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Event Notification Report for October 12, 1999

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           10/08/1999 - 10/12/1999

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

36012  36209  36273  36274  36275  36276  36277  36278  36279  36280  36281  

!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36012       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: CLINTON                  REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/10/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:23[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-6                             |EVENT DATE:        08/10/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        12:30[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  ROBERT POWERS                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/08/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |BRUCE BURGESS        R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B)  OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO FUEL OIL LEAK          |
|                                                                              |
| "Abnormal readings from the lube oil analysis of the division 2 diesel       |
| generator lead to further testing of its lube oil. Gas chromatography        |
| analysis of the division 2 diesel generator lube oil showed a 5.7% fuel oil  |
| dilution. Vendor recommendations were to not operate the diesel with greater |
| than 5.0% fuel oil dilution. The division 2 diesel generator was tagged out  |
| for maintenance and declared inoperable on 8/9/99 at 1330 central time.      |
| During maintenance of the division 2 diesel generator it was discovered that |
| the 12th cylinder of the 16 cylinder engine fuel injector return line        |
| fitting was weeping fuel oil.                                                |
|                                                                              |
| "This notification is being made pursuant to 10CFR5072(b)(1)(ii)(B) as a     |
| condition outside of the design basis of the plant because of the discovery  |
| that the division 2 diesel generator has been incapable of performing its    |
| design function (intended safety function) for an extended period of time    |
| during operation."                                                           |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this notification by the     |
| licensee.                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| * * * RETRACTION 1803 10/8/1999 FROM ED TIEDEMANN TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *    |
|                                                                              |
| "This report is to retract the notification of 8/10/1999, based on further   |
| evaluation by onsite engineering and licensing personnel, and offsite        |
| resources. The engineering evaluation performed for this event determined    |
| that the diesel generator would have fulfilled the design basis              |
| requirements, even with the effects of fuel dilution in the lube oil. "      |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this retraction. Notified    |
| R3DO (Jacobson).                                                             |
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!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36209       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: QUAD CITIES              REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/21/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] []                STATE:  IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 20:41[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3                    |EVENT DATE:        09/10/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        14:40[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  DARYL CLARK                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/08/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |ROGER LANKSBURY      R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| -CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY FILTRATION SYSTEM INOP DUE TO FAILING ITS            |
| SURVEILLANCE TEST-                                                           |
|                                                                              |
| At 1440 CDT on 09/10/99, while performing the Control Room Emergency         |
| Filtration (CREF) System monthly surveillance test, the system flow rate was |
| found to be 2317 scfm.  The required tech spec flow rate is 2000 scfm +/-    |
| 10%.  The licensee declared the CREF System inoperable per Tech Spec 3.8.D   |
| and entered a 7 day LCO.  This event is being reported to the NRC in         |
| accordance with 10CFR50.72 (b)(2)(iii)(D), a condition that prevented the    |
| fulfillment of a safety function.                                            |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee declared the CREF System operable 40 minutes later after        |
| adjusting the air flow.                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee is continuing to evaluate the reportability of this issue.      |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.                            |
|                                                                              |
| * * * RETRACTION 2158 10/8/1999 FROM LECHMAIER TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *       |
|                                                                              |
| "This report is a retraction of the ENS call made on 9/21/99 concerning the  |
| Control Room Emergency Filtration System. We have completed our evaluation   |
| and have determined that the high flow rate condition found would not have   |
| prevented the system from performing its intended function. Therefore, this  |
| event is not reportable with respect to 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iii).               |
|                                                                              |
| "The system damper that was previously repositioned on 9/1/99 was the cause  |
| of this high flow. This condition is prohibited by Technical Specifications  |
| (LCO exceeded) and is reportable in accordance with                          |
| 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(I)(B)."                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this retraction by the       |
| licensee. Notified R3DO (Jacobson).                                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other                     |Event Number:   36273       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  BRITISH NUCLEAR FUELS, PLC           |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/08/1999|
|LICENSEE:  BRITISH NUCLEAR FUELS, PLC           |NOTIFICATION TIME: 08:14[EDT]|
|    CITY:                           REGION:     |EVENT DATE:        08/19/1999|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:     |EVENT TIME:             [EST]|
|LICENSE#:                        AGREEMENT:  N  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/08/1999|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |JOHN KINNEMAN        R1      |
|                                                |BRIAN BONSER         R2      |
+------------------------------------------------+JOHN JACOBSON        R3      |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  EUR ING MIKE R A SMITH       |KRISS KENNEDY        R4      |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                |KEVIN RAMSEY         NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|CCCC 21.21               UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 10 CFR PART 21 NOTIFICATION REGARDING THE POTENTIAL FOR A CYLINDER           |
| (MANUFACTURED BY STARVELEY'S LIMITED AND SUPPLIED BY BNFL TO USEC FOR        |
| ENRICHMENT) TO BE OVERFILLED BECAUSE THE CERTIFIED WATER CAPACITY STAMPED ON |
| THE CYLINDER IS LESS THAN THE SPECIFIED MINIMUM CAPACITY                     |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Eur Ing Mike R. |
| A. Smith, MRA Smith BSc CEng MIES, Head of Magnox and Hex Business, British  |
| Nuclear Fuels (BNFL), Fuel Business Group:                                   |
|                                                                              |
| "[10 CFR 21.21(4)(ii) - Identification of the facility, the activity, or the |
| basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the U.S.  |
| which fails to comply or contains a defect:]  48Y Cylinder no. 1122/0690     |
| containing 12,155.5 kg of UF6 supplied to [United States Enrichment          |
| Corporation (USEC)] by BNFL Fuel for enrichment."                            |
|                                                                              |
| "[10 CFR 21.21(4)(iii) - Identification of the firm constructing the         |
| facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains  |
| a defect:]  Cylinder manufactured by Staveley's Limited, Manchester, England |
| in 1978.                                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| "[10 CFR 21.21(4)(iv) - Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the    |
| safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure |
| to comply:]  The certified water capacity stamped on the cylinder as part of |
| the name plate data is less than the minimum capacity specified in ANSI      |
| N14.1, Table 1, standard cylinder data for a 48Y cylinder.  [The] required   |
| minimum capacity [is] 142.7 ft³[, and the] actual certified water capacity   |
| [is] 4,019 kg; equivalent to 142.1 ft³.  The cylinder, in its current        |
| condition, represents no safety hazard since the actual contents of 2,155.5  |
| kg of UF6 still allows a cylinder ullage of 7.2%.  The cylinder has the      |
| potential to be overfilled if the normal maximum fill limit for a 48Y was    |
| reached (12,501 kg of UF6 as specified in ANSI N14.1)."                      |
|                                                                              |
| "[10 CFR 21.21(4)(v) - The date on which the information of such defect or   |
| failure to comply was obtained:]  A memo was sent from USEC on 19 August     |
| 1999, informing BNFL Fuel that they had noted the certified water capacity   |
| was less than the ANSI-N14.1 minimum."                                       |
|                                                                              |
| "[10 CFR 21.21(4)(vi) - In the case of a basic component which contains a    |
| defect or fails to comply, the number and location of all such components in |
| use at, supplied for, or being supplied for one or more facilities or        |
| activities subject to the regulations in this part:]  Cylinder 1122/0690 is  |
| one of a batch of 108 cylinders purchased from Staveleys in 1978.  All other |
| 48Y Type Cylinders 1122/0600 to 1122/0707 inclusive, numbering 107, are      |
| located on licensed sites in the UK."                                        |
|                                                                              |
| "[10 CFR 21.21(4)(vii) - The corrective action which has been, is being, or  |
| will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for    |
| the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to         |
| complete the action:]  Having established that cylinder 1122/0690 is safe to |
| feed; it is proposed to discuss with USEC the possibility of proceeding with |
| the feed to their diffusion plant, as planned.  Alternatively, should USEC   |
| be unwilling to proceed then concession will be sought to transfer the       |
| cylinder back to BNFL in the UK."                                            |
|                                                                              |
| "Once emptied, the cylinder will be removed from service to prevent any      |
| possibility of a re-occurrence."                                             |
|                                                                              |
| "The Head of Site at BNFL Springfields has commissioned a Working Party,     |
| which includes an independent senior engineer, independent senior operations |
| manager, and standards/surveillance engineers."                              |
|                                                                              |
| "The Working Party:                                                          |
| a)  Has already independently verified that there are no other under         |
| capacity cylinders located in the U.S.;                                      |
| b)  Will independently verify whether or not any other BNFL cylinders are    |
| under capacity;                                                              |
| c)  In the event that the independent verification does reveal any further   |
| such defective cylinders, will initiate appropriate action to remove such    |
| cylinders from service;                                                      |
| d)  Will monitor the implementation of any such actions through to           |
| completion;                                                                  |
| e)  [Has] already examined and modified BNFL's cylinder filling procedures   |
| to prevent an under capacity cylinder from being filled in the future;       |
| [and]                                                                        |
| f)  [Is] in the process of reviewing our cylinder purchase specification to  |
| prevent any further under capacity cylinders from being supplied."           |
|                                                                              |
| "[10 CFR 21.21(4)(viii) - Any advice related to the defect or failure to     |
| comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is    |
| being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees:]  The UK Nuclear         |
| Installations Inspectorate (NII) and Department of the Environment,          |
| Transport, and Regions (DETR) have been advised of this notification."       |
|                                                                              |
| (Call the NRC operations officer for contact information.)                   |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36274       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: NINE MILE POINT          REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/08/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:44[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5                    |EVENT DATE:        10/08/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        09:05[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  THOMAS HOWARD                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/08/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          UNU                   |JOHN KINNEMAN        R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |TAD MARSH            NRR     |
|AAEC 50.72 (a) (1) (I)   EMERGENCY DECLARED     |CHARLES MILLER       IRO     |
|                                                |MIKE TSCHILTZ        EDO     |
|                                                |BURNICE CARR         FEMA    |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       24       Power Operation  |24       Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| DECLARATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO THE POSSIBILITY THAT VARIOUS AREAS OF    |
| THE PLANT ARE INACCESSIBLE DUE TO A HAZARDOUS ATMOSPHERE                     |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:   |
|                                                                              |
| "[At 0905 on 10/08/99, an] Unusual Event [was] declared due to Cardox fire   |
| system discharge ([carbon dioxide]) in [the Administration Building at       |
| 0815].  Various levels of the plant are being considered inaccessible until  |
| [oxygen] levels are verified [to be] satisfactory.  [Carbon dioxide] venting |
| is in progress.  [There is no] effect on plant operation at [the] present    |
| time[, and no effect is currently] anticipated."                             |
|                                                                              |
| "[The] preliminary cause of discharge of [carbon dioxide] appears to be a    |
| switch malfunction.  No fire was detected."                                  |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee stated that the Cardox fire system has both a 30-second siren   |
| and flashing red lights prior to the discharge of carbon dioxide in order to |
| allow personnel to evacuate the affected areas.  There were no injuries      |
| reported, and carbon dioxide venting is currently in progress.  The          |
| Administration Building and some adjacent areas of the turbine building were |
| affected.                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector as well as state and local  |
| agencies.  The licensee also plans to issue a media/press release.           |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE 1219 10/8/1999 FROM MATTESON TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *            |
|                                                                              |
| The Unusual Event was terminated at 1210 EDT. The NRC resident inspector has |
| been informed. Notified R1DO (Kinneman), NRR (Marsh), IRO (Miller), FEMA     |
| (Carr).                                                                      |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36275       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SAINT LUCIE              REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/08/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] []                STATE:  FL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:17[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] CE,[2] CE                        |EVENT DATE:        10/08/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        11:10[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  CALVIN WARD                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/08/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |BRIAN BONSER         R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|APRE 50.72(b)(2)(vi)     OFFSITE NOTIFICATION   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          N       0        Cold Shutdown    |0        Cold Shutdown    |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| OFFSITE NOTIFICATION REQUIRED BY NPDES PERMIT                                |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee contacted the Florida Department of Environmental Protection    |
| (DEP) regarding the discharge of effluent to the Atlantic Ocean. The site    |
| settling ponds were pumped down due to high water levels caused by recent    |
| rain. The site National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES)       |
| permit requires that the licensee contact the state DEP regarding this       |
| discharge. No release limits were exceeded. The NRC resident inspector has   |
| been informed of this notification by the licensee.                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36276       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SALEM                    REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/08/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] []                STATE:  NJ |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:13[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        10/08/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        15:50[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  RUSS GUMBERT                 |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/08/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JOHN KINNEMAN        R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ADEG 50.72(b)(1)(ii)     DEGRAD COND DURING OP  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          N       0        Refueling        |0        Refueling        |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 10 CFR PART 50, APPENDIX R ISSUE REGARDING CABLE SEPARATION                  |
|                                                                              |
| The following is text of a (rather lengthy) facsimile submitted by the       |
| licensee:                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| "1.  Description of Condition                                                |
|                                                                              |
| "During a review of the Salem Post-fire Safe Shutdown Analysis a concern was |
| identified with the cable routing of the pressurizer PORV and block valves.  |
| The cable for each PORV and its associated block valve is routed in the same |
| cable tray inside the containment. The pressurizer PORVs and block valves    |
| are considered a high/low pressure interface point for 10CFR50 Appendix R    |
| analysis. Therefore each PORV block valve combination is considered as       |
| redundant components that require proper separation in accordance with       |
| Section III.G.2 of Appendix R to prevent hot shorts, open circuits, or       |
| shorts to ground from causing spurious operation of these valves.            |
|                                                                              |
| "In the event of a postulated fire inside containment a block valve could    |
| lose power; since this valve is in the open position it would not be able to |
| be closed. A hot short could also cause the PORV to spuriously open. These   |
| two occurrences together would result in the loss of Reactor Coolant System  |
| (RCS) inventory control. This condition does not satisfy the 10CFR50         |
| Appendix R performance goal of inventory control for post-fire Safe Shutdown |
| (SSD).                                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| "A second similar concern exists with the PORVs and block valves for         |
| Alternate Shutdown (ASD) capability. ASD is implemented in the event of a    |
| fire in the Control Room, Relay Room or the ceiling of the 460V Switchgear   |
| room. A fire in the above areas could lead to the spurious operation of the  |
| PORVs. Operators implement the ASD methodology in accordance with procedures |
| S1(2).OP-AB.CR-0002. Spurious operation of the PORV could occur prior to the |
| operators reaching the step in the ASD to operate the local switch for the   |
| block valve and close the block valve. In the current procedure, it takes    |
| approximately 20 minutes to reach the step to operate the transfer switch    |
| for the block valve. Prior to closing the block valve, there would be a loss |
| of RCS inventory control due to the spurious operation of the PORV.          |
|                                                                              |
| "2.  Impact Statement                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| "For design basis accident mitigation (UFSAR Chapter 15), the PORV and block |
| valves are not impacted and remain operable. Currently, the PORV and block   |
| valve configuration does not meet the requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix R and |
| therefore is outside the design basis of the plant for Appendix R. This item |
| is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.72.                                 |
|                                                                              |
| "The inadvertent opening of the PORV and block valve would result in RCS     |
| depressurization. For the block valve and PORV to open the following needs   |
| to occur:                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| "*     an external or internal "hot short" of the PORV solenoid DC control   |
| circuitry which causes the energization of the solenoid, coincident with the |
| complete loss of the power supply cable to the PORV block valve, which       |
| prevents remote operation (closure) of the block valve, is a very low        |
| probability event.                                                           |
|                                                                              |
| "*     The control cables have external insulation, with an armored shield,  |
| with multiple individual insulated conductors within the shield. In order    |
| for the internal hot short to occur, the external fire would have to burn    |
| through the cable external jacket, and shielding, and then selectively       |
| affect specific DC conductors within the cable to enable conductors of the   |
| correct polarity to come in contact in such a manner to energize the         |
| solenoid valve and open the PORV. The same external fire would also have to  |
| damage the power supply to the block valve to preclude operation, as stated  |
| above.                                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| "*     In order for the external hot short to occur, another cable in the    |
| same raceway system, which is also of a shielded construction, would have to |
| have one of its internal conductors affected by the external fire affect the |
| conductors of the PORV control circuit, which is contained in its own        |
| shielded cable. This is an even more unlikely scenario.                      |
|                                                                              |
| "The probability of a fire, of a magnitude that would cause the above to     |
| occur inside containment is extremely low for the following reasons.         |
|                                                                              |
| "*     The main source of combustion inside containment is the oil in the    |
| RCP motor. However, the RCP motor is not in the vicinity of the affected     |
| cable trays. The RCP motor is equipped with detection and suppression        |
| system. An oil collection system is provided in the event of the leakage.    |
|                                                                              |
| "*     The introduction of transient combustible materials into the          |
| containment is extremely remote due to limited containment access during     |
| operation.                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| "*     The RCP motor oil level has a low-level alarm in the control room.    |
| Any inadvertent oil loss would be detected and corrected early. This reduces |
| the probability of lire due to the oil leakage.                              |
|                                                                              |
| "*     The cables in the affected cable tray are made up of                  |
| self-extinguishing cable material. This will minimize fire propagation along |
| the cables.                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| "*     Containment volume is large. The probability of a plume to occur to   |
| affect the cable trays is extremely low.                                     |
|                                                                              |
| "*     A qualitative risk assessment shows that the probability of fire      |
| inside containment, in the area of concern, is extremely low.                |
|                                                                              |
| "3.  Cause of Occurrence                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| "The above concerns were not properly evaluated during development of the    |
| safe shutdown analysis.                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| "4.  Immediate Corrective Actions                                            |
|                                                                              |
| "*     Establish appropriate compensatory measures for the Alternate         |
| Shutdown Area in accordance with the fire protection program.                |
|                                                                              |
| "*     A containment loose debris inspection is performed following each     |
| containment entry during Modes 1-4.                                          |
|                                                                              |
| "*     Following any containment entry, a walkdown will be performed to      |
| ensure that there are no combustible loads in the vicinity of the affected   |
| cable trays.                                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| "*     Ensure operating shifts are alerted that spurious operation of the    |
| PORVs may be caused by a fire inside containment.                            |
|                                                                              |
| "*     Additional corrective actions are being evaluated and will be         |
| implemented as necessary.                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| "5.  Long Term Corrective Actions                                            |
|                                                                              |
| "*     Prior to startup from the next refueling outage, evaluate potential   |
| plant modifications and/or licensing/design basis changes. Actions will be   |
| implemented as required to address the PORV and block valve spurious         |
| operation concern."                                                          |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this notification by the     |
| licensee.                                                                    |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36277       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SURRY                    REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/09/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] []                STATE:  VA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 22:13[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP                |EVENT DATE:        10/09/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        12:41[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  LISA HILBERT-SEMMES          |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/09/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |BRIAN BONSER         R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |JOHN ZWOLINSKI       NRR     |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |CHARLES MILLER       IRO     |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |96       Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| EDGs START AND LOAD DUE TO LOSS OF ONE RESERVE STATION SERVICE TRANSFORMER   |
|                                                                              |
| "At 1241 hours, with Surry Power Station Unit 1 and Unit 2 at 100% reactor   |
| power, a loss of 'C' Reserve Station Service Transformer (RSST) occurred due |
| to a fire on one of the leads. The #1 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) auto  |
| started due to an undervoltage signal on the Unit 1 'H' emergency bus and    |
| re-energized the Unit 1 'H' emergency bus. Also, the #3 EDG auto started due |
| to an undervoltage signal on the Unit 2 'J' emergency bus and re-energized   |
| the Unit 2 'J' emergency bus. The fire team reported that the fire was out   |
| at 1243. Unit 1 remained at 100% power. Unit 2 decreased to 96% power due to |
| a perturbation on the semi-vital bus when the 'J' emergency bus was          |
| de-energized then re-energized by the #3 EDG. The unit was returned to 100%  |
| power at 1400 when all unit conditions were verified stable. All equipment   |
| performed as expected during the event and there were no unexplained         |
| occurrences other than the loss of 'C' RSST which is under investigation.    |
|                                                                              |
| "No adverse radiological consequences resulted from this event. There were   |
| no radiation releases due to this event, nor were there any personnel        |
| injuries or contamination events.                                            |
|                                                                              |
| "Unit 1 is currently at 100% power and 845 MWe with #1 EDG supplying the 'H' |
| emergency bus.                                                               |
|                                                                              |
| "Unit 2 is currently at 100% power and 855 MWe with #3 EDG supplying the 'J' |
| emergency bus.                                                               |
|                                                                              |
| "This event was initially determined to be not reportable based on the EDG   |
| auto start signal being due to an undervoltage signal and not a valid ESF    |
| signal. Upon further review of Tech Specs and NUREG 1022, it was determined  |
| at 2015 that the EDG auto starts due to an under voltage signal were         |
| reportable as an ESF actuation."                                             |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee.  |
|                                                                              |
| This is event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(ii).   |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Research Reactor                                 |Event Number:   36278       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: STATE UNIV OF NEW YORK AT BUFFALO    |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/10/1999|
|   RXTYPE: 2000 KW PULSTAR                      |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:48[EDT]|
| COMMENTS:                                      |EVENT DATE:        10/09/1999|
|                                                |EVENT TIME:        22:00[EDT]|
|                                                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/10/1999|
|    CITY:  BUFFALO                  REGION:  1  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  ERIE                      STATE:  NY |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  R-77                  AGREEMENT:  Y  |JOHN KINNEMAN        R1      |
|  DOCKET:  05000057                             |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  MARK ADAMS                   |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NINF                     INFORMATION ONLY       |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| COURTESY CALL DUE TO POWER OUTAGE                                            |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee reported that a transformer failure resulted in a power outage  |
| to the reactor facility. The emergency diesel generator started, but was     |
| manually stopped due to poor operating performance. Partial power has been   |
| restored from another building. The licensee anticipates that replacement of |
| the transformer could take from three to six weeks. This facility has been   |
| shut down since 1994. The only required equipment affected by the outage are |
| gaseous radiation monitors, which have an allowed outage time of 10 days.    |
|                                                                              |
| The caller made this report because of possible press interest in the event. |
| The local media monitors campus radio transmissions, and the caller          |
| speculated that transmissions regarding the event could be interpreted by    |
| the media as a serious event. The licensee may make a press release.         |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36279       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: FERMI                    REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/11/1999|
|    UNIT:  [2] [] []                 STATE:  MI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:07[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [2] GE-4                             |EVENT DATE:        10/11/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        09:59[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  COSEO                        |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/11/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JOHN JACOBSON        R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION    |                             |
|NLCO                     TECH SPEC LCO A/S      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|2     N          Y       97       Power Operation  |97       Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| VARIOUS SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO LOSS OF COOLING  |
| TO THE BATTERY CHARGER ROOM .                                                |
|                                                                              |
| Following startup of the Division 2 Residual Heat Removal Service Water      |
| (RHRSW) pumps, it was observed that the Division 2 Emergency Equipment       |
| Service Water (EESW) pump was rotating backwards. Division 2 RHRSW flow was  |
| normal at greater than 9000 gpm. The Division 2 Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS)     |
| service water systems discharge into a common header that can be routed to   |
| the Division 2 UHS cooling tower fans or directly to the reservoir. This     |
| indicates that the Division 2 EESW pump discharge check valve is not fully   |
| closed. The Division 2 EESW pump control was placed in OFF/RESET (normally   |
| in AUTO) at 0959 hrs on 10/11/99. The pump discharge valve was closed to     |
| isolate the flow path and Division 2 EESW has been declared inoperable. This |
| results in Division 2 Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) being         |
| inoperable. Division 2 EECW provides cooling to the High Pressure Coolant    |
| Injection (HPCI) pump area cooler during accident conditions. Therefore, the |
| HPCI system was declared inoperable(14 day LCO) at 0959 on 10/11/99. HPCI    |
| remains in standby lineup ready for automatic initiation. The Div 2 EECW     |
| also provides cooling to the battery charger room. With the batteries        |
| inoperable they are in an 18 hr LCO.                                         |
|                                                                              |
| The check valve internals have been inspected and preliminary findings       |
| indicate that all parts are intact. The failure of the valve appears to be   |
| caused by a worn disc pin in the valve. Necessary repairs are in progress.   |
|                                                                              |
| The Resident Inspector was notified.                                         |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36280       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: POINT BEACH              REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/11/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] []                STATE:  WI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:56[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP                |EVENT DATE:        10/11/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        15:14[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  HASTINGS                     |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/11/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JOHN JACOBSON        R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B)  OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FIRE BARRIER WALL NOT MEETING THE LICENSEE'S REQUIRED APPENDIX "R" DESIGN    |
| BASIS.                                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT A WALL SEGMENT SEPARATING THE CONTROL ROOM FROM THE   |
| CABLE SPREADING ROOM PROVIDES ONLY A 1.5 HOUR FIRE BARRIER INSTEAD OF THE 3  |
| HOUR FIRE BARRIER REQUIRED BY THE LICENSEE'S APPENDIX "R" DESIGN             |
| COMMITMENTS.  THIS PLACES THE WALL SEGMENT OUTSIDE APPENDIX "R" DESIGN       |
| BASIS.  HOURLY FIRE WATCHES ON BOTH SIDES OF THIS WALL WERE ALREADY IN PLACE |
| PRIOR TO THIS DISCOVERY AND WILL CONTINUE UNTIL THE PROBLEM IS RESOLVED.     |
|                                                                              |
| THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS INFORMED.                                         |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36281       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PALO VERDE               REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/11/1999|
|    UNIT:  [] [] [3]                 STATE:  AZ |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:10[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE                 |EVENT DATE:        10/11/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        08:40[MST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  STROUD                       |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/11/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |KRISS KENNEDY        R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|HFIT 26.73               FITNESS FOR DUTY       |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
|3     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| CONTRABAND MATERIAL REPORTED AS A FITNESS-FOR-DUTY ISSUE                     |
|                                                                              |
| CONTRABAND MATERIAL FOUND IN THE VITAL AREA.   IMMEDIATE COMPENSATORY        |
| MEASURES TAKEN UPON DISCOVERY.  THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED.         |
|                                                                              |
| CONTACT THE HEADQUARTERS OPERATIONS OFFICER FOR ADDITIONAL DETAILS.          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+