducah personnel. The NRC |
| operations officer notified the R3DO (Clayton). |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 2015 EDT ON 08/28/99 FROM W. F. GAGE TO S. SANDIN * * * |
| |
| Two adjacent sprinkler heads on the C-337 building System D-11 were |
| identified to have corrosion. The PSS was notified of these corroded system |
| parts and declared the system inoperable at 1420 CDT on 08/28/99. LCO |
| required fire patrols of the affected area were initiated. |
| |
| Paducah personnel informed the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations |
| officer notified the R3DO (Leach) and NMSS EO (Piccone). |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 2037 EDT ON 08/29/99 FROM KEVIN BEASLEY TO S. SANDIN * * * |
| |
| Two adjacent sprinkler heads on the C-337 building System D-15 were |
| identified to have corrosion and the PSS declared the system inoperable at |
| 0925 CDT on 08/29/99. Also two adjacent heads on the C-337 building System |
| D-10 were identified to have corrosion and the PSS declared the system |
| inoperable at 1450 CDT. LCO required fire patrols for both of the affected |
| areas were initiated in the time frame required by TSR. |
| |
| Paducah personnel informed the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations |
| officer notified the R3DO (Leach) and NMSS EO (Piccone). |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 0930 EDT ON 09/01/99 FROM ERIC WALKER TO FANGIE JONES * * |
| * |
| |
| Add two adjacent sprinkler heads on the C-337 building System D-14 were |
| declared inoperable. |
| |
| Paducah personnel informed the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations |
| officer notified the R3DO (David Hills) and NMSS EO (Robert Pierson). |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1133 EDT ON 09/08/99 FROM TOM WHITE TO FANGIE JONES * * * |
| |
| Add two adjacent sprinkler heads on the C-331 building System 26 were |
| declared inoperable at 2155 CDT on 09/07/99. An LCO required fire patrol |
| for the affected area was initiated in the time frame required by the TSR. |
| |
| Paducah personnel informed the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations |
| officer notified the R3DO (Monte Phillips) and NMSS EO (Josie Piccone). |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 0948 ON 09/30/99 FROM ERIC WALKER TO DOUG WEAVER * * * |
| |
| Add two adjacent sprinkler heads on the C-333 building System B-15 were |
| identified to have corrosion and the PSS declared the system inoperable at |
| 0815 CDT on 9/30/99. An LCO required fire patrol for the affected area was |
| initiated in the time frame required by the TSR. |
| |
| Paducah personnel informed the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations |
| officer notified the R3DO (Vegel) and NMSS EO (Cool). |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1600 ON 10/13/99 FROM WALKER TO GOULD * * * |
| |
| Two adjacent sprinkler heads on the C-333 building System A-11 were |
| identified to have corrosion and the PSS declared the system inoperable at |
| 1307 CDT on 10/13/99. An LCO required fire patrol for the affected area was |
| initiated in the time frame required by the TSR. |
| |
| Paducah personnel informed the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations |
| officer notified the R3DO (Madera) and NMSS EO (Moore). |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1520 ON 10/19/99 FROM UNDERWOOD TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * * |
| |
| Six sprinkler heads on the C-337 building System D-16 were identified to |
| have corrosion and the PSS declared the system inoperable at 1052 CDT on |
| 10/19/99. An LCO required fire patrol for the affected area was initiated |
| in the time frame required by the TSR. |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this update by Paducah |
| personnel. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Jorgensen). |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 2140 ON 10/19/99 FROM WALKER TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * * |
| |
| Seven sprinkler heads on the C-337 building System A-7 were identified to |
| have corrosion, and another four had been painted over. In addition, three |
| adjacent sprinkler heads on the C-337 building System A-8 were identified to |
| have corrosion. The PSS declared the systems inoperable at 1900 CDT on |
| 10/19/99. An LCO required fire patrols for the affected areas were |
| initiated in the time frame required by the TSR. |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this update by Paducah |
| personnel. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Wright). |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1713 ON 10/21/99 FROM CAGE TAKEN BY JOLLIFFE * * * |
| |
| Four sprinkler heads on the C-337 building System A-5, twelve sprinkler |
| heads on the C-337 building System A-8, three sprinkler heads on the C-337 |
| building System A-9, and six sprinkler heads on the C-337 building System |
| B-8 were identified to have corrosion. On 10/21/99, the PSS declared |
| Systems A-5 and A-9 inoperable at 1028 CDT, System A-8 inoperable at 1227 |
| CDT and System B-8 inoperable at 1406 CDT. An LCO required fire patrol for |
| the affected areas was initiated in the time frame required by the TSR. |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this update by Paducah |
| personnel. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Bruce Jorgensen). |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 2128 ON 10/22/99 FROM ERIC WALKER TAKEN BY JOLLIFFE * * * |
| |
| At 1400 CDT on 10/22/99, the PSS was notified that numerous corroded |
| sprinkler heads were discovered in the C-337 building on sprinkler systems |
| B-1, B-3, B-5, B-6, B-7, B-11, and D-17. Due to the number of systems |
| called into question, the PSS declared all of the sprinkler systems in C-337 |
| on the cell floor (a total of 66 systems) inoperable and TSR required |
| actions establishing roving fire patrols were initiated within the required |
| time frame. |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this update by Paducah |
| personnel. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Bruce Jorgensen). |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1239 ON 10/24/99 FROM TOM WHITE TAKEN BY JOLLIFFE * * * |
| |
| At 1200 CDT on 10/23/99, the PSS was notified that numerous corroded |
| sprinkler heads were discovered in the C-337 building on sprinkler systems |
| B-13 and B-14 on the ground floor, The PSS declared these systems |
| inoperable and TSR required actions establishing roving fire patrols were |
| initiated within the required time frame. At 1600 CDT on 10/23/99, the PSS |
| was notified that numerous corroded sprinkler heads were discovered in the |
| C-337 building on sprinkler systems A-16, B-12, C-8, C-12, C-15, D-5, and |
| D-8 on the cell floor, These systems have already been declared inoperable |
| and fire patrols are already being performed. |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been notified of this update by Paducah |
| personnel. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Bruce Jorgensen). |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1117 ON 10/25/99 FROM W. F. CAGE TAKEN BY SANDIN * * * |
| |
| At 1940 CDT on 10/24/99, the PSS was notified that numerous corroded |
| sprinkler heads had been discovered on High Pressure Fire Water Systems C-4, |
| C-5, C-6 and C-8, located in the C-337 building. These systems had |
| previously been declared inoperable and fire patrols were already being |
| performed at the time of discovery. |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been notified of this update by Paducah |
| personnel. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Lanksbury) and |
| NMSS EO (Brain Smith). |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 2235 ON 10/27/99 FROM WHITE TAKEN BY MACKINNON * * * |
| |
| At 1517 CDT on 10/27/99, the PSS was notified that nine corroded sprinkler |
| heads had been discovered on High Pressure Fire Water System A-12 located in |
| the C-333 building. This system has been declared inoperable and fire |
| patrols have been initiated. |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been notified of this update by Paducah |
| personnel. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Jordan) and NMSS |
| EO (Hickey). |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 2150 ON 10/30/99 FROM UNDERWOOD TAKEN BY WEAVER * * * |
| |
| At 1950 CDT on 10/30/99, the PSS was notified that numerous corroded |
| sprinkler heads had been discovered on High Pressure Fire Water Systems A-5, |
| A-9, A-11, C-5, and C-7 in the C-333 building. Reference ATR-1 1999-6699 |
| and 6702. These systems have been declared inoperable and fire patrols have |
| been initiated. Also, due to the number of inoperable sprinkler heads, the |
| remaining systems on the cell floor of C-333 were called into question and |
| declared inoperable. Fire patrols for the entire cell floor have been |
| initialed. The PSS determined that an update to this report was required. |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been notified of this update by Paducah |
| personnel. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Jordan) and NMSS |
| EO (Hickey). |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 2111 ON 10/31/99 FROM UNDERWOOD TAKEN BY WEAVER * * * |
| |
| At 1412 CDT on 10/31/99, the PSS was notified that five corroded sprinkler |
| heads had been discovered on High Pressure Fire Water System 9 in the C-335 |
| building. There were two adjacent corroded heads discovered in two separate |
| locations and a third individual head at a different location. The system |
| was declared inoperable and fire patrols were initiated. The corroded heads |
| have since been replaced and the system returned to operable status. |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector was notified of this update by Paducah personnel. |
| The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Jordan) and NMSS EO (Hickey). |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 2121 ON 11/01/99 FROM KEVIN BEASLEY TAKEN BY JOLLIFFE * * * |
| |
| |
| At 0930 CST on 11/01/99, the PSS was notified that three corroded sprinkler |
| heads had been discovered on the High Pressure Fire Water System B-4 in the |
| C-337 building. Two of these sprinkler heads are adjacent. Two adjacent |
| corroded sprinkler heads were also discovered on the High Pressure Fire |
| Water System B-5 in the C-337 building. These systems were declared |
| inoperable and fire patrols were initiated. Work has been initiated to |
| replace the corroded heads. |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been notified of this update by Paducah |
| personnel. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Jim Creed). |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 2143 ON 11/02/99 FROM KEVIN BEASLEY TAKEN BY JOLLIFFE * * * |
| |
| |
| At 1400 CST on 11/02/99, the PSS was notified that numerous corroded |
| sprinkler heads had been discovered on High Pressure Fire Water Systems C-8 |
| and D-7 in the C-333 building. These systems had been previously declared |
| inoperable and fire patrols were being performed at the time of discovery. |
| Work has been initiated to replace the corroded heads. |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been notified of this update by Paducah |
| personnel. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Jim Creed). |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 2110 EST ON 11/04/99 FROM ERIC WALKER TO S. SANDIN * * * |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Paducah: |
| |
| "At 1700 [CST] on 11/04/99, the [PSS] was notified that numerous corroded |
| sprinkler heads had been discovered on High Pressure Fire Water systems |
| A-16, C-17, D-12, and D-16 in the C-333 building. These systems had been |
| previously declared inoperable, and fire patrols were being performed at the |
| time of discovery. Work his been initiated to replace the corroded heads. |
| The PSS determined that an update to this report was required." |
| |
| "It has been determined that this event is reportable under |
| 10CFR76.120(c)(2) as an event in which equipment is disabled or fails to |
| function as designed." |
| |
| The NRC senior resident inspector has been notified of this event by Paducah |
| personnel. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Creed) and NMSS EO |
| (Hodges). |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 2328 EST ON 11/23/99 FROM WHITE TAKEN BY MACKINNON * * * |
| |
| At 2240 CST on 11/22/99, the PSS was notified that numerous corroded |
| sprinkler heads had been discovered on High Pressure Fire Water System B-7 |
| and B-8 in the C-337 building. These systems were declared inoperable, and |
| fire patrols were initiated at the time of discovery. The PSS determined |
| that an update to this report was required. |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector was notified of this update by the certificate |
| holder. The R3DO (Ron Gardner) and NMSS EO (Joe Holonich) were notified by |
| the NRC operations officer. |
| |
| ******************** UPDATE AT 1017 ON 11/24/99 FROM ERIC WALKER TO LEIGH |
| TROCINE ******************** |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Paducah: |
| |
| "At 1045 [CST] on 11/23/99, the [PSS] was notified that more than five |
| corroded sprinkler heads per system had been discovered on both High |
| Pressure Fire Water systems B-3 and 8-4 in the C-337 building. Per the |
| Authority Having Jurisdiction (AHJ), the discovery of five or more heads on |
| one system renders the system inoperable. These systems were declared |
| inoperable, and actions were taken as required by the TSR. The PSS |
| determined that an update to this report was required." |
| |
| "It has been determined that this event is reportable under |
| 10CFR76.120(c)(2) as an event in which equipment is disabled or fails to |
| function as designed." |
| |
| Paducah personnel notified the NRC resident inspector. The R3DO (Gardner) |
| and NMSS EO (Hickey) were notified by the NRC operations officer. |
| |
| ***************** UPDATE AT 2147 ON 12/08/99 FROM MIKE UNDERWOOD TO LEIGH |
| TROCINE **************** |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Paducah: |
| |
| "At 1000 [CST] on 12/08/99, the [PSS] was notified that five corroded |
| sprinkler heads had been discovered on High Pressure Fire Water system B-1 |
| in the C-337 building. Two heads are at column Y-X/4, two heads at column |
| Wb-4, and one head at column Wa-4 on the ground floor. Per the Authority |
| Having Jurisdiction (AHJ), the discovery of five or more heads on the system |
| renders the system inoperable. The system was declared inoperable, and |
| actions were taken by the TSR. The PSS determined that an update to this |
| required." |
| |
| "It has been determined that this event is reportable under |
| 10CFR76.120(c)(2) as an event in which equipment is disabled or fails to |
| function as designed." |
| |
| Paducah personnel notified the NRC resident inspector. The R3DO (Hiland) |
| and NMSS EO (Sherr) were notified by the NRC operations officer. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36392 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: OCONEE REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/03/1999|
| UNIT: [] [] [3] STATE: SC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:09[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-L|EVENT DATE: 11/03/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 02:30[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: RANDY TODD |LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/08/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |AL BELISLE R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
| | |
|3 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - Low Pressure Injection System removed from Engineered Safeguards alignment |
| due to erroneous procedure - |
| |
| At 0230 on 11/03/99, both trains of the Low Pressure Injection (LPI) System |
| were removed from their normal Engineered Safeguards (ES) alignment due to |
| an erroneous procedure. Approximately 20 minutes later, the proper ES |
| alignment was restored after the operators questioned the valve position |
| specified by the procedure. |
| |
| Although this event was terminated at approximately 0250 on 11/03/99, the |
| potential impact on system operability remained in question. Engineering |
| was notified and began evaluating operability. This included discussions |
| with Operations as to expected actions, alarm responses, etc. It was |
| concluded that operability could not be assured without a detailed analysis. |
| At 1330 on 11/03/99, Engineering and Operations concluded that there was no |
| longer "reasonable expectation" of past operability. Pending the results of |
| a full evaluation by Engineering, Duke Power decided that this was |
| potentially a "Condition that alone could have prevented the fulfillment of |
| the safety function...to...mitigate the consequences of an accident." |
| Therefore, this event is considered reportable. |
| |
| Impact on Postulated Accident: |
| |
| The valves that were opened were #3LP-92 and #3LP-93, the train 'A' and 'B' |
| Decay Heat Cooler Bypass Valves. As a result of the alignment, flow |
| immediately after an accident could have been higher than expected. This |
| could affect the available NPSH to the LPI and Reactor Building Spray (RBS) |
| System pumps. Per the Emergency Operating Procedure, operators would have |
| throttled the cooler outlet valves to establish the desired total flow. |
| |
| Later in the scenario, the Borated Water Storage Tank inventory would be |
| depleted and operators would realign the LPI and RBS suctions to the Reactor |
| Building Emergency Sump. Also, Low Pressure Service Water would be aligned |
| to the decay heat coolers to cool the sump water. With #3LP-92 and #3LP-93 |
| open, a large portion of the LPI System flow would bypass the coolers |
| resulting in cooling flow at higher temperatures than expected. Inadequate |
| core cooling might result until the inappropriate alignment could be |
| diagnosed and corrected. |
| |
| Cause: |
| |
| Operators were performing a periodic procedure "Tech Spec Flow Path |
| Verification" which had recently been changed to include additional valves. |
| They repositioned two of the newly added valves to "OPEN" as directed by the |
| procedure. Subsequently, they questioned this action and verified from |
| other procedures that the proper position for these valves is "CLOSED." The |
| valves were reclosed within approximately 20 minutes. |
| |
| The root cause for the inaccurate procedure change will be investigated. |
| |
| Corrective action: |
| |
| The proper positions of the valves were questioned, and the valves were |
| returned to the original positions, thus ending the event. |
| |
| Because the impact on operability of the affected systems was not |
| immediately apparent, and it did not become apparent until well after the |
| termination of the event, no Tech Spec Action Statements were entered. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. |
| |
| ******************** UPDATE AT 1551 ON 12/08/99 FROM RANDY TODD TO LEIGH |
| TROCINE ******************** |
| |
| The licensee is retracting this event notification: The following text is a |
| portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: |
| |
| "Reasoning for retraction:" |
| |
| "After further review, Duke Power Company feels that this event does not |
| meet the reportability requirements of 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D)." |
| |
| "On November 3, 1999, Unit 3 was operating at 100% power (Mode 1). At |
| approximately 0230 hours, Reactor Operators (RO) on shift opened the Low |
| Pressure Injection (LPI) Train 'A' and 'B' Decay Heat Cooler By-pass valves |
| in compliance with a newly revised procedure checklist. At approximately |
| 0250 hours on November 3, 1999, the valves were closed, which terminated the |
| event." |
| |
| "The safety function of the LPI system is to provide Emergency Core Cooling |
| immediately following a LOCA (injection phase) and to provide long term core |
| cooling after being placed in the Reactor Building Emergency Sump |
| recirculation alignment (recirculation phase). It was questioned if flow |
| through the LPI coolers would provide adequate cooling in recirculation |
| phase with the by-pass valves open. At 1330 hours Operations and |
| Engineering concluded that LPI system operability during the event could not |
| be assured. At 1509 hours, the NRC was notified." |
| |
| "After completion of an engineering analysis and additional review, it has |
| been concluded that LPI system remained operable and that this event was NOT |
| reportable." |
| |
| "NUREG 1022 allows credit for 'Reasonable operator actions to correct minor |
| problems.'" |
| |
| "Oconee concluded that 1) the problem was minor, and 2) the operator actions |
| are reasonable." |
| |
| "The problem is minor in that the short duration of the inappropriate |
| alignment (approximately 20 minutes) minimized the significance of this |
| event." |
| |
| "The problem is also minor in that the consequences are much less than |
| initially thought." |
| |
| "It was initially assumed that this alignment made the LPI system |
| recirculation mode of core cooling unavailable. With recirculation mode |
| cooling assumed to be unavailable, the estimated change in PRA risk would be |
| 2.9E-8, well below the precursor threshold of 1E-6. " |
| |
| "Subsequently, Engineering analysis showed that the LPI system remained |
| operable and LPI system flow rates were not affected. Adequate NPSH would |
| be available to all ES/ECCS systems taking suction from the BWST." |
| |
| "Emergency Core Cooling during the injection phase was not affected by this |
| event." |
| |
| "Post-LOCA analysis assumes that LPI coolers are not inservice until LPSW is |
| aligned to the LPI coolers 30 minutes after the system realignment to the |
| RBES. Furthermore, the engineering analysis for this event has shown that |
| the LPI coolers were not needed for long-term cooling. The evaluation |
| concluded that LPI recirculation flow though the core was adequate to keep |
| the core covered and to transfer the decay heat from the fuel to the LPI |
| water, which would then flow out of the reactor coolant system into the RB |
| Emergency Sump. Therefore, core cooling would be assured." |
| |
| "This mode of cooling could continue for an extended period of time. Since |
| core cooling is adequate, the discovery and response times for this |
| condition are not time critical." |
| |
| "It is reasonably expected that the Operators, the Shift Technical Advisor, |
| and/or Emergency Response Organization personnel would recognize any higher |
| than expected temperatures while monitoring plant parameters. Since the |
| operators were well aware that they had just operated these valves, it is |
| reasonably expected that they would immediately diagnose the cause." |
| |
| "Upon recognition of the problem, the operators would close the bypass |
| valves. It is reasonably expected that this action would be successful |
| because the valves are operated from the control room, are pneumatic, and |
| fail closed on loss of instrument air. Since closure of either valve |
| restores flow through one of the LPI coolers, one train would be fully |
| restored even with a single failure." |
| |
| "Other considerations were:" |
| |
| "Even if the operator action were to be delayed, the analysis showed that |
| the heat load would be transferred from the sump to the containment |
| atmosphere. An analysis showed that two Reactor Building Cooling Units |
| (RBCU) could remove the resulting heat load (allowing for single failure of |
| one of the three RBCUs). The RBCUs are actuated by the Engineered |
| Safeguards system as part of the Containment Cooling System." |
| |
| "The transition between the injection mode and recirculation mode is |
| performed manually by the operators. No automatic actions are involved. |
| Therefore, the actions to restore flow through the LPI coolers are not being |
| taken in lieu of automatic actions." |
| |
| "This condition would not have had any significant impact on any actions |
| required during an actual event that may be time critical." |
| |
| "All surveillance requirements could be met while the unit was in this |
| configuration." |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations center |
| notified the R2DO (McAlpine). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other |Event Number: 36430 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: ARIZONA RADIATION REG AGENCY |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/12/1999|
|LICENSEE: COLORADO ENGINEERING & INSTRUMENTATIO|NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:22[EST]|
| CITY: PHOENIX REGION: 4 |EVENT DATE: 11/11/1999|
| COUNTY: STATE: AZ |EVENT TIME: 09:00[MST]|
|LICENSE#: AZ 7-457 AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/08/1999|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |LINDA SMITH R4 |
| |CATHERINE HANEY NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: AUBREY GODWIN (by fax) | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NAGR AGREEMENT STATE | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| STOLEN MOISTURE/DENSITY GAUGE. |
| |
| On 11/11/99, the Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency was notified by |
| Colorado Engineering & Instrumentation Company that a Campbell Pacific MC |
| series nuclear moisture/density gauge (Serial number MC-90204820) containing |
| 10 millicuries of Cs-137 and 50 millicuries of Am-241 was stolen from a work |
| site at 34th Street and Gelding in Phoenix, AZ. The gauge was in its |
| shipping container. The Phoenix Police Department (Report number |
| 1999-91880807) is investigating the theft. The licensee is offering a |
| $500.00 reward for the return of the gauge. A press announcement of the |
| reward will be made on 11/12/99. |
| |
| The Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency is investigating the radiation |
| safety issues. |
| |
| The FBI (Phoenix), Mexico, and the States of California, Colorado, Nevada, |
| Utah, and New Mexico are being notified of this incident. |
| |
| (Call the NRC operations officer for contact information.) |
| |
| * * * UPDATE ON 12/08/99 AT 1255 ET FROM LEVINE TAKEN BY MACKINNON * * * |
| |
| On December 7, 1999, the Licensee reported that on November 29, 1999, the |
| licensee recovered the gauge. The gauge was found back in the truck with |
| some associated equipment. |
| |
| The Agency continues to investigate the circumstances regarding this event. |
| |
| The FBI, Mexico, and the States of California, Colorado, Nevada, Utah, and |
| New Mexico are being notified of this incident. |
| |
| NRC Region 4 Duty Officer (David Graves) and NMSS EO (Brain Smith) were |
| notified by the NRC operations officer. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36495 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: WASHINGTON NUCLEAR (WNP-2REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/08/1999|
| UNIT: [2] [] [] STATE: WA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 20:01[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [2] GE-5 |EVENT DATE: 12/08/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 13:30[PST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: BRIAN ADAMI |LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/08/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JOSEPH TAPIA R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AINA 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(A) POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD | |
|NLCO TECH SPEC LCO A/S | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| INOPERABILITY OF HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY DUE TO A POTENTIALLY |
| NON-CONSERVATIVE CALCULATED DUTY LOAD CYCLE LOAD PROFILE FOR THE BATTERY |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: |
| |
| "This is a 4-hour Non-Emergency report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 |
| (b)(2)(iii)(A) due to the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) system being |
| declared inoperable at 1330 hours PST on December 8, 1999. The plant |
| remains in Mode 1 as allowed by plant technical specifications with the |
| Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system operable." |
| |
| "HPCS was declared inoperable due to the HPCS battery being declared |
| technically inoperable. The battery was conservatively declared inoperable |
| because the calculated duty cycle load profile that is used for the |
| acceptance criteria in the surveillance for SR 3.8.4.7 appeared to be |
| non-conservative. It is likely that a lower than actual breaker spring |
| charging motor inrush current was used in the calculation. Charging motor |
| current is being confirmed by the vendor[, General Electric]." |
| |
| The licensee stated that the unit is in a 14-day limiting condition for |
| operation as a result of this issue. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, March 24, 2021
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, March 24, 2021