Event Notification Report for October 20, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/19/1999 - 10/20/1999
EVENT NUMBERS
36323363243632536319363213631336316
General Information or Other
Event Number: 36323
Rep Org: WA DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: ALLIED TECHNOLOGY GROUP
Region: 4
City: RICHMOND State: WA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TERRY FRAZEE (via email)
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Licensee: ALLIED TECHNOLOGY GROUP
Region: 4
City: RICHMOND State: WA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TERRY FRAZEE (via email)
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 10/20/1999
Notification Time: 17:44 [ET]
Event Date: 10/20/1999
Event Time: 12:30 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/21/1999
Notification Time: 17:44 [ET]
Event Date: 10/20/1999
Event Time: 12:30 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/21/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
LINDA SMITH (R4)
LINDA HOWELL (R4)
CHARLEY HAUGHNEY (NMSS)
DOT, EPA, HHS, DOE, (FAX)
FEMA, USDA (FAX)
LINDA SMITH (R4)
LINDA HOWELL (R4)
CHARLEY HAUGHNEY (NMSS)
DOT, EPA, HHS, DOE, (FAX)
FEMA, USDA (FAX)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - CONTAMINATED SHIPMENT OF SPENT CONDENSATE RESINS
The State of Washington submitted the following information via email:
At approximately 12:30 pm on October 20, 1999, the department was notified by ATG, Richland, that a waste shipment had arrived contaminated, with loose radioactive material (condensate resin) on the outside of the packages (4 of 7 poly liners) and on the bed of the open, flatbed trailer. The shipment came from ATG's Oakridge, Tennessee facility on October 13 and arrived at ATG's Richland facility on October 18. The contamination was discovered during the offloading on October 19. Contamination levels as high as 80,000 dpm/100 square centimeters were discovered. A direct frisk of the resin revealed 220,000 dpm. On its route between Tennessee and Washington, the truck traveled through Kentucky, Missouri, Nebraska, Wyoming, Idaho, and Oregon, via interstate highways. It was determined through a visual inspection that only one of the liners had leaked. A review of the manifest revealed radionuclides common to nuclear power plant condensate resin; e.g., Ag-110m, Co-60, Cs-137, Fe-55, Mn-54, Ni-63, Cu-241, and Zn-65.
Gary Robertson, Head
Waste Management Section
Division of Radiation Protection
WA Department of Health
* * * UPDATE AT 2000 ON 10/21/99 (COMMISSIONERS ASSISTANTS BRIEFING) * * *
IRO JOSEPH GIITTER & ERIC WEINSTEIN; NMSS CHARLIE HAUGHNEY, JOHN HICKEY & BILL KANE; PAO BILL BEECHER; OSP PAUL LOHAUS & FRED COMBS; IP RON HAUBER; CA BETSY KEELING; EDO DAVE LANGE & NADAR MAMISH; SECY KEN HART; CHAIRMAN DICUS ASST CYNTHIA JONES & BRAD JONES; COMM McGAFFIGAN ASST STEVE CROCKETT; COMM DIAZ ASST PAT CASTLEMAN & CHARLEEN RADDATZ; COMM MERRIFIELD ASST JOHN THOMA; R1 ERIC REBER; R2 ROGER HANNAH & LUIS REYES; R4 CHARLIE HACKNEY, TOM ANDREWS, LINDA SMITH, BRECK HENDERSON & LINDA HOWELL (BRIEFER).
The State of Washington submitted the following information via email:
At approximately 12:30 pm on October 20, 1999, the department was notified by ATG, Richland, that a waste shipment had arrived contaminated, with loose radioactive material (condensate resin) on the outside of the packages (4 of 7 poly liners) and on the bed of the open, flatbed trailer. The shipment came from ATG's Oakridge, Tennessee facility on October 13 and arrived at ATG's Richland facility on October 18. The contamination was discovered during the offloading on October 19. Contamination levels as high as 80,000 dpm/100 square centimeters were discovered. A direct frisk of the resin revealed 220,000 dpm. On its route between Tennessee and Washington, the truck traveled through Kentucky, Missouri, Nebraska, Wyoming, Idaho, and Oregon, via interstate highways. It was determined through a visual inspection that only one of the liners had leaked. A review of the manifest revealed radionuclides common to nuclear power plant condensate resin; e.g., Ag-110m, Co-60, Cs-137, Fe-55, Mn-54, Ni-63, Cu-241, and Zn-65.
Gary Robertson, Head
Waste Management Section
Division of Radiation Protection
WA Department of Health
* * * UPDATE AT 2000 ON 10/21/99 (COMMISSIONERS ASSISTANTS BRIEFING) * * *
IRO JOSEPH GIITTER & ERIC WEINSTEIN; NMSS CHARLIE HAUGHNEY, JOHN HICKEY & BILL KANE; PAO BILL BEECHER; OSP PAUL LOHAUS & FRED COMBS; IP RON HAUBER; CA BETSY KEELING; EDO DAVE LANGE & NADAR MAMISH; SECY KEN HART; CHAIRMAN DICUS ASST CYNTHIA JONES & BRAD JONES; COMM McGAFFIGAN ASST STEVE CROCKETT; COMM DIAZ ASST PAT CASTLEMAN & CHARLEEN RADDATZ; COMM MERRIFIELD ASST JOHN THOMA; R1 ERIC REBER; R2 ROGER HANNAH & LUIS REYES; R4 CHARLIE HACKNEY, TOM ANDREWS, LINDA SMITH, BRECK HENDERSON & LINDA HOWELL (BRIEFER).
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36324
Facility: PALO VERDE
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: RUSSELL STROUD
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: RUSSELL STROUD
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 10/20/1999
Notification Time: 20:21 [ET]
Event Date: 10/20/1999
Event Time: 16:25 [MST]
Last Update Date: 11/19/1999
Notification Time: 20:21 [ET]
Event Date: 10/20/1999
Event Time: 16:25 [MST]
Last Update Date: 11/19/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
73.71(b)(1) - SAFEGUARDS REPORTS
10 CFR Section:
73.71(b)(1) - SAFEGUARDS REPORTS
Person (Organization):
LINDA SMITH (R4)
GAIL GOOD (IAT)
JOHN DAVIDSON (IAT)
RICHARD ROSANO (IAT)
LINDA SMITH (R4)
GAIL GOOD (IAT)
JOHN DAVIDSON (IAT)
RICHARD ROSANO (IAT)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
Discovery of unsecured safeguards information. Immediate compensatory measures taken upon discovery. The licensee will inform the NRC resident inspector. Contact the NRC Operations Center for additional details.
* * * RETRACTION 1843 11/19/1999 FROM STROUD TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *
After detailed reviews of the safeguards information involved in the initial report, the licensee has decided to retract this event notification. The NRC resident inspector will be informed of this retraction by the licensee. Contact the NRC Operations Center for additional details.
Notified R4DO (Jones).
* * * RETRACTION 1843 11/19/1999 FROM STROUD TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *
After detailed reviews of the safeguards information involved in the initial report, the licensee has decided to retract this event notification. The NRC resident inspector will be informed of this retraction by the licensee. Contact the NRC Operations Center for additional details.
Notified R4DO (Jones).
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 36325
Facility: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: LARSON
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: LARSON
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 10/21/1999
Notification Time: 08:37 [ET]
Event Date: 10/20/1999
Event Time: 10:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/21/1999
Notification Time: 08:37 [ET]
Event Date: 10/20/1999
Event Time: 10:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/21/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
BRUCE JORGENSEN (R3)
BRIAN SMITH EO (NMSS)
BRUCE JORGENSEN (R3)
BRIAN SMITH EO (NMSS)
24 HOUR 91-01 BULLETIN RESPONSE
ON 10/20/99 AT 1030 HOURS, A NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY ANALYSIS (NCSA) NONCOMPLIANCE WAS IDENTIFIED IN THE X-330 PROCESS BUILDING. THIS NONCOMPLIANCE WAS DISCOVERED WHILE REVIEWING OBSERVATIONS FOUND DURING A WALKDOWN OF IMPLEMENTED NCSAs.
AT COLUMN C-53 ON THE CELL FLOOR OF X-330, A DRIP PAN CONNECTED TO A PAIR OF LUBE OIL STRAINERS DID NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF NCSA-PLANT054 FOR LUBE OIL SYSTEMS. NCSA-PLANT054 REQUIRES ALL LUBE OIL LEAK COLLECTION CONTAINERS IN AREAS WHERE SIGNIFICANT UF6 RELEASES ARE CONSIDERED CREDIBLE, MEET CERTAIN SIZE RESTRICTIONS. IN X-330, THE MAXIMUM ALLOWED DEPTH OF A LUBE OIL DRIP PAN ON THE CELL FLOOR IS 3.6 INCHES. THE DRIP PAN FOUND WAS 5.76 INCHES DEEP. THIS VIOLATES THE CONTAINER SIZE REQUIREMENT OF THE NCSA. THE DRIP PAN CONTAINED APPROXIMATELY 25 QUARTS OF OIL AT TIME OF DISCOVERY. THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF ANY UF6 RELEASES IN THE AREA.
THE CONTAINER SIZE LIMIT WAS EXCEEDED RESULTING IN THE LOSS OF GEOMETRY. THE OTHER CONTROL OF THE DOUBLE CONTINGENCY PRINCIPLE (CONCENTRATION) WAS MAINTAINED THROUGHOUT THIS EVENT.
DOUBLE CONTINGENCY WAS REESTABLISHED BY OPENING AND TAGGING (DO NOT CLOSE) THE DRAIN VALVE IN THE BOTTOM OF THE DRIP PAN. THIS PREVENTS THE ACCUMULATION OF LUBE OIL TO A DEPTH GREATER THAN 3.6 INCHES. A WORK PACKAGE WAS DEVELOPED TO REMOVE THE DRIP PAN AND REPLACE IT WITH ONE THAT IS IN COMPLIANCE WITH NCSA-PLANT054. AT 1400 HOURS
ON 10/20/99, THE NONCOMPLIANT DRIP PAN WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH A PAN HAVING A DEPTH OF UNDER THREE INCHES, REESTABLISHING NCSA-PLANT054 COMPLIANCE.
THERE WAS NO LOSS OF HAZARDOUS/RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL OR RADIOACTIVE/RADIOLOGICAL CONTAMINATION EXPOSURE AS A RESULT OF THIS EVENT.
THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR AND THE DOE REPRESENTATIVE WERE NOTIFIED.
ON 10/20/99 AT 1030 HOURS, A NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY ANALYSIS (NCSA) NONCOMPLIANCE WAS IDENTIFIED IN THE X-330 PROCESS BUILDING. THIS NONCOMPLIANCE WAS DISCOVERED WHILE REVIEWING OBSERVATIONS FOUND DURING A WALKDOWN OF IMPLEMENTED NCSAs.
AT COLUMN C-53 ON THE CELL FLOOR OF X-330, A DRIP PAN CONNECTED TO A PAIR OF LUBE OIL STRAINERS DID NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF NCSA-PLANT054 FOR LUBE OIL SYSTEMS. NCSA-PLANT054 REQUIRES ALL LUBE OIL LEAK COLLECTION CONTAINERS IN AREAS WHERE SIGNIFICANT UF6 RELEASES ARE CONSIDERED CREDIBLE, MEET CERTAIN SIZE RESTRICTIONS. IN X-330, THE MAXIMUM ALLOWED DEPTH OF A LUBE OIL DRIP PAN ON THE CELL FLOOR IS 3.6 INCHES. THE DRIP PAN FOUND WAS 5.76 INCHES DEEP. THIS VIOLATES THE CONTAINER SIZE REQUIREMENT OF THE NCSA. THE DRIP PAN CONTAINED APPROXIMATELY 25 QUARTS OF OIL AT TIME OF DISCOVERY. THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF ANY UF6 RELEASES IN THE AREA.
THE CONTAINER SIZE LIMIT WAS EXCEEDED RESULTING IN THE LOSS OF GEOMETRY. THE OTHER CONTROL OF THE DOUBLE CONTINGENCY PRINCIPLE (CONCENTRATION) WAS MAINTAINED THROUGHOUT THIS EVENT.
DOUBLE CONTINGENCY WAS REESTABLISHED BY OPENING AND TAGGING (DO NOT CLOSE) THE DRAIN VALVE IN THE BOTTOM OF THE DRIP PAN. THIS PREVENTS THE ACCUMULATION OF LUBE OIL TO A DEPTH GREATER THAN 3.6 INCHES. A WORK PACKAGE WAS DEVELOPED TO REMOVE THE DRIP PAN AND REPLACE IT WITH ONE THAT IS IN COMPLIANCE WITH NCSA-PLANT054. AT 1400 HOURS
ON 10/20/99, THE NONCOMPLIANT DRIP PAN WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH A PAN HAVING A DEPTH OF UNDER THREE INCHES, REESTABLISHING NCSA-PLANT054 COMPLIANCE.
THERE WAS NO LOSS OF HAZARDOUS/RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL OR RADIOACTIVE/RADIOLOGICAL CONTAMINATION EXPOSURE AS A RESULT OF THIS EVENT.
THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR AND THE DOE REPRESENTATIVE WERE NOTIFIED.
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 36319
Rep Org: MORRISON KNUDSEN CORPORATION
Licensee: MSE-HKM ENGINEERING
Region: 4
City: CODY State: WY
County: PARK
License #: 25-17492-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MARK ROSENBAUM
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Licensee: MSE-HKM ENGINEERING
Region: 4
City: CODY State: WY
County: PARK
License #: 25-17492-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MARK ROSENBAUM
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 10/20/1999
Notification Time: 14:33 [ET]
Event Date: 10/20/1999
Event Time: 12:00 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 10/20/1999
Notification Time: 14:33 [ET]
Event Date: 10/20/1999
Event Time: 12:00 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 10/20/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
LINDA SMITH (R4)
LINDA HOWELL (R4)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
LINDA SMITH (R4)
LINDA HOWELL (R4)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
TROXLER MOISTURE/DENSITY GAUGE DAMAGED AT CONSTRUCTION SITE
A Troxler Series 3400 moisture/density gauge was destroyed when it was run over by a tractor-trailer rig. The gauge was being used to test asphalt at a road construction site on US 14/16 (State highway 20), approximately 28 miles west of Cody, WY. The gauge was being used on the westbound lane, when the truck swerved out of the eastbound lane and onto the freshly poured asphalt, striking the gauge. The gauge has been broken into several pieces. The truck then proceeded eight miles further before turning around and returning to the construction site. The truck then proceeded three miles east from the construction site, where it was stopped. Access to the area surrounding the gauge is being controlled.
The representative of Morrison Knudsen (MK) initially contacted NRC Region IV regarding this event. MK is the primary contractor for the construction work. MSE-HKM Engineering (the licensee) is a subcontractor to MK. The MK representative has also contacted the Park County, WY Emergency Management Agency. The Wyoming State Highway Patrol is preparing to respond to the site with radiation survey equipment. NRC Region IV will contact the State of Wyoming regarding this event.
A Troxler Series 3400 moisture/density gauge was destroyed when it was run over by a tractor-trailer rig. The gauge was being used to test asphalt at a road construction site on US 14/16 (State highway 20), approximately 28 miles west of Cody, WY. The gauge was being used on the westbound lane, when the truck swerved out of the eastbound lane and onto the freshly poured asphalt, striking the gauge. The gauge has been broken into several pieces. The truck then proceeded eight miles further before turning around and returning to the construction site. The truck then proceeded three miles east from the construction site, where it was stopped. Access to the area surrounding the gauge is being controlled.
The representative of Morrison Knudsen (MK) initially contacted NRC Region IV regarding this event. MK is the primary contractor for the construction work. MSE-HKM Engineering (the licensee) is a subcontractor to MK. The MK representative has also contacted the Park County, WY Emergency Management Agency. The Wyoming State Highway Patrol is preparing to respond to the site with radiation survey equipment. NRC Region IV will contact the State of Wyoming regarding this event.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36321
Facility: BIG ROCK POINT
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-1
NRC Notified By: MIKE VANALST
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-1
NRC Notified By: MIKE VANALST
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 10/20/1999
Notification Time: 16:30 [ET]
Event Date: 10/20/1999
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/20/1999
Notification Time: 16:30 [ET]
Event Date: 10/20/1999
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/20/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.73 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
10 CFR Section:
26.73 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
BRUCE JORGENSEN (R3)
BRUCE JORGENSEN (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
FITNESS FOR DUTY REPORT
A contract supervisor tested positive for illegal drug use during a random test. The employee's access to the plant has been revoked, and the individual's supervisor has been notified. Contact the Operations Center for additional details.
The licensee plans to contact NRC Region III regarding this notification.
A contract supervisor tested positive for illegal drug use during a random test. The employee's access to the plant has been revoked, and the individual's supervisor has been notified. Contact the Operations Center for additional details.
The licensee plans to contact NRC Region III regarding this notification.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36313
Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: HICKS
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: HICKS
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 10/20/1999
Notification Time: 06:17 [ET]
Event Date: 10/20/1999
Event Time: 05:24 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/20/1999
Notification Time: 06:17 [ET]
Event Date: 10/20/1999
Event Time: 05:24 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/20/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(i)(A) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(i)(A) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM COOK (R1)
WILLIAM COOK (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 47 | Power Operation | 46 | Power Operation |
PLANT COMMENCED REACTOR SHUTDOWN DUE TO TWO TRAINS OF HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) BEING INOPERABLE.
On 10/20/1999, at 0524, Nine Mile Point Unit 1 has commenced a normal orderly RX shutdown due to two trains of High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) becoming inoperable. During a RX start-up, the plant had an imbalance between feedwater flow through #11 HPCI train and #12 HPCI train. The #13 FWBP recirculation valve was discovered to be open. This led to securing #13 FWBP and declaring it inoperable (2100). This placed the plant in a 15-day Technical Specification shutdown LCO (Limit Condition for Operation).
At 0430, after placing the turbine driven shaft pump on-line, #11 FWP (#11 HPCI train) was secured, #11 FWP (Feedwater Pump) auxiliary oil pump cycled on and off continuously. By design aux. oil pump should remain on for six minutes on a FWP shutdown. The #11 FWP was then declared inoperable. This place the plant in a T.S. 3.1.8, when in the power operation condition and RX pressure greater than 110 psig, and both trains of HPCI inoperable. We must conduct a normal orderly RX shutdown within one hour and be within 110 psig RX pressure and saturation temperature within 24 hours.
Engineering is evaluating system flow characteristic. Maintenance department is investigating the pressure switch on #11 FWP auxiliary oil pump.
They expect to exit this LCO soon.
The Resident Inspector will be notified
*** UPDATE ON 10/20/99 @ 1149 BY PARISH TO GOULD ***
THE PLANT HAS EXITED THE TS LCO AT 1103. THIS IS BASED ON TESTING THE #13 FWBP AND DETERMINING THAT IT FUNCTIONED AS DESIGNED.
THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR WILL BE NOTIFIED.
On 10/20/1999, at 0524, Nine Mile Point Unit 1 has commenced a normal orderly RX shutdown due to two trains of High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) becoming inoperable. During a RX start-up, the plant had an imbalance between feedwater flow through #11 HPCI train and #12 HPCI train. The #13 FWBP recirculation valve was discovered to be open. This led to securing #13 FWBP and declaring it inoperable (2100). This placed the plant in a 15-day Technical Specification shutdown LCO (Limit Condition for Operation).
At 0430, after placing the turbine driven shaft pump on-line, #11 FWP (#11 HPCI train) was secured, #11 FWP (Feedwater Pump) auxiliary oil pump cycled on and off continuously. By design aux. oil pump should remain on for six minutes on a FWP shutdown. The #11 FWP was then declared inoperable. This place the plant in a T.S. 3.1.8, when in the power operation condition and RX pressure greater than 110 psig, and both trains of HPCI inoperable. We must conduct a normal orderly RX shutdown within one hour and be within 110 psig RX pressure and saturation temperature within 24 hours.
Engineering is evaluating system flow characteristic. Maintenance department is investigating the pressure switch on #11 FWP auxiliary oil pump.
They expect to exit this LCO soon.
The Resident Inspector will be notified
*** UPDATE ON 10/20/99 @ 1149 BY PARISH TO GOULD ***
THE PLANT HAS EXITED THE TS LCO AT 1103. THIS IS BASED ON TESTING THE #13 FWBP AND DETERMINING THAT IT FUNCTIONED AS DESIGNED.
THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR WILL BE NOTIFIED.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36316
Facility: THREE MILE ISLAND
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN SCHORK
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN SCHORK
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 10/20/1999
Notification Time: 12:10 [ET]
Event Date: 10/20/1999
Event Time: 11:40 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/20/1999
Notification Time: 12:10 [ET]
Event Date: 10/20/1999
Event Time: 11:40 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/20/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM COOK (R1)
WILLIAM COOK (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
MOTOR FOR "B" MSIV DISCOVERED TO BE INOPERABLE
The licensee discovered that the motor used for remote closure of main steam isolation valve (MSIV) MS-V-1B is inoperable (electrical ground). As a result, MS-V-1B is not capable of being closed remotely from the control room, nor is it capable of being closed within 120 seconds. Technical Specification 4.8.2 requires that the MSIVs be tested and verified to close in less than 120 seconds. In addition, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Section 10.3.1.2 states the following regarding the MSIVs: "These tight closing isolation valves are remotely operated from the Control Room to close in less than two minutes."
The licensee has entered this condition into their corrective action program. Until the motor can be repaired, the licensee has prestaged equipment to facilitate manual closure of the valve and provided specific instructions to operators and maintenance technicians. A safety evaluation is being prepared by the licensee regarding this condition.
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee.
The licensee discovered that the motor used for remote closure of main steam isolation valve (MSIV) MS-V-1B is inoperable (electrical ground). As a result, MS-V-1B is not capable of being closed remotely from the control room, nor is it capable of being closed within 120 seconds. Technical Specification 4.8.2 requires that the MSIVs be tested and verified to close in less than 120 seconds. In addition, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Section 10.3.1.2 states the following regarding the MSIVs: "These tight closing isolation valves are remotely operated from the Control Room to close in less than two minutes."
The licensee has entered this condition into their corrective action program. Until the motor can be repaired, the licensee has prestaged equipment to facilitate manual closure of the valve and provided specific instructions to operators and maintenance technicians. A safety evaluation is being prepared by the licensee regarding this condition.
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee.