Event Notification Report for October 18, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/17/1999 - 10/18/1999
EVENT NUMBERS
36310363053630736308
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 36310
Facility: GE NUCLEAR ENERGY
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 TO UO2)
LEU FABRICATION
LWR COMMERICAL FUEL
NRC Notified By: LON PAULSON
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 TO UO2)
LEU FABRICATION
LWR COMMERICAL FUEL
NRC Notified By: LON PAULSON
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 10/19/1999
Notification Time: 10:16 [ET]
Event Date: 10/18/1999
Event Time: 15:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/19/1999
Notification Time: 10:16 [ET]
Event Date: 10/18/1999
Event Time: 15:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/19/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
CAUDLE JULIAN (R2)
BRIAN SMITH (NMSS)
CAUDLE JULIAN (R2)
BRIAN SMITH (NMSS)
NRC BULLETIN 91-01 RESPONSE - CRITICALITY CONTROL (24-HOUR NOTIFICATION)
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"EVENT DESCRIPTION: At approximately 1515 on October 18, 1999, during packaging of materials in drums for burial, administrative controls associated with drum loading were violated. The quantity of uranium involved was 2,083.3 grams U at 3.6% enrichment. This amount of uranium is under the safe batch value of 27,411 grams U at 3.6% enrichment. Therefore, no unsafe condition existed."
"Controls were reestablished within 4 hours by direct removal of the material inadvertently added to the drum during preparation for shipment. This event is reported pursuant to NRC Bulletin 91-01 (within 24 hours) due to the failure to comply with procedural controls. Associated operations have been shutdown pending investigation and implementation of corrective actions."
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: Low safety significance - [The] actual uranium content in [the] drum [was] determined to be 2,083.3 grams U (3.6% enrichment)[, which is] below the safe batch mass limit of 27,411 grams U (3.6% enrichment)."
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): Multiple failure modes [are] required before a criticality accident could occur."
"CONTROLLED PARAMETER(S) (MASS, MODERATION. GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.): Mass [and] mass/concentration. [Mass was not controlled.]"
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, [AND] FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS UNIT AND % WORST BASE CRITICAL MASS): Composite sample analysis showed 75 [grams of] U235 at 3.60% enrichment (2,083.3 grams U). [The] safe batch value is 986.8 [grams of] U235 at 3.6% (27,411 grams U) where [the] safe batch is defined to be 45% of the minimum critical mass."
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: Administrative controls on queuing materials and loading the drum were violated."
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: (1) Drum preparation operation was shutdown, (2) [Nuclear safety Engineering (NSE)] [has] oversight of content removal from drum #1 to empty drum #2 [as well as] re-sampling of both drums[, and] (3) Investigation and implementation of corrective actions [is] pending."
The licensee plans to notify the NRC Region 2 Office (David Ayres), North Carolina Emergency Management (Mel Fry), and New Hanover County Emergency Management (Dan Summers). (Call the NRC operations officer for a site contact telephone number.)
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:
"EVENT DESCRIPTION: At approximately 1515 on October 18, 1999, during packaging of materials in drums for burial, administrative controls associated with drum loading were violated. The quantity of uranium involved was 2,083.3 grams U at 3.6% enrichment. This amount of uranium is under the safe batch value of 27,411 grams U at 3.6% enrichment. Therefore, no unsafe condition existed."
"Controls were reestablished within 4 hours by direct removal of the material inadvertently added to the drum during preparation for shipment. This event is reported pursuant to NRC Bulletin 91-01 (within 24 hours) due to the failure to comply with procedural controls. Associated operations have been shutdown pending investigation and implementation of corrective actions."
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: Low safety significance - [The] actual uranium content in [the] drum [was] determined to be 2,083.3 grams U (3.6% enrichment)[, which is] below the safe batch mass limit of 27,411 grams U (3.6% enrichment)."
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): Multiple failure modes [are] required before a criticality accident could occur."
"CONTROLLED PARAMETER(S) (MASS, MODERATION. GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.): Mass [and] mass/concentration. [Mass was not controlled.]"
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, [AND] FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS UNIT AND % WORST BASE CRITICAL MASS): Composite sample analysis showed 75 [grams of] U235 at 3.60% enrichment (2,083.3 grams U). [The] safe batch value is 986.8 [grams of] U235 at 3.6% (27,411 grams U) where [the] safe batch is defined to be 45% of the minimum critical mass."
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: Administrative controls on queuing materials and loading the drum were violated."
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: (1) Drum preparation operation was shutdown, (2) [Nuclear safety Engineering (NSE)] [has] oversight of content removal from drum #1 to empty drum #2 [as well as] re-sampling of both drums[, and] (3) Investigation and implementation of corrective actions [is] pending."
The licensee plans to notify the NRC Region 2 Office (David Ayres), North Carolina Emergency Management (Mel Fry), and New Hanover County Emergency Management (Dan Summers). (Call the NRC operations officer for a site contact telephone number.)
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36305
Facility: BYRON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: SCOTT SWANSON
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: SCOTT SWANSON
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 10/18/1999
Notification Time: 12:53 [ET]
Event Date: 10/18/1999
Event Time: 10:55 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/18/1999
Notification Time: 12:53 [ET]
Event Date: 10/18/1999
Event Time: 10:55 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/18/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
BRUCE JORGENSEN (R3)
BRUCE JORGENSEN (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 93 | Power Operation | 93 | Power Operation |
SHIPMENT RECEIVED WITH SURFACE CONTAMINATION IN EXCESS OF SHIPPING LIMITS.
A shipment containing a portable demineralizer resin tank received from the Point Beach Nuclear Station had external removable contamination in excess of shipping limits. Smears taken from the shipment were placed in a radiation detector, and readings of up to 52,800 dpm were observed. The licensee has contacted the shipper (Hitman).
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee.
A shipment containing a portable demineralizer resin tank received from the Point Beach Nuclear Station had external removable contamination in excess of shipping limits. Smears taken from the shipment were placed in a radiation detector, and readings of up to 52,800 dpm were observed. The licensee has contacted the shipper (Hitman).
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 36307
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: MILLER PACIFIC ENGINEERING GROUP
Region: 4
City: SANTA ROSA State: CA
County:
License #: 5411-21 (CA)
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DONALD BUNN
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Licensee: MILLER PACIFIC ENGINEERING GROUP
Region: 4
City: SANTA ROSA State: CA
County:
License #: 5411-21 (CA)
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DONALD BUNN
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 10/18/1999
Notification Time: 19:00 [ET]
Event Date: 10/18/1999
Event Time: 02:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/18/1999
Notification Time: 19:00 [ET]
Event Date: 10/18/1999
Event Time: 02:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/18/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
LINDA SMITH (R4)
WAYNE HODGES (NMSS)
LINDA SMITH (R4)
WAYNE HODGES (NMSS)
STOLEN MOISTURE/DENSITY GAUGE
A representative of the California State Radiation Control Program reported the theft of a CPM Model MC-1DR moisture/density gauge from a state licensee. The gauge contains one 10-mCi Cs-137 source, and one 40-mCi Am-241/Be source. The local police are investigating the theft and plan to file a report with the state. The licensee has issued a press release regarding the theft.
A representative of the California State Radiation Control Program reported the theft of a CPM Model MC-1DR moisture/density gauge from a state licensee. The gauge contains one 10-mCi Cs-137 source, and one 40-mCi Am-241/Be source. The local police are investigating the theft and plan to file a report with the state. The licensee has issued a press release regarding the theft.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36308
Facility: COOPER
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM B. GREEN
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM B. GREEN
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 10/18/1999
Notification Time: 20:28 [ET]
Event Date: 10/18/1999
Event Time: 15:12 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/18/1999
Notification Time: 20:28 [ET]
Event Date: 10/18/1999
Event Time: 15:12 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/18/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
LINDA SMITH (R4)
LINDA SMITH (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
SPURIOUS BUS UNDERVOLTAGE ALARM CAUSES VARIOUS ESF ACTUATIONS.
"At 1512 CDT on 10/18/99, 4160 bus 1B [undervoltage annunciator] alarmed and 4160 bus 1B breaker 1BG, the normal power supply to essential 4160 bus 1G, tripped. The emergency transformer, through breaker 1GS, began supplying power to essential 4160 bus 1G. Diesel generator #2 automatically started on the undervoltage condition but did not load since essential bus 1G was being supplied by the emergency transformer as designed.
"Primary containment isolation system (PCIS) Group isolations for [the] reactor water cleanup system and reactor building isolation occurred due to a loss of power. Emergency Operating Procedure 5A, Secondary Containment Control, was entered due to reactor building pressure going positive, the maximum value reached during the transient was +0.01 inches water gage. Both trains of standby gas treatment started on the Group 6 isolation and returned reactor building pressure to a negative value.
"PCIS Group Isolations 2 and 7 had some valves reposition. These valves were consistent with valves that would reposition on a loss of power. However, two valves normally actuated by a half group isolation on the division 2 side did not reposition. It is believed that this condition occurred due to the speed of actuation of relays in the PCIS system and is being investigated.
"Circulating water pump 1C tripped during the transient, and the steam jet air ejectors (SJAE) isolated during the electrical transient. These conditions caused main condenser vacuum to lower to a point that the turbine generator low vacuum pre-trip alarm was received at 25 inches Hg lowering. The SJAEs were reset, and vacuum in the main condenser began to rise. The lowest vacuum indicated was 24.5 inches Hg. Vacuum is currently 26.5 inches Hg.
"At the time of the event, Electrical Maintenance Personnel were installing monitoring equipment in the condensate pump B cubicle.
"4160 Bus 1G is currently being supplied from the emergency transformer, and diesel generator #2 [was] returned to a normal standby lineup at 1634 [CDT]. The electrical grid is stable, and the reactor and secondary plant are in a stable condition.
"The undervoltage alarm for 4160 bus 1B is still actuated even though an actual undervoltage does not exist on the bus. A team of personnel is investigating the undervoltage condition at this time."
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee.
"At 1512 CDT on 10/18/99, 4160 bus 1B [undervoltage annunciator] alarmed and 4160 bus 1B breaker 1BG, the normal power supply to essential 4160 bus 1G, tripped. The emergency transformer, through breaker 1GS, began supplying power to essential 4160 bus 1G. Diesel generator #2 automatically started on the undervoltage condition but did not load since essential bus 1G was being supplied by the emergency transformer as designed.
"Primary containment isolation system (PCIS) Group isolations for [the] reactor water cleanup system and reactor building isolation occurred due to a loss of power. Emergency Operating Procedure 5A, Secondary Containment Control, was entered due to reactor building pressure going positive, the maximum value reached during the transient was +0.01 inches water gage. Both trains of standby gas treatment started on the Group 6 isolation and returned reactor building pressure to a negative value.
"PCIS Group Isolations 2 and 7 had some valves reposition. These valves were consistent with valves that would reposition on a loss of power. However, two valves normally actuated by a half group isolation on the division 2 side did not reposition. It is believed that this condition occurred due to the speed of actuation of relays in the PCIS system and is being investigated.
"Circulating water pump 1C tripped during the transient, and the steam jet air ejectors (SJAE) isolated during the electrical transient. These conditions caused main condenser vacuum to lower to a point that the turbine generator low vacuum pre-trip alarm was received at 25 inches Hg lowering. The SJAEs were reset, and vacuum in the main condenser began to rise. The lowest vacuum indicated was 24.5 inches Hg. Vacuum is currently 26.5 inches Hg.
"At the time of the event, Electrical Maintenance Personnel were installing monitoring equipment in the condensate pump B cubicle.
"4160 Bus 1G is currently being supplied from the emergency transformer, and diesel generator #2 [was] returned to a normal standby lineup at 1634 [CDT]. The electrical grid is stable, and the reactor and secondary plant are in a stable condition.
"The undervoltage alarm for 4160 bus 1B is still actuated even though an actual undervoltage does not exist on the bus. A team of personnel is investigating the undervoltage condition at this time."
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee.