Event Notification Report for October 25, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Reports For 10/22/1999 - 10/25/1999 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** 35790 36301 36328 36329 36330 36331 36332 36333 36334 36335 36336 36337 36338 36339 36340 +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 35790 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/03/1999| | RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:44[EDT]| | COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 06/02/1999| | 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 16:30[CDT]| | BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/24/1999| | CITY: PADUCAH REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+ | COUNTY: McCRACKEN STATE: KY |PERSON ORGANIZATION | |LICENSE#: GDP-1 AGREEMENT: Y |DAVID HILLS R3 | | DOCKET: 0707001 |DON COOL NMSS | +------------------------------------------------+ | | NRC NOTIFIED BY: THOMAS WHITE | | | HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |OCBA 76.120(c)(2)(i) ACCID MT EQUIP FAILS | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | THREE SPRINKLER SYSTEMS DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO CORRODED HEADS (24-hour | | report) | | | | "On 06/02/99 at 1630 CDT, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified | | that numerous sprinkler heads were corroded, affecting 16 sprinkler systems | | in C-337 and one system in C-333, such that the ability of the sprinklers to | | flow sufficient water was called into question. Subsequently, these | | sprinkler systems were declared inoperable, and TSR-required actions | | establishing roving fire patrols were initiated. This deficiency was | | detected during scheduled system inspections conducted by Fire Protection | | personnel. Currently, functionality of the sprinkler heads has not been | | fully evaluated by Fire Protection personnel, and the remaining cascade | | buildings are currently being inspected, and if necessary, this report will | | be updated to identify any additional areas. It has been determined that | | this event is reportable under 10CFR76.120(c)(2) as an event in which | | equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed." The NRC resident | | inspector has been notified of this event. | | | | * * * UPDATE AT 1022 EDT ON 06/04/99 FROM CAGE TO TROCINE * * * | | | | "Two sprinkler heads on system D-1 in C-337 and two sprinkler heads on | | system 27 in C-335 were identified to also be corroded. These were | | identified to the PSS on 06/03/99 at 1600 CDT and 1601 CDT, respectively, | | and determined to require an update to this report by the PSS. It has been | | determined that this event is reportable under 10CFR76.120(c)(2) as an event | | in which equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed." Paducah | | personnel notified the NRC resident inspector of this update. The NRC | | operations officer notified the R3DO (Hills) and NMSS EO (Combs). | | | | * * * UPDATE AT 2152 EDT ON 06/17/99 FROM WALKER TO POERTNER * * * | | | | "Three sprinkler heads on system C-15 and five sprinkler heads on system B-8 | | in C-333 were identified to also be corroded. The PSS was notified of this | | condition at 1300 CDT on 06/17/99 and determined that an update to this | | report was required. It has been determined that this event is reportable | | under 10CFR76.120(c)(2) as an event in which equipment is disabled or fails | | to function as designed." Paducah personnel notified the NRC resident | | inspector of this update. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO | | (Madera). | | | | * * * UPDATE 1440 EDT 6/18/1999 FROM UNDERWOOD TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * * | | | | "Two sprinkler heads on system C-15 and one sprinkler head on system B-8 in | | C-333 were identified to have corrosion. The PSS was notified of this | | condition at 1350 CDT on 06/18/99. The area of the fire patrol for system | | C-15 was expanded to include the two heads identified as corroded. The one | | head on system B-8 was in the area already being patrolled. The PSS | | determined that an update to this report was required." The NRC resident | | inspector has been informed of this update. Notified R3DO (Madera). | | | | * * * UPDATE 1315 EDT 6/25/1999 FROM WALKER TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * * | | | | "Two sprinkler heads on system D-8 and three sprinkler heads on system D-7 | | in C-337 were identified to have corrosion. The PSS was notified of the | | condition on system D-8 at 0125 CDT on 06/25/99 and at 1019 CDT on 06/25/99 | | for system D-7. Both systems were immediately declared inoperable and LCO | | fire patrol actions were implemented. It was determined that an update to | | this report was required." The NRC resident inspector has been informed of | | this update. Notified R3DO (Jordan). | | | | * * * UPDATE 2119 EDT 7/30/1999 FROM CAGE TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * * | | | | "Five sprinkler heads and one sprinkler piping tee on C-337 system D-7 were | | identified to have corrosion. The PSS was notified of these corroded system | | parts and declared the system inoperable at 0931 CDT on 07/30/99. LCO | | required fire patrols of the affected area were initiated. The PSS | | determined that an update to this event report was required." The NRC | | resident inspector has been informed of this update. Notified R3DO | | (Wright). | | | | * * * UPDATE 1655 EDT 7/31/1999 FROM WHITE TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * * | | | | "Two sprinkler heads on C-337 System D-1 were identified to have corrosion. | | The PSS was notified of these corroded system parts and declared the system | | inoperable at 1155 CDT on 7/31/99. LCO required fire patrols of the | | affected area were initiated. The PSS determined that an update to this | | report was required." The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this | | update. Notified R3DO (Wright). | | | | * * * UPDATE 1546 EDT 8/10/1999 FROM WHITE TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * * | | | | "Two sprinkler heads on C-337 system C-15 were identified to have corrosion. | | The PSS was notified of these corroded system parts and declared the system | | inoperable at 1130 CDT on 8/10/99. LCO required fire patrols of the | | affected area were initiated. The PSS determined that an update to this | | report was required." The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this | | update. Notified R3DO (Burgess). | | | | * * * UPDATE AT 1154 EDT 8/22/99 FROM WALKER TO POERTNER * * * | | | | Four adjacent sprinkler heads on C-333 System B-1 were identified to have | | corrosion. The PSS was notified of the corroded system parts and declared | | the system inoperable at 0918 CDT on 8/22/99. LCO required fire patrols | | were initiated. The PSS determined that an update to this report was | | required. It has been determined that this event is reportable under | | 10CFR76.120(c)(2) as an event in which equipment is disabled or fails to | | function as designed. The NRC resident inspector will be notified. The NRC | | operations officer notified the R3DO (Clayton). | | | | * * * UPDATE 2015 EDT ON 8/28/99 FROM W. F. GAGE TO S. SANDIN * * * | | | | "Two adjacent sprinkler heads on C-337 System D-11 were identified to have | | corrosion. The PSS was notified of these corroded system parts and declared | | the system inoperable at 1420 CDT on 8/28/99. LCO required fire patrols of | | the affected area were initiated. The PSS determined that an update to this | | report was required." | | Paducah personnel informed the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations | | officer notified the R3DO (Leach) and NMSS EO (Piccone). | | | | * * * UPDATE 2037 EDT ON 8/29/99 FROM KEVIN BEASLEY TO S. SANDIN * * * | | | | "Two adjacent sprinkler heads on C-337 System D-15 were identified to have | | corrosion and the PSS declared the system inoperable at 0925 [CDT] on | | 8/29/99. Also two adjacent heads on C-337 System D-10 were identified to | | have corrosion and the PSS declared the system inoperable at 1450. LCO | | required fire patrols for both of the affected areas were initiated in the | | time frame required by TSR. The PSS determined that an update to this | | report was required." Paducah personnel informed the NRC resident | | inspector. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Leach) and NMSS EO | | (Piccone). | | | | * * * UPDATE AT 0930 EDT ON 9/1/99 BY ERIC WALKER TO FANGIE JONES * * * | | | | Add two adjacent sprinkler heads on C-337 D-14. Paducah personnel informed | | the NRC Resident Inspector. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO | | (David Hills) and NMSS (Robert Pierson). | | | | * * * UPDATE AT 1133 EDT ON 9/8/99 BY TOM WHITE TO FANGIE JONES * * * | | | | Add two adjacent sprinkler heads on C-331 System 26, system declared | | inoperable at 2155 CDT on 9/7/99. An LCO required fire patrol for the | | affected area was initiated in the time frame required by the TSR. Paducah | | personnel informed the NRC Resident Inspector. The NRC operations officer | | notified the R3DO (Monte Phillips) and NMSS (Josie Piccone). | | | | * * * UPDATE AT 0948 ON 9/30/99 BY ERIC WALKER TO DOUG WEAVER * * * | | | | Add two adjacent sprinkler heads on C-333 System B-15 were identified to | | have corrosion and the PSS declared the system inoperable at 0815 CDT on | | 9/30/99. An LCO required fire patrol for the affected area was initiated in | | the time frame required by the TSR. The PSS determined that an update to | | this report was required. | | Paducah personnel informed the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations | | officer notified the R3DO (Vegel) and NMSS (Cool). | | | | * * * UPDATE AT 1600 ON 10/13/99 BY WALKER TO GOULD * * * | | | | Two adjacent sprinkler heads on C-333 System A-11 were Identified to have | | corrosion and the PSS declared the system inoperable at 1307 CDT on | | 10/13/99. An LCO required fire patrol for the affected area was initiated | | in the time frame required by the TSR, The PSS determined that an update to | | this report was required. Paducah personnel informed the NRC resident | | inspector. The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Madera) and NMSS | | (Moore). | | | | * * * UPDATE AT 1520 ON 10/19/99 FROM UNDERWOOD TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * * | | | | Six sprinkler heads on C-337 System D-16 were identified to have corrosion | | and the PSS declared the system inoperable at 1052 CDT on 10/19/99. An LCO | | required fire patrol for the affected area was initiated in the time frame | | required by the TSR. The PSS determined that an update to this report was | | required. The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this update. The | | NRC Operations Officer notified R3DO (Jorgensen). | | | | * * * UPDATE AT 2140 ON 10/19/99 FROM WALKER TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * * | | | | Seven sprinkler heads on C-337 System A-7 were identified to have corrosion, | | and another four had been painted over. In addition, three adjacent | | sprinkler heads on C-337 System A-8 were identified to have corrosion. The | | PSS declared the systems inoperable at 1900 CDT on 10/19/99. An LCO | | required fire patrols for the affected areas were initiated in the time | | frame required by the TSR. The PSS determined that an update to this report | | was required. The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this update. | | The NRC Operations Officer notified R3DO (Wright). | | | | * * * UPDATE AT 1713 ON 10/21/99 FROM CAGE TAKEN BY JOLLIFFE * * * | | | | Four sprinkler heads on C-337 System A-5, twelve sprinkler heads on C-337 | | System A-8, three sprinkler heads on C-337 System A-9, and six sprinkler | | heads on C-337 System B-8 were identified to have corrosion. On 10/21/99, | | the PSS declared System A-5 and A-9 inoperable at 1028 CDT, System A-8 | | inoperable at 1227 CDT and System B-8 inoperable at 1406 CDT. An LCO | | required fire patrol for the affected areas was initiated in the time frame | | required by the TSR.. The PSS determined that an update to this report was | | required. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this update. The | | NRC Operations Officer notified the R3DO Bruce Jorgensen. | | | | * * * UPDATE AT 2128 ON 10/22/99 FROM ERIC WALKER TAKEN BY JOLLIFFE * * * | | | | At 1400 CDT on 10/22/99, the PSS was notified that numerous corroded | | sprinkler heads were discovered in C-337 on sprinkler systems B-1, B-3, B-5, | | B-6, B-7, B-11 and D-17. Due to the number of systems called into question, | | the PSS declared all of the sprinkler systems in C-337 on the cell floor (a | | total of 66 systems) inoperable and TSR required actions establishing roving | | fire patrols were initiated within the required time frame. The PSS | | determined that an update to this report was required. It has been | | determined that this event Is reportable under 10CFR76.120(c)(2) as an event | | in which equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed. | | The NRC Resident lnspector has been informed of this update. The NRC | | Operations Officer notified the R3DO Bruce Jorgensen. | | | | * * * UPDATE AT 1239 ON 10/24/99 FROM TOM WHITE TAKEN BY JOLLIFFE * * * | | | | At 1200 CDT on 10/23/99, the PSS was notified that numerous corroded | | sprinkler heads were discovered in C-337 on sprinkler systems B-13 and B-14 | | on the ground floor, The PSS declared these systems inoperable and TSR | | required actions establishing roving fire patrols were initiated within the | | required time frame. At 1600 CDT on 10/23/99, the PSS was notified that | | numerous corroded sprinkler heads were discovered in C-337 on sprinkler | | systems A-16, B-12, C-8, C-12, C-15, D-5 and D-8 on the cell floor, These | | systems have already been declared inoperable and fire patrols are already | | being performed. The PSS determined that an update to this report was | | required. It has been determined that this event is reportable under | | I0CFR76.120(c)(2) as an event in which equipment is disabled or fails to | | function as designed. The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this | | update. The NRC Operations Officer notified the R3DO Bruce Jorgensen. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ !!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!! +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 36301 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: COMANCHE PEAK REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/16/1999| | UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: TX |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:06[EDT]| | RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 10/16/1999| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 14:28[CDT]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: B HUBBARD |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/22/1999| | HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |GAIL GOOD R4 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |1 N N 0 Refueling |0 Refueling | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | DURING TESTING OF THE TRAIN "B" (1EA2) 6.9kV BUS, THE ALTERNATE POWER SUPPLY | | BREAKER FAILED TO CLOSE AND THE BUS WAS LOCKED OUT. | | | | The loss of voltage due to the lockout of the 1EA2 6.9kV bus caused a loss | | of power to the containment particulate iodine gaseous (PIG) monitor which | | actuated a CVI (containment ventilation isolation). The containment | | ventilation was already isolated, so no valves repositioned. The blackout | | sequencer also received an undervoltage actuation. This caused several | | operator lockouts including a turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater start | | signal, which was out of service, and a trip of one of the two operating | | spent fuel pool cooling pumps. The second spent fuel pool cooling pump was | | returned to service about 40 minutes after it had initially lost power. | | Spent fuel pool temperature increased from approximately 104 degrees F to | | about 106 degrees F during the time period that the second spent fuel pool | | cooling pump was de-energized. About 0.25% of the fuel has been reloaded | | back into Comanche Peak Unit 1's core. | | | | The sequencer was de-energized to prevent any unnecessary actuations. The | | train "B," 1EA2, 6.9kV bus was re-energized from the normal offsite source, | | and the spent fuel pool cooling pump was restarted. The residual heat | | removal system was energized from the train "A," 1EA1, 6.9kV bus, and its | | operation was not interrupted by the loss of train the "B," 1EA2, 6.9kV bus. | | The train "B," 1EA2, 6.9kV bus emergency diesel generator is tagged out of | | service for maintenance. | | | | The cause of the bus lockout is under investigation. | | | | The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee. | | | | * * * UPDATE AT 1205 ON 10/22/99 BY DAVE HUBBARD TO JOLLIFFE * * * | | | | On 10/16/99. Unit 1 was in Mode 6 with fuel movement in progress. While | | performing the surveillance test for the 6.9 kV bus #1EA2, breaker #1EA2-2 | | failed to close or tripped when operated from the control room. Breaker | | #1EA2-1 opened as designed during the transfer and does not have an | | automatic re-closure feature. Since the EDG was tagged OOS the bus remained | | de-energized. SFP cooling pump #X-02 and the RMUW pump were stripped by the | | blackout sequencer operator lockout. The ESF actuation was reported as | | event #36301. | | | | Further review of the event by engineering and regulatory affairs, using | | NUREG 1022, concluded that this was a single component actuation of the | | undervoltage relay. However, to complete an ESF function, other components | | need to be actuated such as the EDG, AFW pumps, CCW pumps, etc. The SFP | | cooling pump and the RMUW pumps are not ESF components. The actuation of | | the relay did not result in the start of any ESF components and, therefore | | is not a valid ESF actuation. In addition, the sequencer is not required to | | be operable in Mode 6. The CVI actuation, by itself, would not be | | reportable as a valid ESF actuation | | | | Based on the above the licensee is retracting this ESF notification. | | | | The licensee plans to notify the NRC Resident Inspector. | | | | The NRC Operations Officer notified the R4DO Linda Smith. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 36328 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/22/1999| | RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 03:01[EDT]| | COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 10/21/1999| | 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 15:00[EDT]| | BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/22/1999| | CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+ | COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION | |LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |BRUCE JORGENSEN R3 | | DOCKET: 0707002 |CHARLEY HAUGHNEY NMSS | +------------------------------------------------+ | | NRC NOTIFIED BY: SPAETH | | | HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | 24 HOUR 91-01 BULLETIN RESPONSE | | | | On 10/21/ 1999 at 1500 hrs the Plant Shift Superintendent(PSS) was notified | | that a Nuclear Criticality Safety Approval (NCSA) requirement was not being | | performed in the X-710 ES&H Analytical Labs. NCS Engineering, while | | performing an NCS Self Assessment, noticed an operation where samples were | | brought to a staging area "INSIDE" a room when they were logged in and | | verified. (NCSA-0710_025.AOO) | | | | Requirement #1 of NCSA-071_25.AOO states in part; Samples in any room | | enriched to 1% or greater U-235, will be limited to one group of 30g U-235 | | per room. This will be ensured by maintaining a room inventory log of U-235 | | mass in labeled containers. Each log entry will consist of the U-235 mass | | value plus analytical uncertainty and will be: | | | | a. made by a knowledgeable person "PRIOR" to bringing the samples into the | | room, and | | b. verified by a second knowledgeable person "PRIOR" to bringing the samples | | into the room. | | | | At the direction of the Plant Shift Superintendent the requirements for an | | NCS anomalous condition were initiated and the area baundaried off. | | | | The safety significance of the event is very low. The U-235 mass in material | | is being maintained less than 30 grams as required. This is more than a | | factor of 10 less than the always safe mass of 350 grams U-235. The samples | | were brought to a staging area inside the room where they were logged in and | | verified. After logging and verifying the samples were moved to the | | operational area of the room, where they could interact with other materials | | in the room. | | | | Samples in any room enriched to 1% or greater U-235, with a concentration | | greater or equal to 500 ppm U-235, shall be limited to one group of 30 g | | U-235 per room. This shall be ensured by maintaining a room inventory log of | | U-235 mass in labeled containers. Each log entry shall consist of the U-235 | | mass value plus analytical uncertainty and shall be: | | | | Mass is the only parameter controlled | | | | The actual amount of material In the room is less than 30 grams U-235, at an | | enrichment of less than or equal to 100%. This value is obtained from sample | | data that was logged after the material was brought Into the room. This is | | approximately 4% of the worst case critical mass. | | | | Verbatim compliance with both mass controls was lost because the material | | was supposed to be checked and verified prior to bringing the material into | | the room. The samples were brought to a staging area inside the room where | | they were logged in and verified. After logging and verifying the samples | | were moved to the operational area of the room, where they could interact | | with other materials in the room. | | | | THERE WAS NO LOSS OF HAZARDOUS/RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL OR | | RADIOACTIVE/RADIOLOGICAL CONTAMINATION EXPOSURE AS A RESULT OF THIS EVENT. | | | | The Resident Inspector was notified and the DOE Representative will be | | notified. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 36329 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: BRUNSWICK REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/22/1999| | UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 06:24[EDT]| | RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 10/22/1999| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 03:15[EDT]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: JESTER |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/22/1999| | HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |KERRY LANDIS R2 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | | |NLCO TECH SPEC LCO A/S | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | HPCI IS INOPERABLE | | | | WHILE PERFORMING HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) SYSTEM OPERABILITY | | TEST (OPT-09-2) FOR POST MAINTENANCE TESTING, THE TURBINE STEAM SUPPLY VALVE | | #1-E41-F001 FAILED IN MID-POSITION. THIS OCCURRED WHEN THE VALVE WAS BEING | | CLOSED TO PLACE THE SYSTEM IN ITS STANDBY LINEUP FOLLOWING COMPLETION OF THE | | OPERABILITY TEST. IN ADDITION, THE STEAM SUPPLY DRAIN POT INBOARD AND | | OUTBOARD DRAIN VALVES #1-E41-F028 AND #1-E41-F029 DID NOT OPERATE AS | | EXPECTED. THESE VALVES OPEN AND CLOSE IN UNISON AUTOMATICALLY AS DETERMINED | | BY THE POSITION OF THE TURBINE STEAM SUPPLY VALVE #1-E41-F001. CURRENTLY, | | THE INBOARD DRAIN VALVE #1-E41-F028 IS CLOSED AND THE OUTBOARD DRAIN VALVE | | #1-E41-F029 IS OPEN. | | | | THE AUTOMATIC DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM, LOW PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION | | SYSTEM, CORE SPRAY SYSTEM AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLANT SYSTEM ARE | | OPERABLE. THE LICENSEE IS INVESTIGATING THE CAUSE OF THE PROBLEM AND | | SUSPECTS IT MIGHT BE DUE TO A LOGIC/LIMIT SWITCH CIRCUITRY PROBLEM. | | | | THE SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS EVENT IS MINIMAL. | | | | THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |General Information or Other |Event Number: 36330 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | REP ORG: US AIR FORCE |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/22/1999| |LICENSEE: US AIR FORCE |NOTIFICATION TIME: 07:39[EDT]| | CITY: MACON REGION: 2 |EVENT DATE: 10/21/1999| | COUNTY: STATE: GA |EVENT TIME: 16:53[EDT]| |LICENSE#: 42-32539-01AF AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/22/1999| | DOCKET: |+----------------------------+ | |PERSON ORGANIZATION | | |KERRY LANDIS R2 | | |LINDA SMITH R4 | +------------------------------------------------+CHARLEY HAUGHNEY NMSS | | NRC NOTIFIED BY: MAJ. WROBEL | | | HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |BAB1 20.2201(a)(1)(i) LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | THE AIR FORCE REPORTED THAT A LANTERN POD WAS LOST IN SHIPMENT | | | | A LANTERN POD (INFRARED IMAGING POD) CONTAINING TWO 4 MICROCURIES OF | | AMERICIUM-241 SOURCES WAS LOST IN A SHIPMENT FROM KIRKLAND AFB, NEW MEXICO | | TO ROBINS AFB, GEORGIA. THE DEVICE WAS AN AMERSHAM MODEL AMM.7. FEDEX WAS | | THE CARRIER FOR THIS SHIPMENT AND THE AIRBILL NUMBER IS 5654077161. THE | | SHIPMENT WAS DETERMINED TO BE LOST AT THE FEDEX DISTRIBUTION CENTER IN | | MACON, GA. THE DEVICE IS STILL BEING TRACKED BY FEDEX. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 36331 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: FT CALHOUN REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/22/1999| | UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NE |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:04[EDT]| | RXTYPE: [1] CE |EVENT DATE: 10/22/1999| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 09:22[CDT]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: ERICK MATZKE |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/22/1999| | HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |LINDA SMITH R4 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |ADAS 50.72(b)(2)(i) DEG/UNANALYZED COND | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |1 N N 0 Cold Shutdown |0 Cold Shutdown | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | - Steam Generator #RC-2A in Tech Spec Category C-3; Steam Generator | | inspections continuing - | | | | At 0922 CDT on 10/22/99, during eddy current testing of the steam generators | | (SGs), it has been determined that 50 tubes in SG #RC-2A require plugging. | | This places SG #RC-2A in Technical Specification category C-3 per 3.17(2). | | Forty four tubes have been determined to require plugging in SG #RC-2B at | | this time. Eddy current testing is continuing on the SGs. A 100% full | | length bobbin coil inspection program has been completed in both SGs. A | | rotating pancake coil probe (Plus Point) is being used to inspect 100% of | | the top of the hot leg tube sheets for both SGs. One hundred percent of | | these inspections for the 'A' SG are complete with about 99% evaluated. | | About 85% are complete on the 'B' SG with the rest expected to be completed | | on 10/22/99. In addition, a large number of rotating pancake coil probe | | inspections are being conducted at other locations in the SGs. In-situ | | pressure testing is being completed where needed. To date, 4 tubes in the | | 'A' SG and 2 tubes in the 'B' SG have been pressure tested. All 6 of these | | tubes have passed at 3 times normal operating differential pressure with | | zero leakage. | | | | This report is conservatively being made prior to completing the SG testing | | and before completely evaluating the effect on the plant. Further | | evaluation of reportability will be completed following the completion of | | the eddy current and in-situ pressure testing of the SGs. | | | | The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | | | | NOTE: Refer to related Event #36338. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |General Information or Other |Event Number: 36332 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | REP ORG: ENERTECH, BREA, CA |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/22/1999| |LICENSEE: ENERTECH, BREA, CA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:37[EDT]| | CITY: BREA REGION: 4 |EVENT DATE: 10/22/1999| | COUNTY: STATE: CA |EVENT TIME: 10:00[PDT]| |LICENSE#: AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/22/1999| | DOCKET: |+----------------------------+ | |PERSON ORGANIZATION | | |LINDA SMITH R4 | | |VERN HODGE (by fax) NRR | +------------------------------------------------+ | | NRC NOTIFIED BY: JOHN DeKLEINE | | | HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |CCCC 21.21 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | - Potential 10CFR Part 21 Report - | | | | In late 1998 Enertech manufactured and shipped electro-hydraulic actuators | | for installation on valves to be installed in an overseas plant. Prior to | | shipment, the valve manufacturer observed pressure switch indication | | problems during final testing of the valves on which the actuators were | | installed. | | | | Collective investigation by Burns and Roe, Enertech, including its switch | | supplier and the valve manufacturer determined the problem resulted from | | changes in manufacturing methods implemented by the switch supplier. The | | immediate problem was addressed, the pressure switches were modified using | | the supplier's previous manufacturing methods, installed on the valves and | | subsequently passed all final test requirements. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |General Information or Other |Event Number: 36333 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | REP ORG: KS DEPT of HEALTH & ENVIRONMENT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/22/1999| |LICENSEE: CUSHING MEMORIAL HOSPITAL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:13[EDT]| | CITY: LEAVENWORTH REGION: 4 |EVENT DATE: 09/20/1999| | COUNTY: STATE: KS |EVENT TIME: 12:30[CDT]| |LICENSE#: AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/22/1999| | DOCKET: |+----------------------------+ | |PERSON ORGANIZATION | | |LINDA SMITH R4 | | |CHARLEY HAUGHNEY NMSS | +------------------------------------------------+ | | NRC NOTIFIED BY: JUSTIN SPENCE | | | HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |NAGR AGREEMENT STATE | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | - AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POTENTIAL MEDICAL MISADMINISTRATION - | | | | A POTENTIAL MEDICAL MISADMINISTRATION INVOLVING AN INCORRECT CHEMICAL FORM | | OF TECHNETIUM-99 OCCURRED ON 09/22/99. AT 1230 CDT, THE PATIENT WAS | | ADMINISTERED 25.8 MILLICURIES OF WHAT MAY HAVE BEEN TECHNETIUM-99 DTPA. THE | | PATIENT WAS SCHEDULED TO RECEIVE A DOSE OF TECHNETIUM-99 MYOVIEW FOR A HEART | | SCAN. AN IMAGE OF THE KIDNEYS AND | | BLADDER WERE PRESENTED, BUT NO HEART IMAGE. THE RADIOLOGIST/RSO WAS | | IMMEDIATELY INFORMED. THE RADIOLOGIST CONFIRMED THE FINDINGS OF THE | | TECHNICIAN. THE LABEL FOR THE DOSE STATES THE RADIOPHARMACEUTICAL WAS A | | MYOVIEW DOSE. THE RADIOPHARMACY FROM WHICH THE DOSE WAS RECEIVED BELIEVES | | THAT THE CORRECT SUBSTANCE WAS ADMINISTERED. THE PATIENT AND PHYSICIAN WERE | | INFORMED THAT THE INCORRECT RADIOPHARMACEUTICAL HAD BEEN ADMINISTERED, AND | | THE CORRECT PROCEDURE WAS PERFORMED ON 09/23/99. DURING THE WEEK OF | | 10/04/99, THE CONSULTING PHYSICIST TO THE HOSPITAL WAS INFORMED. ON | | 10/17/99, THE PHYSICIST SENT A REPORT TO THE LICENSEE. IT WAS DETERMINED | | THAT THE CHEMICAL FORM OF THE RADIOPHARMACEUTICAL WAS PROBABLY DTPA. THE | | DOSE OF 25 MILLICURIES RESULTED IN A DOSE OF: TOTAL BODY 0.75 RAD, BLADDER | | 7.00 RAD, KIDNEYS 0.53 RAD, OVARIES 0.50 RAD, UTERUS 0.93 RAD, AND TESTES | | 0.35 RAD. THE CONSULTANT INSTRUCTED THE LICENSEE TO NOTIFY THE STATE OF | | KANSAS AND FILE A WRITTEN REPORT TO THE STATE OF KANSAS WITHIN 15 DAYS. | | | | AT 0930 CDT ON 10/22/99, CUSHING MEMORIAL HOSPITAL TELEPHONED THE KANSAS | | RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM IN ORDER TO INFORM THE AGENCY OF THE EVENT | | DESCRIBED ABOVE. THE KANSAS RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM INITIATED AN | | INVESTIGATION. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 36334 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: MILLSTONE REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/22/1999| | UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: CT |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:45[EDT]| | RXTYPE: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 10/22/1999| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 16:15[EDT]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: STEVE MYERS |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/22/1999| | HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |WILLIAM COOK R1 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | | | |2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | - WATER TIGHT DOOR BETWEEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP ROOMS FOUND IMPROPERLY | | SHUT - | | | | AT 1615 ON 10/22/99, THE LICENSEE DISCOVERED THAT THE WATER TIGHT PERSONNEL | | ACCESS DOOR BETWEEN THE TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER (AFW) PUMP ROOM | | AND THE MOTOR DRIVEN AFW PUMP ROOM IN THE TURBINE BUILDING WAS NOT PROPERLY | | "DOGGED" SHUT. WITH THIS DOOR NOT PROPERLY SEALED SHUT, A STEAM LEAK IN THE | | TURBINE DRIVEN AFW PUMP ROOM COULD HAVE DISABLED ALL THREE AFW PUMPS. THE | | LICENSEE IMMEDIATELY SHUT THE DOOR AND SECURED ALL THE DOOR "DOGS". THE | | LICENSEE IS CONDUCTING AN INVESTIGATION AND HAS DETERMINED THAT THE DOOR HAD | | BEEN IMPROPERLY SHUT FOR 10 TO 60 MINUTES. | | | | THE LICENSEE NOTIFIED STATE AND LOCAL OFFICIALS AND THE NRC RESIDENT | | INSPECTOR. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 36335 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: COOK REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/22/1999| | UNIT: [1] [2] [] STATE: MI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:54[EDT]| | RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 10/22/1999| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 15:00[EDT]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: MARY BETH DePUYDT |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/22/1999| | HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |BRUCE JORGENSEN R3 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |ADAS 50.72(b)(2)(i) DEG/UNANALYZED COND | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |1 N N 0 Refueling |0 Refueling | |2 N N 0 Refueling |0 Refueling | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | - SEVERAL PLANT LOCATIONS DISCOVERED TO BE UNPROTECTED HELB AREAS - | | | | This is a four hour non-emergency notification in accordance | | 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(1), of a condition which was found while both reactors were | | shutdown, which, had it been found while the reactors were in operation, | | could have resulted in the nuclear plant being in an unanalyzed condition | | that significantly compromises plant safety. | | | | A review of the High Energy Line Break (HELB) Program has identified a | | number of locations in the plant that had previously been analyzed to be | | protected from a HELB event, but are now considered to be unprotected HELB | | areas. These areas contain equipment that is not qualified for the harsh | | environment resulting from a HELB event in or near these locations, or the | | jet impingement from a crack in high energy piping near the equipment may | | damage the components and/or electrical cabling. The equipment potentially | | affected Includes: | | - Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps, previously reported in LER 315/99-058-00 | | - Safety and non-safety related switchgear supplying power to safety-related | | and safe shutdown components and vital instruments | | - Emergency Diesel Generators and associated Ventilation Systems | | - Component Cooling Water Pumps, previously reported in LER 316/98-005-00 | | - Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Batteries | | - Cabling and Conduit inside Containment due to jet impingement. | | | | Evaluations of these potential design deficiencies are ongoing. | | | | Both units are currently in no Technical Specifications Operating Mode with | | both cores offloaded. | | | | See also the following Event Notifications made on HELB issues: | | Event #35008 and associated LER 316/98-007-00 | | Event #35428 and associated LER 315/99-007-00 | | Event #34515 and associated LER 316/98-005-00. | | | | The licensee plans to notify the NRC Resident Inspector. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 36336 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: NINE MILE POINT REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/22/1999| | UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 20:55[EDT]| | RXTYPE: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5 |EVENT DATE: 10/22/1999| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 19:55[EDT]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: DON SHEEHAN |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/22/1999| | HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |WILLIAM COOK R1 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | | |NLCO TECH SPEC LCO A/S | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |1 N Y 98 Power Operation |98 Power Operation | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | - UNIT 1 IS OPERATING OUTSIDE ITS DESIGN BASIS IN ITS CURRENT OPERATING | | CONDITION - | | | | Unit 1 received information from its Engineering Department that Unit 1 is | | operating outside of design basis in its current operating condition. | | Specifically, with #11 Reactor Recirc Pump fully isolated, an analysis for | | thermal shock caused by initiation of #12 Emergency Cooling Loop injecting | | through #11 Reactor Recirc Loop suction nozzle has not been performed. | | Mitigating actions include isolating #12 Emergency Cooling Loop, in order to | | return the plant to an analyzed condition, which requires that the plant | | enter a 7-Day Technical Specification Shutdown LCO until such time that an | | analysis for thermal shock has been performed. Engineering Department has | | reasonable assurance that this analysis will be completed within the 7 days | | required by Unit 1 Tech Specs. | | | | All other Emergency Core Cooling System equipment is operable. | | | | This event has no effect on Unit 2. | | | | The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 36337 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/22/1999| | RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 21:22[EDT]| | COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 10/22/1999| | 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 17:15[EDT]| | BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/22/1999| | CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+ | COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION | |LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |BRUCE JORGENSEN R3 | | DOCKET: 0707002 |CHARLEY HAUGHNEY NMSS | +------------------------------------------------+ | | NRC NOTIFIED BY: ERIC SPAETH | | | HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | - NRC BULLETIN 91-01, 24 HOUR REPORT - | | | | ERROR MESSAGE ON THE X-705 DECONTAMINATION FACILITY URANIUM RECOVERY | | EVAPORATOR FLOW DIVERSION SYSTEM CONDUCTIVITY PROBE | | | | At 1750 on 10/22/99, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that | | a Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) Approval requirement had not been | | maintained in the X-705 Decontamination Facility. Upon discovery of an | | error message on one of three conductivity probes on the Uranium Recovery | | Evaporator Flow Diversion (UREFD) System, an investigation was initiated to | | determine cause and impact. | | | | Evidence shows that on 09/28/99, two of three conductivity cells credited as | | Active Engineered Features of the applicable NCS Approvals were displaying | | error codes while the evaporator system was in operation. Engineering began | | an evaluation, but at that time, was not able to provide Reasonable | | Assurance of Operability for the system. The PSS declared the UREFD System | | inoperable at that time. | | | | The NCS Evaluation credits the UREFD System as a secondary NCS Control with | | the physical Integrity of the evaporator tubes as the primary NCS Control. | | There is no indication that the physical integrity of the evaporator tube | | was ever compromised. | | | | The conductivity cells and associated flow diversion valves, while not | | specifically listed in NCS Approval Part 'B' requirements, are still | | considered "NCS Controls" for the purpose of satisfying the double | | contingency principle. The loss of the UREFD System is considered a loss of | | control such that only one double contingency control remained in place. | | | | | | SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: | | The safety significance of this event is very low. The inoperability of the | | UREFD System was a transient event. Available data immediately before and | | after the suspect time shows the system operating within normal parameters. | | | | POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW | | CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): | | During the brief time the UREFD System was inoperable, an evaporator tube | | could have ruptured and allowed uranium bearing solution to enter the | | unfavorable geometry storm drain system. If the concentration of U-235 was | | high enough and the geometry large enough, the system could have reached a | | critical configuration. | | | | CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC): | | Geometry and concentration were controlled. Geometry was controlled within | | the evaporator tube and the favorable geometry storage tanks. Concentration | | was controlled in the condensate being discharged into the storm sewer | | system. | | | | ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDES PROCESS | | LIMIT AND PER CENT WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS): | | The UREFD System normally contains uranyl nitrate or nitrate based | | solutions. The system is analyzed to 100% enriched U-235 solutions, but not | | more the 10% is expected due to plant certificate limitations. The UREFD | | System actuates automatically at 1000 mhos which corresponds to 15 ppm | | uranium. No uranium bearing solution was involved in this event, so no data | | is available on estimated amount or per cent worst case of critical mass. | | | | NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION | | OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: | | The UREFD System monitors the condensate entering the storm sewers to | | automatically divert the flow to favorable geometry storage tanks in the | | event the concentration of uranium exceeds 15 ppm. The system is actuated | | when two of three conductivity probes detect more than 1000 mhos. The | | system was inoperable for a brief period when two of the three conductivity | | probes were displaying an error message instead of providing a conductivity | | reading. | | | | CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: | | At the direction of the PSS, the requirements for an NCS Anomalous Condition | | were initiated and the UREFD System was shut down and placed in safe | | configuration. | | | | There was no loss of hazardous or radioactive material nor radioactive or | | radiological contamination exposure as a result of this event. | | | | The Certificate Holder notified the NRC Resident Inspector of this event. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 36338 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: FT CALHOUN REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/23/1999| | UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NE |NOTIFICATION TIME: 20:59[EDT]| | RXTYPE: [1] CE |EVENT DATE: 10/23/1999| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 16:45[CDT]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: KEVIN BOSTON |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/23/1999| | HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |LINDA SMITH R4 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |ADAS 50.72(b)(2)(i) DEG/UNANALYZED COND | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |1 N N 0 Refueling |0 Refueling | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | - Steam Generator #RC-2B is in Tech Spec Category C-3 - | | | | In accordance with Tech Spec Section 3.17 (5), Reporting Requirements, the | | following 4 hour non-emergency report is being made. | | | | During Eddy Current Testing tube inspections on Steam Generator (SG) #RC-2B, | | greater than 1% of the tubes tested were found to be defective. The number | | of inspected tubes during the 1999 refueling outage is 4905 in SG #RC-2B. | | The number of tubes considered defective and require plugging exceeded 49 | | tubes. | | | | SG #RC-2B was declared in Tech Spec 3.17, Table 3-13, Category C-3 at 1645 | | CDT on 10/23/99. Tube testing is being conducted under procedure | | SE-ST-RC-0003, Inservice Testing of Steam Generator Tubes. | | | | The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | | | | Note: Refer to related Event #36331. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 36339 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: SOUTH TEXAS REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/24/1999| | UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: TX |NOTIFICATION TIME: 08:32[EDT]| | RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 10/24/1999| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 04:38[CDT]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: JOHN M. CRAIN |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/24/1999| | HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |LINDA SMITH R4 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |ADAS 50.72(b)(2)(i) DEG/UNANALYZED COND | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | | | |2 N N 0 Refueling |0 Refueling | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | STEAM GENERATOR "2C" CLASSIFIED AS CATEGORY "C-3" DUE TO STRESS CORROSION | | CRACKING OF > 1% IN-SERVICE TUBES IN THE AREA OF THE HOT LEG SUPPORT PLATE | | CREVICES. | | | | "ON OCTOBER 24, 1999 THE INSPECTION RESULTS OF THE 2C STEAM GENERATOR | | DETERMINED THAT MORE THAN 1% OF THE TUBES ARE DEFECTIVE, CONSTITUTING A C-3 | | CONDITION PER STP TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT 4.4.5.2. | | THE GENERAL AREA OF DEGRADATION IS IN THE HOT LEG TUBE SUPPORT PLATE | | CREVICES. THE CAUSE OF THE DAMAGE IS THOUGHT TO BE OUTSIDE DIAMETER STRESS | | CORROSION CRACKING. 100% OF THE IN-SERVICE TUBE-TO-TUBE SUPPORT PLATE | | INTERSECTIONS ARE BEING EDDY CURRENT INSPECTED BY BOBBIN COIL PROBE. ALL | | DISTORTED SUPPORT PLATE INDICATIONS WITH BOBBIN VOLTAGE OF OVER 1 VOLT ARE | | BEING FURTHER EXAMINED BY PLUS POINT PROBE. COMPLETION OF THE | | EXAMINATION SCOPE IS IN PROGRESS. THIS REPRESENTS A REPORTABLE CONDITION | | PER 10 CFR PART 50.72(B)(2) AS DEFINED BY STP TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE | | 4.4-2." | | | | INSPECTIONS ARE ALSO PLANNED FOR STEAM GENERATORS "2A", "2B" AND "2D." THE | | LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 36340 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: SALEM REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/24/1999| | UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NJ |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:25[EDT]| | RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 10/24/1999| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 12:19[EDT]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: SUSAN SIMPSON |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/24/1999| | HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |WILLIAM COOK R1 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |1 M/R Y 1 Startup |0 Hot Standby | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | - MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DURING CONTROL ROD WORTH TESTING - | | | | With Unit 1 stable in Mode 2 (Startup) at 10E-8 amps, the licensee was | | performing control rod worth measurements in accordance with the Initial | | Criticality and Testing using Advanced Digital Reactivity Computer Procedure | | under the provisions of Special Test Exception Tech Spec 3.10.1 and 3.10.3 | | (Shutdown Margin and Physics Tests). Control Bank 'C' control rods were | | being inserted at maximum speed (66 steps per minute) when the reactor | | operator noted a discrepancy between the Group 1 and Group 2 step counters. | | Reactor operators manually tripped the reactor at 1219. All control rods | | inserted completely. Unit 1 is stable in Mode 3 (Hot Standby). Steam is | | being dumped to the main condenser and main feedwater is aligned to the | | steam generators. | | | | The licensee is troubleshooting the rod control problem. Initial | | investigation revealed a stationary phase failure for Group 1, Control Bank | | 'C' control rods. | | | | The licensee plans to notify local officials and the NRC Resident Inspector. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021