Event Notification Report for April 01, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/31/1999 - 04/01/1999
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35538
Facility: NORTH ANNA
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: K. D. DEVOR
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: K. D. DEVOR
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 04/01/1999
Notification Time: 16:01 [ET]
Event Date: 04/01/1999
Event Time: 15:50 [EST]
Last Update Date: 04/01/1999
Notification Time: 16:01 [ET]
Event Date: 04/01/1999
Event Time: 15:50 [EST]
Last Update Date: 04/01/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) - OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS
Person (Organization):
CHARLES OGLE (R2)
CHARLES OGLE (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
POSSIBLE GAS BINDING OF CHARGING PUMPS DURING CONTROL ROOM FIRE
"Engineering has identified the possibility of equipment failure during an Appendix 'R' control room fire leading to gas binding of all charging pumps. This condition places [both] units outside of Appendix 'R' design basis.
"Compensatory actions: 1) O-FCA-1 [procedure is] being changed to address this condition (Fire Contingency Action, Control Room Fire); 2) establishing continuous fire watch in control room pending resolution of condition."
A fire in the control room could prevent the automatic closing of the charging pump suction valves from the volume control tank (VCT) on low level transfer to the refueling water storage tank. This would allow the gas used in the VCT to expand into the suction of the charging pumps causing gas binding.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
HOO Note: Refer to Events #35481 and #35537.
"Engineering has identified the possibility of equipment failure during an Appendix 'R' control room fire leading to gas binding of all charging pumps. This condition places [both] units outside of Appendix 'R' design basis.
"Compensatory actions: 1) O-FCA-1 [procedure is] being changed to address this condition (Fire Contingency Action, Control Room Fire); 2) establishing continuous fire watch in control room pending resolution of condition."
A fire in the control room could prevent the automatic closing of the charging pump suction valves from the volume control tank (VCT) on low level transfer to the refueling water storage tank. This would allow the gas used in the VCT to expand into the suction of the charging pumps causing gas binding.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
HOO Note: Refer to Events #35481 and #35537.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 35539
Facility: INDIAN POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MICHELLE SAVINO
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MICHELLE SAVINO
HQ OPS Officer: FANGIE JONES
Notification Date: 04/01/1999
Notification Time: 17:24 [ET]
Event Date: 04/01/1999
Event Time: 14:38 [EST]
Last Update Date: 04/01/1999
Notification Time: 17:24 [ET]
Event Date: 04/01/1999
Event Time: 14:38 [EST]
Last Update Date: 04/01/1999
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
KATHLEEN MODES (R1)
KATHLEEN MODES (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 99 | Power Operation | 99 | Power Operation |
COURTESY NOTIFICATION ON LOSS OF DEGRADED VOLTAGE INDICATION ON 480 VAC VITAL BUS
The field operator discovered 480 Vac VITAL bus '6A' degraded bus voltage monitor light was extinguished. After further investigation it was determined that the control power fuses were blown on the degraded bus voltage monitor. The fuses were replaced and the circuit was restored successfully. This report is made at management discretion. Technical Specification 3.5.3 which invokes Table 3.5.3 for undervoltage was entered. The LCO action statement requires placing the plant in cold shutdown. The plant was in the investigation phase and recovered the circuit in question so never commenced a plant shutdown.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The field operator discovered 480 Vac VITAL bus '6A' degraded bus voltage monitor light was extinguished. After further investigation it was determined that the control power fuses were blown on the degraded bus voltage monitor. The fuses were replaced and the circuit was restored successfully. This report is made at management discretion. Technical Specification 3.5.3 which invokes Table 3.5.3 for undervoltage was entered. The LCO action statement requires placing the plant in cold shutdown. The plant was in the investigation phase and recovered the circuit in question so never commenced a plant shutdown.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.