Event Notification Report for October 15, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
10/14/1999 - 10/15/1999
** EVENT NUMBERS **
36290 36291 36292 36293
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36290 |
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| FACILITY: FITZPATRICK REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/14/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:29[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 10/14/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 11:30[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: MARK ABRAMSKI |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/14/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JAMES NOGGLE R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| The Charcoal Absorption Efficiency of Train 'B" Standby Gas Treatment |
| System was discovered to be less than 99.8%. |
| |
| An engineering review of the absorption capability of the Standby Gas |
| Treatment charcoal filters has concluded that the "B" Division of Standby |
| Gas Treatment has been inoperable since March 30, 1999. On April 10, 1999 |
| samples of the charcoal of the Standby Gas Treatment system were sent |
| offsite to check the absorption efficiency of the charcoal, and other |
| properties of the charcoal. The results of the analysis were received by |
| the licensee on 05/16/99. Today it was discovered that the absorption |
| efficiency of the charcoal is 99.3%. The licensee has a commitment that the |
| absorption efficiency of the charcoal will be at least 99.8%. The "B" |
| Division of Standby Gas Treatment System is inoperable at this time for |
| another reason. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee. |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36291 |
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| FACILITY: SAINT LUCIE REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/14/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: FL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:24[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] CE,[2] CE |EVENT DATE: 10/05/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 11:00[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JACK BREEN |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/14/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |CAUDLE JULIAN R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N N 0 Cold Shutdown |0 Hot Standby |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| PRESSURIZER PRESSURE INSTRUMENTS DO NOT MEET CABLE SEPARATION REQUIREMENTS |
| |
| During a walkdown of redundant cable separation in the St Lucie Unit #1 |
| containment during the on-going 1999 refueling outage, it was determined |
| that essential cables associated with the Pressurizer pressure transmitters |
| do not meet the separation requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R |
| III.G.2 or the separation requirements as stated in St Lucie Unit 1 |
| exemption K1. |
| |
| In the event of a postulated fire inside containment, circuit failures could |
| cause the pressure transmitters to spuriously provide abnormal signals to |
| the Reactor Protection System (RPS) high pressurizer pressure bistable trip |
| units, the thermal margin/low pressure bistable trip units, the Engineered |
| Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) cabinet for use in the Safety |
| Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS) and diverse scram system actuation logic, |
| low-low alarm function, and control room indication. If two or more |
| channels failed in the high direction, Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) |
| open signals would be generated. Additional failures for pressure |
| transmitters with similar cable separation could cause spurious operation of |
| the Pressurizer pressure control system (pressurizer spray valves and |
| pressurizer heaters). In addition, control room indication of pressurizer |
| could be compromised. |
| |
| 2. Impact Statement |
| |
| PT-1102A, PT-1102B, PT-1102C and PT-1102D are safety related narrow range |
| (1500 - 2500 psia) pressurizer transmitters for the Pressurizer Pressure |
| Measurement Loops. The narrow range pressurizer pressure instrument loops |
| provide a signal to the RPS high pressurizer pressure bistable trip units, |
| the thermal margin/low pressure bistable trip units, the ESFAS cabinet for |
| use I the SIAS and diverse scram system actuation logic, low-low alarm |
| function, and control room indication. In addition, cables for the |
| pressurizer transmitters, which are input to the pressurizer pressure |
| control system, are routed in the same manner as the other pressurizer |
| pressure transmitters. |
| |
| For design basis accident mitigation (UFSAR Chapter 15), the pressurizer |
| pressure transmitters are not impacted and remain operable. Currently, the |
| cable routing for PT-1102A, PT-1102B, PT-1102C and PT-1102D does not meet |
| the requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix R and therefore is outside the design |
| basis of the plant for Appendix R. This item is reportable in accordance |
| with 10CFR50.72. |
| |
| Using the separation criteria per Exemption K1, a fire in the penetration |
| area of containment at elevation 23'-0 would affect pressurizer transmitters |
| PT-1102A (cable 10372A-MA), PT-1102B (cable 10373A-MB), PT-1102C (cable |
| 10374A-MC) and PT-1102D (cable 10374A-MD). The identified cables provide |
| the interface between the protection system pressurizer pressure |
| transmitters and the remaining portions of each instrument loop. Depending |
| on the cable failure mode the pressure signals could fail either high or |
| low. |
| |
| If two or more channels failed in the high direction, the following would |
| occur: |
| |
| 1. A reactor trip on high pressurizer pressure would occur. |
| 2. PORV open signals would be generated. Spurious operation of PORVs is |
| precluded by placing the PORV control switches in override and by isolation |
| of PORV block valves V1402 and V1404. These actions are currently in the |
| response to fire procedure for containment fire. |
| |
| If two or more channels failed in the low direction, the following actions |
| would occur: |
| |
| 1. A reactor trip on thermal margin/ low pressure (TM/LP) would occur. |
| 2. Safety Injection (SIAS) and Containment Isolation (CIAS) would actuate. |
| The response to fire procedure currently contains compensatory measure for a |
| spurious SIAS signal. |
| |
| In addition the same fire could potentially affect the wide range pressure |
| transmitters (PT-1107 and PT-1108) and the transmitters (PT-1100X and |
| PT-1100Y) providing input to the pressurizer pressure control system. |
| |
| Damage to PT-110X and PT-1100Y could potentially cause spurious operation of |
| the pressurizer spray valves and/or pressurizer heaters. In the event that |
| this control is lost manual control will be used for the pressurizer heaters |
| and the appropriate Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCPs) will be stopped to prevent |
| excessive spray flow. These manual actions are addressed in the Safe |
| Shutdown Analysis and will be addresses in the response to fire procedures. |
| |
| If all the channels were damaged, then pressurizer pressure indication in |
| the control room could be compromised. In this unlikely event alternate |
| means are available to determine pressurizer pressure. The pressure in the |
| charging header is directly related to the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) |
| pressure and this pressure indication (PIA-2212) could be used as an |
| indicator for RCS pressure. In addition, pressure indication is available |
| in the sample system (PI-5510) on the sample line from Hot leg loop 1A. |
| This pressure indicator is located in the sample room. |
| |
| The probability of a fire, and the magnitude of a fire that would cause the |
| above to occur inside the containment is extremely low for the following |
| reasons. |
| |
| * The main source of combustion inside is the oil in the RCP motor. |
| However, the RCP motors are not in the vicinity of the affected cable trays. |
| The affected cable trays are separated from the RCP motors by the biological |
| shield. |
| |
| * The combustible loading in this portion of containment is low and in the |
| area where the lack of separation occurs consists of mostly insulation, |
| which has a high ignition temperature. |
| |
| * There are no fire hazards or ignition sources in the are that the lack of |
| separation occurs. |
| |
| * All non-IEEE 383 cables are covered with a fire retardant coating. |
| |
| * This area has fire detectors, which would provide notification of a fire |
| to the control room. |
| |
| * The containment is inspected prior to operation for items that could |
| impact sump operability; therefore, the potential for transient combustibles |
| is precluded. In addition, the containment is a radiation control area with |
| very limited access during power operation. The possibility of introducing |
| new transient combustibles is very small. |
| |
| * The containment has a large volume with a high ceiling, which would |
| dissipate the hot gases from a fire to the upper are of containment away |
| from the affected area. |
| |
| * The cables in the affected cable tray are self-extinguishing which will |
| minimize fire propagation along the cables. |
| |
| Based upon the above, it is unlikely that a fire would be of the magnitude |
| to affect all four pressure transmitters. In the event, there is a fire of |
| a magnitude to affect all for transmitter cables, the RCS integrity is |
| preserved by isolating the PORVs using the PORV block valves. By procedure, |
| in the event of a fire in containment, the Operators are instructed to |
| position the PORVs to "OVERRIDE" and close the PORV block valves. If |
| pressurizer pressure indication in the control room is lost, alternate |
| means of pressure indication is available. |
| |
| 3. Cause of Occurrence |
| |
| The above concerns were not properly evaluated during development of the |
| safe shutdown analysis. |
| |
| 4. Immediate Corrective Actions |
| |
| * A containment loose debris inspection is performed following each |
| containment entry curing Modes 1-4 |
| |
| * If containment entry is being provided for maintenance purposes, an |
| inventory of all material, tools, and other items intended to go into |
| containment is performed. |
| |
| * All cable trays on the 18 foot and 23 foot elevations will be verified to |
| be free of debris and other fire hazards prior to heatup from the current |
| refueling outage. |
| |
| * Operations has been informed of the potential that all pressurizer |
| pressure indication may be lost for certain fires inside containment. The |
| "Response to Fire" procedure will be revised to include methods for |
| establishing alternate pressurizer pressure indication. |
| |
| 5. Long Term Corrective Actions |
| |
| Prior to startup from the next refueling outage, evaluate potential plant |
| modifications and/or licensing/design basis changes. Actions will be |
| implemented as required during the next St. Lucie Unit 1 outage scheduled |
| for April 2001. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event notification by the |
| licensee. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36292 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: CALVERT CLIFFS REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/14/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [2] [] STATE: MD |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:09[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] CE,[2] CE |EVENT DATE: 10/14/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 16:15[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: NICK LAVATO |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/14/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JAMES NOGGLE R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AARC 50.72(b)(1)(v) OTHER ASMT/COMM INOP | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| DEDICATED TELEPHONE LINES TO THE MARYLAND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY AND |
| MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT INOPERABLE FOR ABOUT 10 MINUTES. |
| |
| THE LICENSEE LOST THEIR DEDICATED LINES TO THE MARYLAND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT |
| AGENCY AND MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT FOR APPROXIMATELY 10 MINUTES |
| DUE TO A LOCAL TELEPHONE OUTAGE PROBLEM IN CALVERT COUNTY. THE ONLY MEANS |
| THE LICENSEE HAD TO NOTIFY THE MARYLAND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY AND THE |
| MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT WAS THEIR RADIO COMMUNICATION SYSTEM. |
| |
| THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WILL NOTIFIED OF THE EVENT BY THE LICENSEE. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36293 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: FITZPATRICK REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/14/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:05[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 10/14/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 17:44[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: ART ZAREMBA |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/14/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JAMES NOGGLE R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION | |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 A/R Y 100 Power Operation |0 Hot Shutdown |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| TURBINE TRIP/REACTOR SCRAM. THE CAUSE OF THE TURBINE TRIP IS UNKNOWN AT THIS |
| TIME. |
| |
| THE LICENSEE RECEIVED A TURBINE TRIP/REACTOR SCRAM FOR UNKNOWN REASONS. ALL |
| RODS FULLY INSERTED INTO THE CORE. HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) |
| AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) AUTOMATICALLY START ON LOW |
| REACTOR VESSEL WATER LEVEL (126.5 INCHES). HPCI AND RCIC DID NOT INJECT |
| INTO THE CORE BECAUSE BOTH HPCI AND RCIC ISOLATED ON HIGH REACTOR VESSEL |
| WATER LEVEL (222.5 INCHES) BEFORE THEY COULD INJECT TO THE REACTOR VESSEL. |
| REACTOR FEEDWATER PUMPS REMAINED OPERATING AND CAUSED REACTOR VESSEL WATER |
| LEVEL TO INCREASE TO THE HIGH LEVEL TRIP POINT OF 222.5 INCHES (REACTOR |
| VESSEL WATER LEVEL DID NOT GET MUCH HIGHER THAN THIS LEVEL). NO SAFETY |
| RELIEF VALVES OPENED. TURBINE BYPASS VALVES ARE BEING USED TO DUMP STEAM TO |
| THE MAIN CONDENSER TO REDUCE REACTOR VESSEL WATER TEMPERATURE TO A COLD |
| SHUTDOWN CONDITION. ALL EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS AND THE EMERGENCY |
| DIESEL GENERATORS ARE FULLY OPERABLE IF NEEDED. THE ELECTRICAL GRID IS ALSO |
| STABLE. |
| |
| THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED BY THE LICENSEE OF THIS EVENT. |
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