Event Notification Report for October 12, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/11/1999 - 10/12/1999
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36282
Facility: WOLF CREEK
Region: 4 State: KS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: HEDGES
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 4 State: KS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: HEDGES
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 10/12/1999
Notification Time: 18:11 [ET]
Event Date: 10/12/1999
Event Time: 17:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/12/1999
Notification Time: 18:11 [ET]
Event Date: 10/12/1999
Event Time: 17:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/12/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
GAIL GOOD (R4)
GAIL GOOD (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
PLANT LOST THEIR SAFETY PARAMETER DISPLAY SYSTEM (SPDS) FOR APPROXIMATELY 26 HOURS
"On October 8, 1999, following scheduled maintenance, the plant's Nuclear Plant Information System (NPIS) experienced a series of intermittent random component and software related failures. The Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) relies on the NPIS computer to provide necessary information. These failures resulted in the SPDS being unavailable for a total of approximately 26 hours since the October 8, 1999 maintenance evolution. The system has been operating without interruption since October 11 at 1758 hours.
"10 CFR 50.72 requires licensees to report events that resulted in a major loss of emergency assessment capability. NUREG-1022, Revision 1, indicates that a major loss of assessment capability would include those events that significantly impair the licensees safety assessment capability. NUREG-1022 further states that the loss of SPDS for a short period of time need not be reported unless other assessment equipment is lost at the same time.
"During the SPDS outages, other control room indications used in emergency response capability were available. The licensee does not believe that this out of service time resulted in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, since no other assessment equipment was lost during this period. Although this event is not considered reportable under 10 CFR 50.72, this report is being provided for information, since the Emergency Response Facility Information System, which supplies the NRC Emergency Response Data System would not have been available during the SPDS outages."
The Resident Inspector was notified.
"On October 8, 1999, following scheduled maintenance, the plant's Nuclear Plant Information System (NPIS) experienced a series of intermittent random component and software related failures. The Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) relies on the NPIS computer to provide necessary information. These failures resulted in the SPDS being unavailable for a total of approximately 26 hours since the October 8, 1999 maintenance evolution. The system has been operating without interruption since October 11 at 1758 hours.
"10 CFR 50.72 requires licensees to report events that resulted in a major loss of emergency assessment capability. NUREG-1022, Revision 1, indicates that a major loss of assessment capability would include those events that significantly impair the licensees safety assessment capability. NUREG-1022 further states that the loss of SPDS for a short period of time need not be reported unless other assessment equipment is lost at the same time.
"During the SPDS outages, other control room indications used in emergency response capability were available. The licensee does not believe that this out of service time resulted in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, since no other assessment equipment was lost during this period. Although this event is not considered reportable under 10 CFR 50.72, this report is being provided for information, since the Emergency Response Facility Information System, which supplies the NRC Emergency Response Data System would not have been available during the SPDS outages."
The Resident Inspector was notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36283
Facility: INDIAN POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [3] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: LIZZO
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [3] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: LIZZO
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 10/12/1999
Notification Time: 23:27 [ET]
Event Date: 10/12/1999
Event Time: 19:44 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/12/1999
Notification Time: 23:27 [ET]
Event Date: 10/12/1999
Event Time: 19:44 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/12/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
JAMES NOGGLE (R1)
JAMES NOGGLE (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
PLANT HAD AN INADVERTENT SAFETY INJECTION SIGNAL ACTUATION AND AN AUTO START OF ONE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR.
"At approximately 1944 hours on October 12, 1999, during thc performance of test 3PT-R003B "Safety injection Test Breaker Sequencing/Bus Stripping" a safety injection (SI) relay was inadvertently actuated.
"The technician performing the test was installing an electrical jumper in accordance with the procedure when the alligator clip used for the jumper slipped off and accidentally actuated the nearby SI relay. The relay actuated a SI sequence on the 480V bus 6A. The load stripping sequence for bus 6A was initiated and SI equipment sequenced on as expected. The associated SI equipment electrical breakers were racked into the test position for the purpose of the test, so no injection occurred. The EDG associated with bus 6A automatically started and came up to speed and voltage but did not load.
"The EDG was secured and equipment restored to the condition necessary to resume the test."
The Resident Inspector has been notified.
"At approximately 1944 hours on October 12, 1999, during thc performance of test 3PT-R003B "Safety injection Test Breaker Sequencing/Bus Stripping" a safety injection (SI) relay was inadvertently actuated.
"The technician performing the test was installing an electrical jumper in accordance with the procedure when the alligator clip used for the jumper slipped off and accidentally actuated the nearby SI relay. The relay actuated a SI sequence on the 480V bus 6A. The load stripping sequence for bus 6A was initiated and SI equipment sequenced on as expected. The associated SI equipment electrical breakers were racked into the test position for the purpose of the test, so no injection occurred. The EDG associated with bus 6A automatically started and came up to speed and voltage but did not load.
"The EDG was secured and equipment restored to the condition necessary to resume the test."
The Resident Inspector has been notified.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 36284
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: J. UNDERWOOD
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 3 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: J. UNDERWOOD
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 10/13/1999
Notification Time: 02:50 [ET]
Event Date: 10/12/1999
Event Time: 02:55 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 11/01/1999
Notification Time: 02:50 [ET]
Event Date: 10/12/1999
Event Time: 02:55 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 11/01/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JOHN MADERA (R3)
BRIAN SMITH (NMSS)
JOHN MADERA (R3)
BRIAN SMITH (NMSS)
24 HOUR REPORT - VALID ALARM ON PRIMARY CONDENSATE, A SAFETY SYSTEM
"At 0225 CDT on 10/12/99, the PSS office was notified that a Primary Condensate alarm was received on the C-360 position 3 autoclave Water Inventory Control System (WICS). The WICS is required to be operable while heating in mode 5 according to TSR 2.1.4.3. The autoclave was checked according to the alarm response procedure and subsequently removed from service and declared inoperable by the Plant Shift Superintendent. Troubleshooting was initiated and is continuing in order to determine the reason for the alarm.
"The safety system actuation is reportable to the NRC as required by Safety Analysis Report, section 6.9, table 1, criteria J.2, Safety System actuation due to a valid signal as a 24-hour event notification."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.
* * * UPDATE AT 1551 ON 11/01/99 BY FRANK CAGE TO JOLLIFFE * * *
"Troubleshooting and testing by System Engineering has determined that this actuation was caused by a short circuit of the primary condensate WICS wiring to its protective conduit. Agitation of the conduit resulted in repeated false alarms on the WICS. Given this finding and the fact that the actuation occurred at a point in the heat cycle beyond the initial heatup and triple point when the maximum condensate is being produced, indicate that the actuation signal was not a result of water backed up in the drain line, which the WICS is designed to protect against. Thus, this is an invalid signal. Actuations caused by invalid signals are not reportable to the NRC."
Therefore, this event is being retracted.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this update. The NRC Operations Officer notified the R3DO Jim Creed and the NMSS EO John Hickey.
PGDP Problem Report #ATR-99-6175, PGDP Event Report #PAD-1999-112.
"At 0225 CDT on 10/12/99, the PSS office was notified that a Primary Condensate alarm was received on the C-360 position 3 autoclave Water Inventory Control System (WICS). The WICS is required to be operable while heating in mode 5 according to TSR 2.1.4.3. The autoclave was checked according to the alarm response procedure and subsequently removed from service and declared inoperable by the Plant Shift Superintendent. Troubleshooting was initiated and is continuing in order to determine the reason for the alarm.
"The safety system actuation is reportable to the NRC as required by Safety Analysis Report, section 6.9, table 1, criteria J.2, Safety System actuation due to a valid signal as a 24-hour event notification."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.
* * * UPDATE AT 1551 ON 11/01/99 BY FRANK CAGE TO JOLLIFFE * * *
"Troubleshooting and testing by System Engineering has determined that this actuation was caused by a short circuit of the primary condensate WICS wiring to its protective conduit. Agitation of the conduit resulted in repeated false alarms on the WICS. Given this finding and the fact that the actuation occurred at a point in the heat cycle beyond the initial heatup and triple point when the maximum condensate is being produced, indicate that the actuation signal was not a result of water backed up in the drain line, which the WICS is designed to protect against. Thus, this is an invalid signal. Actuations caused by invalid signals are not reportable to the NRC."
Therefore, this event is being retracted.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this update. The NRC Operations Officer notified the R3DO Jim Creed and the NMSS EO John Hickey.
PGDP Problem Report #ATR-99-6175, PGDP Event Report #PAD-1999-112.