Event Notification Report for April 20, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Reports For 04/19/1999 - 04/20/1999 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** 35492 35603 35604 35605 35606 35607 35608 !!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!! +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 35492 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: FITZPATRICK REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/20/1999| | UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 04:08[EST]| | RXTYPE: [1] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 03/20/1999| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 02:50[EST]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: ALLEN |LAST UPDATE DATE: 04/19/1999| | HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JACK MCFADDEN R1 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | | |NLCO TECH SPEC LCO A/S | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | THE "A" HPCI WAS DECLARED INOPERABLE, RESULTING IN A 7 DAY LCO ACTION | | STATEMENT. | | | | THE "A" HPCI ISOLATION LOGIC WAS DE-ENERGIZED, MAKING HPCI INOPERABLE, DUE | | TO A 120VDC BATTERY GROUND. THIS CONDITION ALSO ACTUATED VALVES "23MOV-15" | | (INBOARD STEAM ISOLATION VALVE) AND "23MOV-58" (INBOARD TORUS SUCTION | | VALVE). BOTH PENETRATIONS HAVE BEEN ISOLATED AND DE-ENERGIZED WITHIN 1 | | HOUR AS REQUIRED BY TECH SPECS. THE CAUSE OF THE GROUND IS UNKNOWN AND | | BEING INVESTIGATED. | | | | THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR WILL BE NOTIFIED. | | | | | | ***Retraction on 04/19/99 at 1037 ET by Bob Steigerwald taken by | | MacKinnon**** | | | | This event is being retracted because of the following information because | | HPCI was capable of performing its intended safety function with the DC | | ground present. | | | | Due to de-energization a portion of the HPCI system Containment Isolation | | Logic in order to isolate a ground on the 120 VDC bus HPCI was declared | | inoperable. Subsequent review of the DC ground determined that the ground | | was located on a surge suppressor for a signal to the plant computer (EPIC), | | and had no effect on HPCI system operability. The HPCI system isolation | | logic was taken out of service for the troubleshooting effort and the | | appropriate Limiting Condition for Operation was taken. Therefore, since | | HPCI was capable of performing its intended safety function with the DC | | ground present, this event is not reportable and the notification is being | | retracted. R1DO (Shanbaky) notified. | | | | The NRC Resident Inspector was not of this retraction by the licensee. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 35603 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: LIMERICK REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/19/1999| | UNIT: [1] [2] [] STATE: PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 07:45[EDT]| | RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 04/19/1999| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 04:38[EDT]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: THOMAS J. TRAGEMANN |LAST UPDATE DATE: 04/19/1999| | HQ OPS OFFICER: DOUG WEAVER +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |DAN HOLODY R1 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION | | |AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation | |2 A N 0 Refueling |0 Refueling | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | UNIT 2 REACTOR SCRAM FROM CONDITION FIVE | | | | On 4/19/99, at 0438, Unit 2 received an 'A' side half scram signal. Unit 2 | | was in OPCON 5 (refueling) and Unit 1 was at 100% power in OPCON 1. The | | scram signal was a result of loss of voltage to 2AY160, the 'A' RPS power | | supply ('B' RPS was already blocked and a 'B' half scram was in). Due to | | the loss of 2AY160 several isolations were received on Unit 2 including | | Reactor Water Cleanup, High Pressure Coolant Injection, Instrument Gas and | | HVAC Groups (1B, 2A, 2C, 3, 5, 6A, 6B, 6C, 7A and 7B). Unit 1 received | | groups 6A and 6B Containment Atmosphere Control isolations. An | | investigation revealed an arcing bus bar on an RPS series output breaker | | (2AC248). The bus breakers were opened causing the arcing to stop and | | maintenance is currently being planned. All systems performed their | | intended function properly. | | | | The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 35604 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: NINE MILE POINT REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/19/1999| | UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:07[EDT]| | RXTYPE: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5 |EVENT DATE: 04/19/1999| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 11:15[EDT]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: RICK LANGE |LAST UPDATE DATE: 04/19/1999| | HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |MOHAMED SHANBAKY R1 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |APRE 50.72(b)(2)(vi) OFFSITE NOTIFICATION | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | | | |2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | - NEW YORK DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION NOTIFIED OF 11 GALLON | | OIL SPILL - | | | | AT 1115 ON 04/19/99, THE LICENSEE NOTIFIED THE NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF | | ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION THAT APPROXIMATELY 11 GALLONS OF HYDRAULIC OIL | | HAD SPILLED ON PAVED AND UNPAVED AREAS FROM A RUPTURED FORKLIFT HYDRAULIC | | LINE. THE LICENSEE CLEANED UP THE OIL AND REMOVED THE AFFECTED SOIL. | | | | THE LICENSEE PLANS TO INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 35605 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: LIMERICK REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/19/1999| | UNIT: [1] [2] [] STATE: PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:06[EDT]| | RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 04/19/1999| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 15:45[EDT]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: GREG SOSSON |LAST UPDATE DATE: 04/19/1999| | HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |MOHAMED SHANBAKY R1 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |DDDD 73.71 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation | |2 N N 0 Refueling |0 Refueling | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | - PLANT SECURITY REPORT - | | | | UNESCORTED ACCESS INAPPROPRIATELY GRANTED TO THE PLANT PROTECTED AREA. | | COMPENSATORY MEASURES TAKEN IMMEDIATELY UPON DISCOVERY. REFER TO THE HOO | | LOG FOR ADDITIONAL DETAILS. | | | | THE LICENSEE PLANS TO INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 35606 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/19/1999| | RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:54[EDT]| | COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 04/18/1999| | 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 16:00[CDT]| | BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 04/19/1999| | CITY: PADUCAH REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+ | COUNTY: McCRACKEN STATE: KY |PERSON ORGANIZATION | |LICENSE#: GDP-1 AGREEMENT: Y |MELVYN LEACH R3 | | DOCKET: 0707001 |JOHN SURMEIER NMSS | +------------------------------------------------+ | | NRC NOTIFIED BY: FRANK CAGE | | | HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | - NRC Bulletin 91-01, 24 hour report: Vacuum hose found wrapped around a | | HEPA vacuum cleaner - | | | | A HEPA vacuum cleaner was discovered in a containment pan on top of the | | C-337 Surge Drum Room with the vacuum hose wrapped around it in violation of | | Nuclear Criticality Safety Approval NCSA GEN-04. The purpose of the | | requirement is to prevent fissile material which may be present inside the | | hose due to a clog from interacting with the material within the vacuum | | cleaner. No information is available to indicate the hose is clogged, | | therefore, it is assumed that it is not clogged. This information was | | requested, however, the personnel who last used the vacuum was not | | available. | | | | SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: | | Double contingency was not maintained because the hose was not adequately | | spaced from the vacuum. A control which was relied upon for double | | contingency was violated. If both controls were lost, the configuration | | would still be subcritical; however, the evaluation does not credit | | additional controls for double contingency. | | | | POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW | | CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): | | If both controls were lost, the configuration would still be subcritical. | | For a criticality to be possible, both controls would have to be lost and | | the vacuum hose would need to be greater than 12 feet in length and the | | entire hose full of fissile material. Additionally, the hose would have to | | be wrapped around the vacuum cleaner. The hose in use was less than 12 feet | | in total length. | | | | CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC): | | InteractIon. | | | | ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS | | LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS): | | Estimated amount of uranium: Less than 80 pounds. | | Enrichment: Less than 2.0 wt% U-235. | | Form of licensed material: UO2F2. | | Process limit: 600 pounds uranium. | | | | NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROLS INVOLVED AND THEIR IMPACT ON DOUBLE | | CONTINGENCY: | | Double contingency for this scenario is established by implementing two | | controls on Interaction. | | | | The first leg of double contingency is based on requiring a clogged vacuum | | hose to be disconnected from the vacuum and placed in a 5.5 gallon waste | | drum and handled as waste. Handling the clogged hose as waste will ensure | | the minimum spacing is observed and limit/control interaction between the | | hose and vacuum. There is no indication that the hose is clogged; | | therefore, this control is considered intact. | | | | The second leg of double contingency is based on a control to prevent the | | hose from being wrapped around the vacuum. The purpose of this requirement | | is to prevent interaction between the vacuum and other fissile material | | which may be contained within the hose in the event there is a clog within | | the hose and the clog is not discovered or properly handled. This control | | was violated. | | | | Since double contingency was based on two controls on interaction and one | | control was violated, double contingency was not maintained. | | | | EXCLUSION ZONE AND POSTINGS: | | The area should be posted with an NCS requirement sign in accordance with | | CP2-EG-NS1031 which states the following: | | - This area contains improperly stored HEPA vacuum hoses. | | - Do not move fissile/potentially fissile material into or within this zone | | without NCS consent. | | - Maintain a minimum 2 feet edge-to-edge spacing from any other | | fissile/potentially fissile material. | | | | CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: | | Corrective actions will be provided via remediation guide #NCS-RG-99-009. | | | | PGDP Problem Report #ATRC-99-2201; PGDP Event Report #PAD-1999-028; Incident | | Report #NCS-INC-99-021 | | | | This event is being reported as a 24 hour Event Notification as an NRC | | Bulletin 91-01 Report. | | | | The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 35607 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/19/1999| | RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:55[EDT]| | COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 04/19/1999| | 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 14:00[EDT]| | BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 04/19/1999| | CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+ | COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION | |LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |MELVYN LEACH R3 | | DOCKET: 0707002 |JOHN SURMEIER NMSS | +------------------------------------------------+CHARLES MILLER IRO | | NRC NOTIFIED BY: RICK LARSON | | | HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | - NRC BULLETIN 91-01, 4 HOUR REPORT: ABANDONED COLD TRAPS MAY BE COVERED BY | | AN NCSA - | | | | DURING A WALKDOWN OF NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY APPROVAL NCSA_PLANT088.A00, | | "STORAGE of ABANDONED EQUIPMENT" FOR IMPLEMENTATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT | | ABANDONED COLD TRAPS LOCATED IN BUILDINGS X-342 AND X-343 MAY APPLY TO THIS | | NCSA AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN REPORTED IN JANUARY, 1999 UNDER NRC EVENT REPORT | | #35275. AT THIS TIME, THERE IS NO PROOF THAT THIS EQUIPMENT BELONGS TO DOE | | AND WITHOUT THIS DOCUMENTATION, THE MATERIAL FALLS UNDER USEC CONTROL AND | | SHOULD BE COVERED BY AN NCSA. SINCE THIS EQUIPMENT IS NOT COVERED BY AN | | NCSA, IT IS REPORTABLE AS A CRITICALITY CONTROL 4 HOUR BULLETIN 91-01 | | REPORT. THE PLANT FOLLOWED ITS PROCEDURE FOR ANOMALOUS NCSA CONDITIONS. | | FURTHER EVALUATIONS ARE IN PROGRESS TO DETERMINE IF THIS ABANDONED EQUIPMENT | | MEETS THE FISSILE MATERIAL LIMITS. THE FISSILE MATERIAL LIMIT OF 15 GRAMS | | OF U-235 BY PLANT PROCEDURES REQUIRES AN NCSA. | | | | SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: | | NO COLD TRAP CYLINDERS ARE INSTALLED. PIPING IS LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 2 | | INCHES IN DIAMETER WHICH IS A FAVORABLE GEOMETRY. CHEMICAL TRAPS ARE SEALED | | AND NOT EXPOSED TO ANY WATER OR MODERATOR SOURCE. | | | | POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW | | CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): | | PATHWAY ONLY EXISTS IF MORE THAN 13 POUNDS OF UO2F4 EXISTS IN A SINGLE ITEM | | AND WATER IS ALLOWED TO OPTIMALLY MODERATE AND REFLECT A SPHERE OF THIS | | MATERIAL. | | | | CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION. GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.): | | NO NCSA HAS BEEN WRITTEN FOR THIS EQUIPMENT. HOWEVER, NCSA_088 ESTABLISHES | | MASS AND MODERATION CONTROLS FOR THIS EQUIPMENT. PLANT_088 IS NOT | | IMPLEMENTED AT THIS TIME. | | | | ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS | | LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS): | | EXPECTED TO BE LESS THAN 350 GRAMS OF U-235 IN UO2F2 FORM AT 5.0% | | ENRICHMENT. | | | | NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION | | OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: | | NO NCS CONTROLS ESTABLISHED. | | | | CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: | | AT 1710, THE AREAS WERE BOUNDARY OFF PER OUR PROCEDURES. | | | | THERE WAS NO LOSS OF HAZARDOUS OR RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL NOR RADIOACTIVE OR | | RADIOLOGICAL CONTAMINATION EXPOSURE AS A RESULT OF THIS EVENT. | | | | PTS-1 999-029; PR-PTS-99-02208. | | | | THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR HAS BEEN NOTIFIED OF THIS EVENT. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 35608 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/19/1999| | RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 22:51[EDT]| | COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 04/19/1999| | 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 09:50[CDT]| | BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 04/19/1999| | CITY: PADUCAH REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+ | COUNTY: McCRACKEN STATE: KY |PERSON ORGANIZATION | |LICENSE#: GDP-1 AGREEMENT: Y |MELVYN LEACH R3 | | DOCKET: 0707001 |JOHN SURMEIER NMSS | +------------------------------------------------+ | | NRC NOTIFIED BY: KEVIN BEASLEY | | | HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | - NRC BULLETIN 91-01, 24 HOUR REPORT: Two exempted parts contained visible | | quantities of uranium - | | | | At 0910 CDT on 04/19/99, while performing a walk-through of the disassembly | | area of building C-400, two exempted parts were discovered to contain | | visible quantities of uranium. The parts were exempted in violation of | | requirement 3.2.11 of Nuclear Criticality Safety Approval NCSA 400.007.00 | | which allows NCS exemption of decontaminated parts based on two independent, | | visual inspections indicating they contain no visible uranium contamination. | | The purpose of this requirement is to ensure uranium contaminated parts are | | not exempted from NCS controls prior to proper inspection and verification | | of no visible uranium contamination. The independent visual inspections were | | performed in error. | | | | SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: | | The amount of visible uranium contamination was limited to a small quantity | | In a crevice of the parts. Although the amount of fissile material present | | is far below a safe mass, double contingency was not maintained since the | | Independent visual inspections were performed in error. Both controls | | relied upon for verification of no visible uranium mass were violated, | | | | POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW | | CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): | | In order for a criticality to be possible, the seal parts would have to | | contain greater than a safe mass of uranium and form a critical | | configuration. | | | | CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION. GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.): | | Mass | | | | ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS | | LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS): | | Less than 80 pounds of uranium; less than 2.0 wt %; UO2F2; (process limit: | | 2.0 wt %; worst case critical mass: 600 pounds of uranium) | | | | NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION | | OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: | | Double contingency for this scenario is established by implementing two | | controls on mass. | | | | The first leg of double contingency is based upon inspection results | | Indicating there is no visible uranium present on seal parts prior to NCS | | exemption. This is controlled by performing a visual inspection of the seal | | parts indicating no visible uranium contamination. The documentation for the | | inspection indicated no visual uranium contamination. The seal parts | | contained visible quantities of uranium contamination: therefore, this | | control was violated and the process condition exceeded. | | | | The second leg of double contingency relies upon a second independent, | | visual inspection verifying there is no visible uranium present on seal | | parts prior to NCS exemption. This is controlled by performing a second | | independent visual inspection of the seal parts indicating no visible | | uranium contamination. The documentation for the second independent | | inspection also indicated no visual uranium contamination. The seal parts | | contained visible quantities of uranium contamination: therefore, this | | control was violated and the process condition exceeded. | | | | Since both controls relied upon for double contingency were violated, double | | contingency was not maintained. | | | | CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: | | NCSA GEN-01 was immediately implemented upon discovery of the problem to | | prevent further actions until NCS approved corrective actions can be | | implemented. | | | | This event is being categorized as a 24-hour event, in accordance with | | Safety Analysis Report Table 6.9-1, Criteria A.4.a and NRC Bulletin 91-01, | | Supplement 1 report. | | | | The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event. | | | | PGDP Problem Report No. ATR-99-2212; PGDP Event Report No. PAD-I999-029. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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