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Event Notification Report for August 13, 1999

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           08/12/1999 - 08/13/1999

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

36010  36022  36023  36024  36025  36026  

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|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   36010       |
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| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT   |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/10/1999|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:49[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        08/09/1999|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        11:30[EDT]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  08/12/1999|
|    CITY:  PIKETON                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  PIKE                      STATE:  OH |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-2                 AGREEMENT:  N  |BRUCE BURGESS        R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707002                              |DON COOL             NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  RICK LARSON                  |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  WILLIAM POERTNER             |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
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                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
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| NRC BULLETIN 91-01 RESPONSE (24-HOUR REPORT)                                 |
|                                                                              |
| Operations personnel during a walkdown of the seal exhaust system discovered |
| that a nuclear criticality safety analysis (NCSA) requirement, maximum oil   |
| volume, could not be verified when an oil level was observed in the pumps    |
| separator's sight glass.  The pumps in question were used for the highly     |
| enriched uranium (HEU) program, and after it's suspension, prior to March    |
| 1997, the pumps were placed out of service.  Visible oil level in the sight  |
| glass without supporting documentation for oil capacity of these pumps       |
| constitutes a loss of one control (Volume) for double contingency.  The      |
| second control (Interaction) was maintained.                                 |
|                                                                              |
| There was no loss of hazardous/radioactive material or                       |
| radioactive/radiological contamination exposure as a result of this event.   |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector and DOE.                    |
|                                                                              |
| *** UPDATE ON 8/12/99 @ 0130 BY SPAETH TO GOULD ***                          |
|                                                                              |
| WALKDOWNS OF SEAL EXHAUST PUMPS IN THE X-326 BUILDING REVEALED THAT SEVERAL  |
| OLD STYLE/OUT OF SERVICE PUMPS (KDH-80, DVD-8810) HAD INDICATION OF OIL IN   |
| THE SEPARATOR SITE GLASS, ABOVE THE LEVEL OF THE OVERFLOW.  THIS IS A LOSS   |
| OF ONE CONTROL (VOLUME) OF THE DOUBLE CONTINGENCY PRINCIPLE.  THE SECOND     |
| CONTROL  (INTERACTION) REMAINS IN PLACE. THIS UPDATE IS BEING SUBMITTED TO   |
| IDENTIFY THE FACT THAT ADDITIONAL PUMPS WERE IDENTIFIED IN WHICH THE MAXIMUM |
| AMOUNT OF OIL COULD NOT BE VERIFIED.                                         |
|                                                                              |
| THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR AND DOE WERE NOTIFIED BY PORTSMOUTH PERSONNEL.    |
|                                                                              |
| REG 3 RDO(BURGESS) AND NMSS EO(HICKEY) WERE NOTIFIED.                        |
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|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   36022       |
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| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT   |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/12/1999|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 01:30[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        08/11/1999|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        12:35[EDT]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  08/12/1999|
|    CITY:  PIKETON                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  PIKE                      STATE:  OH |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-2                 AGREEMENT:  N  |BRUCE BURGESS        R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707002                              |JOHN HICKEY          NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  SPAETH                       |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
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                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| NRC BULLETIN 91-01 RESPONSE (24-HOUR REPORT)                                 |
|                                                                              |
| At 1235 on 08/11/99. the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that  |
| a Nuclear Criticality Safety Approval (NCSA) requirement was not being       |
| maintained in the X-333 process building.  NCS Engineering, while performing |
| a pre-implementation walkdown of an NCSA, noticed a depression in the floor  |
| around a building column (X-333 operating floor) that is greater than 1.5    |
| inches deep (~1.75 to 2 inches).   A 12-position rack for storing small      |
| diameter uranium bearing containers is located directly above the depression |
| (NCSA-PLANT025).                                                             |
|                                                                              |
| Requirement #10 of NCSA-PLANT025.A01 states in part, "Storage areas shall    |
| not be located over equipment or spaces that could confine a spill to a      |
| depth of greater than 1.5 inches.  In the event of a spill or a loss of      |
| container integrity, the depression in the floor (a violation of requirement |
| #10) could result in an unfavorable geometry."                               |
|                                                                              |
| At the direction of the PSS, the requirements for an NCS anomalous condition |
| were initiated, and the area was bounded off.                                |
|                                                                              |
| Safety significance of the event is low, and the diked area would have to be |
| full of uranium at optimum moderated conditions for criticality to be        |
| possible.  Geometry was the controlled parameter that was lost.  The mass of |
| material (uranium solution with a max allowed enrichment of 10%) is not      |
| controlled; therefore, more than a safe mass could be in the containers.     |
|                                                                              |
| Corrective action was to remove all small containers from the storage area   |
| and reestablish NCS compliance.                                              |
|                                                                              |
| There was no loss of hazardous/radioactive material or                       |
| radioactive/radiological contamination exposure as a result of this event.   |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified, and the DOE Site Representative     |
| will be notified.                                                            |
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|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36023       |
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| FACILITY: INDIAN POINT             REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/12/1999|
|    UNIT:  [] [3] []                 STATE:  NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 07:49[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        08/12/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        04:05[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  ROKES                        |LAST UPDATE DATE:  08/12/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |HAROLD GRAY          R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     RPS ACTUATION          |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|3     A/R        Y       100      Power Operation  |0        Hot Shutdown     |
|                                                   |                          |
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                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| PLANT HAD A REACTOR TRIP FROM 100% POWER DUE TO A LOW STEAM GENERATOR        |
| LEVEL.                                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| AN AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP OCCURRED DURING A TRANSIENT ON THE 34 INSTRUMENT   |
| BUS, WHICH DE-ENERGIZED FOR UNKNOWN REASONS.  THIS RESULTED IN A TURBINE     |
| RUNBACK AND LOSS OF AUTOMATIC CONTROL OF STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL.  THE REACTOR |
| TRIP WAS GENERATED AS A RESULT OF A LOW LEVEL ON THE 33 STEAM GENERATOR.     |
| AUXILIARY FEEDWATER AUTOMATICALLY STARTED AS A RESULT OF THE TRIP.   ALL     |
| RODS FULLY INSERTED, AND NO ECCS INJECTION OCCURRED.  NO PRIMARY RELIEF      |
| VALVES LIFTED, BUT ONE STEAM GENERATOR RELIEF VALVE LIFTED.  (THEY HAVE NO   |
| STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAKS.)  THE PLANT IS STABLE IN HOT SHUTDOWN WITH THE   |
| HEAT SINK BEING THE CONDENSER.  THE CAUSE OF THE INSTRUMENT BUS TRANSIENT IS |
| UNDER INVESTIGATION.                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED BY THE LICENSEE.                     |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36024       |
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| FACILITY: SOUTH TEXAS              REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/12/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  TX |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:00[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        08/12/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        11:00[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  RICK NANCE                   |LAST UPDATE DATE:  08/12/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |DALE POWERS          R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NLTR                     LICENSEE 24 HR REPORT  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
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                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
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| 24-hour report for violation of Operating License NPF-76 based on inoperable |
| control room makeup and cleanup filtration train (control room ventilation   |
| system).                                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| In accordance with technical specification surveillance requirement          |
| 4.7.7.c.2, carbon samples were removed from the Unit 1 train 'B' control     |
| room makeup and cleanup filtration system on 07/19/99 and sent offsite for   |
| laboratory analysis.  On 08/02/99, the licensee was notified that the        |
| as-found methyl iodide penetration for the makeup and cleanup filter unit    |
| samples were 1.62% and 1.13%, respectively, which exceeded the required 1.0% |
| technical specification acceptance criteria.  Although surveillance          |
| requirement 4.7.7.c.2 allows up to 31 days to obtain charcoal sample         |
| analysis results, the allowed outage time for the respective train per       |
| Technical Specification 3.7.7 is 7 days.  The charcoal samples were removed  |
| on 07/19/99, and results were received on 08/02/99 (14 days later).  Upon    |
| receipt of the unsatisfactory laboratory analysis results, maintenance was   |
| initiated to replace the charcoal and was completed on 08/05/99.  Therefore, |
| the Unit 1 train 'B' control room makeup and cleanup filtration system was   |
| in a condition prohibited by technical specifications for approximately 10   |
| days longer than the allowed outage time.                                    |
|                                                                              |
| Additionally, the Unit 1 train 'C' control room makeup and cleanup           |
| filtration system was inoperable as part of a train 'C' extended allowed     |
| outage time (EAOT) from 0300 CDT on 07/26/99 to 2227 CDT on 07/29/99 (based  |
| on train 'C' essential chiller out-of service and return to operable status  |
| times), and thus, both train 'B' and train 'C' control room makeup and       |
| cleanup filtration systems were inoperable concurrently for a period of 91   |
| hours and 27 minutes.  Therefore, Unit 1 had also unknowingly exceeded       |
| Technical Specification 3.7.7 shutdown LCO requirements for two trains in an |
| inoperable condition by 13 hours and 27 minutes (based on a 72-hour LCO time |
| plus 6 hours to enter Mode 3).                                               |
|                                                                              |
| Furthermore, Technical Specification 3.8.1.1.d requires that with an         |
| emergency diesel generator (EDG) inoperable, all required systems,           |
| subsystems, trains, components, and devices that depend on the remaining two |
| operable EDGs are verified to be operable within 24 hours, or be in at least |
| Hot Standby within the next 6 hours, and in Cold Shutdown within the         |
| following 30 hours.  Since the train 'C'  EDG was inoperable from 0300 CDT   |
| on 07/26/99 until 0330 CDT on 07/29/99 (72 hours and 30 minutes) as part of  |
| the train 'C' EAOT, Unit 1 had unknowingly exceeded Technical Specification  |
| 3.8.1.1.d shutdown LCO requirements beginning at 0900 CDT on 07/27/99 (based |
| on a 24-hour LCO time plus 6 hours to enter Mode 3) for a total of 42 hours  |
| and 30 minutes.                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| Although the technical specification limit of 1.0% methyl iodide penetration |
| (or 99.0% filter efficiency) was exceeded, design basis accident analyses    |
| assume a filter efficiency of 95%.  Since the as-found efficiencies for both |
| the makeup and cleanup filter units were above 98%, the train 'B' control    |
| room makeup and cleanup filtration system was at all times capable of        |
| performing its required design function, and therefore, the overall safety   |
| impact as a result of this event is believed to be minimal.                  |
|                                                                              |
| This notification is being made pursuant to Operating License NPF-76,        |
| Section 2.G, for an operation or condition prohibited by technical           |
| specifications.                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| This event had no impact on Unit 2.                                          |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Hospital                                         |Event Number:   36025       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  THERATRONICS INTERNATIONAL LIMITED   |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/12/1999|
|LICENSEE:  SENTARA NORFOLK HOSPITAL             |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:11[EDT]|
|    CITY:  NORFOLK                  REGION:  2  |EVENT DATE:        08/06/1999|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  VA |EVENT TIME:        12:00[EDT]|
|LICENSE#:                        AGREEMENT:  N  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  08/12/1999|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |CHARLES OGLE         R2      |
|                                                |KEVIN RAMSEY (fax)   NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  DOUGLAS BEATTY, RSO          |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|CDEG 21.21(c)(3)(i)      DEFECTS/NONCOMPLIANCE  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| PART 21 REPORT - DEFECT IN A GAMMAMED BRACHYTHERAPHY UNIT                    |
|                                                                              |
| DOUGLAS BEATTY, RADIATION SAFETY OFFICER, THERATRONICS INTERNATIONAL LIMITED |
| IN KANATA, ONTARIO, CANADA, REPORTED THAT ON 08/06/99, AN Ir-192 SOURCE      |
| CABLE ON A GAMMAMED BRACHYTHERAPY UNIT, MODEL #12i, SERIAL #709, LOCATED AT  |
| SENTARA NORFOLK HOSPITAL IN NORFOLK, VA, FAILED TO RETRACT TO ITS SHIELDED   |
| POSITION.  THE SOURCE WAS MANUALLY RETURNED TO ITS SHIELDED POSITION BY A    |
| THERATRONICS SERVICE TECHNICIAN ON 08/06/99.                                 |
|                                                                              |
| THE LICENSEE IS PERFORMING AN INVESTIGATION TO DETERMINE THE CAUSE OF THE    |
| DEFECT AND PLANS TO SUBMIT A WRITTEN REPORT TO THE NRC.                      |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36026       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PRAIRIE ISLAND           REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/12/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] []                STATE:  MN |NOTIFICATION TIME: 20:40[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP                |EVENT DATE:        08/12/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        18:46[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  WARNER ANDREWS               |LAST UPDATE DATE:  08/12/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |BRUCE BURGESS        R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B)  OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - CONTROL ROOM CHILLER ROOM DOORS INOPERABLE DUE TO INCORRECT DOOR LATCH     |
| PINS -                                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| AT 1846 CDT ON 08/12/99, THE LICENSEE IDENTIFIED PERSONNEL ENTRY DOORS #158  |
| AND #159 TO THE CONTROL ROOM CHILLER ROOMS #121 AND #123, RESPECTIVELY, AS   |
| BEING INOPERABLE DUE TO MATERIAL PROPERTY CONCERNS OF THE LATCH PINS.  AN    |
| ANALYSIS SHOWED THAT THE EXISTING PINS WERE OF INADEQUATE STRENGTH TO        |
| WITHSTAND HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAK FORCES.  THE INOPERABILITY OF THE DOOR PINS |
| RESULTED IN THE INOPERABILITY OF BOTH TRAINS OF THE CONTROL ROOM SPECIAL     |
| VENTILATION SYSTEM (TECH SPEC 3.13.A.1).                                     |
|                                                                              |
| AT 1938 CDT ON 08/12/99, THE PINS WERE REPLACED, AND THE DOORS AND CONTROL   |
| ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEM WERE BOTH RETURNED TO OPERABLE STATUS.               |
|                                                                              |
| THE LICENSEE PLANS TO INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.                     |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+