Event Notification Report for April 1, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
03/31/1999 - 04/01/1999
** EVENT NUMBERS **
35534 35535 35536 35537
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|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 35534 |
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| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/31/1999|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:46[EST]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 03/30/1999|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 15:00[CST]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/31/1999|
| CITY: PADUCAH REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: McCRACKEN STATE: KY |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-1 AGREEMENT: Y |MARK RING R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707001 |DON COOL, EO NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: KEVIN BEASLEY | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| - NRC BULLETIN 91-01, 24 HOUR REPORT - |
| |
| Four drums containing seal parts in the C-746-Q1 building were discovered to |
| have been improperly characterized and labeled/treated as NCS Spacing Exempt |
| in violation of NCSA WM-O. The drum weights were discovered to be outside |
| the valid calibration range of the instrument, resulting in an invalid mass |
| measurement for characterization. The purpose of using a valid calibration |
| range is to ensure that fissile waste will not be improperly classified as |
| NCS Spacing Exempt. |
| |
| SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: |
| Double contingency was not maintained because the drums were not properly |
| characterized. The control relied upon for verification of U-235 mass was |
| violated. However, previous NDA measurements of the drums, performed as a |
| single unit, demonstrated an always safe single unit mass. Although the |
| safety significance is low, a control for double contingency was lost. |
| |
| POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIOS) OF HOW CRITICALITY |
| COULD OCCUR): |
| Double contingency for this scenario is established by implementing two |
| controls on mass. The first leg of double contingency is based on limiting |
| the mass of uranium that is accumulated. NCSA KY/S-253 states that it is |
| unlikely that heterogeneous waste will contain greater than 120 grams U-235 |
| per drum. The drums involved contain seal parts and would be considered |
| heterogeneous waste; therefore this control was maintained. |
| |
| The second leg of double contingency relies upon maintaining mass in NCS |
| spacing exempt drums to less than 120 grams of U-235. WM-01 controls mass |
| by requiring a drum monitor analysis to verify that each drum has less than |
| 120 grams of U-235 prior to handling as NCS spacing exempt. This control |
| was violated because the drums were not characterized properly. Therefore, |
| it cannot be shown that the 120 gram limit was maintained. Since one of the |
| two controls on the mass process condition was violated, double contingency |
| was not maintained. |
| |
| CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.): |
| Controlled parameter is the establishment of two controls on mass. |
| |
| ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS): |
| The amount has been conservatively measured as less than 200 pounds of |
| U-235, which is significantly less than 600 pounds of U-235 at 2.0 wt %. |
| |
| NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: |
| Loss of mass control. The process relies on two controls on mass to assure |
| double contingency. Inadequate drum monitor analysis resulted in the loss |
| of one of the controls. |
| |
| CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: |
| The drums were moved to a secure area with proper spacing. Additional |
| corrective actions will be provided via remediation guide NCS-RG-99-008. |
| |
| This event is being categorized as a 24-hour event in accordance with Safety |
| Analysis Report Table 6.9-1, Criteria A.4.a and NRC Bulletin 91-01, |
| Supplement 1 Report. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event. |
| |
| PGDP Problem Report No. ATR-99-1832; PGDP Event Report No. PAD-1999-023. |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 35535 |
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| FACILITY: SEABROOK REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/31/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NH |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:07[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 03/31/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 11:00[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: KILBY |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/31/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: |KATHLEEN MODES R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AINA 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(A) POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N N 0 Cold Shutdown |0 Cold Shutdown |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| "B" Train Emergency Diesel Generator may not have been operable during |
| portions or all of the previous operating cycle due to a defective AR |
| relay. |
| |
| "On March 31, 1999 at 1100, during the current refueling outage, North |
| Atlantic Energy Service Corporation (North |
| Atlantic) determined that the B Train Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) may |
| not have been operable during portions or all of the previous operating |
| cycle. Specifically, during 18 month EDG testing on March 29, 1999, it was |
| determined that an AR relay associated with the B Train EDG Emergency Power |
| Sequencer (EPS) was incapable of opening the breaker to the Unit Auxiliary |
| Transformer (UAT). This would have prevented the EDG from powering the |
| emergency bus if called upon to do so. |
| |
| "Additional testing on March 30, 1999, revealed that another AR relay |
| associated with the B Train EDG EPS was incapable of starting a Containment |
| Building Spray (CBS) pump. This would have prevented the B Train CBS pump |
| from automatically starting if called upon to do so. |
| |
| "North Atlantic is currently investigating this issue and has not been able |
| to determine the definitive cause of the relay failures or when the failures |
| occurred, however, the B Train AR relays were replaced during the last |
| refueling outage which was completed in June 1997. The B Train EDG |
| successfully passed its surveillance testing during that outage after the |
| relays were replaced. North Atlantic is currently investigating the |
| potential for similar issues with the A Train AR relays. |
| |
| "North Atlantic has concluded that during the prior operating cycle, it is |
| possible that there were times when the A Train EDG was inoperable for |
| maintenance or testing concurrent with the B Train EDG being inoperable due |
| to the aforementioned AR relay failures. This constitutes a condition that |
| alone could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of |
| structures, systems, or components that are needed to mitigate the |
| consequences of an accident and is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 5 |
| 0.72(b)(2)(iii). Notwithstanding, the potential unavailability of the B EDG, |
| during the past operating cycle offsite power was available. The AR relays |
| in the B Train EDG EPS have been replaced and EDG testing has been |
| satisfactorily completed." |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee. |
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|Other Nuclear Material |Event Number: 35536 |
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| REP ORG: UNIV. OF MINNESOTA, MINNEAPOLIS |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/31/1999|
|LICENSEE: UNIV. OF MINNESOTA, MINNEAPOLIS |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:20[EST]|
| CITY: MINNEAPLIS REGION: 3 |EVENT DATE: 03/31/1999|
| COUNTY: STATE: MN |EVENT TIME: 14:30[CST]|
|LICENSE#: 22-00187-46 AGREEMENT: N |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/31/1999|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |MARK RING R3 |
| |LARRY CAMPER NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JERRY STAIGER | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|BAAA 20.1906(d) SURFACE CONTAMINATION E| |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| Tritium contamination was found on the bottom of a package delivered by |
| FEDEX to the University of Minnesota Duluth campus. |
| |
| A package containing Phosphorus-33 delivered by FEDEX, (origin Amersham of |
| Chicago), to the University of Minnesota, Duluth campus was found to have |
| Tritium contamination only on the bottom of the package. Swipes of the |
| package were taken twice and each time only contamination was found on the |
| bottom of the package. The contamination level of each swipe was 50,000 DPM. |
| The package was double bagged and the carpeting on which the package was |
| resting was covered to prevent spread of contamination. The RSO for the |
| University of Minnesota Minneapolis campus contacted the Amersham RSO, |
| located in Chicago, IL., and informed him of this incident. The RSO for the |
| University of Minnesota Minneapolis campus said that they were going to take |
| another swipe of the package tomorrow morning (04/01/99) and take a reading |
| of the swipe to make sure that the contamination of the package is from |
| Tritium. The University of Minnesota at Duluth only received one package |
| from FEDEX so the Tritium contamination of the bottom of the package did not |
| come from the carpeting of the floor. |
| |
| |
| Contact the HOO for contact numbers. |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 35537 |
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| FACILITY: SURRY REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/31/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [2] [] STATE: VA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:47[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP |EVENT DATE: 03/31/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 19:30[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: B WEBSTER |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/31/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |CHARLES OGLE R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | |
|ACNC 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(C) COND OUTSIDE EOPS | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
|2 N Y 73 Power Operation |73 Power Operation |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| INADEQUATE FIRE CONTINGENCY PROCEDURE IDENTIFIED FOLLOWING REVIEW OF |
| INDUSTRY FINDINGS AT CALLAWAY AND BEAVER VALLEY |
| |
| A review of recent industry findings at Callaway and Beaver Valley was |
| performed for Surry Power Station to determine its applicability. The |
| specific issue involves a postulated fire in the Main Control Room (MCR) |
| resulting in inadequate isolation of the VCT from the Charging/High Head |
| Safety Injection (HHSI) pumps which causes gas binding of the pumps. |
| |
| Fire Contingency Action Procedure 0-FCA- 1.00 "Limiting MCR Fire" provides |
| direction for responding to a fire in the MCR for Surry Power Station. No |
| specific direction is provided to ensure that an adequate Charging/HHSI pump |
| suction alignment is maintained to minimize the possibility of gas binding |
| the Charging/HHSI pumps. Letdown is isolated as part of Step 11 of 0-FCA- |
| 1.00 to conserve RCS inventory, however, no other actions are directed with |
| respect to the Charging/HHSI system until Step 26 which verifies at least |
| one charging pump is running. Since the control circuits for the |
| Charging/HHSI suction valves (CH-MOV-11 5B, C, D, & E) are routed through |
| the MCR, fire could conceivably render electrical operation of all of these |
| valves unavailable. Therefore, the automatic swapover to the RWST due to a |
| low VCT level may not occur and potentially lead to gas binding of the |
| Charging/HHSI pumps. In summary, 0-FCA-I.00 does not adequately address the |
| potential of gas binding the Charging/HHSI pumps and could lead to the |
| inoperability of all Charging/HHSI pumps for the MCR fire coincident with |
| appropriate Appendix R assumptions. This condition places the Station |
| outside of its Appendix R design basis for both Units 1 & 2 in that the |
| potential loss of Charging/HHSI pumps could result in the inability to |
| achieve and maintain a safe shutdown condition in the event of an Appendix R |
| fire. |
| |
| Procedure changes are currently being implemented to 0-FCA- 1.00 to provide |
| guidance to prevent this potential condition. The licensee will change the |
| FCA procedures to give proper guidance to verify that the suction valves are |
| aligned to the charging pumps. The licensee will have the non-operating |
| charging pump placed in pull-to-lock before leaving the MCR. The licensee |
| would then verify that the charging pump has a proper suction source before |
| starting it from the remote shutdown panel., |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified of this event notification by |
| the licensee. |
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