Event Notification Report for December 6, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Reports For 12/03/1999 - 12/06/1999 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** 36471 36483 36484 36485 36486 36487 36488 !!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!! +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 36471 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: PALISADES REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/28/1999| | UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: MI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:50[EST]| | RXTYPE: [1] CE |EVENT DATE: 11/28/1999| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 15:45[EST]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: DALE ENGLE |LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/05/1999| | HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |RONALD GARDNER R3 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |ADAS 50.72(b)(2)(i) DEG/UNANALYZED COND | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |1 N N 0 Cold Shutdown |0 Cold Shutdown | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | "B" TRAIN LOW PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION (LPSI) FLOW RATES FOUND DEGRADED | | DURING SURVEILLANCE TESTING. | | | | "WHILE PERFORMING QO-8B (LOW PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION FLOW TESTING), IT WAS | | DETERMINED THAT FLOW TO TWO (2) OF FOUR (4) LOOPS (VALVES-MO-3012 & MO-3014 | | [RIGHT CHANNEL]) WAS INADEQUATE. THE FLOW RATES WERE BELOW THE DESIGN BASIS | | FOR ACCIDENT CONDITIONS. [THIS] CONDITION WAS DISCOVERED DURING | | SURVEILLANCE TESTING WHILE THE PLANT WAS IN COLD SHUTDOWN. THIS IS | | REPORTABLE PER 50.72(b)(2)(I)." | | | | THE DESIGN FLOW RATE IS 1720 GPM. THE AS-FOUND FLOW RATES THROUGH VALVES | | 3012 & 3014 WERE 1650 AND 1500 GPM, RESPECTIVELY. THE "B" TRAIN LPSI HAS | | BEEN DECLARED INOPERABLE PENDING CORRECTIVE ACTION WHICH IS TO BE | | DETERMINED. THE UNIT IS NOT IN A TECH SPEC ACTION STATEMENT IN THAT LPSI IS | | NOT REQUIRED FOR CURRENT PLANT CONDITIONS. THE SURVEILLANCE TEST WHICH | | IDENTIFIED THIS CONDITION IS PERFORMED EACH REFUELING OUTAGE (APPROXIMATELY | | EVERY 18 MONTHS). THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | | | | * * * RETRACTED AT 1813 EST ON 12/5/99 BY ROBERT VINCENT TO FANGIE JONES * * | | * | | | | The licensee conducted extensive testing and analysis to better model | | accidents and the performance of the LPSI system. They have determined that | | the LPSI system flow rates are capable of meeting the requirements of | | accident mitigation and are retracting this event notification. | | | | The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the NRC Headquarters | | Operations Officer notified the R3DO (Geoffrey Wright). | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 36483 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: PEACH BOTTOM REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/03/1999| | UNIT: [2] [3] [] STATE: PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 00:09[EST]| | RXTYPE: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 12/02/1999| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 22:25[EST]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: BREIDENBAUGH |LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/03/1999| | HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |STEVEN DENNIS R1 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation | |3 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | PERFORMANCE OF RHR LOGIC FUNCTIONAL TEST DEFEATS THE AUTOMATIC START OF ALL | | FOUR RHR PUMPS. | | | | A review of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) logic system functional test | | identified that during part of the performance of the test, the automatic | | start of all four RHR pumps was defeated. Manual initiation remained | | available. This test was last performed on both Unit 2 and Unit 3 in 1997. | | This report is being made due to the loss of the automatic initiation of the | | Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) mode of RHR. This alone could have | | prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. | | | | The NRC resident inspector will be notified of this event by the licensee. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 36484 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: CALLAWAY REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/03/1999| | UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: MO |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:47[EST]| | RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 12/03/1999| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: [CST]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: BRUCE SCHOENBACH |LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/03/1999| | HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |DALE POWERS R4 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | PART OF THE RCS LEAK RATE DETECTION SYSTEM MAY BE OUTSIDE DESIGN BASES. | | | | "Callaway was contacted by Wolf Creek [see Event #36481] with a concern | | regarding the Containment Normal Sump Level Measurement System and | | Containment Air Cooler Condensate Flow Rate System not [being] capable of | | performing their design function in all cases. Further review by Callaway | | determined this concern was also applicable to Callaway Plant. These | | systems are required per Tech Spec 3.4.6.1b&c for the RCS Leakage Detection | | Systems. The FSAR states [that] this system meets the requirements of Reg. | | Guide 1.45, which requires the leakage detection system to be able to detect | | a 1 gpm leak within 1 hour. The methodology used will not always provide | | adequate leak detection to ensure a 1 gpm RCS leak will be detected in 1 | | hour. | | | | "Therefore, Callaway may be operating outside its design bases since the | | Containment Normal Sump Level Measurement System and Containment Air Cooler | | Condensate Flow Rate System do not meet this design bases at this time. The | | licensee is pursuing a software change to bring the systems into compliance | | with the design bases well within the 30-day action statement requirement of | | Tech Spec 3.4.6.1. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector." | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |General Information or Other |Event Number: 36485 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | REP ORG: TENNESSEE DIV. OF RAD. HEALTH |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/03/1999| |LICENSEE: JOHNSON CITY MEDICAL CENTER |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:45[EST]| | CITY: JOHNSON CITY REGION: 2 |EVENT DATE: 12/03/1999| | COUNTY: STATE: TN |EVENT TIME: 16:00[EST]| |LICENSE#: R-90005-L97 AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/03/1999| | DOCKET: |+----------------------------+ | |PERSON ORGANIZATION | | |KENNETH BARR R2 | | |JOSIE PICCONE NMSS | +------------------------------------------------+ | | NRC NOTIFIED BY: CHARLES ARNOTT | | | HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |NAGR AGREEMENT STATE | | |NINF INFORMATION ONLY | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | NEW SOURCES FOR BRACHYTHERAPY DEVICE TOO LONG | | | | The State of Tennessee, Division of Radiological Health, received a call | | from Mountain States Alliance DBA Johnson City Medical Center concerning | | receipt of three new sources for brachytherapy treatment that did not fit. | | The three sources, model number CDC.T1 Product Code CDCS.J4, which contain | | cesium-137, were the same model number, but were 1 millimeter longer than | | the original sources. The extra length would not allow the shielded storage | | drawer to close. The medical center called Tennessee to inform them of the | | problem and called the manufacturer, Amersham, in Illinois. The Division of | | Radiological Health called the State of Illinois for their information. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 36486 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/03/1999| | RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 22:05[EST]| | COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 12/03/1999| | 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 13:00[CST]| | BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/03/1999| | CITY: PADUCAH REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+ | COUNTY: McCRACKEN STATE: KY |PERSON ORGANIZATION | |LICENSE#: GDP-1 AGREEMENT: Y |GEOFFREY WRIGHT R3 | | DOCKET: 0707001 |SUSAN SHANKMAN NMSS | +------------------------------------------------+CHARLES MILLER IRO | | NRC NOTIFIED BY: E. G. WALKER | | | HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | NRC BULLETIN 91-01 RESPONSE (24-HOUR REPORT) - LOSS OF A DOUBLE CONTINGENCY | | CONTROL | | | | "On 12-3-99, at 1300 CST, the C-333 Seal Exhaust and Wet Air Station pumps | | were discovered to be hard-piped to the building lube oil supply in | | violation of NCSE.014. The NCSE (Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation) | | credits an air gap as a design feature of the lube oil piping to prevent the | | potential for backflow of uranium contaminated oil into the unit lube oil | | system. | | | | "In order for a criticality to be possible, significant quantities of oil | | contaminated with uranium enriched to greater than 1.0 wt. % 235U assay | | would have to backflow into the unit lube oil system and collect in the Seal | | Exhaust and Wet Air pumps with the oil reservoir filled above 4.75 inches. | | In order for oil to backflow, the pump reservoir would need to be filled to | | absolute capacity, operator level checks would need to fail to detect and | | correct the overfilled condition, and the oil would need to backflow through | | multiple closed valves and overcome the elevation head of the oil lines. | | Therefore, it is not considered credible that contaminated oil intrusion | | into the unit lube oil system has ever occurred. | | | | "The Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation (NCSE) relies upon an air gap | | being installed in the oil fill line to the Seal Exhaust and Wet Air pumps | | to prevent backflow of uranium contaminated oil into the unit lube oil | | supply system. There are no double contingency arguments for this scenario | | because the scenario is considered incredible with the installed air gap. | | | | "NCSA (Nuclear Criticality Safety Approval) GEN-01 was immediately initiated | | on discovery of the problem to ensure nuclear criticality safety | | implementation. Initiation of a modification package to correct the | | deficiency was implemented in accordance with NCS engineering approval." | | | | Paducah personnel notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 36487 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: PRAIRIE ISLAND REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/04/1999| | UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: MN |NOTIFICATION TIME: 01:17[EST]| | RXTYPE: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP |EVENT DATE: 12/03/1999| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 22:30[CST]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: MICHAEL T. MURPHY |LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/04/1999| | HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |GEOFFREY WRIGHT R3 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | | | |2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | ACTUATION OF TWO UNIT 2 AUXILIARY BUILDING NORMAL RADIATION MONITORS DURING | | PERFORMANCE OF VENTILATION SYSTEM SURVEILLANCE TESTING | | | | The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: | | | | "At 2230 [CST] during normal Unit 1 [and] 2 [reactor coolant system] | | sampling, a [high] radiation and [emergency safety feature (ESF)] actuation | | signal was received on [radiation monitors] 2R-30 and 2R-37 ([auxiliary | | building] normal exhaust monitors). Normal exhaust was off, and [the | | auxiliary] building special ventilation system was in operation while | | performing [surveillance procedure] SP-1172, Monthly Ventilation System | | Operation. Alarm response procedures were completed for high radiation on | | 2R-30 [and 2R-]37. [The] duty chemist was informed, the sample was secured, | | and 2R-30 [and 2R-]37 levels [then] returned normal. At 2255 [CST,] the | | actuating signals were reset, and all equipment returned to normal." | | | | The licensee stated that all systems functioned as required in response to | | the high radiation and ESF actuation signal. The cause of the ESF signal is | | under investigation. At the time of this event notification, both units | | were operating at 100% power. | | | | The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 36488 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/04/1999| | RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:04[EST]| | COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 12/03/1999| | 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 16:10[EST]| | BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/04/1999| | CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+ | COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION | |LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |GEOFFREY WRIGHT R3 | | DOCKET: 0707002 |SUSAN SHANKMAN NMSS | +------------------------------------------------+CHARLES MILLER IRO | | NRC NOTIFIED BY: JEFF CASTLE | | | HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | NRC BULLETIN 91-01 RESPONSE (24-HOUR REPORT) - LOSS OF MODERATION CONTROL | | | | The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Portsmouth: | | | | "At 1610 hours on 12/03/99, operations personnel in the X-333 Process | | Building identified a piece of unattended cascade equipment (33-8-6 stage-1 | | converter) which had an uncovered 'A'-line flange. This violated requirement | | #4 of NCSA-PLANT062.A02 which states; 'Openings/penetrations made during | | maintenance activities shall be covered to minimize the potential for | | moderator collection and moist air exposure when unattended.' This | | constitutes the loss of one NCS control (moderation) with mass and | | interaction controls maintained throughout this event. Moderation control | | was reestablished at 1800 hours under the direction of Nuclear Criticality | | Safety (NCS) personnel by covering the opening." | | | | "This is reportable under NRC Bulletin 91-01: 24-hour criticality | | control." | | | | "There was no lose of hazardous/radioactive material or | | radioactive/radiological exposure as a result of this event." | | | | "SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: This event has a low safety significance. | | Although the control credited toward making moderation intrusion unlikely | | was lost, no actual intrusion of liquid moderation occurred. Interaction | | and mass controls remained in place." | | | | "POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW | | CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): For a criticality to occur, additional U-235 | | would have to be added to the system." | | | | "CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.): | | Mass, moderation, and interaction are controlled. The mass and interaction | | controls were maintained, but moderation control was lost." | | | | "ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS | | LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS): UO2F2 [was] equal to or less than | | 3% enriched U-235." | | | | "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION | | OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: Mass, moderation, and interaction are | | controlled. The mass and interaction controls ware maintained, but | | moderation control was lost." | | | | "CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: | | Moderation control was reestablished at 1800 hours [on] 12/03/99 under the | | direction of NCS personnel by covering the opening." | | | | Portsmouth personnel notified the NRC resident inspector and the Department | | of Energy site representative. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021