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Event Notification Report for October 20, 1999

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           10/19/1999 - 10/20/1999

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

35790  36309  36310  36311  36312  

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|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   35790       |
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+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT      |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/03/1999|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:44[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        06/02/1999|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        16:30[CDT]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/19/1999|
|    CITY:  PADUCAH                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  McCRACKEN                 STATE:  KY |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-1                 AGREEMENT:  Y  |DAVID HILLS          R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707001                              |DON COOL             NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  THOMAS WHITE                 |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  FANGIE JONES                 |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|OCBA 76.120(c)(2)(i)     ACCID MT EQUIP FAILS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
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                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
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| THREE SPRINKLER SYSTEMS DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO CORRODED HEADS (24-hour   |
| report)                                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Paducah:        |
|                                                                              |
| "On 06/02/99 at 1630 CDT, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified  |
| that numerous sprinkler heads were corroded, affecting 16 sprinkler systems  |
| in C-337 and one system in C-333, such that the ability of the sprinklers to |
| flow sufficient water was called into question.  Subsequently, these         |
| sprinkler systems were declared inoperable, and TSR-required actions         |
| establishing roving fire patrols were initiated.  This deficiency was        |
| detected during scheduled system inspections conducted by Fire Protection    |
| personnel.  Currently, functionality of the sprinkler heads has not been     |
| fully evaluated by Fire Protection personnel, and the remaining cascade      |
| buildings are currently being inspected, and if necessary, this report will  |
| be updated to identify any additional areas.                                 |
|                                                                              |
| "It has been determined that this event is reportable under                  |
| 10CFR76.120(c)(2) as an event in which equipment is disabled or fails to     |
| function as designed."                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been notified of this event.                  |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1022 EDT ON 06/04/99 FROM CAGE TO TROCINE * * *              |
|                                                                              |
| "Two sprinkler heads on system D-1 in C-337 and two sprinkler heads on       |
| system 27 in C-335 were identified to also be corroded.  These were          |
| identified to the PSS on 06/03/99 at 1600 CDT and 1601 CDT, respectively,    |
| and determined to require an update to this report by the PSS.               |
|                                                                              |
| "It has been determined that this event is reportable under                  |
| 10CFR76.120(c)(2) as an event in which equipment is disabled or fails to     |
| function as designed."                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| Paducah personnel notified the NRC resident inspector of this update.  The   |
| NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Hills) and NMSS EO (Combs).        |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 2152 EDT ON 06/17/99 FROM WALKER TO POERTNER * * *           |
|                                                                              |
| "Three sprinkler heads on system C-15 and five sprinkler heads on system B-8 |
| in C-333 were identified to also be corroded.  The PSS was notified of this  |
| condition at 1300 CDT on 06/17/99 and determined that an update to this      |
| report was required."                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| "It has been determined that this event is reportable under                  |
| 10CFR76.120(c)(2) as an event in which equipment is disabled or fails to     |
| function as designed."                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| Paducah personnel notified the NRC resident inspector of this update.  The   |
| NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Madera).                           |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE 1440 EDT 6/18/1999 FROM UNDERWOOD TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *       |
|                                                                              |
| "Two sprinkler heads on system C-15 and one sprinkler head on system B-8 in  |
| C-333 were identified to have corrosion.  The PSS was notified of this       |
| condition at 1350 CDT on 06/18/99.  The area of the fire patrol for system   |
| C-15 was expanded to include the two heads identified as corroded.  The one  |
| head on system B-8 was in the area already being patrolled.  The PSS         |
| determined that an update to this report was required."                      |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this update.  Notified R3DO  |
| (Madera).                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE 1315 EDT 6/25/1999 FROM WALKER TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *          |
|                                                                              |
| "Two sprinkler heads on system D-8 and three sprinkler heads on system D-7   |
| in C-337 were identified to have corrosion.  The PSS was notified of the     |
| condition on system D-8 at 0125 CDT on 06/25/99 and at 1019 CDT on 06/25/99  |
| for system D-7.  Both systems were immediately declared inoperable and LCO   |
| fire patrol actions were implemented.  It was determined that an update to   |
| this report was required."                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this update.  Notified R3DO  |
| (Jordan).                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE 2119 EDT 7/30/1999 FROM CAGE TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *            |
|                                                                              |
| "Five sprinkler heads and one sprinkler piping tee on C-337 system D-7 were  |
| identified to have corrosion. The PSS was notified of these corroded system  |
| parts and declared the system inoperable at 0931 CDT on 07/30/99.  LCO       |
| required fire patrols of the affected area were initiated.  The PSS          |
| determined that an update to this event report was required."                |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this update.  Notified R3DO  |
| (Wright).                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE 1655 EDT 7/31/1999 FROM WHITE TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *           |
|                                                                              |
| "Two sprinkler heads on C-337 System D-1 were identified to have corrosion.  |
| The PSS was notified of these corroded system parts and declared the system  |
| inoperable at 1155 CDT on 7/31/99.  LCO required fire patrols of the         |
| affected area were initiated.  The PSS determined that an update to this     |
| report was required."                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this update. Notified R3DO   |
| (Wright).                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE 1546 EDT 8/10/1999 FROM WHITE TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *           |
|                                                                              |
| "Two sprinkler heads on C-337 system C-15 were identified to have corrosion. |
| The PSS was notified of these corroded system parts and declared the system  |
| inoperable at 1130 CDT on 8/10/99.  LCO required fire patrols of the         |
| affected area were initiated.  The PSS determined that an update to this     |
| report was required."                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this update. Notified R3DO   |
| (Burgess).                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1154 EDT 8/22/99 FROM WALKER TO POERTNER * * *               |
|                                                                              |
| Four adjacent sprinkler heads on C-333 System B-1 were identified to have    |
| corrosion.  The PSS was notified of the corroded system parts and declared   |
| the system inoperable at 0918 CDT on 8/22/99.  LCO required fire patrols     |
| were initiated.  The PSS determined that an update to this report was        |
| required.                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| It has been determined that this event is reportable under 10CFR76.120(c)(2) |
| as an event in which equipment is disabled or fails to function as           |
| designed.                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector will be notified.                                 |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Clayton).                      |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE 2015 EDT ON 8/28/99 FROM W.F. GAGE TO S. SANDIN * * *           |
|                                                                              |
| The following information was provided as an update to this report:          |
|                                                                              |
| "Two adjacent sprinkler heads on C-337 System D-11 were identified to have   |
| corrosion.  The PSS was notified of these corroded system parts and declared |
| the system inoperable at 1420 [CDT] on 8/28/99.   LCO required fire patrols  |
| of the affected area were initiated. The PSS determined that an update to    |
| this report was required."                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| Paducah personnel informed the NRC resident inspector.  The NRC operations   |
| officer notified the R3DO (Leach) and NMSS EO (Piccone).                     |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE 2037 EDT ON 8/29/99 FROM KEVIN BEASLEY TO S. SANDIN * * *       |
|                                                                              |
| The following information was provided as an update to this report:          |
|                                                                              |
| "Two adjacent sprinkler heads on C-337 System D-15 were identified to have   |
| corrosion and the PSS declared the system inoperable at 0925 [CDT] on        |
| 8/29/99.  Also two adjacent heads on C-337 System D-10 were identified to    |
| have corrosion and the PSS declared the system inoperable at 1450.   LCO     |
| required fire patrols for both of the affected areas were initiated in the   |
| time frame required by TSR.  The PSS determined that an update to this       |
| report was required."                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| Paducah personnel informed the NRC resident inspector.  The NRC operations   |
| officer notified the R3DO (Leach) and NMSS EO (Piccone).                     |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 0930 EDT ON 9/1/99  BY ERIC WALKER TO FANGIE JONES * * *     |
|                                                                              |
| Add two adjacent sprinkler heads on C-337 D-14.  Paducah personnel informed  |
| the NRC Resident Inspector.  The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO    |
| (David Hills) and NMSS (Robert Pierson).                                     |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1133 EDT ON 9/8/99  BY TOM WHITE TO FANGIE JONES * * *       |
|                                                                              |
| Add two adjacent sprinkler heads on C-331 System 26, system declared         |
| inoperable at 2155 CDT on 9/7/99. An LCO required fire patrol for the        |
| affected area was initiated in the time frame required by the TSR.  Paducah  |
| personnel informed the NRC Resident Inspector.  The NRC operations officer   |
| notified the R3DO (Monte Phillips) and NMSS (Josie Piccone).                 |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 0948 ON 9/30/99 BY ERIC WALKER TO DOUG WEAVER * * *          |
|                                                                              |
| Add two adjacent sprinkler heads on C-333  System B-15 were identified to    |
| have corrosion and the PSS declared the system inoperable at 0815 on         |
| 9/30/99.  An LCO required fire patrol for the affected area was initiated in |
| the time frame required by the TSR.  The PSS determined that an update to    |
| this report was required.                                                    |
| Paducah personnel informed the NRC resident inspector.   The NRC operations  |
| officer notified the R3DO (Vegel) and NMSS (Cool).                           |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| *** UPDATE ON 10/13/99 @ 1600 BY WALKER TO GOULD ***                         |
|                                                                              |
| Two adjacent sprinkler heads on C-333 System A-11 were Identified to have    |
| corrosion and the PSS declared the system inoperable at 1307 on 10-13-99. An |
| LCO required fire patrol for the affected area was initiated in the time     |
| frame required by the TSR, The PSS determined that an update to this report  |
| was required. Paducah personnel informed the NRC resident inspector.   The   |
| NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Madera) and NMSS (Moore).          |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE 1520 10/19/1999 FROM UNDERWOOD TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *          |
|                                                                              |
| Six sprinkler heads on C-337 System D-16 were identified to have corrosion   |
| and the PSS declared the system inoperable at 1052 CDT on 10/19/99. An LCO   |
| required fire patrol for the affected area was initiated in the time frame   |
| required by the TSR. The PSS determined that an update to this report was    |
| required. The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this update.       |
| Notified R3DO (Jorgensen).                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE 2140 10/19/1999 FROM WALKER TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *             |
|                                                                              |
| Seven sprinkler heads on C-337 System A-7 were identified to have corrosion, |
| and another four had been painted over. In addition, three adjacent          |
| sprinkler heads pm C-337 System A-8 were identified to have corrosion. The   |
| PSS declared the systems inoperable at 1900 CDT on 10/19/99. LCO required    |
| fire patrols for the affected areas were initiated in the time frame         |
| required by the TSR. The PSS determined that an update to this report was    |
| required. The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this update.       |
| Notified R3DO (Wright).                                                      |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36309       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PALO VERDE               REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/19/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  AZ |NOTIFICATION TIME: 07:36[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE                 |EVENT DATE:        10/19/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        00:49[MST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  DAN MARKS                    |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/19/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |LINDA SMITH          R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          N       0        Refueling        |0        Refueling        |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| UNEXPECTED EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR START                                  |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:   |
|                                                                              |
| "The following event description is based on information currently           |
| available.  If through subsequent reviews of this event, additional          |
| information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the      |
| information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be    |
| made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73."         |
|                                                                              |
| "On October 19, 1999, at approximately 0049 MST, Palo Verde Unit 1           |
| experienced an unexpected start of the Train A Emergency Diesel Generator.   |
| In addition, many Train-A components actuated to the post Safety Injection   |
| Actuation (SIAS) condition.  No safety injection pumps or valves actuated,   |
| and no injection into the reactor coolant system occurred.  Train A Leg 2-4  |
| (half leg) annunciation alarms were received and immediately cleared for     |
| SIAS, Containment Isolation Actuation Signal (CIAS), Main Steam Isolation    |
| Signal (MSIS), Containment Spray Actuation Signal (CSAS), Auxiliary          |
| Feedwater Actuation Signal (AFAS-1 and AFAS-2), and Recirculation Actuation  |
| Signal (RAS).  The Train A Emergency Diesel Generator received a start       |
| signal, started from a standby condition, and ran unloaded until it was shut |
| down.  Based on initial investigation, a Plant Protection System (PPS) power |
| supply anomaly is suspected to be the cause of this condition.  The unit is  |
| stable with all fuel removed from the reactor vessel to the spent fuel pool  |
| during a scheduled refueling outage (U1R8)."                                 |
|                                                                              |
| "Palo Verde personnel are investigating the PPS power supplies and power     |
| sources to the power supplies.  There was no valid actuation signal.  The    |
| event did not result in any challenges to the fission product barrier or     |
| result in any releases of radioactive materials.  There were no adverse      |
| safety consequences or implications as a result of this event.  The event    |
| did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or health and       |
| safety of the public."                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee stated that all systems functioned as required in response to   |
| this event; however, the root cause of the event is under investigation.     |
| There were no maintenance activities involving the power supplies ongoing at |
| the time of the event.  Spent fuel pool cooling was not affected by this     |
| transient.                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   36310       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: GE NUCLEAR ENERGY                    |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/19/1999|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION             |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:16[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 TO UO2)          |EVENT DATE:        10/18/1999|
|           LEU FABRICATION                      |EVENT TIME:        15:15[EDT]|
|           LWR COMMERICAL FUEL                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/19/1999|
|    CITY:  WILMINGTON               REGION:  2  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  NEW HANOVER               STATE:  NC |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  SNM-1097              AGREEMENT:  Y  |CAUDLE JULIAN        R2      |
|  DOCKET:  07001113                             |BRIAN SMITH          NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  LON PAULSON                  |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| NRC BULLETIN 91-01 RESPONSE - CRITICALITY CONTROL (24-HOUR NOTIFICATION)     |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:   |
|                                                                              |
| "EVENT DESCRIPTION:  At approximately 1515 on October 18, 1999, during       |
| packaging of materials in drums for burial, administrative controls          |
| associated with drum loading were violated.  The quantity of uranium         |
| involved was 2,083.3 grams U at 3.6% enrichment.  This amount of uranium is  |
| under the safe batch value of 27,411 grams U at 3.6% enrichment.  Therefore, |
| no unsafe condition existed."                                                |
|                                                                              |
| "Controls were reestablished within 4 hours by direct removal of the         |
| material inadvertently added to the drum during preparation for shipment.    |
| This event is reported pursuant to NRC Bulletin 91-01 (within 24 hours) due  |
| to the failure to comply with procedural controls.  Associated operations    |
| have been shutdown pending investigation and implementation of corrective    |
| actions."                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| "SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:  Low safety significance - [The] actual      |
| uranium content in [the] drum [was] determined to be 2,083.3 grams U (3.6%   |
| enrichment)[, which is] below the safe batch mass limit of 27,411 grams U    |
| (3.6% enrichment)."                                                          |
|                                                                              |
| "POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW           |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):  Multiple failure modes [are] required before a    |
| criticality accident could occur."                                           |
|                                                                              |
| "CONTROLLED PARAMETER(S) (MASS, MODERATION. GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):  |
| Mass [and] mass/concentration.  [Mass was not controlled.]"                  |
|                                                                              |
| "ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, [AND] FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE      |
| PROCESS UNIT AND % WORST BASE CRITICAL MASS):  Composite sample analysis     |
| showed 75 [grams of] U235 at 3.60% enrichment (2,083.3 grams U).  [The] safe |
| batch value is 986.8 [grams of] U235 at 3.6% (27,411 grams U) where [the]    |
| safe batch is defined to be 45% of the minimum critical mass."               |
|                                                                              |
| "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF  |
| THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:  Administrative controls on queuing materials  |
| and loading the drum were violated."                                         |
|                                                                              |
| "CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: |
| (1) Drum preparation operation was shutdown, (2) [Nuclear safety Engineering |
| (NSE)] [has] oversight of content removal from drum #1 to empty drum #2 [as  |
| well as] re-sampling of both drums[, and] (3) Investigation and              |
| implementation of corrective actions [is] pending."                          |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee plans to notify the NRC Region 2 Office (David Ayres), North    |
| Carolina Emergency Management (Mel Fry), and New Hanover County Emergency    |
| Management (Dan Summers).  (Call the NRC operations officer for a site       |
| contact telephone number.)                                                   |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36311       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: CATAWBA                  REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/19/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] []                STATE:  SC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:06[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        10/19/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        11:00[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  MARCUS ABERNATHY             |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/19/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |KERRY LANDIS         R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NLTR                     LICENSEE 24 HR REPORT  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| DESIGN ISSUE REGARDING BULK HYDROGEN SUPPLY PIPING IN VICINITY OF RWST       |
|                                                                              |
| "A licensee audit of the design, operation, and maintenance of the site bulk |
| hydrogen systems identified an apparent deviation from the approved Fire     |
| Protection Program. It was observed that a section of hydrogen supply piping |
| located in a safety-related area appeared not to meet the requirements in    |
| section C.5.d.5 of Branch Technical Position (BTP) CMEB 9.5-1 (SRP). BTP     |
| CMEB 9.5-1, section C.5.d.5 requires that 'hydrogen lines in safety related  |
| areas should be either designed to seismic Class I requirements, or sleeved  |
| such that the water (i.e. guard) pipe is directly vented to the outside, or  |
| equipped with an excess flow valve so that in case of a line break, the      |
| hydrogen concentration in the affected areas will not exceed 2%.' An         |
| immediate evaluation determined that this is an old design issue and it does |
| not present a current operability issue. In the Catawba SSER No. 2, the      |
| staff indicated that the bulk hydrogen system at Catawba was designed in     |
| accordance with the requirements of BTP CMEB 9.5-1. Other hydrogen lines     |
| that are located in safety related areas are either seismically designed or  |
| supplied with an excess flow check valve. The piping in question travels     |
| from the hydrogen bulk storage house, is buried in the yard, enters the      |
| Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) trench, and proceeds into the auxiliary  |
| building. It appears that the failure to seismically design the hydrogen     |
| piping located in the RWST trench was an oversight. Engineering is           |
| evaluating appropriate long-term corrective actions.                         |
|                                                                              |
| "The licensee's staff has completed an evaluation and determined that this   |
| situation constitutes a deviation from the approved Fire Protection Program  |
| as described in the Facility Operating License (FOL) condition 2.C.(8)       |
|                                                                              |
| "Catawba FOL NPF-35 (Unit 1) and NPP-52 (Unit 2) require a 24-hour           |
| notification to the NRC for deviations from the approved Fire Protection     |
| Program. The above deviation is being reported under that license condition  |
| criterion. A follow-up report describing the cause of the deviation and      |
| corrective actions will be submitted to the NRC within 30 days."             |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee has notified the resident NRC inspector of this issue.          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36312       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: DRESDEN                  REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/19/1999|
|    UNIT:  [] [2] []                 STATE:  IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:21[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3           |EVENT DATE:        10/19/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        17:31[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  GLEN MORROW                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/19/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |GEOFFREY WRIGHT      R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ACCS 50.72(b)(1)(iv)     ECCS INJECTION         |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|2     N          N       0        Refueling        |0        Refueling        |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| MANUAL ECCS INJECTION INTO REACTOR VESSEL                                    |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee manually initiated the "2B" core spray subsystem to restore     |
| reactor vessel water level after  observing a decrease in reactor vessel     |
| water level. At the time of the event, the reactor vessel was flooded up     |
| above the main steam lines. The licensee had removed the "B" main steam line |
| plug in order to perform some refueling outage activities when the level     |
| decrease was observed. Level decreased approximately six inches before       |
| recovering.                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| Reactor vessel water level was restored to normal and the "B" main steam     |
| line plug was reinstalled. Upon investigation, the licensee discovered that  |
| the "2E" electromatic relief valve (ERV) was open, creating a flow path from |
| the main steam line to the suppression pool. The ERV was closed by the       |
| licensee. The licensee is currently investigating the cause of the ERV       |
| opening.                                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee.  |
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