Event Notification Report for October 25, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
10/22/1999 - 10/25/1999
** EVENT NUMBERS **
35790 36301 36328 36329 36330 36331 36332 36333 36334 36335 36336 36337
36338 36339 36340
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 35790 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/03/1999|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:44[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 06/02/1999|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 16:30[CDT]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/24/1999|
| CITY: PADUCAH REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: McCRACKEN STATE: KY |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-1 AGREEMENT: Y |DAVID HILLS R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707001 |DON COOL NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: THOMAS WHITE | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|OCBA 76.120(c)(2)(i) ACCID MT EQUIP FAILS | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| THREE SPRINKLER SYSTEMS DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO CORRODED HEADS (24-hour |
| report) |
| |
| "On 06/02/99 at 1630 CDT, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified |
| that numerous sprinkler heads were corroded, affecting 16 sprinkler systems |
| in C-337 and one system in C-333, such that the ability of the sprinklers to |
| flow sufficient water was called into question. Subsequently, these |
| sprinkler systems were declared inoperable, and TSR-required actions |
| establishing roving fire patrols were initiated. This deficiency was |
| detected during scheduled system inspections conducted by Fire Protection |
| personnel. Currently, functionality of the sprinkler heads has not been |
| fully evaluated by Fire Protection personnel, and the remaining cascade |
| buildings are currently being inspected, and if necessary, this report will |
| be updated to identify any additional areas. It has been determined that |
| this event is reportable under 10CFR76.120(c)(2) as an event in which |
| equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed." The NRC resident |
| inspector has been notified of this event. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1022 EDT ON 06/04/99 FROM CAGE TO TROCINE * * * |
| |
| "Two sprinkler heads on system D-1 in C-337 and two sprinkler heads on |
| system 27 in C-335 were identified to also be corroded. These were |
| identified to the PSS on 06/03/99 at 1600 CDT and 1601 CDT, respectively, |
| and determined to require an update to this report by the PSS. It has been |
| determined that this event is reportable under 10CFR76.120(c)(2) as an event |
| in which equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed." Paducah |
| personnel notified the NRC resident inspector of this update. The NRC |
| operations officer notified the R3DO (Hills) and NMSS EO (Combs). |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 2152 EDT ON 06/17/99 FROM WALKER TO POERTNER * * * |
| |
| "Three sprinkler heads on system C-15 and five sprinkler heads on system B-8 |
| in C-333 were identified to also be corroded. The PSS was notified of this |
| condition at 1300 CDT on 06/17/99 and determined that an update to this |
| report was required. It has been determined that this event is reportable |
| under 10CFR76.120(c)(2) as an event in which equipment is disabled or fails |
| to function as designed." Paducah personnel notified the NRC resident |
| inspector of this update. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO |
| (Madera). |
| |
| * * * UPDATE 1440 EDT 6/18/1999 FROM UNDERWOOD TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * * |
| |
| "Two sprinkler heads on system C-15 and one sprinkler head on system B-8 in |
| C-333 were identified to have corrosion. The PSS was notified of this |
| condition at 1350 CDT on 06/18/99. The area of the fire patrol for system |
| C-15 was expanded to include the two heads identified as corroded. The one |
| head on system B-8 was in the area already being patrolled. The PSS |
| determined that an update to this report was required." The NRC resident |
| inspector has been informed of this update. Notified R3DO (Madera). |
| |
| * * * UPDATE 1315 EDT 6/25/1999 FROM WALKER TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * * |
| |
| "Two sprinkler heads on system D-8 and three sprinkler heads on system D-7 |
| in C-337 were identified to have corrosion. The PSS was notified of the |
| condition on system D-8 at 0125 CDT on 06/25/99 and at 1019 CDT on 06/25/99 |
| for system D-7. Both systems were immediately declared inoperable and LCO |
| fire patrol actions were implemented. It was determined that an update to |
| this report was required." The NRC resident inspector has been informed of |
| this update. Notified R3DO (Jordan). |
| |
| * * * UPDATE 2119 EDT 7/30/1999 FROM CAGE TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * * |
| |
| "Five sprinkler heads and one sprinkler piping tee on C-337 system D-7 were |
| identified to have corrosion. The PSS was notified of these corroded system |
| parts and declared the system inoperable at 0931 CDT on 07/30/99. LCO |
| required fire patrols of the affected area were initiated. The PSS |
| determined that an update to this event report was required." The NRC |
| resident inspector has been informed of this update. Notified R3DO |
| (Wright). |
| |
| * * * UPDATE 1655 EDT 7/31/1999 FROM WHITE TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * * |
| |
| "Two sprinkler heads on C-337 System D-1 were identified to have corrosion. |
| The PSS was notified of these corroded system parts and declared the system |
| inoperable at 1155 CDT on 7/31/99. LCO required fire patrols of the |
| affected area were initiated. The PSS determined that an update to this |
| report was required." The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this |
| update. Notified R3DO (Wright). |
| |
| * * * UPDATE 1546 EDT 8/10/1999 FROM WHITE TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * * |
| |
| "Two sprinkler heads on C-337 system C-15 were identified to have corrosion. |
| The PSS was notified of these corroded system parts and declared the system |
| inoperable at 1130 CDT on 8/10/99. LCO required fire patrols of the |
| affected area were initiated. The PSS determined that an update to this |
| report was required." The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this |
| update. Notified R3DO (Burgess). |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1154 EDT 8/22/99 FROM WALKER TO POERTNER * * * |
| |
| Four adjacent sprinkler heads on C-333 System B-1 were identified to have |
| corrosion. The PSS was notified of the corroded system parts and declared |
| the system inoperable at 0918 CDT on 8/22/99. LCO required fire patrols |
| were initiated. The PSS determined that an update to this report was |
| required. It has been determined that this event is reportable under |
| 10CFR76.120(c)(2) as an event in which equipment is disabled or fails to |
| function as designed. The NRC resident inspector will be notified. The NRC |
| operations officer notified the R3DO (Clayton). |
| |
| * * * UPDATE 2015 EDT ON 8/28/99 FROM W. F. GAGE TO S. SANDIN * * * |
| |
| "Two adjacent sprinkler heads on C-337 System D-11 were identified to have |
| corrosion. The PSS was notified of these corroded system parts and declared |
| the system inoperable at 1420 CDT on 8/28/99. LCO required fire patrols of |
| the affected area were initiated. The PSS determined that an update to this |
| report was required." |
| Paducah personnel informed the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations |
| officer notified the R3DO (Leach) and NMSS EO (Piccone). |
| |
| * * * UPDATE 2037 EDT ON 8/29/99 FROM KEVIN BEASLEY TO S. SANDIN * * * |
| |
| "Two adjacent sprinkler heads on C-337 System D-15 were identified to have |
| corrosion and the PSS declared the system inoperable at 0925 [CDT] on |
| 8/29/99. Also two adjacent heads on C-337 System D-10 were identified to |
| have corrosion and the PSS declared the system inoperable at 1450. LCO |
| required fire patrols for both of the affected areas were initiated in the |
| time frame required by TSR. The PSS determined that an update to this |
| report was required." Paducah personnel informed the NRC resident |
| inspector. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Leach) and NMSS EO |
| (Piccone). |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 0930 EDT ON 9/1/99 BY ERIC WALKER TO FANGIE JONES * * * |
| |
| Add two adjacent sprinkler heads on C-337 D-14. Paducah personnel informed |
| the NRC Resident Inspector. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO |
| (David Hills) and NMSS (Robert Pierson). |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1133 EDT ON 9/8/99 BY TOM WHITE TO FANGIE JONES * * * |
| |
| Add two adjacent sprinkler heads on C-331 System 26, system declared |
| inoperable at 2155 CDT on 9/7/99. An LCO required fire patrol for the |
| affected area was initiated in the time frame required by the TSR. Paducah |
| personnel informed the NRC Resident Inspector. The NRC operations officer |
| notified the R3DO (Monte Phillips) and NMSS (Josie Piccone). |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 0948 ON 9/30/99 BY ERIC WALKER TO DOUG WEAVER * * * |
| |
| Add two adjacent sprinkler heads on C-333 System B-15 were identified to |
| have corrosion and the PSS declared the system inoperable at 0815 CDT on |
| 9/30/99. An LCO required fire patrol for the affected area was initiated in |
| the time frame required by the TSR. The PSS determined that an update to |
| this report was required. |
| Paducah personnel informed the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations |
| officer notified the R3DO (Vegel) and NMSS (Cool). |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1600 ON 10/13/99 BY WALKER TO GOULD * * * |
| |
| Two adjacent sprinkler heads on C-333 System A-11 were Identified to have |
| corrosion and the PSS declared the system inoperable at 1307 CDT on |
| 10/13/99. An LCO required fire patrol for the affected area was initiated |
| in the time frame required by the TSR, The PSS determined that an update to |
| this report was required. Paducah personnel informed the NRC resident |
| inspector. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Madera) and NMSS |
| (Moore). |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1520 ON 10/19/99 FROM UNDERWOOD TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * * |
| |
| Six sprinkler heads on C-337 System D-16 were identified to have corrosion |
| and the PSS declared the system inoperable at 1052 CDT on 10/19/99. An LCO |
| required fire patrol for the affected area was initiated in the time frame |
| required by the TSR. The PSS determined that an update to this report was |
| required. The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this update. The |
| NRC Operations Officer notified R3DO (Jorgensen). |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 2140 ON 10/19/99 FROM WALKER TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * * |
| |
| Seven sprinkler heads on C-337 System A-7 were identified to have corrosion, |
| and another four had been painted over. In addition, three adjacent |
| sprinkler heads on C-337 System A-8 were identified to have corrosion. The |
| PSS declared the systems inoperable at 1900 CDT on 10/19/99. An LCO |
| required fire patrols for the affected areas were initiated in the time |
| frame required by the TSR. The PSS determined that an update to this report |
| was required. The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this update. |
| The NRC Operations Officer notified R3DO (Wright). |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1713 ON 10/21/99 FROM CAGE TAKEN BY JOLLIFFE * * * |
| |
| Four sprinkler heads on C-337 System A-5, twelve sprinkler heads on C-337 |
| System A-8, three sprinkler heads on C-337 System A-9, and six sprinkler |
| heads on C-337 System B-8 were identified to have corrosion. On 10/21/99, |
| the PSS declared System A-5 and A-9 inoperable at 1028 CDT, System A-8 |
| inoperable at 1227 CDT and System B-8 inoperable at 1406 CDT. An LCO |
| required fire patrol for the affected areas was initiated in the time frame |
| required by the TSR.. The PSS determined that an update to this report was |
| required. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this update. The |
| NRC Operations Officer notified the R3DO Bruce Jorgensen. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 2128 ON 10/22/99 FROM ERIC WALKER TAKEN BY JOLLIFFE * * * |
| |
| At 1400 CDT on 10/22/99, the PSS was notified that numerous corroded |
| sprinkler heads were discovered in C-337 on sprinkler systems B-1, B-3, B-5, |
| B-6, B-7, B-11 and D-17. Due to the number of systems called into question, |
| the PSS declared all of the sprinkler systems in C-337 on the cell floor (a |
| total of 66 systems) inoperable and TSR required actions establishing roving |
| fire patrols were initiated within the required time frame. The PSS |
| determined that an update to this report was required. It has been |
| determined that this event Is reportable under 10CFR76.120(c)(2) as an event |
| in which equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed. |
| The NRC Resident lnspector has been informed of this update. The NRC |
| Operations Officer notified the R3DO Bruce Jorgensen. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1239 ON 10/24/99 FROM TOM WHITE TAKEN BY JOLLIFFE * * * |
| |
| At 1200 CDT on 10/23/99, the PSS was notified that numerous corroded |
| sprinkler heads were discovered in C-337 on sprinkler systems B-13 and B-14 |
| on the ground floor, The PSS declared these systems inoperable and TSR |
| required actions establishing roving fire patrols were initiated within the |
| required time frame. At 1600 CDT on 10/23/99, the PSS was notified that |
| numerous corroded sprinkler heads were discovered in C-337 on sprinkler |
| systems A-16, B-12, C-8, C-12, C-15, D-5 and D-8 on the cell floor, These |
| systems have already been declared inoperable and fire patrols are already |
| being performed. The PSS determined that an update to this report was |
| required. It has been determined that this event is reportable under |
| I0CFR76.120(c)(2) as an event in which equipment is disabled or fails to |
| function as designed. The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this |
| update. The NRC Operations Officer notified the R3DO Bruce Jorgensen. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36301 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: COMANCHE PEAK REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/16/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: TX |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:06[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 10/16/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 14:28[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: B HUBBARD |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/22/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |GAIL GOOD R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N N 0 Refueling |0 Refueling |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| DURING TESTING OF THE TRAIN "B" (1EA2) 6.9kV BUS, THE ALTERNATE POWER SUPPLY |
| BREAKER FAILED TO CLOSE AND THE BUS WAS LOCKED OUT. |
| |
| The loss of voltage due to the lockout of the 1EA2 6.9kV bus caused a loss |
| of power to the containment particulate iodine gaseous (PIG) monitor which |
| actuated a CVI (containment ventilation isolation). The containment |
| ventilation was already isolated, so no valves repositioned. The blackout |
| sequencer also received an undervoltage actuation. This caused several |
| operator lockouts including a turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater start |
| signal, which was out of service, and a trip of one of the two operating |
| spent fuel pool cooling pumps. The second spent fuel pool cooling pump was |
| returned to service about 40 minutes after it had initially lost power. |
| Spent fuel pool temperature increased from approximately 104 degrees F to |
| about 106 degrees F during the time period that the second spent fuel pool |
| cooling pump was de-energized. About 0.25% of the fuel has been reloaded |
| back into Comanche Peak Unit 1's core. |
| |
| The sequencer was de-energized to prevent any unnecessary actuations. The |
| train "B," 1EA2, 6.9kV bus was re-energized from the normal offsite source, |
| and the spent fuel pool cooling pump was restarted. The residual heat |
| removal system was energized from the train "A," 1EA1, 6.9kV bus, and its |
| operation was not interrupted by the loss of train the "B," 1EA2, 6.9kV bus. |
| The train "B," 1EA2, 6.9kV bus emergency diesel generator is tagged out of |
| service for maintenance. |
| |
| The cause of the bus lockout is under investigation. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1205 ON 10/22/99 BY DAVE HUBBARD TO JOLLIFFE * * * |
| |
| On 10/16/99. Unit 1 was in Mode 6 with fuel movement in progress. While |
| performing the surveillance test for the 6.9 kV bus #1EA2, breaker #1EA2-2 |
| failed to close or tripped when operated from the control room. Breaker |
| #1EA2-1 opened as designed during the transfer and does not have an |
| automatic re-closure feature. Since the EDG was tagged OOS the bus remained |
| de-energized. SFP cooling pump #X-02 and the RMUW pump were stripped by the |
| blackout sequencer operator lockout. The ESF actuation was reported as |
| event #36301. |
| |
| Further review of the event by engineering and regulatory affairs, using |
| NUREG 1022, concluded that this was a single component actuation of the |
| undervoltage relay. However, to complete an ESF function, other components |
| need to be actuated such as the EDG, AFW pumps, CCW pumps, etc. The SFP |
| cooling pump and the RMUW pumps are not ESF components. The actuation of |
| the relay did not result in the start of any ESF components and, therefore |
| is not a valid ESF actuation. In addition, the sequencer is not required to |
| be operable in Mode 6. The CVI actuation, by itself, would not be |
| reportable as a valid ESF actuation |
| |
| Based on the above the licensee is retracting this ESF notification. |
| |
| The licensee plans to notify the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| |
| The NRC Operations Officer notified the R4DO Linda Smith. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 36328 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/22/1999|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 03:01[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 10/21/1999|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 15:00[EDT]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/22/1999|
| CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |BRUCE JORGENSEN R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707002 |CHARLEY HAUGHNEY NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: SPAETH | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 24 HOUR 91-01 BULLETIN RESPONSE |
| |
| On 10/21/ 1999 at 1500 hrs the Plant Shift Superintendent(PSS) was notified |
| that a Nuclear Criticality Safety Approval (NCSA) requirement was not being |
| performed in the X-710 ES&H Analytical Labs. NCS Engineering, while |
| performing an NCS Self Assessment, noticed an operation where samples were |
| brought to a staging area "INSIDE" a room when they were logged in and |
| verified. (NCSA-0710_025.AOO) |
| |
| Requirement #1 of NCSA-071_25.AOO states in part; Samples in any room |
| enriched to 1% or greater U-235, will be limited to one group of 30g U-235 |
| per room. This will be ensured by maintaining a room inventory log of U-235 |
| mass in labeled containers. Each log entry will consist of the U-235 mass |
| value plus analytical uncertainty and will be: |
| |
| a. made by a knowledgeable person "PRIOR" to bringing the samples into the |
| room, and |
| b. verified by a second knowledgeable person "PRIOR" to bringing the samples |
| into the room. |
| |
| At the direction of the Plant Shift Superintendent the requirements for an |
| NCS anomalous condition were initiated and the area baundaried off. |
| |
| The safety significance of the event is very low. The U-235 mass in material |
| is being maintained less than 30 grams as required. This is more than a |
| factor of 10 less than the always safe mass of 350 grams U-235. The samples |
| were brought to a staging area inside the room where they were logged in and |
| verified. After logging and verifying the samples were moved to the |
| operational area of the room, where they could interact with other materials |
| in the room. |
| |
| Samples in any room enriched to 1% or greater U-235, with a concentration |
| greater or equal to 500 ppm U-235, shall be limited to one group of 30 g |
| U-235 per room. This shall be ensured by maintaining a room inventory log of |
| U-235 mass in labeled containers. Each log entry shall consist of the U-235 |
| mass value plus analytical uncertainty and shall be: |
| |
| Mass is the only parameter controlled |
| |
| The actual amount of material In the room is less than 30 grams U-235, at an |
| enrichment of less than or equal to 100%. This value is obtained from sample |
| data that was logged after the material was brought Into the room. This is |
| approximately 4% of the worst case critical mass. |
| |
| Verbatim compliance with both mass controls was lost because the material |
| was supposed to be checked and verified prior to bringing the material into |
| the room. The samples were brought to a staging area inside the room where |
| they were logged in and verified. After logging and verifying the samples |
| were moved to the operational area of the room, where they could interact |
| with other materials in the room. |
| |
| THERE WAS NO LOSS OF HAZARDOUS/RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL OR |
| RADIOACTIVE/RADIOLOGICAL CONTAMINATION EXPOSURE AS A RESULT OF THIS EVENT. |
| |
| The Resident Inspector was notified and the DOE Representative will be |
| notified. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36329 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: BRUNSWICK REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/22/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 06:24[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 10/22/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 03:15[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JESTER |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/22/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |KERRY LANDIS R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | |
|NLCO TECH SPEC LCO A/S | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| HPCI IS INOPERABLE |
| |
| WHILE PERFORMING HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) SYSTEM OPERABILITY |
| TEST (OPT-09-2) FOR POST MAINTENANCE TESTING, THE TURBINE STEAM SUPPLY VALVE |
| #1-E41-F001 FAILED IN MID-POSITION. THIS OCCURRED WHEN THE VALVE WAS BEING |
| CLOSED TO PLACE THE SYSTEM IN ITS STANDBY LINEUP FOLLOWING COMPLETION OF THE |
| OPERABILITY TEST. IN ADDITION, THE STEAM SUPPLY DRAIN POT INBOARD AND |
| OUTBOARD DRAIN VALVES #1-E41-F028 AND #1-E41-F029 DID NOT OPERATE AS |
| EXPECTED. THESE VALVES OPEN AND CLOSE IN UNISON AUTOMATICALLY AS DETERMINED |
| BY THE POSITION OF THE TURBINE STEAM SUPPLY VALVE #1-E41-F001. CURRENTLY, |
| THE INBOARD DRAIN VALVE #1-E41-F028 IS CLOSED AND THE OUTBOARD DRAIN VALVE |
| #1-E41-F029 IS OPEN. |
| |
| THE AUTOMATIC DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM, LOW PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION |
| SYSTEM, CORE SPRAY SYSTEM AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLANT SYSTEM ARE |
| OPERABLE. THE LICENSEE IS INVESTIGATING THE CAUSE OF THE PROBLEM AND |
| SUSPECTS IT MIGHT BE DUE TO A LOGIC/LIMIT SWITCH CIRCUITRY PROBLEM. |
| |
| THE SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS EVENT IS MINIMAL. |
| |
| THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other |Event Number: 36330 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: US AIR FORCE |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/22/1999|
|LICENSEE: US AIR FORCE |NOTIFICATION TIME: 07:39[EDT]|
| CITY: MACON REGION: 2 |EVENT DATE: 10/21/1999|
| COUNTY: STATE: GA |EVENT TIME: 16:53[EDT]|
|LICENSE#: 42-32539-01AF AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/22/1999|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |KERRY LANDIS R2 |
| |LINDA SMITH R4 |
+------------------------------------------------+CHARLEY HAUGHNEY NMSS |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: MAJ. WROBEL | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|BAB1 20.2201(a)(1)(i) LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| THE AIR FORCE REPORTED THAT A LANTERN POD WAS LOST IN SHIPMENT |
| |
| A LANTERN POD (INFRARED IMAGING POD) CONTAINING TWO 4 MICROCURIES OF |
| AMERICIUM-241 SOURCES WAS LOST IN A SHIPMENT FROM KIRKLAND AFB, NEW MEXICO |
| TO ROBINS AFB, GEORGIA. THE DEVICE WAS AN AMERSHAM MODEL AMM.7. FEDEX WAS |
| THE CARRIER FOR THIS SHIPMENT AND THE AIRBILL NUMBER IS 5654077161. THE |
| SHIPMENT WAS DETERMINED TO BE LOST AT THE FEDEX DISTRIBUTION CENTER IN |
| MACON, GA. THE DEVICE IS STILL BEING TRACKED BY FEDEX. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36331 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: FT CALHOUN REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/22/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NE |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:04[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] CE |EVENT DATE: 10/22/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 09:22[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: ERICK MATZKE |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/22/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |LINDA SMITH R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ADAS 50.72(b)(2)(i) DEG/UNANALYZED COND | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N N 0 Cold Shutdown |0 Cold Shutdown |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - Steam Generator #RC-2A in Tech Spec Category C-3; Steam Generator |
| inspections continuing - |
| |
| At 0922 CDT on 10/22/99, during eddy current testing of the steam generators |
| (SGs), it has been determined that 50 tubes in SG #RC-2A require plugging. |
| This places SG #RC-2A in Technical Specification category C-3 per 3.17(2). |
| Forty four tubes have been determined to require plugging in SG #RC-2B at |
| this time. Eddy current testing is continuing on the SGs. A 100% full |
| length bobbin coil inspection program has been completed in both SGs. A |
| rotating pancake coil probe (Plus Point) is being used to inspect 100% of |
| the top of the hot leg tube sheets for both SGs. One hundred percent of |
| these inspections for the 'A' SG are complete with about 99% evaluated. |
| About 85% are complete on the 'B' SG with the rest expected to be completed |
| on 10/22/99. In addition, a large number of rotating pancake coil probe |
| inspections are being conducted at other locations in the SGs. In-situ |
| pressure testing is being completed where needed. To date, 4 tubes in the |
| 'A' SG and 2 tubes in the 'B' SG have been pressure tested. All 6 of these |
| tubes have passed at 3 times normal operating differential pressure with |
| zero leakage. |
| |
| This report is conservatively being made prior to completing the SG testing |
| and before completely evaluating the effect on the plant. Further |
| evaluation of reportability will be completed following the completion of |
| the eddy current and in-situ pressure testing of the SGs. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| |
| NOTE: Refer to related Event #36338. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other |Event Number: 36332 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: ENERTECH, BREA, CA |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/22/1999|
|LICENSEE: ENERTECH, BREA, CA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:37[EDT]|
| CITY: BREA REGION: 4 |EVENT DATE: 10/22/1999|
| COUNTY: STATE: CA |EVENT TIME: 10:00[PDT]|
|LICENSE#: AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/22/1999|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |LINDA SMITH R4 |
| |VERN HODGE (by fax) NRR |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JOHN DeKLEINE | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|CCCC 21.21 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - Potential 10CFR Part 21 Report - |
| |
| In late 1998 Enertech manufactured and shipped electro-hydraulic actuators |
| for installation on valves to be installed in an overseas plant. Prior to |
| shipment, the valve manufacturer observed pressure switch indication |
| problems during final testing of the valves on which the actuators were |
| installed. |
| |
| Collective investigation by Burns and Roe, Enertech, including its switch |
| supplier and the valve manufacturer determined the problem resulted from |
| changes in manufacturing methods implemented by the switch supplier. The |
| immediate problem was addressed, the pressure switches were modified using |
| the supplier's previous manufacturing methods, installed on the valves and |
| subsequently passed all final test requirements. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other |Event Number: 36333 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: KS DEPT of HEALTH & ENVIRONMENT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/22/1999|
|LICENSEE: CUSHING MEMORIAL HOSPITAL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:13[EDT]|
| CITY: LEAVENWORTH REGION: 4 |EVENT DATE: 09/20/1999|
| COUNTY: STATE: KS |EVENT TIME: 12:30[CDT]|
|LICENSE#: AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/22/1999|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |LINDA SMITH R4 |
| |CHARLEY HAUGHNEY NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JUSTIN SPENCE | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NAGR AGREEMENT STATE | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POTENTIAL MEDICAL MISADMINISTRATION - |
| |
| A POTENTIAL MEDICAL MISADMINISTRATION INVOLVING AN INCORRECT CHEMICAL FORM |
| OF TECHNETIUM-99 OCCURRED ON 09/22/99. AT 1230 CDT, THE PATIENT WAS |
| ADMINISTERED 25.8 MILLICURIES OF WHAT MAY HAVE BEEN TECHNETIUM-99 DTPA. THE |
| PATIENT WAS SCHEDULED TO RECEIVE A DOSE OF TECHNETIUM-99 MYOVIEW FOR A HEART |
| SCAN. AN IMAGE OF THE KIDNEYS AND |
| BLADDER WERE PRESENTED, BUT NO HEART IMAGE. THE RADIOLOGIST/RSO WAS |
| IMMEDIATELY INFORMED. THE RADIOLOGIST CONFIRMED THE FINDINGS OF THE |
| TECHNICIAN. THE LABEL FOR THE DOSE STATES THE RADIOPHARMACEUTICAL WAS A |
| MYOVIEW DOSE. THE RADIOPHARMACY FROM WHICH THE DOSE WAS RECEIVED BELIEVES |
| THAT THE CORRECT SUBSTANCE WAS ADMINISTERED. THE PATIENT AND PHYSICIAN WERE |
| INFORMED THAT THE INCORRECT RADIOPHARMACEUTICAL HAD BEEN ADMINISTERED, AND |
| THE CORRECT PROCEDURE WAS PERFORMED ON 09/23/99. DURING THE WEEK OF |
| 10/04/99, THE CONSULTING PHYSICIST TO THE HOSPITAL WAS INFORMED. ON |
| 10/17/99, THE PHYSICIST SENT A REPORT TO THE LICENSEE. IT WAS DETERMINED |
| THAT THE CHEMICAL FORM OF THE RADIOPHARMACEUTICAL WAS PROBABLY DTPA. THE |
| DOSE OF 25 MILLICURIES RESULTED IN A DOSE OF: TOTAL BODY 0.75 RAD, BLADDER |
| 7.00 RAD, KIDNEYS 0.53 RAD, OVARIES 0.50 RAD, UTERUS 0.93 RAD, AND TESTES |
| 0.35 RAD. THE CONSULTANT INSTRUCTED THE LICENSEE TO NOTIFY THE STATE OF |
| KANSAS AND FILE A WRITTEN REPORT TO THE STATE OF KANSAS WITHIN 15 DAYS. |
| |
| AT 0930 CDT ON 10/22/99, CUSHING MEMORIAL HOSPITAL TELEPHONED THE KANSAS |
| RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM IN ORDER TO INFORM THE AGENCY OF THE EVENT |
| DESCRIBED ABOVE. THE KANSAS RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM INITIATED AN |
| INVESTIGATION. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36334 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: MILLSTONE REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/22/1999|
| UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: CT |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:45[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 10/22/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 16:15[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: STEVE MYERS |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/22/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |WILLIAM COOK R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - WATER TIGHT DOOR BETWEEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP ROOMS FOUND IMPROPERLY |
| SHUT - |
| |
| AT 1615 ON 10/22/99, THE LICENSEE DISCOVERED THAT THE WATER TIGHT PERSONNEL |
| ACCESS DOOR BETWEEN THE TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER (AFW) PUMP ROOM |
| AND THE MOTOR DRIVEN AFW PUMP ROOM IN THE TURBINE BUILDING WAS NOT PROPERLY |
| "DOGGED" SHUT. WITH THIS DOOR NOT PROPERLY SEALED SHUT, A STEAM LEAK IN THE |
| TURBINE DRIVEN AFW PUMP ROOM COULD HAVE DISABLED ALL THREE AFW PUMPS. THE |
| LICENSEE IMMEDIATELY SHUT THE DOOR AND SECURED ALL THE DOOR "DOGS". THE |
| LICENSEE IS CONDUCTING AN INVESTIGATION AND HAS DETERMINED THAT THE DOOR HAD |
| BEEN IMPROPERLY SHUT FOR 10 TO 60 MINUTES. |
| |
| THE LICENSEE NOTIFIED STATE AND LOCAL OFFICIALS AND THE NRC RESIDENT |
| INSPECTOR. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36335 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: COOK REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/22/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [2] [] STATE: MI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:54[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 10/22/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 15:00[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: MARY BETH DePUYDT |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/22/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |BRUCE JORGENSEN R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ADAS 50.72(b)(2)(i) DEG/UNANALYZED COND | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N N 0 Refueling |0 Refueling |
|2 N N 0 Refueling |0 Refueling |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - SEVERAL PLANT LOCATIONS DISCOVERED TO BE UNPROTECTED HELB AREAS - |
| |
| This is a four hour non-emergency notification in accordance |
| 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(1), of a condition which was found while both reactors were |
| shutdown, which, had it been found while the reactors were in operation, |
| could have resulted in the nuclear plant being in an unanalyzed condition |
| that significantly compromises plant safety. |
| |
| A review of the High Energy Line Break (HELB) Program has identified a |
| number of locations in the plant that had previously been analyzed to be |
| protected from a HELB event, but are now considered to be unprotected HELB |
| areas. These areas contain equipment that is not qualified for the harsh |
| environment resulting from a HELB event in or near these locations, or the |
| jet impingement from a crack in high energy piping near the equipment may |
| damage the components and/or electrical cabling. The equipment potentially |
| affected Includes: |
| - Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps, previously reported in LER 315/99-058-00 |
| - Safety and non-safety related switchgear supplying power to safety-related |
| and safe shutdown components and vital instruments |
| - Emergency Diesel Generators and associated Ventilation Systems |
| - Component Cooling Water Pumps, previously reported in LER 316/98-005-00 |
| - Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Batteries |
| - Cabling and Conduit inside Containment due to jet impingement. |
| |
| Evaluations of these potential design deficiencies are ongoing. |
| |
| Both units are currently in no Technical Specifications Operating Mode with |
| both cores offloaded. |
| |
| See also the following Event Notifications made on HELB issues: |
| Event #35008 and associated LER 316/98-007-00 |
| Event #35428 and associated LER 315/99-007-00 |
| Event #34515 and associated LER 316/98-005-00. |
| |
| The licensee plans to notify the NRC Resident Inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36336 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: NINE MILE POINT REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/22/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 20:55[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5 |EVENT DATE: 10/22/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 19:55[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: DON SHEEHAN |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/22/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |WILLIAM COOK R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | |
|NLCO TECH SPEC LCO A/S | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 98 Power Operation |98 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - UNIT 1 IS OPERATING OUTSIDE ITS DESIGN BASIS IN ITS CURRENT OPERATING |
| CONDITION - |
| |
| Unit 1 received information from its Engineering Department that Unit 1 is |
| operating outside of design basis in its current operating condition. |
| Specifically, with #11 Reactor Recirc Pump fully isolated, an analysis for |
| thermal shock caused by initiation of #12 Emergency Cooling Loop injecting |
| through #11 Reactor Recirc Loop suction nozzle has not been performed. |
| Mitigating actions include isolating #12 Emergency Cooling Loop, in order to |
| return the plant to an analyzed condition, which requires that the plant |
| enter a 7-Day Technical Specification Shutdown LCO until such time that an |
| analysis for thermal shock has been performed. Engineering Department has |
| reasonable assurance that this analysis will be completed within the 7 days |
| required by Unit 1 Tech Specs. |
| |
| All other Emergency Core Cooling System equipment is operable. |
| |
| This event has no effect on Unit 2. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 36337 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/22/1999|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 21:22[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 10/22/1999|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 17:15[EDT]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/22/1999|
| CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |BRUCE JORGENSEN R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707002 |CHARLEY HAUGHNEY NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: ERIC SPAETH | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - NRC BULLETIN 91-01, 24 HOUR REPORT - |
| |
| ERROR MESSAGE ON THE X-705 DECONTAMINATION FACILITY URANIUM RECOVERY |
| EVAPORATOR FLOW DIVERSION SYSTEM CONDUCTIVITY PROBE |
| |
| At 1750 on 10/22/99, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that |
| a Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) Approval requirement had not been |
| maintained in the X-705 Decontamination Facility. Upon discovery of an |
| error message on one of three conductivity probes on the Uranium Recovery |
| Evaporator Flow Diversion (UREFD) System, an investigation was initiated to |
| determine cause and impact. |
| |
| Evidence shows that on 09/28/99, two of three conductivity cells credited as |
| Active Engineered Features of the applicable NCS Approvals were displaying |
| error codes while the evaporator system was in operation. Engineering began |
| an evaluation, but at that time, was not able to provide Reasonable |
| Assurance of Operability for the system. The PSS declared the UREFD System |
| inoperable at that time. |
| |
| The NCS Evaluation credits the UREFD System as a secondary NCS Control with |
| the physical Integrity of the evaporator tubes as the primary NCS Control. |
| There is no indication that the physical integrity of the evaporator tube |
| was ever compromised. |
| |
| The conductivity cells and associated flow diversion valves, while not |
| specifically listed in NCS Approval Part 'B' requirements, are still |
| considered "NCS Controls" for the purpose of satisfying the double |
| contingency principle. The loss of the UREFD System is considered a loss of |
| control such that only one double contingency control remained in place. |
| |
| |
| SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: |
| The safety significance of this event is very low. The inoperability of the |
| UREFD System was a transient event. Available data immediately before and |
| after the suspect time shows the system operating within normal parameters. |
| |
| POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): |
| During the brief time the UREFD System was inoperable, an evaporator tube |
| could have ruptured and allowed uranium bearing solution to enter the |
| unfavorable geometry storm drain system. If the concentration of U-235 was |
| high enough and the geometry large enough, the system could have reached a |
| critical configuration. |
| |
| CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC): |
| Geometry and concentration were controlled. Geometry was controlled within |
| the evaporator tube and the favorable geometry storage tanks. Concentration |
| was controlled in the condensate being discharged into the storm sewer |
| system. |
| |
| ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDES PROCESS |
| LIMIT AND PER CENT WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS): |
| The UREFD System normally contains uranyl nitrate or nitrate based |
| solutions. The system is analyzed to 100% enriched U-235 solutions, but not |
| more the 10% is expected due to plant certificate limitations. The UREFD |
| System actuates automatically at 1000 mhos which corresponds to 15 ppm |
| uranium. No uranium bearing solution was involved in this event, so no data |
| is available on estimated amount or per cent worst case of critical mass. |
| |
| NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: |
| The UREFD System monitors the condensate entering the storm sewers to |
| automatically divert the flow to favorable geometry storage tanks in the |
| event the concentration of uranium exceeds 15 ppm. The system is actuated |
| when two of three conductivity probes detect more than 1000 mhos. The |
| system was inoperable for a brief period when two of the three conductivity |
| probes were displaying an error message instead of providing a conductivity |
| reading. |
| |
| CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: |
| At the direction of the PSS, the requirements for an NCS Anomalous Condition |
| were initiated and the UREFD System was shut down and placed in safe |
| configuration. |
| |
| There was no loss of hazardous or radioactive material nor radioactive or |
| radiological contamination exposure as a result of this event. |
| |
| The Certificate Holder notified the NRC Resident Inspector of this event. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36338 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: FT CALHOUN REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/23/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NE |NOTIFICATION TIME: 20:59[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] CE |EVENT DATE: 10/23/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 16:45[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: KEVIN BOSTON |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/23/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |LINDA SMITH R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ADAS 50.72(b)(2)(i) DEG/UNANALYZED COND | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N N 0 Refueling |0 Refueling |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - Steam Generator #RC-2B is in Tech Spec Category C-3 - |
| |
| In accordance with Tech Spec Section 3.17 (5), Reporting Requirements, the |
| following 4 hour non-emergency report is being made. |
| |
| During Eddy Current Testing tube inspections on Steam Generator (SG) #RC-2B, |
| greater than 1% of the tubes tested were found to be defective. The number |
| of inspected tubes during the 1999 refueling outage is 4905 in SG #RC-2B. |
| The number of tubes considered defective and require plugging exceeded 49 |
| tubes. |
| |
| SG #RC-2B was declared in Tech Spec 3.17, Table 3-13, Category C-3 at 1645 |
| CDT on 10/23/99. Tube testing is being conducted under procedure |
| SE-ST-RC-0003, Inservice Testing of Steam Generator Tubes. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| |
| Note: Refer to related Event #36331. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36339 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SOUTH TEXAS REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/24/1999|
| UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: TX |NOTIFICATION TIME: 08:32[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 10/24/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 04:38[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JOHN M. CRAIN |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/24/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |LINDA SMITH R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ADAS 50.72(b)(2)(i) DEG/UNANALYZED COND | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|2 N N 0 Refueling |0 Refueling |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| STEAM GENERATOR "2C" CLASSIFIED AS CATEGORY "C-3" DUE TO STRESS CORROSION |
| CRACKING OF > 1% IN-SERVICE TUBES IN THE AREA OF THE HOT LEG SUPPORT PLATE |
| CREVICES. |
| |
| "ON OCTOBER 24, 1999 THE INSPECTION RESULTS OF THE 2C STEAM GENERATOR |
| DETERMINED THAT MORE THAN 1% OF THE TUBES ARE DEFECTIVE, CONSTITUTING A C-3 |
| CONDITION PER STP TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT 4.4.5.2. |
| THE GENERAL AREA OF DEGRADATION IS IN THE HOT LEG TUBE SUPPORT PLATE |
| CREVICES. THE CAUSE OF THE DAMAGE IS THOUGHT TO BE OUTSIDE DIAMETER STRESS |
| CORROSION CRACKING. 100% OF THE IN-SERVICE TUBE-TO-TUBE SUPPORT PLATE |
| INTERSECTIONS ARE BEING EDDY CURRENT INSPECTED BY BOBBIN COIL PROBE. ALL |
| DISTORTED SUPPORT PLATE INDICATIONS WITH BOBBIN VOLTAGE OF OVER 1 VOLT ARE |
| BEING FURTHER EXAMINED BY PLUS POINT PROBE. COMPLETION OF THE |
| EXAMINATION SCOPE IS IN PROGRESS. THIS REPRESENTS A REPORTABLE CONDITION |
| PER 10 CFR PART 50.72(B)(2) AS DEFINED BY STP TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE |
| 4.4-2." |
| |
| INSPECTIONS ARE ALSO PLANNED FOR STEAM GENERATORS "2A", "2B" AND "2D." THE |
| LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36340 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SALEM REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/24/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NJ |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:25[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 10/24/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 12:19[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: SUSAN SIMPSON |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/24/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |WILLIAM COOK R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 M/R Y 1 Startup |0 Hot Standby |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DURING CONTROL ROD WORTH TESTING - |
| |
| With Unit 1 stable in Mode 2 (Startup) at 10E-8 amps, the licensee was |
| performing control rod worth measurements in accordance with the Initial |
| Criticality and Testing using Advanced Digital Reactivity Computer Procedure |
| under the provisions of Special Test Exception Tech Spec 3.10.1 and 3.10.3 |
| (Shutdown Margin and Physics Tests). Control Bank 'C' control rods were |
| being inserted at maximum speed (66 steps per minute) when the reactor |
| operator noted a discrepancy between the Group 1 and Group 2 step counters. |
| Reactor operators manually tripped the reactor at 1219. All control rods |
| inserted completely. Unit 1 is stable in Mode 3 (Hot Standby). Steam is |
| being dumped to the main condenser and main feedwater is aligned to the |
| steam generators. |
| |
| The licensee is troubleshooting the rod control problem. Initial |
| investigation revealed a stationary phase failure for Group 1, Control Bank |
| 'C' control rods. |
| |
| The licensee plans to notify local officials and the NRC Resident Inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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