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Event Notification Report for October 25, 1999

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           10/22/1999 - 10/25/1999

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

35790  36301  36328  36329  36330  36331  36332  36333  36334  36335  36336  36337 
36338  36339  36340  

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   35790       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT      |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/03/1999|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:44[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        06/02/1999|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        16:30[CDT]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/24/1999|
|    CITY:  PADUCAH                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  McCRACKEN                 STATE:  KY |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-1                 AGREEMENT:  Y  |DAVID HILLS          R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707001                              |DON COOL             NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  THOMAS WHITE                 |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  FANGIE JONES                 |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|OCBA 76.120(c)(2)(i)     ACCID MT EQUIP FAILS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
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                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| THREE SPRINKLER SYSTEMS DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO CORRODED HEADS (24-hour   |
| report)                                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| "On 06/02/99 at 1630 CDT, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified  |
| that numerous sprinkler heads were corroded, affecting 16 sprinkler systems  |
| in C-337 and one system in C-333, such that the ability of the sprinklers to |
| flow sufficient water was called into question.  Subsequently, these         |
| sprinkler systems were declared inoperable, and TSR-required actions         |
| establishing roving fire patrols were initiated.  This deficiency was        |
| detected during scheduled system inspections conducted by Fire Protection    |
| personnel.  Currently, functionality of the sprinkler heads has not been     |
| fully evaluated by Fire Protection personnel, and the remaining cascade      |
| buildings are currently being inspected, and if necessary, this report will  |
| be updated to identify any additional areas.  It has been determined that    |
| this event is reportable under 10CFR76.120(c)(2) as an event in which        |
| equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed."  The NRC resident   |
| inspector has been notified of this event.                                   |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1022 EDT ON 06/04/99 FROM CAGE TO TROCINE * * *              |
|                                                                              |
| "Two sprinkler heads on system D-1 in C-337 and two sprinkler heads on       |
| system 27 in C-335 were identified to also be corroded.  These were          |
| identified to the PSS on 06/03/99 at 1600 CDT and 1601 CDT, respectively,    |
| and determined to require an update to this report by the PSS.  It has been  |
| determined that this event is reportable under 10CFR76.120(c)(2) as an event |
| in which equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed."  Paducah   |
| personnel notified the NRC resident inspector of this update.  The NRC       |
| operations officer notified the R3DO (Hills) and NMSS EO (Combs).            |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 2152 EDT ON 06/17/99 FROM WALKER TO POERTNER * * *           |
|                                                                              |
| "Three sprinkler heads on system C-15 and five sprinkler heads on system B-8 |
| in C-333 were identified to also be corroded.  The PSS was notified of this  |
| condition at 1300 CDT on 06/17/99 and determined that an update to this      |
| report was required.  It has been determined that this event is reportable   |
| under 10CFR76.120(c)(2) as an event in which equipment is disabled or fails  |
| to function as designed."  Paducah personnel notified the NRC resident       |
| inspector of this update.  The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO      |
| (Madera).                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE 1440 EDT 6/18/1999 FROM UNDERWOOD TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *       |
|                                                                              |
| "Two sprinkler heads on system C-15 and one sprinkler head on system B-8 in  |
| C-333 were identified to have corrosion.  The PSS was notified of this       |
| condition at 1350 CDT on 06/18/99.  The area of the fire patrol for system   |
| C-15 was expanded to include the two heads identified as corroded.  The one  |
| head on system B-8 was in the area already being patrolled.  The PSS         |
| determined that an update to this report was required."  The NRC resident    |
| inspector has been informed of this update.  Notified R3DO (Madera).         |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE 1315 EDT 6/25/1999 FROM WALKER TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *          |
|                                                                              |
| "Two sprinkler heads on system D-8 and three sprinkler heads on system D-7   |
| in C-337 were identified to have corrosion.  The PSS was notified of the     |
| condition on system D-8 at 0125 CDT on 06/25/99 and at 1019 CDT on 06/25/99  |
| for system D-7.  Both systems were immediately declared inoperable and LCO   |
| fire patrol actions were implemented.  It was determined that an update to   |
| this report was required."  The NRC resident inspector has been informed of  |
| this update.  Notified R3DO (Jordan).                                        |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE 2119 EDT 7/30/1999 FROM CAGE TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *            |
|                                                                              |
| "Five sprinkler heads and one sprinkler piping tee on C-337 system D-7 were  |
| identified to have corrosion. The PSS was notified of these corroded system  |
| parts and declared the system inoperable at 0931 CDT on 07/30/99.  LCO       |
| required fire patrols of the affected area were initiated.  The PSS          |
| determined that an update to this event report was required."  The NRC       |
| resident inspector has been informed of this update.  Notified R3DO          |
| (Wright).                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE 1655 EDT 7/31/1999 FROM WHITE TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *           |
|                                                                              |
| "Two sprinkler heads on C-337 System D-1 were identified to have corrosion.  |
| The PSS was notified of these corroded system parts and declared the system  |
| inoperable at 1155 CDT on 7/31/99.  LCO required fire patrols of the         |
| affected area were initiated.  The PSS determined that an update to this     |
| report was required."  The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this  |
| update.  Notified R3DO (Wright).                                             |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE 1546 EDT 8/10/1999 FROM WHITE TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *           |
|                                                                              |
| "Two sprinkler heads on C-337 system C-15 were identified to have corrosion. |
| The PSS was notified of these corroded system parts and declared the system  |
| inoperable at 1130 CDT on 8/10/99.  LCO required fire patrols of the         |
| affected area were initiated.  The PSS determined that an update to this     |
| report was required."  The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this  |
| update.  Notified R3DO (Burgess).                                            |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1154 EDT 8/22/99 FROM WALKER TO POERTNER * * *               |
|                                                                              |
| Four adjacent sprinkler heads on C-333 System B-1 were identified to have    |
| corrosion.  The PSS was notified of the corroded system parts and declared   |
| the system inoperable at 0918 CDT on 8/22/99.  LCO required fire patrols     |
| were initiated.  The PSS determined that an update to this report was        |
| required.  It has been determined that this event is reportable under        |
| 10CFR76.120(c)(2) as an event in which equipment is disabled or fails to     |
| function as designed.  The NRC resident inspector will be notified.  The NRC |
| operations officer notified the R3DO (Clayton).                              |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE 2015 EDT ON 8/28/99 FROM W. F. GAGE TO S. SANDIN * * *          |
|                                                                              |
| "Two adjacent sprinkler heads on C-337 System D-11 were identified to have   |
| corrosion.  The PSS was notified of these corroded system parts and declared |
| the system inoperable at 1420 CDT on 8/28/99.   LCO required fire patrols of |
| the affected area were initiated. The PSS determined that an update to this  |
| report was required."                                                        |
| Paducah personnel informed the NRC resident inspector.  The NRC operations   |
| officer notified the R3DO (Leach) and NMSS EO (Piccone).                     |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE 2037 EDT ON 8/29/99 FROM KEVIN BEASLEY TO S. SANDIN * * *       |
|                                                                              |
| "Two adjacent sprinkler heads on C-337 System D-15 were identified to have   |
| corrosion and the PSS declared the system inoperable at 0925 [CDT] on        |
| 8/29/99.  Also two adjacent heads on C-337 System D-10 were identified to    |
| have corrosion and the PSS declared the system inoperable at 1450.   LCO     |
| required fire patrols for both of the affected areas were initiated in the   |
| time frame required by TSR.  The PSS determined that an update to this       |
| report was required."  Paducah personnel informed the NRC resident           |
| inspector.  The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Leach) and NMSS EO |
| (Piccone).                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 0930 EDT ON 9/1/99  BY ERIC WALKER TO FANGIE JONES * * *     |
|                                                                              |
| Add two adjacent sprinkler heads on C-337 D-14.  Paducah personnel informed  |
| the NRC Resident Inspector.  The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO    |
| (David Hills) and NMSS (Robert Pierson).                                     |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1133 EDT ON 9/8/99  BY TOM WHITE TO FANGIE JONES * * *       |
|                                                                              |
| Add two adjacent sprinkler heads on C-331 System 26, system declared         |
| inoperable at 2155 CDT on 9/7/99.  An LCO required fire patrol for the       |
| affected area was initiated in the time frame required by the TSR.  Paducah  |
| personnel informed the NRC Resident Inspector.  The NRC operations officer   |
| notified the R3DO (Monte Phillips) and NMSS (Josie Piccone).                 |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 0948 ON 9/30/99 BY ERIC WALKER TO DOUG WEAVER * * *          |
|                                                                              |
| Add two adjacent sprinkler heads on C-333  System B-15 were identified to    |
| have corrosion and the PSS declared the system inoperable at 0815 CDT on     |
| 9/30/99.  An LCO required fire patrol for the affected area was initiated in |
| the time frame required by the TSR.  The PSS determined that an update to    |
| this report was required.                                                    |
| Paducah personnel informed the NRC resident inspector.   The NRC operations  |
| officer notified the R3DO (Vegel) and NMSS (Cool).                           |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1600 ON 10/13/99 BY WALKER TO GOULD * * *                    |
|                                                                              |
| Two adjacent sprinkler heads on C-333 System A-11 were Identified to have    |
| corrosion and the PSS declared the system inoperable at 1307 CDT on          |
| 10/13/99.  An LCO required fire patrol for the affected area was initiated   |
| in the time frame required by the TSR,  The PSS determined that an update to |
| this report was required.  Paducah personnel informed the NRC resident       |
| inspector.   The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Madera) and NMSS  |
| (Moore).                                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1520 ON 10/19/99 FROM UNDERWOOD TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *      |
|                                                                              |
| Six sprinkler heads on C-337 System D-16 were identified to have corrosion   |
| and the PSS declared the system inoperable at 1052 CDT on 10/19/99.  An LCO  |
| required fire patrol for the affected area was initiated in the time frame   |
| required by the TSR.  The PSS determined that an update to this report was   |
| required.  The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this update.  The |
| NRC Operations Officer notified R3DO (Jorgensen).                            |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 2140 ON 10/19/99 FROM WALKER TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *         |
|                                                                              |
| Seven sprinkler heads on C-337 System A-7 were identified to have corrosion, |
| and another four had been painted over.  In addition, three adjacent         |
| sprinkler heads on C-337 System A-8 were identified to have corrosion.  The  |
| PSS declared the systems inoperable at 1900 CDT on 10/19/99.  An LCO         |
| required fire patrols for the affected areas were initiated in the time      |
| frame required by the TSR.  The PSS determined that an update to this report |
| was required.  The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this update.  |
| The NRC Operations Officer notified R3DO (Wright).                           |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1713 ON 10/21/99 FROM CAGE TAKEN BY JOLLIFFE * * *           |
|                                                                              |
| Four sprinkler heads on C-337 System A-5, twelve sprinkler heads on C-337    |
| System A-8, three sprinkler heads on C-337 System A-9, and six sprinkler     |
| heads on C-337 System B-8 were identified to have corrosion.  On 10/21/99,   |
| the PSS declared System A-5 and A-9 inoperable at 1028 CDT, System A-8       |
| inoperable at 1227 CDT and System B-8 inoperable at 1406 CDT.   An LCO       |
| required fire patrol for the affected areas was initiated in the time frame  |
| required by the TSR..  The PSS determined that an update to this report was  |
| required.  The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this update.  The |
| NRC Operations Officer notified the R3DO Bruce Jorgensen.                    |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 2128 ON 10/22/99 FROM ERIC WALKER TAKEN BY JOLLIFFE * * *    |
|                                                                              |
| At 1400 CDT on 10/22/99, the PSS was notified that numerous corroded         |
| sprinkler heads were discovered in C-337 on sprinkler systems B-1, B-3, B-5, |
| B-6, B-7, B-11 and D-17.  Due to the number of systems called into question, |
| the PSS declared all of the sprinkler systems in C-337 on the cell floor (a  |
| total of 66 systems) inoperable and TSR required actions establishing roving |
| fire patrols were initiated within the required time frame.  The PSS         |
| determined that an update to this report was required.  It has been          |
| determined that this event Is reportable under 10CFR76.120(c)(2) as an event |
| in which equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed.             |
| The NRC Resident lnspector has been informed of this update.  The NRC        |
| Operations Officer notified the R3DO Bruce Jorgensen.                        |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1239 ON 10/24/99 FROM TOM WHITE TAKEN BY JOLLIFFE * * *      |
|                                                                              |
| At 1200 CDT on 10/23/99, the PSS was notified that numerous corroded         |
| sprinkler heads were discovered in C-337 on sprinkler systems B-13 and B-14  |
| on the ground floor,  The PSS declared these systems inoperable and TSR      |
| required actions establishing roving fire patrols were initiated within the  |
| required time frame.  At 1600 CDT on 10/23/99, the PSS  was notified that    |
| numerous corroded sprinkler heads were discovered in C-337 on sprinkler      |
| systems A-16, B-12, C-8, C-12, C-15, D-5 and D-8 on the cell floor,  These   |
| systems have already been declared inoperable and fire patrols are already   |
| being performed.  The PSS determined that an update to this report was       |
| required.  It has been determined that this event is reportable under        |
| I0CFR76.120(c)(2) as an event in which equipment is disabled or fails to     |
| function as designed.  The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this  |
| update.  The NRC Operations Officer notified the R3DO Bruce Jorgensen.       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36301       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: COMANCHE PEAK            REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/16/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  TX |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:06[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        10/16/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        14:28[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  B HUBBARD                    |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/22/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |GAIL GOOD            R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          N       0        Refueling        |0        Refueling        |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| DURING TESTING OF THE TRAIN "B" (1EA2) 6.9kV BUS, THE ALTERNATE POWER SUPPLY |
| BREAKER FAILED TO CLOSE AND THE BUS WAS LOCKED OUT.                          |
|                                                                              |
| The loss of voltage due to the lockout of the 1EA2 6.9kV bus caused a loss   |
| of power to the containment particulate iodine gaseous (PIG) monitor which   |
| actuated a CVI (containment ventilation isolation).  The containment         |
| ventilation was already isolated, so no valves repositioned.  The blackout   |
| sequencer also received an undervoltage actuation.  This caused several      |
| operator lockouts including a turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater start       |
| signal, which was out of service, and a trip of one of the two operating     |
| spent fuel pool cooling pumps.  The second spent fuel pool cooling pump was  |
| returned to service about 40 minutes after it had initially lost power.      |
| Spent fuel pool temperature increased from approximately 104 degrees F to    |
| about 106 degrees F during the time period that the second spent fuel pool   |
| cooling pump was de-energized.  About 0.25% of the fuel has been reloaded    |
| back into Comanche Peak Unit 1's core.                                       |
|                                                                              |
| The sequencer was de-energized to prevent any unnecessary actuations.  The   |
| train "B," 1EA2, 6.9kV bus was re-energized from the normal offsite source,  |
| and the spent fuel pool cooling pump was restarted.  The residual heat       |
| removal system was energized from the train "A," 1EA1, 6.9kV bus, and its    |
| operation was not interrupted by the loss of train the "B," 1EA2, 6.9kV bus. |
| The train "B," 1EA2, 6.9kV bus emergency diesel generator is tagged out of   |
| service for maintenance.                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| The cause of the bus lockout is under investigation.                         |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.       |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1205 ON 10/22/99 BY DAVE HUBBARD TO JOLLIFFE * * *           |
|                                                                              |
| On 10/16/99. Unit 1 was in Mode 6 with fuel movement in progress.  While     |
| performing the surveillance test for the 6.9 kV bus #1EA2, breaker #1EA2-2   |
| failed to close or tripped when operated from the control room.  Breaker     |
| #1EA2-1 opened as designed during the transfer and does not have an          |
| automatic re-closure feature. Since the EDG was tagged OOS the bus remained  |
| de-energized.  SFP cooling pump #X-02 and the RMUW pump were stripped by the |
| blackout sequencer operator lockout.  The ESF actuation was reported as      |
| event #36301.                                                                |
|                                                                              |
| Further review of the event by engineering and regulatory affairs, using     |
| NUREG 1022, concluded that this was a single component actuation of the      |
| undervoltage relay.  However, to complete an ESF function, other components  |
| need to be actuated such as the EDG, AFW pumps, CCW pumps, etc.  The SFP     |
| cooling pump and the RMUW pumps are not ESF components.  The actuation of    |
| the relay did not result in the start of any ESF components and, therefore   |
| is not a valid ESF actuation.  In addition, the sequencer is not required to |
| be operable in Mode 6.  The CVI actuation, by itself, would not be           |
| reportable as a valid ESF actuation                                          |
|                                                                              |
| Based on the above the licensee is retracting this ESF notification.         |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee plans to notify the NRC Resident Inspector.                     |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Operations Officer notified the R4DO Linda Smith.                    |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   36328       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT   |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/22/1999|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 03:01[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        10/21/1999|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        15:00[EDT]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/22/1999|
|    CITY:  PIKETON                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  PIKE                      STATE:  OH |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-2                 AGREEMENT:  N  |BRUCE JORGENSEN      R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707002                              |CHARLEY HAUGHNEY     NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  SPAETH                       |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 24 HOUR 91-01 BULLETIN RESPONSE                                              |
|                                                                              |
| On 10/21/ 1999 at 1500 hrs the Plant Shift Superintendent(PSS) was notified  |
| that a Nuclear Criticality Safety Approval (NCSA) requirement was not being  |
| performed in the X-710 ES&H Analytical Labs. NCS Engineering, while          |
| performing an NCS Self Assessment, noticed an operation where samples were   |
| brought to a staging area "INSIDE" a room when they were logged in and       |
| verified. (NCSA-0710_025.AOO)                                                |
|                                                                              |
| Requirement #1 of NCSA-071_25.AOO states in part; Samples in any room        |
| enriched to 1% or greater U-235, will be limited to one group of 30g U-235   |
| per room. This will be ensured by maintaining a room inventory log of U-235  |
| mass in labeled containers. Each log entry will consist of the U-235 mass    |
| value plus analytical uncertainty and will be:                               |
|                                                                              |
| a. made by a knowledgeable person "PRIOR" to bringing the samples into the   |
| room, and                                                                    |
| b. verified by a second knowledgeable person "PRIOR" to bringing the samples |
| into the room.                                                               |
|                                                                              |
| At the direction of the Plant Shift Superintendent the requirements for an   |
| NCS anomalous condition were initiated and the area baundaried off.          |
|                                                                              |
| The safety significance of the event is very low. The U-235 mass in material |
| is being maintained less than 30 grams as required. This is more than a      |
| factor of 10 less than the always safe mass of 350 grams U-235. The samples  |
| were brought to a staging area inside the room where they were logged in and |
| verified. After logging and verifying the samples were moved to the          |
| operational area of the room, where they could interact with other materials |
| in the room.                                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| Samples in any room enriched to 1% or greater U-235, with a concentration    |
| greater or equal to 500 ppm U-235, shall be limited to one group of 30 g     |
| U-235 per room. This shall be ensured by maintaining a room inventory log of |
| U-235 mass in labeled containers. Each log entry shall consist of the U-235  |
| mass value plus analytical uncertainty and shall be:                         |
|                                                                              |
| Mass is the only parameter controlled                                        |
|                                                                              |
| The actual amount of material In the room is less than 30 grams U-235, at an |
| enrichment of less than or equal to 100%. This value is obtained from sample |
| data that was logged after the material was brought Into the room. This is   |
| approximately 4% of the worst case critical mass.                            |
|                                                                              |
| Verbatim compliance with both mass controls was lost because the material    |
| was supposed to be checked and verified prior to bringing the material into  |
| the room. The samples were brought to a staging area inside the room where   |
| they were logged in and verified. After logging and verifying the samples    |
| were moved to the operational area of the room, where they could interact    |
| with other materials in the room.                                            |
|                                                                              |
| THERE WAS NO LOSS OF HAZARDOUS/RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL OR                       |
| RADIOACTIVE/RADIOLOGICAL CONTAMINATION EXPOSURE AS A RESULT OF THIS EVENT.   |
|                                                                              |
| The Resident Inspector was notified and the DOE Representative will be       |
| notified.                                                                    |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36329       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: BRUNSWICK                REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/22/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  NC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 06:24[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4                    |EVENT DATE:        10/22/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        03:15[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  JESTER                       |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/22/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |KERRY LANDIS         R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION    |                             |
|NLCO                     TECH SPEC LCO A/S      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| HPCI IS INOPERABLE                                                           |
|                                                                              |
| WHILE PERFORMING HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) SYSTEM OPERABILITY   |
| TEST (OPT-09-2) FOR POST MAINTENANCE TESTING, THE TURBINE STEAM SUPPLY VALVE |
| #1-E41-F001 FAILED IN MID-POSITION.  THIS OCCURRED WHEN THE VALVE WAS BEING  |
| CLOSED TO PLACE THE SYSTEM IN ITS STANDBY LINEUP FOLLOWING COMPLETION OF THE |
| OPERABILITY TEST.  IN ADDITION, THE STEAM SUPPLY DRAIN POT INBOARD AND       |
| OUTBOARD DRAIN VALVES #1-E41-F028 AND #1-E41-F029 DID NOT OPERATE AS         |
| EXPECTED.  THESE VALVES OPEN AND CLOSE IN UNISON AUTOMATICALLY AS DETERMINED |
| BY THE POSITION OF THE TURBINE STEAM SUPPLY VALVE #1-E41-F001.  CURRENTLY,   |
| THE INBOARD DRAIN VALVE #1-E41-F028 IS CLOSED AND THE OUTBOARD DRAIN VALVE   |
| #1-E41-F029 IS OPEN.                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| THE AUTOMATIC DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM, LOW PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION        |
| SYSTEM, CORE SPRAY SYSTEM AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLANT SYSTEM ARE      |
| OPERABLE.  THE LICENSEE IS INVESTIGATING THE CAUSE OF THE PROBLEM AND        |
| SUSPECTS IT MIGHT BE DUE TO A LOGIC/LIMIT SWITCH CIRCUITRY PROBLEM.          |
|                                                                              |
| THE SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS EVENT IS MINIMAL.                            |
|                                                                              |
| THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED.                                         |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other                     |Event Number:   36330       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  US AIR FORCE                         |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/22/1999|
|LICENSEE:  US AIR FORCE                         |NOTIFICATION TIME: 07:39[EDT]|
|    CITY:  MACON                    REGION:  2  |EVENT DATE:        10/21/1999|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  GA |EVENT TIME:        16:53[EDT]|
|LICENSE#:  42-32539-01AF         AGREEMENT:  Y  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/22/1999|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |KERRY LANDIS         R2      |
|                                                |LINDA SMITH          R4      |
+------------------------------------------------+CHARLEY HAUGHNEY     NMSS    |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  MAJ. WROBEL                  |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|BAB1 20.2201(a)(1)(i)    LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| THE AIR FORCE REPORTED THAT A LANTERN POD WAS LOST IN SHIPMENT               |
|                                                                              |
| A LANTERN POD (INFRARED IMAGING POD) CONTAINING TWO 4 MICROCURIES OF         |
| AMERICIUM-241 SOURCES WAS LOST IN A SHIPMENT FROM KIRKLAND AFB, NEW MEXICO   |
| TO ROBINS AFB, GEORGIA.  THE DEVICE WAS AN AMERSHAM MODEL AMM.7.  FEDEX WAS  |
| THE CARRIER FOR THIS SHIPMENT AND THE AIRBILL NUMBER IS 5654077161.  THE     |
| SHIPMENT WAS DETERMINED TO BE LOST AT THE FEDEX  DISTRIBUTION CENTER IN      |
| MACON, GA.  THE DEVICE IS STILL BEING TRACKED BY FEDEX.                      |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36331       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: FT CALHOUN               REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/22/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  NE |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:04[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] CE                               |EVENT DATE:        10/22/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        09:22[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  ERICK MATZKE                 |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/22/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |LINDA SMITH          R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ADAS 50.72(b)(2)(i)      DEG/UNANALYZED COND    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          N       0        Cold Shutdown    |0        Cold Shutdown    |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - Steam Generator #RC-2A in Tech Spec Category C-3; Steam Generator          |
| inspections continuing -                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| At 0922 CDT on 10/22/99, during eddy current testing of the steam generators |
| (SGs), it has been determined that 50 tubes in SG #RC-2A require plugging.   |
| This places SG #RC-2A in Technical Specification category C-3 per 3.17(2).   |
| Forty four tubes have been determined to require plugging in SG #RC-2B at    |
| this time.  Eddy current testing is continuing on the SGs.  A 100% full      |
| length bobbin coil inspection program has been completed in both SGs.  A     |
| rotating pancake coil probe (Plus Point) is being used to inspect 100% of    |
| the top of the hot leg tube sheets for both SGs.  One hundred percent of     |
| these inspections for the 'A' SG are complete with about 99% evaluated.      |
| About 85% are complete on the 'B' SG with the rest expected to be completed  |
| on 10/22/99.  In addition, a large number of rotating pancake coil probe     |
| inspections are being conducted at other locations in the SGs.  In-situ      |
| pressure testing is being completed where needed.  To date, 4 tubes in the   |
| 'A' SG and 2 tubes in the 'B' SG have been pressure tested.  All 6 of these  |
| tubes have passed at 3 times normal operating differential pressure with     |
| zero leakage.                                                                |
|                                                                              |
| This report is conservatively being made prior to completing the SG testing  |
| and before completely evaluating the effect on the plant.  Further           |
| evaluation of reportability will be completed following the completion of    |
| the eddy current and in-situ pressure testing of the SGs.                    |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.                            |
|                                                                              |
| NOTE:  Refer to related Event #36338.                                        |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other                     |Event Number:   36332       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  ENERTECH, BREA, CA                   |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/22/1999|
|LICENSEE:  ENERTECH, BREA, CA                   |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:37[EDT]|
|    CITY:  BREA                     REGION:  4  |EVENT DATE:        10/22/1999|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  CA |EVENT TIME:        10:00[PDT]|
|LICENSE#:                        AGREEMENT:  Y  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/22/1999|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |LINDA SMITH          R4      |
|                                                |VERN HODGE (by fax)  NRR     |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  JOHN DeKLEINE                |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|CCCC 21.21               UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - Potential 10CFR Part 21 Report -                                           |
|                                                                              |
| In late 1998 Enertech manufactured and shipped electro-hydraulic actuators   |
| for installation on valves to be installed in an overseas plant.  Prior to   |
| shipment, the valve manufacturer observed pressure switch indication         |
| problems during final testing of the valves on which the actuators were      |
| installed.                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| Collective investigation by Burns and Roe, Enertech, including its switch    |
| supplier and the valve manufacturer determined the problem resulted from     |
| changes in manufacturing methods implemented by the switch supplier. The     |
| immediate problem was addressed, the pressure switches were modified using   |
| the supplier's previous manufacturing methods, installed on the valves and   |
| subsequently passed all final test requirements.                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other                     |Event Number:   36333       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  KS DEPT of HEALTH & ENVIRONMENT      |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/22/1999|
|LICENSEE:  CUSHING MEMORIAL HOSPITAL            |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:13[EDT]|
|    CITY:  LEAVENWORTH              REGION:  4  |EVENT DATE:        09/20/1999|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  KS |EVENT TIME:        12:30[CDT]|
|LICENSE#:                        AGREEMENT:  Y  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/22/1999|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |LINDA SMITH          R4      |
|                                                |CHARLEY HAUGHNEY     NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  JUSTIN SPENCE                |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:                                |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NAGR                     AGREEMENT STATE        |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POTENTIAL MEDICAL MISADMINISTRATION -             |
|                                                                              |
| A POTENTIAL MEDICAL MISADMINISTRATION INVOLVING AN INCORRECT CHEMICAL FORM   |
| OF TECHNETIUM-99 OCCURRED ON 09/22/99.  AT 1230 CDT, THE PATIENT WAS         |
| ADMINISTERED 25.8 MILLICURIES OF WHAT MAY HAVE BEEN TECHNETIUM-99 DTPA.  THE |
| PATIENT WAS SCHEDULED TO RECEIVE A DOSE OF TECHNETIUM-99 MYOVIEW FOR A HEART |
| SCAN.  AN IMAGE OF THE KIDNEYS AND                                           |
| BLADDER WERE PRESENTED, BUT NO HEART IMAGE.  THE RADIOLOGIST/RSO WAS         |
| IMMEDIATELY INFORMED.  THE RADIOLOGIST CONFIRMED THE FINDINGS OF THE         |
| TECHNICIAN.  THE LABEL FOR THE DOSE STATES THE RADIOPHARMACEUTICAL WAS A     |
| MYOVIEW DOSE.  THE RADIOPHARMACY FROM WHICH THE DOSE WAS RECEIVED BELIEVES   |
| THAT THE CORRECT SUBSTANCE WAS ADMINISTERED.  THE PATIENT AND PHYSICIAN WERE |
| INFORMED THAT THE INCORRECT RADIOPHARMACEUTICAL HAD BEEN ADMINISTERED, AND   |
| THE CORRECT PROCEDURE WAS PERFORMED ON 09/23/99.  DURING THE WEEK OF         |
| 10/04/99, THE CONSULTING PHYSICIST TO THE HOSPITAL WAS INFORMED.  ON         |
| 10/17/99, THE PHYSICIST SENT A REPORT TO THE LICENSEE.  IT WAS DETERMINED    |
| THAT THE CHEMICAL FORM OF THE RADIOPHARMACEUTICAL WAS PROBABLY DTPA.  THE    |
| DOSE OF 25 MILLICURIES RESULTED IN A DOSE OF: TOTAL BODY 0.75 RAD, BLADDER   |
| 7.00 RAD, KIDNEYS 0.53 RAD, OVARIES 0.50 RAD, UTERUS 0.93 RAD, AND TESTES    |
| 0.35 RAD.  THE CONSULTANT INSTRUCTED THE LICENSEE TO NOTIFY THE STATE OF     |
| KANSAS AND FILE A WRITTEN REPORT TO THE STATE OF KANSAS WITHIN 15 DAYS.      |
|                                                                              |
| AT 0930 CDT ON 10/22/99, CUSHING MEMORIAL HOSPITAL TELEPHONED THE KANSAS     |
| RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM IN ORDER TO INFORM THE AGENCY OF THE EVENT         |
| DESCRIBED ABOVE. THE KANSAS RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM INITIATED AN           |
| INVESTIGATION.                                                               |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36334       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: MILLSTONE                REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/22/1999|
|    UNIT:  [] [2] []                 STATE:  CT |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:45[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP           |EVENT DATE:        10/22/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        16:15[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  STEVE MYERS                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/22/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |WILLIAM COOK         R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B)  OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - WATER TIGHT DOOR BETWEEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP ROOMS FOUND IMPROPERLY   |
| SHUT -                                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| AT 1615 ON 10/22/99, THE LICENSEE DISCOVERED THAT THE WATER TIGHT PERSONNEL  |
| ACCESS DOOR BETWEEN THE TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER (AFW) PUMP ROOM   |
| AND THE MOTOR DRIVEN AFW PUMP ROOM IN THE TURBINE BUILDING WAS NOT PROPERLY  |
| "DOGGED" SHUT.  WITH THIS DOOR NOT PROPERLY SEALED SHUT, A STEAM LEAK IN THE |
| TURBINE DRIVEN AFW PUMP ROOM COULD HAVE DISABLED ALL THREE AFW PUMPS.  THE   |
| LICENSEE IMMEDIATELY SHUT THE DOOR AND SECURED ALL THE DOOR "DOGS".  THE     |
| LICENSEE IS CONDUCTING AN INVESTIGATION AND HAS DETERMINED THAT THE DOOR HAD |
| BEEN IMPROPERLY SHUT FOR 10 TO 60 MINUTES.                                   |
|                                                                              |
| THE LICENSEE NOTIFIED STATE AND LOCAL OFFICIALS AND THE NRC RESIDENT         |
| INSPECTOR.                                                                   |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36335       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: COOK                     REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/22/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] []                STATE:  MI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:54[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        10/22/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        15:00[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  MARY BETH DePUYDT            |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/22/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |BRUCE JORGENSEN      R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ADAS 50.72(b)(2)(i)      DEG/UNANALYZED COND    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          N       0        Refueling        |0        Refueling        |
|2     N          N       0        Refueling        |0        Refueling        |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - SEVERAL PLANT LOCATIONS DISCOVERED TO BE UNPROTECTED HELB AREAS -          |
|                                                                              |
| This is a four hour non-emergency notification in accordance                 |
| 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(1), of a condition which was found while both reactors were |
| shutdown, which, had it been found while the reactors were in operation,     |
| could have resulted in the nuclear plant being in an unanalyzed condition    |
| that significantly compromises plant safety.                                 |
|                                                                              |
| A review of the High Energy Line Break (HELB) Program has identified a       |
| number of locations in the plant that had previously been analyzed to be     |
| protected from a HELB event, but are now considered to be unprotected HELB   |
| areas.  These areas contain equipment that is not qualified for the harsh    |
| environment resulting from a HELB event in or near these locations, or the   |
| jet impingement from a crack in high energy piping near the equipment may    |
| damage the components and/or electrical cabling.  The equipment potentially  |
| affected Includes:                                                           |
| - Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps, previously reported in LER 315/99-058-00        |
| - Safety and non-safety related switchgear supplying power to safety-related |
| and safe shutdown components and vital instruments                           |
| - Emergency Diesel Generators and associated Ventilation Systems             |
| - Component Cooling Water Pumps, previously reported in LER 316/98-005-00    |
| - Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Batteries                          |
| - Cabling and Conduit inside Containment due to jet impingement.             |
|                                                                              |
| Evaluations of these potential design deficiencies are ongoing.              |
|                                                                              |
| Both units are currently in no Technical Specifications Operating Mode with  |
| both cores offloaded.                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| See also the following Event Notifications made on HELB issues:              |
| Event #35008 and associated LER 316/98-007-00                                |
| Event #35428 and associated LER 315/99-007-00                                |
| Event #34515 and associated LER 316/98-005-00.                               |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee plans to notify the NRC Resident Inspector.                     |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36336       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: NINE MILE POINT          REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/22/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 20:55[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5                    |EVENT DATE:        10/22/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        19:55[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  DON SHEEHAN                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/22/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |WILLIAM COOK         R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B)  OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS   |                             |
|NLCO                     TECH SPEC LCO A/S      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       98       Power Operation  |98       Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - UNIT 1 IS OPERATING OUTSIDE ITS DESIGN BASIS IN ITS CURRENT OPERATING      |
| CONDITION -                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| Unit 1 received information from its Engineering Department that Unit 1 is   |
| operating outside of design basis in its current operating condition.        |
| Specifically, with #11 Reactor Recirc Pump fully isolated, an analysis for   |
| thermal shock caused by initiation of #12 Emergency Cooling Loop injecting   |
| through #11 Reactor Recirc Loop suction nozzle has not been performed.       |
| Mitigating actions include isolating #12 Emergency Cooling Loop, in order to |
| return the plant to an analyzed condition, which requires that the plant     |
| enter a 7-Day Technical Specification Shutdown LCO until such time that an   |
| analysis for thermal shock has been performed.  Engineering Department has   |
| reasonable assurance that this analysis will be completed within the 7 days  |
| required by Unit 1 Tech Specs.                                               |
|                                                                              |
| All other Emergency Core Cooling System equipment is operable.               |
|                                                                              |
| This event has no effect on Unit 2.                                          |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   36337       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT   |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/22/1999|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 21:22[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        10/22/1999|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        17:15[EDT]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/22/1999|
|    CITY:  PIKETON                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  PIKE                      STATE:  OH |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-2                 AGREEMENT:  N  |BRUCE JORGENSEN      R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707002                              |CHARLEY HAUGHNEY     NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  ERIC SPAETH                  |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - NRC BULLETIN 91-01, 24 HOUR REPORT -                                       |
|                                                                              |
| ERROR MESSAGE ON THE X-705 DECONTAMINATION FACILITY URANIUM RECOVERY         |
| EVAPORATOR FLOW DIVERSION SYSTEM CONDUCTIVITY PROBE                          |
|                                                                              |
| At 1750 on 10/22/99, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that  |
| a Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) Approval requirement had not been         |
| maintained in the X-705 Decontamination Facility.  Upon discovery of an      |
| error message on one of three conductivity probes on the Uranium Recovery    |
| Evaporator Flow Diversion (UREFD) System, an investigation was initiated to  |
| determine cause and impact.                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| Evidence shows that on 09/28/99, two of three conductivity cells credited as |
| Active Engineered Features of the applicable NCS Approvals were displaying   |
| error codes while the evaporator system was in operation.  Engineering began |
| an evaluation, but at that time, was not able to provide Reasonable          |
| Assurance of Operability for the system.  The PSS declared the UREFD System  |
| inoperable at that time.                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| The NCS Evaluation credits the UREFD System as a secondary NCS Control with  |
| the physical Integrity of the evaporator tubes as the primary NCS Control.   |
| There is no indication that the physical integrity of the evaporator tube    |
| was ever compromised.                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| The conductivity cells and associated flow diversion valves, while not       |
| specifically listed in NCS Approval Part 'B' requirements, are still         |
| considered "NCS Controls" for the purpose of satisfying the double           |
| contingency principle.  The loss of the UREFD System is considered a loss of |
| control such that only one double contingency control remained in place.     |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:                                               |
| The safety significance of this event is very low.  The inoperability of the |
| UREFD System was a transient event.  Available data immediately before and   |
| after the suspect time shows the system operating within normal parameters.  |
|                                                                              |
| POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW            |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):                                                    |
| During the brief time the UREFD System was inoperable, an evaporator tube    |
| could have ruptured and allowed uranium bearing solution to enter the        |
| unfavorable geometry storm drain system.  If the concentration of U-235 was  |
| high enough and the geometry large enough, the system could have reached a   |
| critical configuration.                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC):      |
| Geometry and concentration were controlled.  Geometry was controlled within  |
| the evaporator tube and the favorable geometry storage tanks.  Concentration |
| was controlled in the condensate being discharged into the storm sewer       |
| system.                                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDES PROCESS    |
| LIMIT AND PER CENT WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS):                             |
| The UREFD System normally contains uranyl nitrate or nitrate based           |
| solutions.  The system is analyzed to 100% enriched U-235 solutions, but not |
| more the 10% is expected due to plant certificate limitations.  The UREFD    |
| System actuates automatically at 1000 mhos which corresponds to 15 ppm       |
| uranium.  No uranium bearing solution was involved in this event, so no data |
| is available on estimated amount or per cent worst case of critical mass.    |
|                                                                              |
| NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION   |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:                                             |
| The UREFD System monitors the condensate entering the storm sewers to        |
| automatically divert the flow to favorable geometry storage tanks in the     |
| event the concentration of uranium exceeds 15 ppm.  The system is actuated   |
| when two of three conductivity probes detect more than 1000 mhos.  The       |
| system was inoperable for a brief period when two of the three conductivity  |
| probes were displaying an error message instead of providing a conductivity  |
| reading.                                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:   |
| At the direction of the PSS, the requirements for an NCS Anomalous Condition |
| were initiated and the UREFD System was shut down and placed in safe         |
| configuration.                                                               |
|                                                                              |
| There was no loss of hazardous or radioactive material nor radioactive or    |
| radiological contamination exposure as a result of this event.               |
|                                                                              |
| The Certificate Holder notified the NRC Resident Inspector of this event.    |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36338       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: FT CALHOUN               REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/23/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  NE |NOTIFICATION TIME: 20:59[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] CE                               |EVENT DATE:        10/23/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        16:45[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  KEVIN BOSTON                 |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/23/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |LINDA SMITH          R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ADAS 50.72(b)(2)(i)      DEG/UNANALYZED COND    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          N       0        Refueling        |0        Refueling        |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - Steam Generator #RC-2B is in Tech Spec Category C-3 -                      |
|                                                                              |
| In accordance with Tech Spec Section 3.17 (5), Reporting Requirements, the   |
| following 4 hour non-emergency report is being made.                         |
|                                                                              |
| During Eddy Current Testing tube inspections on Steam Generator (SG) #RC-2B, |
| greater than 1% of the tubes tested were found to be defective.  The number  |
| of inspected tubes during the 1999 refueling outage is 4905 in SG #RC-2B.    |
| The number of tubes considered defective and require plugging exceeded 49    |
| tubes.                                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| SG #RC-2B was declared in Tech Spec 3.17, Table 3-13, Category C-3 at 1645   |
| CDT on 10/23/99.  Tube testing is being conducted under procedure            |
| SE-ST-RC-0003, Inservice Testing of Steam Generator Tubes.                   |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.                            |
|                                                                              |
| Note:  Refer to related Event #36331.                                        |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36339       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SOUTH TEXAS              REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/24/1999|
|    UNIT:  [] [2] []                 STATE:  TX |NOTIFICATION TIME: 08:32[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        10/24/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        04:38[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  JOHN M. CRAIN                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/24/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |LINDA SMITH          R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ADAS 50.72(b)(2)(i)      DEG/UNANALYZED COND    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|2     N          N       0        Refueling        |0        Refueling        |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| STEAM GENERATOR "2C" CLASSIFIED AS CATEGORY "C-3" DUE TO STRESS CORROSION    |
| CRACKING OF > 1% IN-SERVICE TUBES IN THE AREA OF THE HOT LEG SUPPORT PLATE   |
| CREVICES.                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| "ON OCTOBER 24, 1999 THE INSPECTION RESULTS OF THE 2C STEAM GENERATOR        |
| DETERMINED THAT MORE THAN 1% OF THE TUBES ARE DEFECTIVE, CONSTITUTING A C-3  |
| CONDITION PER STP TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT 4.4.5.2.  |
| THE GENERAL AREA OF DEGRADATION IS IN THE HOT LEG TUBE SUPPORT PLATE         |
| CREVICES. THE CAUSE OF THE DAMAGE IS THOUGHT TO BE OUTSIDE DIAMETER STRESS   |
| CORROSION CRACKING.  100% OF THE IN-SERVICE TUBE-TO-TUBE SUPPORT PLATE       |
| INTERSECTIONS ARE BEING EDDY CURRENT INSPECTED BY BOBBIN COIL PROBE.   ALL   |
| DISTORTED SUPPORT PLATE INDICATIONS WITH BOBBIN VOLTAGE OF OVER 1 VOLT ARE   |
| BEING FURTHER EXAMINED BY PLUS POINT PROBE.  COMPLETION OF THE               |
| EXAMINATION SCOPE IS IN PROGRESS.  THIS REPRESENTS A REPORTABLE CONDITION    |
| PER 10 CFR PART 50.72(B)(2) AS DEFINED BY STP TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE |
| 4.4-2."                                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| INSPECTIONS ARE ALSO PLANNED FOR STEAM GENERATORS "2A", "2B" AND "2D."  THE  |
| LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.                                |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36340       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SALEM                    REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/24/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  NJ |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:25[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        10/24/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        12:19[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  SUSAN SIMPSON                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/24/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |WILLIAM COOK         R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     RPS ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     M/R        Y       1        Startup          |0        Hot Standby      |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DURING CONTROL ROD WORTH TESTING -                     |
|                                                                              |
| With Unit 1 stable in Mode 2 (Startup) at 10E-8 amps, the licensee was       |
| performing control rod worth measurements in accordance with the Initial     |
| Criticality and Testing using Advanced Digital Reactivity Computer Procedure |
| under the provisions of Special Test Exception Tech Spec 3.10.1 and 3.10.3   |
| (Shutdown Margin and Physics Tests).  Control Bank 'C' control rods were     |
| being inserted at maximum speed (66 steps per minute) when the reactor       |
| operator noted a discrepancy between the Group 1 and Group 2 step counters.  |
| Reactor operators manually tripped the reactor at 1219.  All control rods    |
| inserted completely.  Unit 1 is stable in Mode 3 (Hot Standby).  Steam is    |
| being dumped to the main condenser and main feedwater is aligned to the      |
| steam generators.                                                            |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee is troubleshooting the rod control problem.  Initial            |
| investigation revealed a stationary phase failure for Group 1, Control Bank  |
| 'C' control rods.                                                            |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee plans to notify local officials and the NRC Resident Inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+