Event Notification Report for July 6, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
07/02/1999 - 07/06/1999
** EVENT NUMBERS **
35887 35888 35889 35890 35891 35892 35893 35894 35895 35896 35897
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 35887 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/02/1999|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 00:50[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 07/02/1999|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 00:40[EDT]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/03/1999|
| CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |JAMES CREED R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707002 |SUSAN SHANKMAN NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+JOSEPH GIITTER IRO |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: MAY |HILAND/CANIANO R3 |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD |LIZ TEN EYCK NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+CANUPP FEMA |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: ALE | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|OADD 76.120(a)(4) EMERGENCY DECLARED | |
|OCBB 76.120(c)(2)(ii) EQUIP DISABLED/FAILS | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| ALERT DECLARED DUE TO CRITICALITY ACCIDENT ALARM SYSTEM BEING DECLARED |
| INOPERABLE. |
| |
| THE CERTIFICATEE DISCOVERED THAT THE CRITICALITY ACCIDENT ALARM SYSTEM |
| (CAAS) FAILED ITS SURVEILLANCE TEST DUE TO THE CALIBRATION SETPOINT BEING |
| INCORRECT. THE CORRECT SETPOINT SHOULD BE 5 MR/HR, BUT THE AS-FOUND |
| SETPOINT WAS 8.57 MR/HR. DUE TO THIS CONDITION, THE CERTIFICATEE CANNOT |
| MEET THEIR OPERABILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR THE CAAS, SO ALL OF THE CAAS IS |
| BEING DECLARED INOPERABLE (BUT FUNCTIONAL) WHICH PUTS THE PLANT AT THE ALERT |
| LEVEL PER THEIR EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL PROCEDURES. ALL OF THE AUTOCLAVE |
| AREAS ARE SHUTDOWN AND PLANT PERSONNEL THAT ARE STAFFING THE FACILITIES ARE |
| USING ALARMING DOSIMETERS. THE CASCADES ARE STILL OPERATING AT THIS TIME. |
| THERE ARE 76 CAAS CLUSTERS AFFECTED BY THIS CONDITION. THE CERTIFICATEE |
| BELIEVES THAT THESE INSTRUMENTS HAVE NOT BEEN CALIBRATED CORRECTLY SINCE |
| ORIGINAL INSTALLATION. THE CERTIFICATEE HAS NOT YET DETERMINED WHEN THE |
| CALIBRATION OF THE CAAS CLUSTERS WILL BE COMPLETED. |
| |
| THE CERTIFICATEE NOTIFIED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR, DOE SITE |
| REPRESENTATIVE, DOE OAK RIDGE, OHIO EMA, PIKE COUNTY LEPC AND PIKE COUNTY |
| EMA. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE ON 07/02/99 @ 0251 BY MCCRAE TO GOULD * * * |
| |
| THE CERTIFICATEE IS RESTRICTING ACCESS TO ALL AREAS AFFECTED BY THE |
| INOPERABLE CAAS MONITORS. RECOVERY EFFORTS ARE BEING IMPLEMENTED TO |
| RECALIBRATE THE MONITORS. NONESSENTIAL PERSONNEL ON DAY SHIFT WILL BE SENT |
| HOME UPON ARRIVAL AT THE SITE. |
| |
| THE NRC OPERATIONS OFFICER NOTIFIED THE R3DO (JAMES CREED) AND NMSS EO |
| (SUSAN SHANKMAN). |
| |
| * * * UPDATE ON 07/02/99 @ 0432 BY CASTLE TO GOULD * * * |
| |
| THE CERTIFICATEE WILL BE MAKING A PRESS RELEASE AND NOTIFIED DOE. THIS |
| ACTION REQUIRES A 4 HOUR NOTIFICATION TO NRC. |
| |
| WITH THE CAAS CLUSTERS INOPERABLE AND NOT AVAILABLE TO FUNCTION AS DESIGNED, |
| THIS IS A 24 HOUR NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT. |
| |
| THE NRC OPERATIONS OFFICER NOTIFIED THE R3DO (JAMES CREED), NMSS EO (SUSAN |
| SHANKMAN) AND HQ PAO (JOE GILLILAND). |
| |
| * * * UPDATE ON 07/03/99 @ 0013 BY FAUST TO GOULD * * * |
| |
| THE CERTIFICATEE SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED TWO CAAS CALIBRATIONS, TERMINATED |
| THE ALERT AT 0010 ON 07/03/99, AND NOTIFIED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR, SITE |
| DOE REPRESENTATIVE, AND STATE AND LOCAL OFFICIALS. |
| |
| THE NRC OPERATIONS OFFICER NOTIFIED THE R3DO (JAMES CREED), NMSS EO (SUSAN |
| SHANKMAN), IRO(JOE GIITTER), FEMA (STINEDURF), DOE (BY FAX), USDA (BY FAX), |
| HHS (BY FAX), & EPA/NATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER (BY FAX). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other |Event Number: 35888 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: CROW BUTTE RESOURCES, INC |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/02/1999|
|LICENSEE: CROW BUTTE RESOURCES, INC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:49[EDT]|
| CITY: CRAWFORD REGION: 4 |EVENT DATE: 07/02/1999|
| COUNTY: STATE: NE |EVENT TIME: 10:00[CDT]|
|LICENSE#: SUA-1534 AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/02/1999|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |LINDA SMITH R4 |
| |SCOTT MOORE NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+DAN GILLEN NMSS |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: MIKE GRIFFIN |EPA (by fax) |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NINF INFORMATION ONLY | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - CROW BUTTE URANIUM LEACH MINE PERIMETER MONITOR WELL PLACED IN EXCURSION |
| STATUS - |
| |
| WATER SAMPLES OF THE PERIMETER MONITOR WELL #CM6-6 AT THE CROW BUTTE IN-SITU |
| URANIUM LEACH MINE, CRAWFORD, NE, EXCEEDED THE MULTIPLE UPPER CONTROL LIMITS |
| ON FOUR OF THE FOLLOWING FIVE PARAMETERS MONITORED AND THE WELL WAS PLACED |
| IN EXCURSION STATUS: |
| |
| PARAMETER (UNITS) UPPER LIMIT (MULTIPLE) UPPER LIMIT |
| (SINGLE) LATEST SAMPLE |
| ----------------------------------- |
| ----------------------------------- ------------------------------- |
| ------------------------ |
| CONDUCTIVITY (�MHOs) 2412 |
| 2894 2750 |
| CARBONATES (PPM) 370 |
| 444 378 |
| CHLORIDES (PPM) 251 |
| 301 268 |
| SULFATES (PPM) 461 |
| 553 550 |
| SODIUM (PPM) 486 |
| 583 457 |
| |
| OPERATORS HAVE REDUCED INJECTION AND INCREASED PRODUCTION IN THE AREA OF THE |
| EXCURSION. THE MINE IS LOCATED 5 - 6 MILES FROM THE NEAREST TOWN OF |
| CRAWFORD, NE. THERE WERE NO SPILLS OR RELEASES OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL FROM |
| THE MINE. |
| |
| THE LICENSEE'S ASSESSMENT OF THIS SITUATION IS THAT RISK IS MINIMAL AND |
| THERE IS NO ADVERSE IMPACT ON PERSONS, ANIMALS, OR THE ENVIRONMENT. THE NRC |
| URANIUM MINING EXPERT, DAN GILLEN, AGREES WITH THIS ASSESSMENT AND NO NRC |
| RESPONSE IS REQUIRED. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 35889 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: NINE MILE POINT REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/02/1999|
| UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:41[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5 |EVENT DATE: 07/02/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 13:30[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: HANK STRAHLEY |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/02/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | |
|NLCO TECH SPEC LCO A/S | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|2 N Y 15 Power Operation |15 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - RCIC SYSTEM DECLARED INOPERABLE - |
| |
| While performing Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System injection |
| testing, the licensee declared the RCIC System inoperable due to problems |
| with the system injection testable check valves. Valve #2ICS*AOV157 did not |
| indicate open with full flow to the reactor vessel and valve #2ICS*AOV156 |
| continued to indicate open following injection. The licensee declared these |
| containment isolation valves inoperable and is taking actions to isolate the |
| containment penetration. The RCIC System injected properly with the |
| exception of the above noted problem. Otherwise, the RCIC System operated |
| properly. Tech Spec 3.7.4 requires the licensee to restore the RCIC System |
| to operable status within 14 days. The High Pressure Core Spray System is |
| operable. The licensee will be troubleshooting these valves. |
| |
| The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 35890 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: VERMONT YANKEE REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/02/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: VT |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:58[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 07/02/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 16:34[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: MIKE EMPY |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/02/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - PRIMARY CONTAINMENT COULD BE OUTSIDE ITS DESIGN BASIS UNDER CERTAIN |
| CONDITIONS - |
| |
| During validation of the Vermont Yankee (VY) Containment Pressurization |
| System Design Basis Document, the licensee determined that a design analysis |
| which envelopes the design operating conditions of the torus and drywell |
| does not exist. Specifically, no design analysis exists which verifies the |
| ability of the torus-to-drywell and torus-to-reactor building vacuum |
| breakers to limit depressurization of the containment to less than the |
| design basis value of - 2 psig (22A1265, Rev. 1). |
| |
| The specific event in question involves the effects of an inadvertent |
| drywell spray actuation occurring during conditions when the torus water is |
| at a minimum temperature 50�F (VYAPF 0150.03). |
| |
| Present design evaluations (VYC-236, Rev 0, "Torus-Reactor Building Vacuum |
| Breaker Conditions" and VYC-315, Rev 0, "Primary Containment Vacuum") |
| calculated the resulting torus and containment pressure caused by |
| inadvertent spray actuation, but used a spray water temperature of 83.7�F. |
| These analyses concluded that vacuum breaker operation was not necessary to |
| ensure that the containment remained within its external design pressure. |
| These analyses evaluated this event at normal operating conditions (100�F |
| torus water temperature, 33�F service water temperature, and 165�F drywell |
| temperature). No evaluation has been performed for temperatures below these |
| values. |
| |
| The General Electric design basis for the VY vacuum breaker sizing is based |
| on an evaluation for Monticello. This evaluation assumed a minimum spray |
| water temperature of 50�F and assumed that all vacuum breakers operated |
| within one second. The VY vacuum breaker design differs from this design |
| assumption in that operation of the torus-to-reactor building vacuum |
| breakers requires the opening of air operated valves (AOVs) #SB-16-19-11A & |
| B as part of the vacuum breaker operation. These AOVs require more than 5 |
| seconds to operate (VYOPF 4115.01, 03/23/99). As a result, it cannot be |
| assured that the vacuum breaker system will function adequately to prevent |
| the containment from exceeding its design basis external design pressure for |
| low spray water temperature conditions. |
| |
| A plant operability evaluation, based on the information included in |
| VYC-315, Rev 0, has concluded that a minimum drywell spray water temperature |
| of 70�F would be required to approach the design basis containment external |
| pressure limit of - 2.0 psig without effective vacuum breaker operation. In |
| order to achieve this low spray water temperature, a combination of low |
| torus water temperature and/or low service water temperature would be |
| required to exist. Current operating conditions indicate that the torus |
| water temperature is being maintained at ~80�F and has been maintained at |
| this temperature during the months of May and June, 1999. The current |
| service water temperature of 79�F ensures that, in the event of an |
| inadvertent drywell spray event, spray water temperature will not be lower |
| than 70�F. |
| |
| This 79�F service water temperature corresponds to the maximum 20 year |
| average for river water temperature. Based on this temperature, river water |
| temperature would not be anticipated to decrease below 70�F until |
| mid-to-late September, 1999. |
| |
| Based on the current high service water temperature, in combination with |
| existing torus water temperature, this condition does not effect the |
| operability of the primary containment or the operability of the primary |
| containment vacuum breakers. There is no operability concern providing the |
| torus water temperature remains above 70�F and river water temperature |
| remains above 33�F. |
| |
| The license plans to immediately issue standing orders to plant operators |
| regarding this situation and to perform necessary design analyses prior to |
| September, 1999. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 35891 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SUSQUEHANNA REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/02/1999|
| UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 22:13[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 07/02/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 21:30[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: DAVE WALSH |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/02/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - Emergency safeguards system transformer radiator bottom oil drain valves |
| found closed - |
| |
| At 1500 on 07/01/99, Susquehanna Unit 1 was in Condition 4 (Cold Shutdown) |
| and Unit 2 was at 100% power, when the licensee identified that the radiator |
| bottom drain valves were closed on two of the four emergency safeguards |
| system (ESS) transformers. Each transformer provides the preferred offsite |
| power to one load group and alternate offsite power to another. The two |
| affected transformers provided backup to each other. The drain valves allow |
| oil circulation though the transformer finned coolers. The drain valves |
| were opened and the ESS transformers are currently operable. |
| |
| Per the Susquehanna Tech Spec 3.8.1 Basis, the AC electrical power |
| distribution system is designed to meet the requirements of 10CFR50, |
| Appendix A, GDC 17, which requires the AC electrical power system to provide |
| independence and redundancy to ensure an available source of power to ESF |
| systems. The class 1E AC distribution system is divided into redundant load |
| groups, so the loss of any one group does not prevent minimum safety |
| functions from being performed. Each load group has connections to two |
| preferred offsite power supplies and a single emergency diesel generator |
| (EDG) in order to meet this requirement. |
| |
| Licensee evaluation of the effects of the drain valves being closed is in |
| progress. Initial evaluation has determined that in this configuration, |
| these transformers would have been able to perform their design function for |
| an indeterminate period of time. Pending further evaluation, this report is |
| being provided based on conservative interpretation of the existing guidance |
| in that due to the absence of design analysis for this scenario, it could |
| represent a condition that is potentially outside of design basis, therefore |
| reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B). |
| |
| The licensee currently believes that this condition was not safety |
| significant because Susquehanna is designed for a DBA LOCA/LOOP with a |
| single failure which they believe is more limiting. At no time were any ESS |
| buses deenergized due to this condition and the condition was promptly |
| corrected and does not currently exist. The EDGs would have been available |
| to power the subject buses had the transformers failed. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 35892 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: TROJAN REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/02/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: OR |NOTIFICATION TIME: 22:55[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 07/02/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 18:43[PDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: KARL OBERLOH |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/02/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: UNU |LINDA SMITH R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: |LEDYARD (TAD) MARSH NRR |
|AAEC 50.72 (a) (1) (I) EMERGENCY DECLARED |BUTCH STINEDURF FEMA |
| |JOSEPH GIITTER IRO |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N N 0 Decommissioned |0 Decommissioned |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - 5.0 EARTHQUAKE FELT ONSITE AT TROJAN; NO DAMAGE TO PLANT COMPONENTS OR |
| SYSTEMS - |
| |
| AT 1843 PDT ON 07/02/99, AN EARTHQUAKE, MEASURING 5.0 ON THE RICHTER SCALE, |
| OCCURRED AT THE GREY HARBOR AREA OF WASHINGTON STATE, APPROXIMATELY 50 - 60 |
| MILES SOUTHWEST OF SEATTLE, WA. |
| |
| TROJAN, WHICH IS LOCATED APPROXIMATELY 70 - 80 MILES FROM THE EPICENTER, |
| REPORTED THAT THE EARTHQUAKE WAS FELT ONSITE AND THAT THERE WAS NO DAMAGE TO |
| PLANT COMPONENTS OR SYSTEMS. |
| |
| TROJAN IS DECOMMISSIONED BUT STILL HAS SPENT FUEL IN THEIR SPENT FUEL POOL. |
| |
| AT 1905 PDT, THE LICENSEE DECLARED AND TERMINATED AN UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO |
| THE EARTHQUAKE BEING FELT ONSITE AND NOTIFIED STATE AND LOCAL OFFICIALS. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other |Event Number: 35893 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: FL BUREAU OF RAD CONTROL |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/03/1999|
|LICENSEE: ATC ASSOCIATES, MIAMI, FL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:05[EDT]|
| CITY: HOMESTEAD REGION: 2 |EVENT DATE: 07/02/1999|
| COUNTY: STATE: FL |EVENT TIME: 22:30[EDT]|
|LICENSE#: FL 2962-1 AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/03/1999|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |PAUL FREDRICKSON R2 |
| |SUSAN SHANKMAN NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JOHN WILLIAMS, FL BRC | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NAGR AGREEMENT STATE | |
|BAB1 20.2201(a)(1)(i) LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE STOLEN FROM A COMPANY TRUCK IN HOMESTEAD, |
| FL - |
| |
| A TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE WAS STOLEN FROM A TRUCK OWNED BY ATC |
| ASSOCIATES, |
| MIAMI, FL, BETWEEN 2230 ON 07/02/99 AND 0730 ON 07/03/99. THE TRUCK WAS AT |
| THE HOME OF AN |
| EMPLOYEE IN HOMESTEAD, FL. THE UNDAMAGED GAUGE, MODEL #3411B, SERIAL |
| #15140, CONTAINS |
| SEALED SOURCES OF 6.1 MILLICURIES OF Cs-137 AND 39.3 MILLICURIES OF |
| Am-241-Be. AN ATC |
| REPRESENTATIVE NOTIFIED THE HOMESTEAD POLICE AND THE FL BUREAU OF RADIATION |
| CONTROL (BRC). THE HOMESTEAD POLICE ARE PREPARING A PRESS RELEASE WARNING |
| OF THE DANGER INVOLVED IN HANDLING THE GAUGE AND OFFERING A REWARD FOR THE |
| RETURN OF THE GAUGE. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 35894 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PILGRIM REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/05/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: MA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:51[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-3 |EVENT DATE: 07/05/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 11:30[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: GORDEN FIEDLER |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/05/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | |
|NLCO TECH SPEC LCO A/S | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 22 Power Operation |22 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| UNIT ENTERED 24-HOUR LIMITING CONDITION OF OPERATIONS (LCO) ACTION STATEMENT |
| (A/S) DUE TO AMBIENT AIR TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE EMERGENCY DIESEL |
| GENERATOR (EDG) TEMPERATURE LIMIT. |
| |
| BOTH EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS WERE DETERMINED TO BE OUTSIDE THEIR DESIGN |
| BASIS DUE TO AMBIENT OUTSIDE AIR TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING 88 DEGREES F. THE |
| UNIT ENTERED A 24-HOUR LCO A/S 3.5.F.1 AND COMMENCED TEMPERATURE MONITORING |
| PER 2.2.8 ATTACHMENT 6. ONE OF THE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS WILL BE |
| TAGGED OUT TO INSTALL A TEMPERATURE MODIFICATION WHICH WILL RAISE THE DESIGN |
| AMBIENT TEMPERATURE LIMIT TO 95 DEGREES F. BOTH EDGs ARE STILL AVAILABLE, |
| IF NEEDED. |
| |
| THE NRC RESIDENT WILL BE NOTIFIED OF THIS EVENT BY THE LICENSEE. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 35895 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SURRY REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/05/1999|
| UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: VA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:57[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP |EVENT DATE: 07/05/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 11:22[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: DONALD HART |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/05/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |PAUL FREDRICKSON R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: |LEDYARD (TAD) MARSH NRR |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION |JOSEPH GIITTER IRO |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|2 A/R Y 100 Power Operation |0 Hot Standby |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO A LOSS OF COOLANT FLOW SIGNAL. |
| |
| A loss of coolant flow signal was received from the "A" RCP which actuated |
| an automatic reactor trip. All control rods except 2 inserted into the core |
| as designed as indicated by the rod bottom light indication. Control rods |
| J13 (outer portion of the core) & F8 (inner portion of the core) initially |
| did not fully insert however both slowly drifted into the core as indicated |
| by rod bottom lights. This is believed to be an instrumentation problem and |
| is being investigated. The shutdown margin for Unit 2 was determined to be |
| satisfactory. Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps (both Turbine and Motor Driven |
| Pumps) automatically initiated as designed on low low steam generator water |
| level following the reactor trip. Reactor Coolant System (RCS) temperature |
| decreased to 542 degrees F following the trip. No primary or secondary |
| safety or power operated relief valves (PORVs) actuated during the event. |
| No indication of primary to secondary leakage exists. Therefore, no adverse |
| radiological consequences resulted. All electrical buses transferred |
| properly following the trip and all emergency diesel generators and |
| emergency core cooling systems are operable and available. There were no |
| radiation releases nor were there any personnel injuries or contamination |
| involved. The cause of the loss of coolant flow signal is being |
| investigated. |
| |
| Unit 2 is at a Tave no load condition of 547 degrees dumping steam to the |
| main condenser. |
| |
| Unit 1 was not affected by and remains stable at 100% power. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was informed by the licensee. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 35896 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: OYSTER CREEK REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/05/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NJ |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:40[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-2 |EVENT DATE: 07/05/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 14:53[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: ERIC deMONCH |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/05/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: |LEDYARD (TAD) MARSH NRR |
|ASHU 50.72(b)(1)(i)(A) PLANT S/D REQD BY TS |JOSEPH GIITTER IRO |
|NLCO TECH SPEC LCO A/S | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| TECH SPEC REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO LOSS OF POWER TO STARTUP TRANSFORMERS FOR |
| APPROXIMATELY 8 MINUTES |
| |
| The units main generator output supplies power to two (2) 230KV "A" & "B" |
| buses. The 230KV "A" & "B" buses, in addition to supplying power to the |
| grid, each have a 230KV/34.5KV step-down transformer energizing the 34.5KV |
| "A" & "B" buses, respectively. These 34.5KV buses feed Bank 5 and 6 Startup |
| Transformers using offsite power when the main generator is offline. Both |
| the "A" & "B" 34.5KV buses deenergized for approximately 8 minutes, |
| possibly due to a thermal overload trip condition caused by high ambient |
| temperatures >100 degrees F (the specific location of the 34.5KV loss is |
| under investigation). This placed the unit in Tech Spec 3.7.A.(3) which |
| states "that one 230KV line must be fully operational and switchgear for |
| both Startup Transformers to the station are energized to carry power . . . |
| ." or the unit must be shutdown. The unit exited the Technical |
| Specification required Shutdown after approximately 8 minutes when both |
| 34.5KV buses were reenergized. The associated 4.16KV safeguard buses |
| remained energized throughout the transient since they normally receive |
| power from the Auxiliary Transformer during power operations. Both emergency |
| diesel generators are available, if needed. |
| |
| At the present time the licensee said that they are carrying a large amount |
| of VARS. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector will be informed of this event notification by |
| the licensee. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 35897 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SURRY REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/06/1999|
| UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: VA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 02:44[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP |EVENT DATE: 07/06/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 02:04[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: LISA HILBERT-SEMMES |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/06/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |PAUL FREDRICKSON R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ASHU 50.72(b)(1)(i)(A) PLANT S/D REQD BY TS | |
|NLCO TECH SPEC LCO A/S | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|2 N N 0 Hot Shutdown |0 Intermediate Shut|
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| MODE CHANGE INITIATED AS PART OF A TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED |
| SHUTDOWN |
| |
| "At 1810 hours on 7-5-99, with Surry Power Station Unit 2 at Hot Shutdown |
| (HSD) following a reactor trip, the 'A' Cold Leg Loop Stop Valve (Mark |
| number 2-RC-MOV-2591) was removed from it's backseat in accordance with |
| station procedure 2-GOP-2.4. Upon reopening the valve, full open indication |
| was not received. In accordance with Technical Specification 3.17.1 and |
| 3.0.1, a 30 hour clock to Cold Shutdown (CSD) LCO was started. The valve was |
| de-energized by opening it's breaker. A cooldown to CSD was initiated at |
| 2050 on 7-5-99. At 0204 on 7-6-99, a review of Station procedures and |
| 10CFR50.72 determined that a one hour report was required for commencing the |
| RCS cooldown in accordance with the Technical Specification LCO. |
| |
| "There were no radiation releases due to this event, nor were there any |
| personnel injuries or contamination events. |
| |
| "Unit 2 is currently at Intermediate Shutdown with RCS cooldown in progress |
| in accordance with station procedures. |
| |
| "Unit 1 was not affected by this event and remains stable at 100% power and |
| 824 MWe. |
| |
| "This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(1)(i)(A)." |
| |
| The Licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021