Event Notification Report for November 10, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Reports For 11/09/1999 - 11/10/1999 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** 36290 36331 36338 36411 36415 36416 36417 !!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!! +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 36290 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: FITZPATRICK REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/14/1999| | UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:29[EDT]| | RXTYPE: [1] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 10/14/1999| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 11:30[EDT]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: MARK ABRAMSKI |LAST UPDATE DATE: 11/09/1999| | HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JAMES NOGGLE R1 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | The Charcoal Absorption Efficiency of Train 'B" Standby Gas Treatment | | System was discovered to be less than 99.8%. | | | | An engineering review of the absorption capability of the Standby Gas | | Treatment charcoal filters has concluded that the "B" Division of Standby | | Gas Treatment has been inoperable since 03/30/99. On 04/10/99, samples of | | the charcoal of the Standby Gas Treatment system were sent offsite to check | | the absorption efficiency of the charcoal, and other properties of the | | charcoal. The results of the analysis were received by the licensee on | | 05/16/99. Today, it was discovered that the absorption efficiency of the | | charcoal is 99.3%. The licensee has a commitment that the absorption | | efficiency of the charcoal will be at least 99.8%. The "B" Division of | | Standby Gas Treatment System is inoperable at this time for another reason. | | | | The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee. | | | | * * * RETRACTION 0801 11/9/1999 FROM COSTEDIO TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * * | | | | The LOCA dose evaluations assume a standby gas treatment (SBGT) system | | charcoal efficiency of 99%. Based on the SBGT train 'B' charcoal efficiency | | test results of 99.37%, the licensee believes that reasonable assurance | | exists to conclude that the SBGT system would have performed its intended | | safety function. Based upon this conclusion, the plant did not operate | | outside of its design basis. The NRC resident inspector has been informed of | | this event by the licensee. Notified R1DO (Holody). | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ !!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!! +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 36331 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: FT CALHOUN REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/22/1999| | UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NE |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:04[EDT]| | RXTYPE: [1] CE |EVENT DATE: 10/22/1999| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 09:22[CDT]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: ERICK MATZKE |LAST UPDATE DATE: 11/09/1999| | HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |LINDA SMITH R4 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |ADAS 50.72(b)(2)(i) DEG/UNANALYZED COND | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |1 N N 0 Cold Shutdown |0 Cold Shutdown | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | - Steam Generator #RC-2A in Tech Spec Category C-3; Steam Generator | | inspections continuing - | | | | At 0922 CDT on 10/22/99, during eddy current testing of the steam generators | | (SG), it has been determined that 50 tubes in SG #RC-2A require plugging. | | This places SG #RC-2A in Technical Specification category C-3 per 3.17(2). | | Forty-four tubes have been determined to require plugging in SG #RC-2B at | | this time. Eddy current testing is continuing on the SGs. A 100% full | | length bobbin coil inspection program has been completed in both SGs. A | | rotating pancake coil probe (Plus Point) is being used to inspect 100% of | | the top of the hot leg tube sheets for both SGs. One hundred percent of | | these inspections for the 'A' SG are complete with about 99% evaluated. | | About 85% are complete on the 'B' SG with the rest expected to be completed | | on 10/22/99. In addition, a large number of rotating pancake coil probe | | inspections are being conducted at other locations in the SGs. In-situ | | pressure testing is being completed where needed. To date, 4 tubes in the | | 'A' SG and 2 tubes in the 'B' SG have been pressure tested. All 6 of these | | tubes have passed at 3 times normal operating differential pressure with | | zero leakage. | | | | This report is conservatively being made prior to completing the SG testing | | and before completely evaluating the effect on the plant. Further | | evaluation of reportability will be completed following the completion of | | the eddy current and in-situ pressure testing of the SGs. | | | | The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | | | | NOTE: Refer to related Event #36338. | | | | * * * RETRACTION 0923 EST 11/9/1999 FROM MATZKE TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * * | | | | "Both steam generators were declared in category C-3 per Technical | | Specification 3.17 due to having greater than 1% of the inspected tubes | | being found defective. In steam generator RC-2A, 63 tubes were found | | defective out of 4901 inspected tubes. In steam generator RC-2B, 57 tubes | | were found defective out of 4905 inspected tubes. | | | | "The technical specifications contain provisions for plugging tubes when | | they are found to contain defects that penetrate greater than 40% | | through-wall. Under this technical specification, it is expected that the | | plant may operate for a period of time with defects greater than 40% | | through-wall prior to being found and plugged. The tubes that were found to | | contain defects were plugged in accordance with technical specifications. | | The plugging criteria currently in use at Fort Calhoun Station requires that | | all indications of corrosion detected by eddy current are plugged on | | detection due to the absence of a qualified technique for sizing | | indications. | | | | "Following eddy current testing of the steam generator tubes, in-situ | | pressure testing was performed on certain defects which exceeded the | | screening criteria. The criteria is based on the potential to exceed the | | performance criteria for leakage or structural integrity. The leakage | | performance criterion requires that leakage from all defects within a steam | | generator shall not exceed 1 gallon per minute under worst case accident | | differential pressure and the structural integrity performance criterion | | states that the tubes shall withstand pressure of up to three times normal | | operating differential pressure without burst. Selected indications which | | are representative of the worst of the population of indications found in | | the steam generators successfully passed in-situ pressure tests with no | | leakage at worst case accident differential pressure and no leakage at three | | times normal operating differential pressure. There was no detectable | | primary-to-secondary leakage during operation prior to shutdown for the | | current refueling outage. Therefore, the steam generators were both | | available to perform their required safety functions as verified through | | in-situ pressure testing. Based on the testing performed, the tubes are not | | considered to have been seriously degraded, the plant was not in an | | unanalyzed condition, the steam generators would have performed their design | | basis functions during accident conditions, and this did not constitute a | | condition outside the plant's operating and emergency procedures. | | | | "The original reports were made conservatively awaiting the completion of | | the inspection and testing program. The reports are now being retracted | | based on the complete testing results. The Fort Calhoun Station Technical | | Specification 30-day plugging report and 6-month inspection report will be | | submitted as required." | | | | The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this retraction by the | | licensee. Notified R4DO (Smith). | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ !!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!! +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 36338 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: FT CALHOUN REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/23/1999| | UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NE |NOTIFICATION TIME: 20:59[EDT]| | RXTYPE: [1] CE |EVENT DATE: 10/23/1999| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 16:45[CDT]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: KEVIN BOSTON |LAST UPDATE DATE: 11/09/1999| | HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |LINDA SMITH R4 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |ADAS 50.72(b)(2)(i) DEG/UNANALYZED COND | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |1 N N 0 Refueling |0 Refueling | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | - Steam Generator #RC-2B is in Tech Spec Category C-3 - | | | | In accordance with Tech Spec Section 3.17 (5), Reporting Requirements, the | | following 4-hour non-emergency report is being made. | | | | During Eddy Current Testing tube inspections on Steam Generator (SG) #RC-2B, | | greater than 1% of the tubes tested were found to be defective. The number | | of inspected tubes during the 1999 refueling outage is 4905 in SG #RC-2B. | | The number of tubes considered defective and require plugging exceeded 49 | | tubes. | | | | SG #RC-2B was declared in Tech Spec 3.17, Table 3-13, Category C-3, at 1645 | | CDT on 10/23/99. Tube testing is being conducted under procedure | | SE-ST-RC-0003, Inservice Testing of Steam Generator Tubes. | | | | The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | | | | Note: Refer to related Event #36331. | | | | * * * RETRACTION 0923 11/9/1999 FROM MATZKE TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * * | | | | "Both steam generators were declared in category C-3 per Technical | | Specification 3.17 due to having greater than 1% of the inspected tubes | | being found defective. In steam generator RC-2A, 63 tubes were found | | defective out of 4901 inspected tubes. In steam generator RC-2B, 57 tubes | | were found defective out of 4905 inspected tubes. | | | | "The technical specifications contain provisions for plugging tubes when | | they are found to contain defects that penetrate greater than 40% | | through-wall. Under this technical specification, it is expected that the | | plant may operate for a period of time with defects greater than 40% | | through-wall prior to being found and plugged. The tubes that were found to | | contain defects were plugged in accordance with technical specifications. | | The plugging criteria currently in use at Fort Calhoun Station requires that | | all indications of corrosion detected by eddy current are plugged on | | detection due to the absence of a qualified technique for sizing | | indications. | | | | "Following eddy current testing of the steam generator tubes, in-situ | | pressure testing was performed on certain defects which exceeded the | | screening criteria. The criteria is based on the potential to exceed the | | performance criteria for leakage or structural integrity. The leakage | | performance criterion requires that leakage from all defects within a steam | | generator shall not exceed 1 gallon per minute under worst case accident | | differential pressure and the structural integrity performance criterion | | states that the tubes shall withstand pressure of up to three times normal | | operating differential pressure without burst. Selected indications which | | are representative of the worst of the population of indications found in | | the steam generators successfully passed in-situ pressure tests with no | | leakage at worst case accident differential pressure and no leakage at three | | times normal operating differential pressure. There was no detectable | | primary-to-secondary leakage during operation prior to shutdown for the | | current refueling outage. Therefore, the steam generators were both | | available to perform their required safety functions as verified through | | in-situ pressure testing. Based on the testing performed, the tubes are not | | considered to have been seriously degraded, the plant was not in an | | unanalyzed condition, the steam generators would have performed their design | | basis functions during accident conditions, and this did not constitute a | | condition outside the plant's operating and emergency procedures. | | | | "The original reports were made conservatively awaiting the completion of | | the inspection and testing program. The reports are now being retracted | | based on the complete testing results. The Fort Calhoun Station Technical | | Specification 30-day plugging report and 6-month inspection report will be | | submitted as required." | | | | The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this retraction by the | | licensee. Notified R4DO (Smith). | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 36411 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/07/1999| | RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 22:36[EST]| | COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 11/07/1999| | 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 04:00[EST]| | BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 11/09/1999| | CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+ | COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION | |LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |JAMES CREED R3 | | DOCKET: 0707002 |JOHN HICKEY NMSS | +------------------------------------------------+ | | NRC NOTIFIED BY: KURT SISLER | | | HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | 24-HOUR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 NOTIFICATION INVOLVING LOSS OF CRITICALITY | | CONTROL (MODERATION) | | | | "On 11/7/99 at 0400 hours, it was discovered that the standard solution used | | to calibrate X-344, Autoclave #2 conductivity system probes on 11/1/99 was | | past its shelf life expiration date as stated on the certificate of NIST | | traceability. This brings into question the operability (AQ-NCS boundary | | item) of the conductivity system. Autoclave #2 was operated in Mode II | | (Cylinder Heating) for approximately 30 minutes on 11/2/99. Conductivity | | system as-found readings were performed on 11/2/99 with a standard solution | | in date according to NIST requirements, The as-found results were within | | tolerance indicating that the system would have performed its intended | | safety function. | | | | "Nuclear Criticality Engineering has determined that the operation of the | | autoclave, after calibration of the conductivity system with out-dated | | conductivity standard solution, constitutes the loss of one (1) NCS control | | (moderation). The other control (Mass) was maintained throughout the | | duration of this event. The loss of one NCS control is reportable to the NRC | | as a 24-hour event. | | | | "THERE WAS NO LOSS OF HAZARDOUS/RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL OR | | RADIOACTIVE/RADIOLOGICAL CONTAMINATION EXPOSURE AS A RESULT OF THIS EVENT. | | | | "SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: | | | | "The safety significance of this event is low. The conductivity probes are | | required to be operable and are tested semi-annually to verify this. The | | probes were tested on 11/1/99 however, the solution used to calibrate the | | probes was out of date. If the probes completely failed a UF6 release in | | quantities greater than the minimum critical mass would have to occur or a | | slow release could allow a dilute UO(2)F(2) solution to reach unfavorable | | geometry storm drains. There was no UF6 release during this event and the | | autoclave was only operated for 30 minutes in this condition (As-found | | testing with in-date standard on 11/2/99 revealed that the conductivity | | system was within allowable tolerance). | | | | "POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW | | CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): | | | | "The potential pathway to criticality is that a slow UF6 release occurs | | (less than 2 pounds per minute) and the conductivity probes fail to detect | | it. A release with greater than 2 pounds per minute would isolate the | | autoclave due to high pressure. This slow release could allow a dilute | | solution to reach unfavorable geometry storm drains. | | | | "CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.): | | | | "The controlled parameters are mass and moderation. | | | | "ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS | | LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS): | | | | "The estimated amount of material is zero because there was no release, the | | maximum enrichment is 5% U235 and the form of material is UF6. | | | | "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION | | OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES | | | | "The control that was lost was moderation. The conductivity probes were | | calibrated with a solution that was out of date and therefore the probes | | were inoperable. The autoclave was operated for 30 minutes in this | | condition. | | | | "CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: | | | | "As found readings were completed with an in-date batch of conductivity | | standard solution. All as-found readings were in acceptable limits. | | Autoclave #2 is inoperable (since 11/4/99) for reasons other than this | | event." | | | | The standard solution used to calibrate the conductivity system expired on | | 10/12/99. Operations has the cause for this incident report under review; | | however, the preliminary investigation attributes the failure to personnel | | error. | | | | The NRC Resident Inspector was informed. | | | | * * * UPDATE AT 1434 ON 11/9/99 BY SPAETH TAKEN BY WEAVER * * * | | | | Further evaluation has determined that although the autoclave was operated | | with a conductivity system that was calibrated with an out-of-date buffer | | solution, as-found data show that the system was operable and capable of | | performing its safety function as required by the NCSA. Therefore, double | | contingency controls remained in place throughout this incident. | | | | It should also be noted that the original event description incorrectly | | stated that moderation and mass were the controlled parameters. The | | controlled parameters in this case should have been reported as moderation | | and geometry. Moderation control is based on the integrity of the UF6 | | cylinder, and geometry control is based on the conductivity system | | preventing UF6 from entering the unfavorable geometry floor drains. | | | | HOO notified R3DO (Parker) and NMSS (Piccone). | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Hospital |Event Number: 36415 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | REP ORG: FOREST PARK HOSPITAL |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/09/1999| |LICENSEE: FOREST PARK HOSPITAL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:30[EST]| | CITY: ST. LOUIS REGION: 3 |EVENT DATE: 11/05/1999| | COUNTY: STATE: MO |EVENT TIME: 18:30[CST]| |LICENSE#: 24-00752-01 AGREEMENT: N |LAST UPDATE DATE: 11/09/1999| | DOCKET: |+----------------------------+ | |PERSON ORGANIZATION | | |MICHAEL PARKER R3 | | |JOHN HICKEY NMSS | +------------------------------------------------+ | | NRC NOTIFIED BY: DAVID KEYS | | | HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |LADM 35.33(a) MED MISADMINISTRATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | MEDICAL MISADMINISTRATION | | | | The licensee reported that a patient received treatment of an incorrect site | | as the result of an error in setting up the Nucletron HDR (high dose rate) | | afterloader device. When the treatment simulation was run, a dwell setting | | of 1.0 cm was used; however, when the actual treatment was administered, a | | dwell setting of 0.5 cm was selected. This resulted in the actual treatment | | site being displaced 5 cm from the intended site. The intended site received | | less than 10% of the prescribed dose. The misadministration was discovered | | at approximately 1600 CST on 11/8/1999. The licensee plans to revise | | treatment procedures to ensure that the dwell setting used during treatment | | planning is the same as that used during the administration of treatment. | | | | The licensee intends to continue treatment of the patient at a later date. | | The licensee has contacted NRC Region III (Null) regarding this event. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 36416 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: DUANE ARNOLD REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/09/1999| | UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: IA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:15[EST]| | RXTYPE: [1] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 11/09/1999| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 10:30[CST]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: BOB MURRELL |LAST UPDATE DATE: 11/09/1999| | HQ OPS OFFICER: DOUG WEAVER +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |MICHAEL PARKER R3 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |ADAS 50.72(b)(2)(i) DEG/UNANALYZED COND | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |1 N N 0 Refueling |0 Refueling | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | RECIRCULATION RISER WELD FOUND CRACKED | | | | While performing ultrasonic exam of recirc riser weld RRD-F002 (nozzle to | | safe-end weld) indications of Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking | | (IGSCC) were identified. Specifically, an approximately 65% through-wall | | crack was found on the 'D' RECIRC riser nozzle to safe-end weld. This | | nozzle was being inspected as a part of an expanded inspection scope as a | | result of a similar indication found on the 'B' RECIRC riser nozzle to | | safe-end weld. To date, 5 out of 10 welds have been inspected. | | | | The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. | | | | SEE RELATED EVENT: #36402. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 36417 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: INDIAN POINT REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/09/1999| | UNIT: [2] [] [] STATE: NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:50[EST]| | RXTYPE: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 11/09/1999| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 12:40[EST]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: KEVIN DONNELLY |LAST UPDATE DATE: 11/09/1999| | HQ OPS OFFICER: DOUG WEAVER +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |DAN HOLODY R1 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |APRE 50.72(b)(2)(vi) OFFSITE NOTIFICATION | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |2 N Y 99 Power Operation |99 Power Operation | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | OFFSITE NOTIFICATION - WORKERS EXPOSED TO MERCURY | | | | The licensee notified the National Response Center, Environmental Protection | | Agency RIV and the Tennessee Hotline of an incident involving mercury. A | | radwaste shipment from Indian Point 2 was sent to GTS - Duratek in | | Tennessee. A worker at GTS - Duratek was exposed to a small amount of | | mercury while opening a bag. The shipment was marked as only radioactive | | and was not supposed to contain any mercury. The licensee is investigating | | to determine the source of the mercury. | | | | The licensee will notify the NRC resident inspector. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021