Event Notification Report for August 23, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
08/22/1999 - 08/23/1999
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 36064
Facility: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: RON CRABTREE
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: RON CRABTREE
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 08/24/1999
Notification Time: 12:54 [ET]
Event Date: 08/23/1999
Event Time: 17:18 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/18/1999
Notification Time: 12:54 [ET]
Event Date: 08/23/1999
Event Time: 17:18 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/18/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
76.120(c)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
10 CFR Section:
76.120(c)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
MELVYN LEACH (R3)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
MELVYN LEACH (R3)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
CRITICALITY ACCIDENT ALARM SYSTEM SLAVE UNITS MAY NOT MEET REQUIRED STANDARD
THE FOLLOWING TEXT IS A PORTION OF A FACSIMILE RECEIVED FROM PORTSMOUTH:
"At 1718 HOURS ON 08/23/99, THE PLANT SHIFT SUPERINTENDENT WAS NOTIFIED THAT THE CRITICALITY ACCIDENT ALARM SYSTEM (CAAS) SLAVE UNITS MAY NOT MEET [THE] ANSI 8.3, SECTION 5.5, STANDARD. ANSI 8.3 IDENTIFIES THAT THE CAAS SYSTEM SHALL AUTOMATICALLY INITIATE AN EVACUATION ALARM SIGNAL WITHIN ½ SECOND OF THE ALARM SETPOINT BEING EXCEEDED. ENGINEERING COULD NOT PROVIDE ASSURANCE THAT THE CAAS SLAVE UNITS WOULD MEET THIS REQUIREMENT. FACILITIES WITH CAAS CLUSTERS (DETECTORS) AND THEIR EVACUATION HORNS ARE COMPLIANT WITH [THE] ANSI 8.3, SECTION 55, REQUIREMENT.
"THE SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE IS MINIMAL SINCE THE SLAVES WILL STILL PROVIDE ALARM INDICATION
BEFORE SIMILAR INDICATIONS WOULD BE PROVIDED UNDER THE [TECHNICAL SAFETY REQUIREMENT LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION] ACTIONS IMPLEMENTED."
FOR INFORMATION: THE ALARMS DISCUSSED HERE ARE REMOTE ALARMS IN AREAS WITHIN SO MANY FEET OF THE AREA OF CONCERN, BUT OUTSIDE THE BUILDING OR ROOM.
PLANT PERSONNEL HAVE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR AND THE ONSITE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DOE) REPRESENTATIVE.
*** UPDATE ON 09/18/99 @ 1007 FROM HALCOMB TO GOULD *** EVENT RETRACTION
THIS EVENT IS BEING RETRACTED SINCE TESTING OF ALL SLAVE FACILITY EVACUATION HORNS HAS BEEN COMPLETED, AND IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THEY WILL INITIATE AN ALARM SIGNAL WITHIN ½ SECOND AS REQUIRED BY ANSI STANDARD 8.3. THEREFORE, THIS EVENT IS NOT REPORTABLE.
PORTSMOUTH PERSONNEL NOTIFIED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR AND PLAN TO NOTIFY THE DOE SITE REPRESENTATIVE. THE R3DO (SHEAR) AND NMSS EO (SHERR) WERE NOTIFIED BY THE NRC OPERATIONS OFFICER.
THE FOLLOWING TEXT IS A PORTION OF A FACSIMILE RECEIVED FROM PORTSMOUTH:
"At 1718 HOURS ON 08/23/99, THE PLANT SHIFT SUPERINTENDENT WAS NOTIFIED THAT THE CRITICALITY ACCIDENT ALARM SYSTEM (CAAS) SLAVE UNITS MAY NOT MEET [THE] ANSI 8.3, SECTION 5.5, STANDARD. ANSI 8.3 IDENTIFIES THAT THE CAAS SYSTEM SHALL AUTOMATICALLY INITIATE AN EVACUATION ALARM SIGNAL WITHIN ½ SECOND OF THE ALARM SETPOINT BEING EXCEEDED. ENGINEERING COULD NOT PROVIDE ASSURANCE THAT THE CAAS SLAVE UNITS WOULD MEET THIS REQUIREMENT. FACILITIES WITH CAAS CLUSTERS (DETECTORS) AND THEIR EVACUATION HORNS ARE COMPLIANT WITH [THE] ANSI 8.3, SECTION 55, REQUIREMENT.
"THE SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE IS MINIMAL SINCE THE SLAVES WILL STILL PROVIDE ALARM INDICATION
BEFORE SIMILAR INDICATIONS WOULD BE PROVIDED UNDER THE [TECHNICAL SAFETY REQUIREMENT LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION] ACTIONS IMPLEMENTED."
FOR INFORMATION: THE ALARMS DISCUSSED HERE ARE REMOTE ALARMS IN AREAS WITHIN SO MANY FEET OF THE AREA OF CONCERN, BUT OUTSIDE THE BUILDING OR ROOM.
PLANT PERSONNEL HAVE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR AND THE ONSITE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DOE) REPRESENTATIVE.
*** UPDATE ON 09/18/99 @ 1007 FROM HALCOMB TO GOULD *** EVENT RETRACTION
THIS EVENT IS BEING RETRACTED SINCE TESTING OF ALL SLAVE FACILITY EVACUATION HORNS HAS BEEN COMPLETED, AND IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THEY WILL INITIATE AN ALARM SIGNAL WITHIN ½ SECOND AS REQUIRED BY ANSI STANDARD 8.3. THEREFORE, THIS EVENT IS NOT REPORTABLE.
PORTSMOUTH PERSONNEL NOTIFIED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR AND PLAN TO NOTIFY THE DOE SITE REPRESENTATIVE. THE R3DO (SHEAR) AND NMSS EO (SHERR) WERE NOTIFIED BY THE NRC OPERATIONS OFFICER.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36058
Facility: GINNA
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: DOUGLAS GOMEZ
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: DOUGLAS GOMEZ
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 08/23/1999
Notification Time: 12:25 [ET]
Event Date: 08/23/1999
Event Time: 11:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/23/1999
Notification Time: 12:25 [ET]
Event Date: 08/23/1999
Event Time: 11:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/23/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
KATHLEEN MODES (R1)
KATHLEEN MODES (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
TEAR DISCOVERED IN THE SUCTION BOOT OF THE CONTROL ROOM RETURN AIR FAN
"At 1015 on 8/23/99 a tear was discovered in a flexible suction joint to the Control Room Return Air Fan. This allowed unisolable outside air to be drawn into the Control Room Air Handling Unit. A temporary patch was in place at 1040. At 1055 the temporary patch was removed and a Temporary Modification was installed and completed at 1103.
"Further analysis showed that the tear had allowed inleakage of 178 CFM which exceeded the allowable leak rate of 45 CFM per UFSAR Section 6.4."
An investigation will be conducted to determine the cause of the tear.
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 1015 on 8/23/99 a tear was discovered in a flexible suction joint to the Control Room Return Air Fan. This allowed unisolable outside air to be drawn into the Control Room Air Handling Unit. A temporary patch was in place at 1040. At 1055 the temporary patch was removed and a Temporary Modification was installed and completed at 1103.
"Further analysis showed that the tear had allowed inleakage of 178 CFM which exceeded the allowable leak rate of 45 CFM per UFSAR Section 6.4."
An investigation will be conducted to determine the cause of the tear.
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36059
Facility: SAINT LUCIE
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: JIM HURCHALLA
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: JIM HURCHALLA
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 08/23/1999
Notification Time: 14:25 [ET]
Event Date: 08/23/1999
Event Time: 12:36 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/24/1999
Notification Time: 14:25 [ET]
Event Date: 08/23/1999
Event Time: 12:36 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/24/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
KENNETH BARR (R2)
KENNETH BARR (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | M/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO LOSS OF MAIN CONDENSER VACUUM
The reactor was manually tripped (all rods inserted) due to low main condenser vacuum at 1236 EDT. The cause of the low vacuum is under investigation and is unknown at this time. When the trip occurred the 'A' side non-essential 6.9 kV bus failed to transfer from the auxiliary (plant) power to startup (offsite) source resulting in the loss of two of four reactor coolant pumps. The cause of the failure to transfer is also unknown and under investigation.
The plant is stable in hot standby with forced circulation via the remaining two reactor coolant pumps. Feedwater is via the main feedwater system and steaming is via the steam bypass system.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
*** UPDATE ON 8/24/99 @ 0915 BY HALL TO GOULD ***
THIS UPDATE IS TO INCLUDE THE ACTUATION OF THE AFAS-2 (AUX FEEDWATER ACTUATION SYSTEM) FOR 4 MINS TO THE #2 STEAM GENERATOR. THIS RESPONSE IS EXPECTED AND NORMAL.
THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED.
THE REG 2 RDO(BARR) WAS NOTIFIED.
The reactor was manually tripped (all rods inserted) due to low main condenser vacuum at 1236 EDT. The cause of the low vacuum is under investigation and is unknown at this time. When the trip occurred the 'A' side non-essential 6.9 kV bus failed to transfer from the auxiliary (plant) power to startup (offsite) source resulting in the loss of two of four reactor coolant pumps. The cause of the failure to transfer is also unknown and under investigation.
The plant is stable in hot standby with forced circulation via the remaining two reactor coolant pumps. Feedwater is via the main feedwater system and steaming is via the steam bypass system.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
*** UPDATE ON 8/24/99 @ 0915 BY HALL TO GOULD ***
THIS UPDATE IS TO INCLUDE THE ACTUATION OF THE AFAS-2 (AUX FEEDWATER ACTUATION SYSTEM) FOR 4 MINS TO THE #2 STEAM GENERATOR. THIS RESPONSE IS EXPECTED AND NORMAL.
THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED.
THE REG 2 RDO(BARR) WAS NOTIFIED.