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Event Notification Report for October 15, 1999

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           10/14/1999 - 10/15/1999

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

36290  36291  36292  36293  

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|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36290       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: FITZPATRICK              REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/14/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:29[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4                             |EVENT DATE:        10/14/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        11:30[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  MARK ABRAMSKI                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/14/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JAMES NOGGLE         R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B)  OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
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| The Charcoal Absorption Efficiency of  Train 'B" Standby Gas Treatment       |
| System was discovered to be less than 99.8%.                                 |
|                                                                              |
| An engineering review of the absorption capability of the Standby Gas        |
| Treatment charcoal filters has concluded that the "B" Division of Standby    |
| Gas Treatment has been inoperable since March 30, 1999.  On April 10, 1999   |
| samples of the charcoal of the Standby Gas Treatment system were sent        |
| offsite to check the absorption efficiency of the charcoal, and other        |
| properties of the charcoal.  The results of the analysis were received by    |
| the licensee on 05/16/99.  Today it was discovered that the absorption       |
| efficiency of the charcoal is 99.3%.  The licensee has a commitment that the |
| absorption efficiency of the charcoal will be at least 99.8%.  The "B"       |
| Division of Standby Gas Treatment System is inoperable at this time for      |
| another reason.                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.       |
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+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36291       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SAINT LUCIE              REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/14/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  FL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:24[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] CE,[2] CE                        |EVENT DATE:        10/05/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        11:00[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  JACK BREEN                   |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/14/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |CAUDLE JULIAN        R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B)  OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          N       0        Cold Shutdown    |0        Hot Standby      |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| PRESSURIZER PRESSURE INSTRUMENTS DO NOT MEET CABLE SEPARATION REQUIREMENTS   |
|                                                                              |
| During a walkdown of redundant cable separation in the St Lucie Unit #1      |
| containment during the on-going 1999 refueling outage, it was determined     |
| that essential cables associated with the Pressurizer pressure transmitters  |
| do not meet the separation requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R        |
| III.G.2 or the separation requirements as stated in St Lucie Unit 1          |
| exemption K1.                                                                |
|                                                                              |
| In the event of a postulated fire inside containment, circuit failures could |
| cause the pressure transmitters to spuriously provide abnormal signals to    |
| the Reactor Protection System (RPS) high pressurizer pressure bistable trip  |
| units, the thermal margin/low pressure bistable trip units, the Engineered   |
| Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) cabinet for use in the Safety        |
| Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS)  and diverse scram system actuation logic, |
| low-low alarm function, and control room indication.  If two or more         |
| channels failed in the high direction, Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV)    |
| open signals would be generated.  Additional failures for pressure           |
| transmitters with similar cable separation could cause spurious operation of |
| the Pressurizer pressure control system (pressurizer spray valves and        |
| pressurizer heaters).  In addition, control room indication of pressurizer   |
| could be compromised.                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| 2.  Impact Statement                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| PT-1102A, PT-1102B, PT-1102C and PT-1102D are safety related narrow range    |
| (1500 - 2500 psia) pressurizer transmitters for the Pressurizer Pressure     |
| Measurement Loops.  The narrow range pressurizer pressure instrument loops   |
| provide a signal to the RPS high pressurizer pressure bistable trip units,   |
| the thermal margin/low pressure bistable trip units, the ESFAS cabinet for   |
| use I the SIAS and diverse scram system actuation logic, low-low alarm       |
| function, and control room indication.  In addition, cables for the          |
| pressurizer transmitters, which are input to the pressurizer pressure        |
| control system, are routed in the same manner as the other pressurizer       |
| pressure transmitters.                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| For design basis accident mitigation (UFSAR Chapter 15), the pressurizer     |
| pressure transmitters are not impacted and remain operable.  Currently, the  |
| cable routing for PT-1102A, PT-1102B, PT-1102C and PT-1102D does not meet    |
| the requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix R and therefore is outside the design   |
| basis of the plant for Appendix R.  This item is reportable in accordance    |
| with 10CFR50.72.                                                             |
|                                                                              |
| Using the separation criteria per Exemption K1, a fire in the penetration    |
| area of containment at elevation 23'-0 would affect pressurizer transmitters |
| PT-1102A (cable 10372A-MA), PT-1102B (cable 10373A-MB), PT-1102C (cable      |
| 10374A-MC) and PT-1102D (cable 10374A-MD).  The identified cables provide    |
| the interface between the protection system pressurizer pressure             |
| transmitters and the remaining portions of each instrument loop. Depending   |
| on the cable failure mode the pressure signals could fail either high or     |
| low.                                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| If two or more channels failed in the high direction, the following would    |
| occur:                                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| 1.  A reactor trip on high pressurizer pressure would occur.                 |
| 2.  PORV open signals would be generated.  Spurious operation of PORVs is    |
| precluded by placing the PORV control switches in override and by isolation  |
| of PORV block valves V1402 and V1404.  These actions are currently in the    |
| response to fire procedure for containment fire.                             |
|                                                                              |
| If two or more channels failed in the low direction, the following actions   |
| would occur:                                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| 1.  A reactor trip on thermal margin/ low pressure (TM/LP) would occur.      |
| 2.  Safety Injection (SIAS) and Containment Isolation (CIAS) would actuate.  |
| The response to fire procedure currently contains compensatory measure for a |
| spurious SIAS signal.                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| In addition the same fire could potentially affect the wide range pressure   |
| transmitters (PT-1107 and PT-1108) and the transmitters (PT-1100X and        |
| PT-1100Y) providing input to the pressurizer pressure control system.        |
|                                                                              |
| Damage to PT-110X and PT-1100Y could potentially cause spurious operation of |
| the pressurizer spray valves and/or pressurizer heaters.  In the event that  |
| this control is lost manual control will be used for the pressurizer heaters |
| and the appropriate Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCPs)  will be stopped to prevent |
| excessive spray flow.  These manual actions are addressed in the Safe        |
| Shutdown Analysis and will be addresses in the response to fire procedures.  |
|                                                                              |
| If all the channels were damaged, then pressurizer pressure indication in    |
| the control room could be compromised.  In this unlikely event alternate     |
| means are available to determine pressurizer pressure.  The pressure in the  |
| charging header is directly related to the Reactor Coolant System (RCS)      |
| pressure and this pressure indication (PIA-2212) could be used as an         |
| indicator for RCS pressure.  In addition, pressure indication is available   |
| in the sample system (PI-5510) on the sample line from Hot leg loop 1A.      |
| This pressure indicator is located in the sample room.                       |
|                                                                              |
| The probability of a fire, and the magnitude of a fire that would cause the  |
| above to occur inside the containment is extremely low for the following     |
| reasons.                                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| * The main source of combustion inside is the oil in the RCP motor.          |
| However, the RCP motors are not in the vicinity of the affected cable trays. |
| The affected cable trays are separated from the RCP motors by the biological |
| shield.                                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| * The combustible loading in this portion of containment is low and in the   |
| area where the lack of separation occurs consists of mostly insulation,      |
| which has a high ignition temperature.                                       |
|                                                                              |
| * There are no fire hazards or ignition sources in the are that the lack of  |
| separation occurs.                                                           |
|                                                                              |
| * All non-IEEE 383 cables are covered with a fire retardant coating.         |
|                                                                              |
| * This area has fire detectors, which would provide notification of a fire   |
| to the control room.                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| * The containment is inspected prior to operation for items that could       |
| impact sump operability; therefore, the potential for transient combustibles |
| is precluded.  In addition, the containment is a radiation control area with |
| very limited access during power operation.  The possibility of introducing  |
| new transient combustibles is very small.                                    |
|                                                                              |
| * The containment has a large volume with a high ceiling, which would        |
| dissipate the hot gases from a fire to the upper are of containment away     |
| from the affected area.                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| * The cables in the affected cable tray are self-extinguishing which will    |
| minimize fire propagation along the cables.                                  |
|                                                                              |
| Based upon the above, it is unlikely that a fire would be of the magnitude   |
| to affect all four pressure transmitters.  In the event, there is a fire of  |
| a magnitude to affect all for transmitter cables, the RCS integrity is       |
| preserved by isolating the PORVs using the PORV block valves.  By procedure, |
| in the event of a fire in containment, the Operators are instructed to       |
| position the PORVs to "OVERRIDE" and close the PORV block valves.  If        |
| pressurizer pressure  indication in the control room is lost, alternate      |
| means of pressure indication is available.                                   |
|                                                                              |
| 3.  Cause of Occurrence                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| The above concerns were not properly evaluated during development of the     |
| safe shutdown analysis.                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| 4.  Immediate Corrective Actions                                             |
|                                                                              |
| * A containment loose debris inspection is performed following each          |
| containment entry curing Modes 1-4                                           |
|                                                                              |
| * If containment entry is being provided for maintenance purposes, an        |
| inventory of all material, tools, and other items intended to go into        |
| containment is performed.                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| * All cable trays on the 18 foot and 23 foot elevations will be verified to  |
| be free of debris and other fire hazards prior to heatup from the current    |
| refueling outage.                                                            |
|                                                                              |
| * Operations has been informed of the potential that all pressurizer         |
| pressure indication may be lost for certain fires inside containment.  The   |
| "Response to Fire" procedure will be revised to include methods for          |
| establishing alternate pressurizer pressure indication.                      |
|                                                                              |
| 5.  Long Term Corrective Actions                                             |
|                                                                              |
| Prior to startup from the next refueling outage, evaluate potential plant    |
| modifications and/or licensing/design basis changes.  Actions will be        |
| implemented as required during the next St. Lucie Unit 1 outage scheduled    |
| for April 2001.                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event notification by the    |
| licensee.                                                                    |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36292       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: CALVERT CLIFFS           REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/14/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] []                STATE:  MD |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:09[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] CE,[2] CE                        |EVENT DATE:        10/14/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        16:15[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  NICK LAVATO                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/14/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JAMES NOGGLE         R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AARC 50.72(b)(1)(v)      OTHER ASMT/COMM INOP   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| DEDICATED TELEPHONE LINES TO THE MARYLAND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY AND    |
| MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT INOPERABLE FOR ABOUT 10 MINUTES.          |
|                                                                              |
| THE LICENSEE LOST THEIR DEDICATED LINES TO THE MARYLAND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT |
| AGENCY AND MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT FOR APPROXIMATELY 10 MINUTES   |
| DUE TO A LOCAL TELEPHONE OUTAGE PROBLEM IN CALVERT COUNTY. THE ONLY MEANS    |
| THE LICENSEE HAD TO NOTIFY THE MARYLAND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY AND THE  |
| MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT WAS THEIR RADIO COMMUNICATION SYSTEM.     |
|                                                                              |
| THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WILL NOTIFIED OF THE EVENT BY THE LICENSEE.       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36293       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: FITZPATRICK              REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/14/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:05[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4                             |EVENT DATE:        10/14/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        17:44[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  ART ZAREMBA                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/14/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JAMES NOGGLE         R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     RPS ACTUATION          |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     A/R        Y       100      Power Operation  |0        Hot Shutdown     |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| TURBINE TRIP/REACTOR SCRAM. THE CAUSE OF THE TURBINE TRIP IS UNKNOWN AT THIS |
| TIME.                                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| THE LICENSEE RECEIVED A TURBINE TRIP/REACTOR SCRAM FOR UNKNOWN REASONS.  ALL |
| RODS FULLY INSERTED INTO THE CORE.  HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION  (HPCI)  |
| AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC)  AUTOMATICALLY START ON LOW        |
| REACTOR VESSEL WATER LEVEL (126.5 INCHES).  HPCI AND RCIC DID NOT INJECT     |
| INTO THE CORE BECAUSE  BOTH HPCI AND RCIC ISOLATED ON HIGH REACTOR VESSEL    |
| WATER LEVEL (222.5 INCHES) BEFORE THEY COULD INJECT TO THE REACTOR VESSEL.   |
| REACTOR FEEDWATER PUMPS REMAINED OPERATING  AND CAUSED REACTOR VESSEL WATER  |
| LEVEL TO INCREASE TO THE HIGH LEVEL TRIP POINT OF 222.5 INCHES (REACTOR      |
| VESSEL WATER LEVEL DID NOT GET MUCH HIGHER THAN THIS LEVEL).  NO SAFETY      |
| RELIEF VALVES OPENED.  TURBINE BYPASS VALVES ARE BEING USED TO DUMP STEAM TO |
| THE MAIN CONDENSER TO REDUCE REACTOR VESSEL WATER TEMPERATURE TO A COLD      |
| SHUTDOWN CONDITION.  ALL EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS AND THE EMERGENCY    |
| DIESEL GENERATORS ARE FULLY OPERABLE IF NEEDED. THE ELECTRICAL GRID IS ALSO  |
| STABLE.                                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED BY THE LICENSEE OF THIS EVENT.       |
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