Event Notification Report for October 28, 1999

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The following report from the State of Arizona was forwarded to the Operations Center by NRC Region IV:

At approximately 8:00 p.m. 10/27/99 to 5:45 a.m. 10/28/99, a Troxler moisture density gauge, model 3411B, serial number 12764, containing less than 50 millicuries of americium-241/beryllium and less than 10 millicuries of cesium-137 was stolen from 8907 N. 53rd Drive, Glendale, AZ 85302. The Glendale Police were notified by the licensee as was the Arizona Highway Patrol.

MONITOR WELL IN EXCURSION STATUS

A routine biweekly water sample collected on 10/26/99 from monitor well #6MW21 exceeded all three of its upper control limits (UCLs). A confirmation sample was collected on 10/26/99 and it also exceeded all three of its UCLs. Well #6MW21 has been placed in excursion status per license Section 11.2 and its sampling frequency increased to weekly. Well #6MW21 is a perimeter ore zone monitor well located approximately 300 feet south of the Mine Unit 6 boundary at the Christensen Mine, Campbell County, Wyoming. The nearest community is Lint, Wyoming, approximately 15 miles to the southeast.

Analysis:
Date Chloride Conductivity Alkalinity Uranium
Sampled (mg/I) (umhos/cm2) (mg/l) (mg/I U-308)
UCL 120.0 UCL 1576 UCL 95.2 UCL none
10-26-99 32.2 1800 329.4 0.5
10-28-99 29.2 1746 305.8 0.5

Health and Environmental Hazards:
None

Corrective Action:
Over-recovery pumping of the wellfield area nearest Mine #6MW21

Written Notification:
A written notification will be submitted to NRC Uranium Recovery Branch Chief within 7 days.

MANUAL REACTOR TRIPS OF BOTH UNITS

UNIT 1: Manual reactor trip initiated due to loss of both circulating water pumps during heavy sea conditions. Following the reactor trip, auxiliary feedwater pumps 2-2 and 2-3 auto started. Auxiliary feedwater pump 2-1 was already running for a scheduled surveillance test. A feedwater isolation actuation occurred on reactor trip with low T-avg signal. The reactor is currently stable in hot standby with the MSIVs closed. All control rods fully inserted on the trip and reactor coolant pumps continued to run throughout the event. Decay heat is being removed by steaming the generators through the atmospheric dumps. The unit will remain in hot standby until heavy sea conditions have subsided.

UNIT 2: Manual reactor trip initiated due to loss of both circulating water pumps during heavy sea conditions. Following the reactor trip, all auxiliary feedwater pumps auto started, a feedwater isolation actuation occurred on reactor trip with low T-avg signal, and emergency diesel generators 1-1 and 1-3 auto started but did not load. The reactor is currently stable in hot standby with MSIVs closed. All control rods fully inserted on the trip and reactor coolant pumps continued to run throughout the event. Decay heat is being removed by steaming the generators through the atmospheric dumps. The unit will remain in hot standby until heavy sea condition have subsided.

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector, the San Luis Obispo Sheriff's Office and the California State Office of Emergency Services.

UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO BOMB THREAT

Contact the NRC Operations Center for additional details. The NRC resident inspector will be informed.

* * * COMMISSIONERS' ASSISTANTS BRIEFING HELD AT 0630 EDT * * *

Briefer: H. Miller. Participants: C. Miller (IRO), Adensam, Matthews (NRR), Ten Eyck (NMSS), Beecher (OPA), Lohaus (OSP), Hauber (OIP), Madden (OCA), Tschiltz (EDO), Paperiello (DEDE), Boyce, Olencz (Dicus), Sharkey (McGaffigan), Castleman (Diaz), Doane (Merrifield), Rosano, Warren (IAT), Screnci (R1PAO).

* * * UPDATE AT 1134 ON 10/28/99 FROM JOHN HUNTER TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *

The licensee terminated the Unusual Event at 1124 EDT. Searches of the plant protected area were completed without the discovery of any suspicious devices. In addition, the threat, initially determined to be credible, has been determined not to be credible. The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this update by the licensee. Notified R1DO (Lew), NRR EO (Lyons), FEMA (Sullivan).

******************** UPDATE AT 1712 ON 01/13/00 BY LEIGH TROCINE ********************

This event notification is being updated to document the NRC's response to this event. According to the NRC HOO Log and a time-line generated from recordings of the event, the NRC entered the Monitoring Phase of Normal Mode at 0454 EDT on 10/28/99, and the Monitoring Phase of Normal Mode was exited at 0955 EDT on the same day.

HOO NOTE: The bomb threat was made at approximately 0243 EDT, and the Unusual Event was declared at
0335 EDT.

FITNESS FOR DUTY EVENT

A licensed operator tested positive for illegal drug use during a random screening. The individual's site access has been suspended, and the individual will be referred to the Employee Assistance Program for evaluation. The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee. Contact the NRC Operations Center for additional details.

SECURITY EVENT -

UNESCORTED ACCESS GRANTED INAPPROPRIATELY TO A CONTRACTOR EMPLOYEE. COMPENSATORY ACTIONS TAKEN IMMEDIATELY UPON DISCOVERY. CONTACT THE NRC HEADQUARTERS OPERATIONS OFFICER FOR ADDITIONAL DETAILS. THE LICENSEE NOTIFIED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.

OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS BASED ON APPENDIX R ISSUE

During an ongoing review of the current Salem Post-fire Safe Shutdown Analysis a concern was identified with the 125 VDC control circuits for the 4KV circuit breakers in the post fire Alternate Shutdown Area. Alternate Shutdown (ASD) is implemented in the event of a fire in the Control Room, Relay Room or the ceiling of the 460 V Switchgear room (ASD area). Operators implement the ASD methodology in accordance with procedures S1(2).OP-AB.CR-0002. The procedures require that 125 VDC control power to required 4KV breakers be isolated by opening the main bus feeder breaker local to the switchgear. The 4KV breakers are then manually operated at the switchgear as necessary to shed and load the 4KV buses in the event of loss of offsite power.

In the event of a postulated fire in the ASD area, cables associated with the 4KV breaker 125 VDC control circuits could experience a hot short on the positive side of the open/close coils. Such a short occurring in combination with multiple grounds (occurring due to the postulated fire on negative 125 VDC circuit legs could result in energization of the closing or trip coils. This effectively bypasses the isolation provided by opening the control power breaker. This fire induced circuit failure (due to a combination of one hot short and two shorts to ground) could result in the inability to locally operate one or more 4KV breakers as required for alternate shutdown unless the hot short is removed. This scenario could lead to loss of vital buses (worst case). This event is applicable to 460 V Switchgear room and relay room. It is not applicable to the fire in control room because the affected cables are not routed in the control room. This condition does not satisfy the 10CFR50 Appendix R performance goal of providing necessary electrical support functions for post fire safe shutdown.

Immediate corrective action is an hourly roving fire watch established in accordance with the fire protection program. Long term corrective action includes evaluating plant modifications and/or licensing/design basis changes, and a review of other components relied upon for ASD of the plant to determine if there are any other ungrounded DC control circuits which could malfunction in the same manner.

The licensee will notify the NRC resident inspector.