Event Notification Report for May 16, 1999

LOST OR STOLEN 3-CURIE TRITIUM SOURCE FROM AN M140 ALIGNMENT DEVICE

Sometime on 05/16/99 near Watervliet Arsenal (about 35 miles from Albany, NY) at a contractor's facility (Wright Malta Corporation at Wright Malta Station), a break-in occurred. In the facility was a howitzer with an M1A1 collimator (10 curies tritium) and an M140 alignment device (3 curies tritium). The two devices were taken but were recovered on site when the thieves were interrupted on the way out and dropped them. However, the source was missing from the M140 alignment device, and it is unknown whether the source was missing previously or removed and taken by the thieves. The local police are following up on the break-in and theft. The Watervliet Arsenal contacted the State of New York, who in turn notified NRC Region 1.

(Call the NRC Operations Officer for additional information.)

* * * UPDATE AT 1730 EDT ON 05/19/99 FROM JEFF HAVENNER TO S. SANDIN * * *

Additional information received by the licensee on 05/19/99 indicates that an M58 and an M59 aiming post light may also be missing. These are 5 and 4 curies of tritium for a total of 9 curies. The NRC Operations Officer notified R1DO (Eselgroth), R3DO (Clayton), NMSS EO (Haughney) and FEMA, DOE, USDA, HHS, EPA, and DOT (via NRC) by fax.

* * * UPDATE AT 1329 EDT ON 05/20/99 FROM JEFF HAVENNER TO MACKINNON * * *

Mr Havenner reported that the M58 and M59 aiming post lights containing tritium were not missing but two aiming post lights which do not container radioactive material were missing. The two missing aiming post lights are battery operated. The NRC Operations Officer notified the R1DO (Peter Eselgroth), R3DO (Brent Clayton), NMSS EO (Scott Moore) and FEMA, DOE, USDA, HHS, EPA, and DOT (via NRC) by fax.

AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE A REACTOR COOLANT PUMP TRIP

The Unit 1 reactor automatically tripped from 100% power due to a loss of 1C reactor coolant pump flow. The 1C reactor coolant pump tripped due to an undervoltage condition on the 1H 13.8-kV auxiliary bus. All rods fully inserted, and all systems functioned as required. Main feedwater isolated on the plant trip, and auxiliary feedwater actuated as expected. The pressurizer and steam generator power-operated relief valves remained closed during the event, and the main steam isolation valves remained open. There was no loss of offsite power, and there were no emergency core cooling system injections.

The unit is currently stable in Mode 3 (Hot Standby). The 1C reactor coolant pump is still secured, and primary system transport control is being maintained with the reactor coolant pumps in the remaining three loops. Normal charging and letdown and pressurizer heaters and sprays are being utilized for primary system level and pressure control. Auxiliary feedwater has been secured, and main feedwater is supplying water to the steam generators. Secondary steam is being dumped to the condenser. Offsite power is available, and the emergency diesel generators and emergency core cooling systems are operable and available if needed.

The cause of the undervoltage on the 1H 13.8-kV auxiliary bus is being investigated. The 1H 13.8-kV auxiliary bus has protection circuits that strip the two big loads (the reactor coolant pump and circulating water pump) on undervoltage. At this time, it appears that the feed to the protection circuitry on the C phase may have failed. Preliminary indications reveal that the bus itself did not fail. There were no maintenance or surveillance activities occurring at the time of the event.

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.

INOPERABILITY OF PRIMARY CONTAINMENT DUE TO MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE (MSIV) LEAKAGES IN EXCESS OF LOCAL LEAK RATE TESTING LIMITS

Local leak rate testing of the MSIVs on main steam line 'C' revealed leakages in excess of the 1% per day technical specification leakage limit. The revealed leakages of 280 standard liters per minute (slm) and 255 slm exceed the limit of 210.5 slm. These MSIVs are containment isolation valves, and this makes the primary containment system inoperable. However, the unit is currently shut down with the vessel head removed as part of a refueling outage.

The licensee stated that secondary containment was not lost because the main steam line plugs are in place in the vessel's steam nozzles (before the MSIVs). Therefore, the ongoing fuel shuffle has not been suspended. The licensee has suspended all work on lines in the drywell that would open anything downstream of the plugs. The licensee cannot commence work on the MSIV until a contingency plan is developed to either establish secondary containment downstream of the valves or finish fuel moves so that secondary containment would no longer be required. The first fuel shuffle is scheduled to be completed by midnight tonight.

Contingency plans are to repair the MSIVs during the ongoing refueling outage.

Prior to this issue, one of the MSIVs in the 'C' main steam line failed its quarterly stroke-time test. The valve was declared inoperable, and the second MSIV in the 'C' main steam line was closed to isolate the line on 03/27/99. The unit remained at 80% reactor power until commencement of the current refueling outage on 05/08/99. Prior to 03/27/99, the 'C' main steam line was in service.

The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO SMALL AIR POCKETS IN THE HIGH AREAS OF THE COMMON RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL TRAIN INJECTION LINES

Small air pockets in high point areas of common residual heat removal train injection lines. The licensee is unable to completely remove the small air pockets at this time. The licensee entered Technical Specification 3.0.3 at 0843 CST. Unit 1 commenced reactor shutdown at 1231 CST. All emergency core cooling systems are fully operable except the residual heat removal system, which is available to perform its required functions but is not operable. The emergency diesel generators are fully operable, and the electrical grid is stable.

The licensee continues to troubleshoot in trying to remove the air pockets.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee.