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Event Notification Report for April 1, 1999

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           03/31/1999 - 04/01/1999

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

35534  35535  35536  35537  

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   35534       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT      |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/31/1999|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:46[EST]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        03/30/1999|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        15:00[CST]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/31/1999|
|    CITY:  PADUCAH                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  McCRACKEN                 STATE:  KY |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-1                 AGREEMENT:  Y  |MARK RING            R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707001                              |DON COOL, EO         NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  KEVIN BEASLEY                |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| -  NRC BULLETIN 91-01, 24 HOUR REPORT -                                      |
|                                                                              |
| Four drums containing seal parts in the C-746-Q1 building were discovered to |
| have been improperly characterized and labeled/treated as NCS Spacing Exempt |
| in violation of NCSA WM-O.  The drum weights were discovered to be outside   |
| the valid calibration range of the instrument, resulting in an invalid mass  |
| measurement for characterization.  The purpose of using a valid calibration  |
| range is to ensure that fissile waste will not be improperly classified as   |
| NCS Spacing Exempt.                                                          |
|                                                                              |
| SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:                                               |
| Double contingency was not maintained because the drums were not properly    |
| characterized.  The control relied upon for verification of U-235 mass was   |
| violated.  However, previous NDA measurements of the drums, performed as a   |
| single unit, demonstrated an always safe single unit mass.  Although the     |
| safety significance is low, a control for double contingency was lost.       |
|                                                                              |
| POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIOS) OF HOW CRITICALITY |
| COULD OCCUR):                                                                |
| Double contingency for this scenario is established by implementing two      |
| controls on mass.  The first leg of double contingency is based on limiting  |
| the mass of uranium that is accumulated.  NCSA KY/S-253 states that it is    |
| unlikely that heterogeneous waste will contain greater than 120 grams U-235  |
| per drum.  The drums involved contain seal parts and would be considered     |
| heterogeneous waste; therefore this control was maintained.                  |
|                                                                              |
| The second leg of double contingency relies upon maintaining mass in NCS     |
| spacing exempt drums to less than 120 grams of U-235.  WM-01 controls mass   |
| by requiring a drum monitor analysis to verify that each drum has less than  |
| 120 grams of U-235 prior to handling as NCS spacing exempt.  This control    |
| was violated because the drums were not characterized properly.  Therefore,  |
| it cannot be shown that the 120 gram limit was maintained.  Since one of the |
| two controls on the mass process condition was violated, double contingency  |
| was not maintained.                                                          |
|                                                                              |
| CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):     |
| Controlled parameter is the establishment of two controls on mass.           |
|                                                                              |
| ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS     |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS):                                    |
| The amount has been conservatively measured as less than 200 pounds of       |
| U-235, which is significantly less than 600 pounds of U-235 at 2.0 wt %.     |
|                                                                              |
| NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION   |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:                                             |
| Loss of mass control.  The process relies on two controls on mass to assure  |
| double contingency.  Inadequate drum monitor analysis resulted in the loss   |
| of one of the controls.                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:   |
| The drums were moved to a secure area with proper spacing.  Additional       |
| corrective actions will be provided via remediation guide NCS-RG-99-008.     |
|                                                                              |
| This event is being categorized as a 24-hour event in accordance with Safety |
| Analysis Report Table 6.9-1, Criteria A.4.a and NRC Bulletin 91-01,          |
| Supplement 1 Report.                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.                  |
|                                                                              |
| PGDP Problem Report No. ATR-99-1832; PGDP Event Report No. PAD-1999-023.     |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35535       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SEABROOK                 REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/31/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  NH |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:07[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP                           |EVENT DATE:        03/31/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        11:00[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  KILBY                        |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/31/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:                                |KATHLEEN MODES       R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AINA 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(A) POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          N       0        Cold Shutdown    |0        Cold Shutdown    |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| "B" Train Emergency Diesel Generator may not have been operable during       |
| portions or all of the previous operating cycle due to a defective  AR       |
| relay.                                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| "On March 31, 1999 at 1100, during the current refueling outage, North       |
| Atlantic Energy Service Corporation (North                                   |
| Atlantic) determined that the B Train Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) may   |
| not have been operable during portions or all of the previous operating      |
| cycle. Specifically, during 18 month EDG testing on March 29, 1999, it was   |
| determined that an AR relay associated with the B Train EDG Emergency Power  |
| Sequencer (EPS) was incapable of opening the breaker to the Unit Auxiliary   |
| Transformer (UAT). This would have prevented the EDG from powering the       |
| emergency bus if called upon to do so.                                       |
|                                                                              |
| "Additional testing on March 30, 1999, revealed that another AR relay        |
| associated with the B Train EDG EPS was incapable of starting a Containment  |
| Building Spray (CBS) pump. This would have prevented the B Train CBS pump    |
| from automatically starting if called upon to do so.                         |
|                                                                              |
| "North Atlantic is currently investigating this issue and has not been able  |
| to determine the definitive cause of the relay failures or when the failures |
| occurred, however, the B Train AR relays were replaced during the last       |
| refueling outage which was completed in June 1997. The B Train EDG           |
| successfully passed its surveillance testing during that outage after the    |
| relays were replaced. North Atlantic is currently investigating the          |
| potential for similar issues with the A Train AR relays.                     |
|                                                                              |
| "North Atlantic has concluded that during the prior operating cycle, it is   |
| possible that there were times when the A Train EDG was inoperable for       |
| maintenance or testing concurrent with the B Train EDG being inoperable due  |
| to the aforementioned AR relay failures. This constitutes a condition that   |
| alone could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of         |
| structures, systems, or components that are needed to mitigate the           |
| consequences of an accident and is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 5           |
| 0.72(b)(2)(iii). Notwithstanding, the potential unavailability of the B EDG, |
| during the past operating cycle offsite power was available. The AR relays   |
| in the B Train EDG EPS have been replaced and EDG testing has been           |
| satisfactorily completed."                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Other Nuclear Material                           |Event Number:   35536       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  UNIV. OF MINNESOTA, MINNEAPOLIS      |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/31/1999|
|LICENSEE:  UNIV. OF MINNESOTA, MINNEAPOLIS      |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:20[EST]|
|    CITY:  MINNEAPLIS               REGION:  3  |EVENT DATE:        03/31/1999|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  MN |EVENT TIME:        14:30[CST]|
|LICENSE#:  22-00187-46           AGREEMENT:  N  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/31/1999|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |MARK RING            R3      |
|                                                |LARRY CAMPER         NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  JERRY STAIGER                |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|BAAA 20.1906(d)          SURFACE CONTAMINATION E|                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Tritium contamination was found on the bottom of a package delivered by      |
| FEDEX to the University of Minnesota Duluth campus.                          |
|                                                                              |
| A package containing Phosphorus-33 delivered by FEDEX, (origin Amersham of   |
| Chicago), to the University of Minnesota, Duluth campus was found to have    |
| Tritium contamination only on the bottom of the package.  Swipes of  the     |
| package were taken twice and each time only contamination was found on the   |
| bottom of the package. The contamination level of each swipe was 50,000 DPM. |
| The package was double bagged and the carpeting on which the package was     |
| resting was covered to prevent spread of contamination.  The RSO for the     |
| University of Minnesota Minneapolis campus contacted the Amersham RSO,       |
| located in Chicago, IL.,  and informed him of this incident. The RSO for the |
| University of Minnesota Minneapolis campus said that they were going to take |
| another swipe of the package tomorrow morning (04/01/99) and take a reading  |
| of the swipe to make sure that the contamination of the package is from      |
| Tritium. The University of Minnesota at Duluth only received one package     |
| from FEDEX so the Tritium contamination of the bottom of the package did not |
| come from the carpeting of the floor.                                        |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| Contact the HOO for contact numbers.                                         |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35537       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SURRY                    REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/31/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] []                STATE:  VA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:47[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP                |EVENT DATE:        03/31/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        19:30[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  B WEBSTER                    |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/31/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |CHARLES OGLE         R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B)  OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS   |                             |
|ACNC 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(C)  COND OUTSIDE EOPS      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|2     N          Y       73       Power Operation  |73       Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| INADEQUATE FIRE CONTINGENCY PROCEDURE IDENTIFIED FOLLOWING REVIEW OF         |
| INDUSTRY FINDINGS AT CALLAWAY AND BEAVER VALLEY                              |
|                                                                              |
| A review of recent industry findings at Callaway and Beaver Valley was       |
| performed for Surry Power Station to determine its applicability. The        |
| specific issue involves a postulated fire in the Main Control Room (MCR)     |
| resulting in inadequate isolation of the VCT from the Charging/High Head     |
| Safety Injection (HHSI) pumps which causes gas binding of the pumps.         |
|                                                                              |
| Fire Contingency Action Procedure 0-FCA- 1.00 "Limiting MCR Fire"  provides  |
| direction for responding to a fire in the MCR for Surry Power Station. No    |
| specific direction is provided to ensure that an adequate Charging/HHSI pump |
| suction alignment is maintained to minimize the possibility of gas binding   |
| the Charging/HHSI pumps. Letdown is isolated as part of Step 11 of 0-FCA-    |
| 1.00 to conserve RCS inventory, however, no other actions are directed with  |
| respect to the Charging/HHSI system until Step 26 which verifies at least    |
| one charging pump is running. Since the control circuits for the             |
| Charging/HHSI suction valves (CH-MOV-11 5B, C, D, & E) are routed through    |
| the MCR, fire could conceivably render electrical operation of all of these  |
| valves unavailable. Therefore, the automatic swapover to the RWST due to a   |
| low VCT level may not occur and potentially lead to gas binding of the       |
| Charging/HHSI pumps. In summary, 0-FCA-I.00 does not adequately address the  |
| potential of gas binding the Charging/HHSI pumps and could lead to the       |
| inoperability of all Charging/HHSI pumps for the MCR fire coincident with    |
| appropriate Appendix R assumptions. This condition places the Station        |
| outside of its Appendix R design basis for both Units 1 & 2 in that the      |
| potential loss of Charging/HHSI pumps could result in the inability to       |
| achieve and maintain a safe shutdown condition in the event of an Appendix R |
| fire.                                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| Procedure changes are currently being implemented to 0-FCA- 1.00 to provide  |
| guidance to prevent this potential condition.  The licensee will change the  |
| FCA procedures to give proper guidance to verify that the suction valves are |
| aligned to the charging pumps. The licensee will have the non-operating      |
| charging pump placed in pull-to-lock before leaving the MCR.  The licensee   |
| would then verify that the charging pump has a proper suction source before  |
| starting it from the remote shutdown panel.,                                 |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified of this event notification by    |
| the licensee.                                                                |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+


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