Event Notification Report for March 31, 1999

"B" Train Emergency Diesel Generator may not have been operable during portions or all of the previous operating cycle due to a defective AR relay.

"On March 31, 1999 at 1100, during the current refueling outage, North Atlantic Energy Service Corporation (North
Atlantic) determined that the B Train Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) may not have been operable during portions or all of the previous operating cycle. Specifically, during 18 month EDG testing on March 29, 1999, it was determined that an AR relay associated with the B Train EDG Emergency Power Sequencer (EPS) was incapable of opening the breaker to the Unit Auxiliary Transformer (UAT). This would have prevented the EDG from powering the emergency bus if called upon to do so.

"Additional testing on March 30, 1999, revealed that another AR relay associated with the B Train EDG EPS was incapable of starting a Containment Building Spray (CBS) pump. This would have prevented the B Train CBS pump from automatically starting if called upon to do so.

"North Atlantic is currently investigating this issue and has not been able to determine the definitive cause of the relay failures or when the failures occurred, however, the B Train AR relays were replaced during the last refueling outage which was completed in June 1997. The B Train EDG successfully passed its surveillance testing during that outage after the relays were replaced. North Atlantic is currently investigating the potential for similar issues with the A Train AR relays.

"North Atlantic has concluded that during the prior operating cycle, it is possible that there were times when the A Train EDG was inoperable for maintenance or testing concurrent with the B Train EDG being inoperable due to the aforementioned AR relay failures. This constitutes a condition that alone could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures, systems, or components that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident and is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 5 0.72(b)(2)(iii). Notwithstanding, the potential unavailability of the B EDG, during the past operating cycle offsite power was available. The AR relays in the B Train EDG EPS have been replaced and EDG testing has been satisfactorily completed."

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.

Tritium contamination was found on the bottom of a package delivered by FEDEX to the University of Minnesota Duluth campus.

A package containing Phosphorus-33 delivered by FEDEX, (origin Amersham of Chicago), to the University of Minnesota, Duluth campus was found to have Tritium contamination only on the bottom of the package. Swipes of the package were taken twice and each time only contamination was found on the bottom of the package. The contamination level of each swipe was 50,000 DPM. The package was double bagged and the carpeting on which the package was resting was covered to prevent spread of contamination. The RSO for the University of Minnesota Minneapolis campus contacted the Amersham RSO, located in Chicago, IL., and informed him of this incident. The RSO for the University of Minnesota Minneapolis campus said that they were going to take another swipe of the package tomorrow morning (04/01/99) and take a reading of the swipe to make sure that the contamination of the package is from Tritium. The University of Minnesota at Duluth only received one package from FEDEX so the Tritium contamination of the bottom of the package did not come from the carpeting of the floor.

Contact the HOO for contact numbers.

* * * UPDATE 1050EST ON 4/1/99 FROM J. STAIGER TO S.SANDIN * * *

The licensee is retracting this event after confirming that the scintillation counter response was due to chemical luminescence rather than tritium contamination. The licensee discussed this with R3(Jones) and notified the Amersham RSO as well as FEDEX. Notified R3DO (Ring).

INADEQUATE FIRE CONTINGENCY PROCEDURE IDENTIFIED FOLLOWING REVIEW OF INDUSTRY FINDINGS AT CALLAWAY AND BEAVER VALLEY

A review of recent industry findings at Callaway and Beaver Valley was performed for Surry Power Station to determine its applicability. The specific issue involves a postulated fire in the Main Control Room (MCR) resulting in inadequate isolation of the VCT from the Charging/High Head Safety Injection (HHSI) pumps which causes gas binding of the pumps.

Fire Contingency Action Procedure 0-FCA- 1.00 "Limiting MCR Fire" provides direction for responding to a fire in the MCR for Surry Power Station. No specific direction is provided to ensure that an adequate Charging/HHSI pump suction alignment is maintained to minimize the possibility of gas binding the Charging/HHSI pumps. Letdown is isolated as part of Step 11 of 0-FCA- 1.00 to conserve RCS inventory, however, no other actions are directed with respect to the Charging/HHSI system until Step 26 which verifies at least one charging pump is running. Since the control circuits for the Charging/HHSI suction valves (CH-MOV-11 5B, C, D, & E) are routed through the MCR, fire could conceivably render electrical operation of all of these valves unavailable. Therefore, the automatic swapover to the RWST due to a low VCT level may not occur and potentially lead to gas binding of the Charging/HHSI pumps. In summary, 0-FCA-I.00 does not adequately address the potential of gas binding the Charging/HHSI pumps and could lead to the inoperability of all Charging/HHSI pumps for the MCR fire coincident with appropriate Appendix R assumptions. This condition places the Station outside of its Appendix R design basis for both Units 1 & 2 in that the potential loss of Charging/HHSI pumps could result in the inability to achieve and maintain a safe shutdown condition in the event of an Appendix R fire.

Procedure changes are currently being implemented to 0-FCA- 1.00 to provide guidance to prevent this potential condition. The licensee will change the FCA procedures to give proper guidance to verify that the suction valves are aligned to the charging pumps. The licensee will have the non-operating charging pump placed in pull-to-lock before leaving the MCR. The licensee would then verify that the charging pump has a proper suction source before starting it from the remote shutdown panel.,

The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified of this event notification by the licensee.

HOO Note: Refer to Event #35481 and #35538.

SECURITY REPORT

Unescorted access granted inappropriately. Immediate compensatory measures taken upon discovery.

Refer to the HOO Log for additional details.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

See EN #37908.