Event Notification Report for April 20, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
04/19/1999 - 04/20/1999
** EVENT NUMBERS **
35492 35603 35604 35605 35606 35607 35608
!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 35492 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: FITZPATRICK REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/20/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 04:08[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 03/20/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 02:50[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: ALLEN |LAST UPDATE DATE: 04/19/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JACK MCFADDEN R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | |
|NLCO TECH SPEC LCO A/S | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| THE "A" HPCI WAS DECLARED INOPERABLE, RESULTING IN A 7 DAY LCO ACTION |
| STATEMENT. |
| |
| THE "A" HPCI ISOLATION LOGIC WAS DE-ENERGIZED, MAKING HPCI INOPERABLE, DUE |
| TO A 120VDC BATTERY GROUND. THIS CONDITION ALSO ACTUATED VALVES "23MOV-15" |
| (INBOARD STEAM ISOLATION VALVE) AND "23MOV-58" (INBOARD TORUS SUCTION |
| VALVE). BOTH PENETRATIONS HAVE BEEN ISOLATED AND DE-ENERGIZED WITHIN 1 |
| HOUR AS REQUIRED BY TECH SPECS. THE CAUSE OF THE GROUND IS UNKNOWN AND |
| BEING INVESTIGATED. |
| |
| THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR WILL BE NOTIFIED. |
| |
| |
| ***Retraction on 04/19/99 at 1037 ET by Bob Steigerwald taken by |
| MacKinnon**** |
| |
| This event is being retracted because of the following information because |
| HPCI was capable of performing its intended safety function with the DC |
| ground present. |
| |
| Due to de-energization a portion of the HPCI system Containment Isolation |
| Logic in order to isolate a ground on the 120 VDC bus HPCI was declared |
| inoperable. Subsequent review of the DC ground determined that the ground |
| was located on a surge suppressor for a signal to the plant computer (EPIC), |
| and had no effect on HPCI system operability. The HPCI system isolation |
| logic was taken out of service for the troubleshooting effort and the |
| appropriate Limiting Condition for Operation was taken. Therefore, since |
| HPCI was capable of performing its intended safety function with the DC |
| ground present, this event is not reportable and the notification is being |
| retracted. R1DO (Shanbaky) notified. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was not of this retraction by the licensee. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 35603 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: LIMERICK REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/19/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [2] [] STATE: PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 07:45[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 04/19/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 04:38[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: THOMAS J. TRAGEMANN |LAST UPDATE DATE: 04/19/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DOUG WEAVER +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |DAN HOLODY R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION | |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
|2 A N 0 Refueling |0 Refueling |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| UNIT 2 REACTOR SCRAM FROM CONDITION FIVE |
| |
| On 4/19/99, at 0438, Unit 2 received an 'A' side half scram signal. Unit 2 |
| was in OPCON 5 (refueling) and Unit 1 was at 100% power in OPCON 1. The |
| scram signal was a result of loss of voltage to 2AY160, the 'A' RPS power |
| supply ('B' RPS was already blocked and a 'B' half scram was in). Due to |
| the loss of 2AY160 several isolations were received on Unit 2 including |
| Reactor Water Cleanup, High Pressure Coolant Injection, Instrument Gas and |
| HVAC Groups (1B, 2A, 2C, 3, 5, 6A, 6B, 6C, 7A and 7B). Unit 1 received |
| groups 6A and 6B Containment Atmosphere Control isolations. An |
| investigation revealed an arcing bus bar on an RPS series output breaker |
| (2AC248). The bus breakers were opened causing the arcing to stop and |
| maintenance is currently being planned. All systems performed their |
| intended function properly. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 35604 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: NINE MILE POINT REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/19/1999|
| UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:07[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5 |EVENT DATE: 04/19/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 11:15[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: RICK LANGE |LAST UPDATE DATE: 04/19/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |MOHAMED SHANBAKY R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|APRE 50.72(b)(2)(vi) OFFSITE NOTIFICATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - NEW YORK DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION NOTIFIED OF 11 GALLON |
| OIL SPILL - |
| |
| AT 1115 ON 04/19/99, THE LICENSEE NOTIFIED THE NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF |
| ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION THAT APPROXIMATELY 11 GALLONS OF HYDRAULIC OIL |
| HAD SPILLED ON PAVED AND UNPAVED AREAS FROM A RUPTURED FORKLIFT HYDRAULIC |
| LINE. THE LICENSEE CLEANED UP THE OIL AND REMOVED THE AFFECTED SOIL. |
| |
| THE LICENSEE PLANS TO INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 35605 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: LIMERICK REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/19/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [2] [] STATE: PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:06[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 04/19/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 15:45[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: GREG SOSSON |LAST UPDATE DATE: 04/19/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |MOHAMED SHANBAKY R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|DDDD 73.71 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
|2 N N 0 Refueling |0 Refueling |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - PLANT SECURITY REPORT - |
| |
| UNESCORTED ACCESS INAPPROPRIATELY GRANTED TO THE PLANT PROTECTED AREA. |
| COMPENSATORY MEASURES TAKEN IMMEDIATELY UPON DISCOVERY. REFER TO THE HOO |
| LOG FOR ADDITIONAL DETAILS. |
| |
| THE LICENSEE PLANS TO INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 35606 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/19/1999|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:54[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 04/18/1999|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 16:00[CDT]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 04/19/1999|
| CITY: PADUCAH REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: McCRACKEN STATE: KY |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-1 AGREEMENT: Y |MELVYN LEACH R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707001 |JOHN SURMEIER NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: FRANK CAGE | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - NRC Bulletin 91-01, 24 hour report: Vacuum hose found wrapped around a |
| HEPA vacuum cleaner - |
| |
| A HEPA vacuum cleaner was discovered in a containment pan on top of the |
| C-337 Surge Drum Room with the vacuum hose wrapped around it in violation of |
| Nuclear Criticality Safety Approval NCSA GEN-04. The purpose of the |
| requirement is to prevent fissile material which may be present inside the |
| hose due to a clog from interacting with the material within the vacuum |
| cleaner. No information is available to indicate the hose is clogged, |
| therefore, it is assumed that it is not clogged. This information was |
| requested, however, the personnel who last used the vacuum was not |
| available. |
| |
| SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: |
| Double contingency was not maintained because the hose was not adequately |
| spaced from the vacuum. A control which was relied upon for double |
| contingency was violated. If both controls were lost, the configuration |
| would still be subcritical; however, the evaluation does not credit |
| additional controls for double contingency. |
| |
| POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): |
| If both controls were lost, the configuration would still be subcritical. |
| For a criticality to be possible, both controls would have to be lost and |
| the vacuum hose would need to be greater than 12 feet in length and the |
| entire hose full of fissile material. Additionally, the hose would have to |
| be wrapped around the vacuum cleaner. The hose in use was less than 12 feet |
| in total length. |
| |
| CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC): |
| InteractIon. |
| |
| ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS): |
| Estimated amount of uranium: Less than 80 pounds. |
| Enrichment: Less than 2.0 wt% U-235. |
| Form of licensed material: UO2F2. |
| Process limit: 600 pounds uranium. |
| |
| NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROLS INVOLVED AND THEIR IMPACT ON DOUBLE |
| CONTINGENCY: |
| Double contingency for this scenario is established by implementing two |
| controls on Interaction. |
| |
| The first leg of double contingency is based on requiring a clogged vacuum |
| hose to be disconnected from the vacuum and placed in a 5.5 gallon waste |
| drum and handled as waste. Handling the clogged hose as waste will ensure |
| the minimum spacing is observed and limit/control interaction between the |
| hose and vacuum. There is no indication that the hose is clogged; |
| therefore, this control is considered intact. |
| |
| The second leg of double contingency is based on a control to prevent the |
| hose from being wrapped around the vacuum. The purpose of this requirement |
| is to prevent interaction between the vacuum and other fissile material |
| which may be contained within the hose in the event there is a clog within |
| the hose and the clog is not discovered or properly handled. This control |
| was violated. |
| |
| Since double contingency was based on two controls on interaction and one |
| control was violated, double contingency was not maintained. |
| |
| EXCLUSION ZONE AND POSTINGS: |
| The area should be posted with an NCS requirement sign in accordance with |
| CP2-EG-NS1031 which states the following: |
| - This area contains improperly stored HEPA vacuum hoses. |
| - Do not move fissile/potentially fissile material into or within this zone |
| without NCS consent. |
| - Maintain a minimum 2 feet edge-to-edge spacing from any other |
| fissile/potentially fissile material. |
| |
| CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: |
| Corrective actions will be provided via remediation guide #NCS-RG-99-009. |
| |
| PGDP Problem Report #ATRC-99-2201; PGDP Event Report #PAD-1999-028; Incident |
| Report #NCS-INC-99-021 |
| |
| This event is being reported as a 24 hour Event Notification as an NRC |
| Bulletin 91-01 Report. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 35607 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/19/1999|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:55[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 04/19/1999|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 14:00[EDT]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 04/19/1999|
| CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |MELVYN LEACH R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707002 |JOHN SURMEIER NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+CHARLES MILLER IRO |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: RICK LARSON | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - NRC BULLETIN 91-01, 4 HOUR REPORT: ABANDONED COLD TRAPS MAY BE COVERED BY |
| AN NCSA - |
| |
| DURING A WALKDOWN OF NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY APPROVAL NCSA_PLANT088.A00, |
| "STORAGE of ABANDONED EQUIPMENT" FOR IMPLEMENTATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT |
| ABANDONED COLD TRAPS LOCATED IN BUILDINGS X-342 AND X-343 MAY APPLY TO THIS |
| NCSA AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN REPORTED IN JANUARY, 1999 UNDER NRC EVENT REPORT |
| #35275. AT THIS TIME, THERE IS NO PROOF THAT THIS EQUIPMENT BELONGS TO DOE |
| AND WITHOUT THIS DOCUMENTATION, THE MATERIAL FALLS UNDER USEC CONTROL AND |
| SHOULD BE COVERED BY AN NCSA. SINCE THIS EQUIPMENT IS NOT COVERED BY AN |
| NCSA, IT IS REPORTABLE AS A CRITICALITY CONTROL 4 HOUR BULLETIN 91-01 |
| REPORT. THE PLANT FOLLOWED ITS PROCEDURE FOR ANOMALOUS NCSA CONDITIONS. |
| FURTHER EVALUATIONS ARE IN PROGRESS TO DETERMINE IF THIS ABANDONED EQUIPMENT |
| MEETS THE FISSILE MATERIAL LIMITS. THE FISSILE MATERIAL LIMIT OF 15 GRAMS |
| OF U-235 BY PLANT PROCEDURES REQUIRES AN NCSA. |
| |
| SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: |
| NO COLD TRAP CYLINDERS ARE INSTALLED. PIPING IS LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 2 |
| INCHES IN DIAMETER WHICH IS A FAVORABLE GEOMETRY. CHEMICAL TRAPS ARE SEALED |
| AND NOT EXPOSED TO ANY WATER OR MODERATOR SOURCE. |
| |
| POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): |
| PATHWAY ONLY EXISTS IF MORE THAN 13 POUNDS OF UO2F4 EXISTS IN A SINGLE ITEM |
| AND WATER IS ALLOWED TO OPTIMALLY MODERATE AND REFLECT A SPHERE OF THIS |
| MATERIAL. |
| |
| CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION. GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.): |
| NO NCSA HAS BEEN WRITTEN FOR THIS EQUIPMENT. HOWEVER, NCSA_088 ESTABLISHES |
| MASS AND MODERATION CONTROLS FOR THIS EQUIPMENT. PLANT_088 IS NOT |
| IMPLEMENTED AT THIS TIME. |
| |
| ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS): |
| EXPECTED TO BE LESS THAN 350 GRAMS OF U-235 IN UO2F2 FORM AT 5.0% |
| ENRICHMENT. |
| |
| NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: |
| NO NCS CONTROLS ESTABLISHED. |
| |
| CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: |
| AT 1710, THE AREAS WERE BOUNDARY OFF PER OUR PROCEDURES. |
| |
| THERE WAS NO LOSS OF HAZARDOUS OR RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL NOR RADIOACTIVE OR |
| RADIOLOGICAL CONTAMINATION EXPOSURE AS A RESULT OF THIS EVENT. |
| |
| PTS-1 999-029; PR-PTS-99-02208. |
| |
| THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR HAS BEEN NOTIFIED OF THIS EVENT. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 35608 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/19/1999|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 22:51[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 04/19/1999|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 09:50[CDT]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 04/19/1999|
| CITY: PADUCAH REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: McCRACKEN STATE: KY |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-1 AGREEMENT: Y |MELVYN LEACH R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707001 |JOHN SURMEIER NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: KEVIN BEASLEY | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - NRC BULLETIN 91-01, 24 HOUR REPORT: Two exempted parts contained visible |
| quantities of uranium - |
| |
| At 0910 CDT on 04/19/99, while performing a walk-through of the disassembly |
| area of building C-400, two exempted parts were discovered to contain |
| visible quantities of uranium. The parts were exempted in violation of |
| requirement 3.2.11 of Nuclear Criticality Safety Approval NCSA 400.007.00 |
| which allows NCS exemption of decontaminated parts based on two independent, |
| visual inspections indicating they contain no visible uranium contamination. |
| The purpose of this requirement is to ensure uranium contaminated parts are |
| not exempted from NCS controls prior to proper inspection and verification |
| of no visible uranium contamination. The independent visual inspections were |
| performed in error. |
| |
| SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: |
| The amount of visible uranium contamination was limited to a small quantity |
| In a crevice of the parts. Although the amount of fissile material present |
| is far below a safe mass, double contingency was not maintained since the |
| Independent visual inspections were performed in error. Both controls |
| relied upon for verification of no visible uranium mass were violated, |
| |
| POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): |
| In order for a criticality to be possible, the seal parts would have to |
| contain greater than a safe mass of uranium and form a critical |
| configuration. |
| |
| CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION. GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.): |
| Mass |
| |
| ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS): |
| Less than 80 pounds of uranium; less than 2.0 wt %; UO2F2; (process limit: |
| 2.0 wt %; worst case critical mass: 600 pounds of uranium) |
| |
| NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: |
| Double contingency for this scenario is established by implementing two |
| controls on mass. |
| |
| The first leg of double contingency is based upon inspection results |
| Indicating there is no visible uranium present on seal parts prior to NCS |
| exemption. This is controlled by performing a visual inspection of the seal |
| parts indicating no visible uranium contamination. The documentation for the |
| inspection indicated no visual uranium contamination. The seal parts |
| contained visible quantities of uranium contamination: therefore, this |
| control was violated and the process condition exceeded. |
| |
| The second leg of double contingency relies upon a second independent, |
| visual inspection verifying there is no visible uranium present on seal |
| parts prior to NCS exemption. This is controlled by performing a second |
| independent visual inspection of the seal parts indicating no visible |
| uranium contamination. The documentation for the second independent |
| inspection also indicated no visual uranium contamination. The seal parts |
| contained visible quantities of uranium contamination: therefore, this |
| control was violated and the process condition exceeded. |
| |
| Since both controls relied upon for double contingency were violated, double |
| contingency was not maintained. |
| |
| CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: |
| NCSA GEN-01 was immediately implemented upon discovery of the problem to |
| prevent further actions until NCS approved corrective actions can be |
| implemented. |
| |
| This event is being categorized as a 24-hour event, in accordance with |
| Safety Analysis Report Table 6.9-1, Criteria A.4.a and NRC Bulletin 91-01, |
| Supplement 1 report. |
| |
| The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event. |
| |
| PGDP Problem Report No. ATR-99-2212; PGDP Event Report No. PAD-I999-029. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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