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Event Notification Report for March 1, 1999

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           02/26/1999 - 03/01/1999

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

35407  35409  35410  35411  35412  35413  35415  35416  35417  35418  35419 
35420  35421  35422  35423  35424  

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35407       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: WATERFORD                REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/25/1999|
|    UNIT:  [3] [] []                 STATE:  LA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:41[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [3] CE                               |EVENT DATE:        02/25/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        14:18[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  BILL MCKINNEY                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  02/27/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |ELMO COLLINS         R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ADAS 50.72(b)(2)(i)      DEG/UNANALYZED COND    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|3     N          N       0        Refueling        |0        Refueling        |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| PRESSURIZER NOZZLE LEAKAGE DISCOVERED DURING REFUELING OUTAGE                |
|                                                                              |
| During a visual inspection, evidence of reactor coolant system leakage was   |
| found on two inconel instrument nozzles located on the top head of the       |
| pressurizer.  The leakage was in the annulus area where the nozzle           |
| penetrates the pressurizer head.  The nozzles are welded on the inner        |
| diameter of the pressurizer and are joined to instrument valves RC-310 and   |
| RC-311.                                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this notification by the     |
| licensee.                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 2251 ON 02/27/99 FROM DAVID LITOLFF TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *  |
|                                                                              |
| "On 02/25/99 a 4-hour report to the NRC was made per 10CFR50 72(b)(2)(i) for |
| evidence of Reactor Coolant System Leakage on two pressurizer instrument     |
| nozzles.  The purpose of this report is to update the 02/25/99 report for    |
| additional Reactor Coolant System instrument nozzles which have been         |
| identified as having evidence of RCS leakage.  On 02/27/99, evidence of      |
| boric acid leakage was found on one Hot Leg 1 Inconel Alloy 600 instrument   |
| nozzle.  Potential leakage was also found for one steam generator instrument |
| nozzle and the pressurizer side shell nozzle.  Any further evidence of       |
| leakage found in subsequent inspections will be included in the 30-day       |
| Licensee Event Report."                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector will be informed of this report by the licensee.  |
| The NRC Operations Officer notified the R4DO (Chuck Cain).                   |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35409       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SEABROOK                 REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/26/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  NH |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:28[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP                           |EVENT DATE:        02/26/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        01:22[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  STEVE MORRISSEY              |LAST UPDATE DATE:  02/26/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |RICHARD BARKLEY      R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NLTR                     LICENSEE 24 HR REPORT  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| DISCOVERY OF A DEAD SEAL IN THE CIRCULATING WATER FOREBAY                    |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:   |
|                                                                              |
| "A dead seal was observed in the Seabrook Station's CW (circulating) water   |
| forebay on February 26, 1999, at about 0122.  It is not known whether the    |
| seal was alive or dead upon entering the offshore intake structure.  This    |
| 24-hour notification is [being] made in accordance with Section 4.1 of the   |
| Environmental Protection Plan, Appendix 'B' of the Operating License."       |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector.                     |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   35410       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT      |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/26/1999|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:09[EST]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        02/26/1999|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        08:45[CST]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  02/26/1999|
|    CITY:  PADUCAH                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  McCRACKEN                 STATE:  KY |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-1                 AGREEMENT:  Y  |BRUCE JORGENSEN      R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707001                              |JOHN HICKEY          NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  M. UNDERWOOD                 |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|OCBA 76.120(c)(2)(i)     ACCID MT EQUIP FAILS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| PROCESS GAS LEAK DETECTION SYSTEM INOPERABLE (24-HOUR REPORT)                |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Paducah:        |
|                                                                              |
| "On 02/26/99 at 0845 [CST], while performing TSR surveillances on C-333 unit |
| 4 cell 10 Process Gas Leak Detection (PGLD), it was discovered that the      |
| detector heads would not test fire.  In the process of evaluating and        |
| troubleshooting, the PGLD system was placed in a condition (override mode)   |
| which would have detected a release, but was then placed back in a condition |
| (normal mode) in which the PGLD system was inoperable.  After approximately  |
| 90 minutes, the system was returned to an operable condition (override       |
| mode).  The PGLD system is required to be operable when operating above      |
| atmospheric pressure.   C-333 unit 4 cell 10 was operating above atmospheric |
| pressure at the time of the failure."                                        |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this notification by Paducah |
| personnel.                                                                   |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35411       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: OCONEE                   REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/26/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] [3]               STATE:  SC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:20[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-L|EVENT DATE:        02/26/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        13:00[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  LARRY NICHOLSON              |LAST UPDATE DATE:  02/26/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |ROBERT HAAG          R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B)  OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|2     N          N       0        Hot Shutdown     |0        Hot Shutdown     |
|3     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| EFW SYSTEM DECLARED OUTSIDE OF DESIGN BASIS                                  |
|                                                                              |
| "On February 8, 1999, Duke Energy Corporation (Duke) met with the NRC staff  |
| at NRC Headquarters to discuss a concern involving the differences in the    |
| Oconee Emergency Feedwater (EFW) system design and post-TMI licensing basis  |
| associated with the mitigation of certain Main Feedwater break scenarios.    |
| The plant design utilizes the availability of EFW from any unit should the   |
| affected unit's EFW system be lost during a Main Feedwater line break. In    |
| response, an NRC letter, dated February 24, 1999, agreed that the issue did  |
| not constitute a significant safety concern and provided an NRC              |
| interpretation that the reliance of alternate EFW sources, except for        |
| certain approved exceptions, was not consistent with the current licensing   |
| basis.                                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| "The specific concern involves the failure to close of the upper surge tank  |
| to hotwell makeup valve (C-187) following a main feedwater line rupture,     |
| resulting in the depletion of the upper surge tank and subsequent loss of    |
| EFW on the affected unit. Should this occur, operators would restore         |
| feedwater by either cross-connecting EFW to one of the other units or        |
| starting the Standby Shutdown Facility Auxiliary Service Water pump. These   |
| alternate sources are designed and capable of supplying feedwater to the     |
| affected unit. Operators are trained and procedures are established to       |
| accomplish these tasks.                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| "On February 26, 1999, following review of the NRC letter, it was determined |
| that the differences in the Oconee Emergency Feedwater (EFW) system design   |
| and post-TMI licensing basis regarding mitigation of certain Main Feedwater  |
| break scenarios, concurrent with a single active failure, constituted a      |
| condition outside the licensing basis of the plant. This condition does not  |
| constitute a safety concern due to the availability of multiple, diverse     |
| sources of feedwater. The EFW system is considered operable but in           |
| non-conformance with the licensing basis as stated in the UFSAR. Duke is     |
| evaluating options to resolve the subject UFSAR discrepancy."                |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this notification.           |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Hospital                                         |Event Number:   35412       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  MAYO CLINIC                          |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/26/1999|
|LICENSEE:  MAYO FOUNDATION                      |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:22[EST]|
|    CITY:  ROCHESTER                REGION:  3  |EVENT DATE:        02/18/1999|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  MN |EVENT TIME:        12:00[CST]|
|LICENSE#:  22-00519-03           AGREEMENT:  N  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  02/26/1999|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |BRUCE JORGENSEN      R3      |
|                                                |JOHN HICKEY          NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+KEVIN RAMSEY (fax)   NMSS    |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  RICHARD VETTER               |RICHARD BARKLEY      R1      |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|LADM 35.33(a)            MED MISADMINISTRATION  |                             |
|CCCC 21.21               UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 10 CFR PART 21 REPORT - TREATMENT SOFTWARE ERROR CAUSED MEDICAL              |
| MISADMINISTRATION                                                            |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee reported that a medical misadministration occurred on 2/18/1999 |
| due to a problem with treatment planning software (TCP Version 1.20 upgrade) |
| provided by Nucletron of Columbia, Maryland.  The misadministration was      |
| identified on 2/25/1999 and verified on 2/26/1999.  Specifically, a patient  |
| was prescribed a dose of 4500 rads by external beam; however, due to a       |
| problem with the treatment software, the patient was also given a dose of    |
| 200 rads to the area from a high dose rate brachytherapy unit. The patient   |
| and the referring physician have both been informed of the                   |
| misadministration.                                                           |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee submitted the following information in accordance with 10 CFR   |
| Part 21:                                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| "Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component:       |
| High dose rate afterloader treatment (Ir-192 microselectron HDR V2)          |
| Device software (TCS Version 1.20 upgrade)                                   |
|                                                                              |
| "Identification of the firm supplying the basic component which failed to    |
| comply:                                                                      |
| Nucletron, Columbia, MD                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| "Nature of the failure and safety hazard that could be created:              |
| The software allows more than one active cell on a treatment planning        |
| sheet.                                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| "This allows parameters within another cell to be modified while not working |
| in that cell. In this case, dwell time and step size were simultaneously     |
| active. While purposely intending to change dwell time, step size can change |
| without alerting the user. This could result in a possible therapy           |
| misadministration under 10CFR35.                                             |
|                                                                              |
| "Date on which information of defect was obtained:                           |
| February 25, 1999                                                            |
|                                                                              |
| "Number and location of all such components:                                 |
| Mayo Foundation has only one such device. It is located in the Charlton      |
| Building, Room CHS-209. Nucletron can supply information regarding other     |
| facilities using the device.                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| "Corrective action:                                                          |
| Mayo Foundation modified its procedures to require a pretreatment check that |
| includes step size; this action has been completed. All individuals who      |
| manually enter treatment data will be made aware of the defect and told to   |
| visually confirm their entries prior to printing the pretreatment report;    |
| this action will be completed by Tuesday, March 2, 1999.                     |
|                                                                              |
| "On Friday, February 26, Mayo Foundation notified Nucletron of the anomaly   |
| suggesting they correct their computer software."                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   35413       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT      |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/26/1999|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:38[EST]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        02/25/1999|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        16:15[CST]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  02/26/1999|
|    CITY:  PADUCAH                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  McCRACKEN                 STATE:  KY |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-1                 AGREEMENT:  Y  |BRUCE JORGENSEN      R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707001                              |JOHN HICKEY          NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  J. M. UNDERWOOD              |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 24-HOUR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 REPORT                                            |
|                                                                              |
| "Potentially fissile trap media was discovered in an approximately 30 gallon |
| trash can in violation of NCSA GEN-15. NCSA GEN-15 requires that             |
| fissile/potentially fissile waste be accumulated in a maximum 5.5-gallon     |
| waste drum. The only exception is if the waste is exempted from NCS controls |
| in accordance with requirement 2 of NCSA GEN-15. However, the trap media was |
| not exempted prior to disposal.                                              |
|                                                                              |
| "The waste was generated prior to implementation of NCSA GEN-1 5 and is      |
| therefore a legacy issue; however, NCSA GEN-15 is the currently approved     |
| NCSA for the generation and handling of potentially fissile waste.           |
|                                                                              |
| "This event is being categorized as a 24-hour event in accordance with       |
| Safety Analysis Report Table 6.9-1 Criteria A.4.a and NRC Bulletin 91-01,    |
| Supplement 1 report.                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| "SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:                                              |
|                                                                              |
| "This violation resulted in the loss of one leg of double contingency.       |
| Although double contingency was not maintained, there was not enough         |
| material present to result in a critical configuration.                      |
|                                                                              |
| "POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW           |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| The trash can contained approximately 15 gallons of contaminated alumina.    |
| Based upon data from KY/S-208, Subcritical Dimensions For Water Reflected    |
| UO2F2 and Water Systems at Two Weight Percent Enrichment, at 2.0 wt % U-235, |
| the safe volume of UO2F2 solution is 23 gallons.  Additionally, KY/S-208     |
| modeled optimal concentration UO2F2 solution in a spherical geometry         |
| reflected with 30 cm of water. The trash can contains trap material          |
| intermixed with the UO2F2, and the material is not in the optimum            |
| configuration modeled in KY/S-208, therefore, in reality it would take much  |
| more than 23 gallons to achieve a critical configuration. Based upon this    |
| information, a criticality is not possible.                                  |
|                                                                              |
| "In order for a criticality to be possible much more than 23 gallons of the  |
| trap material would have to be present In the trash can.                     |
|                                                                              |
| "CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION. GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):    |
|                                                                              |
| "Controlled parameters are geometry and spacing.                             |
|                                                                              |
| "ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS    |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS):                                    |
|                                                                              |
| "The trash can contained approximately 15 gallons of contaminated alumina at |
| a maximum assay of 1.04 wt % U235.                                           |
|                                                                              |
| "In order for a criticality to be possible, much more than 23 gallons of the |
| trap material would have to be present in the trash can.                     |
|                                                                              |
| "The determination that the material in the drum was fissile is based on     |
| conservative sample results. Two independent smears and two independent bulk |
| samples were taken and analyzed. One of the bulk sample results indicated an |
| assay of .944% U-235. All of the remaining sample results were below 9%. A   |
| .1% error is conservatively applied to lab sample results as a general rule  |
| to account for uncertainties. Much lower uncertainties are routinely         |
| achieved but have not been established far these samples at this time. This  |
| Incident Report conservatively assumes the material in the drum is fissile   |
| based on the .1% error applied to the one sample result above .9% U-235.     |
|                                                                              |
| "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION  |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:                                             |
|                                                                              |
| "Loss of spacing control. Double contingency control leg was lost since      |
| geometry process condition was not maintained.                               |
|                                                                              |
| "CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:  |
|                                                                              |
| "The trap media will be disposed of in a minimum 5.5 gallon drum in          |
| accordance with plant procedure CP2-EW-WM1036.                               |
|                                                                              |
| "A minimum 6 ft. spacing is being maintained between the cold trap and the   |
| container of contaminated trap media. A minimum 2 ft. spacing will be        |
| maintained between the maximum 5.5 gallon waste drum containing the trap     |
| media and all other fissile/potentially fissile material."                   |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed  of this notification.          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Hospital                                         |Event Number:   35415       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  SAN DIEGO MEDICAL CENTER             |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/26/1999|
|LICENSEE:  VA MEDICAL SYSTEM                    |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:31[EST]|
|    CITY:  SAN DIEGO                REGION:  4  |EVENT DATE:        02/26/1999|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  CA |EVENT TIME:        08:10[PST]|
|LICENSE#:  04-15030-01           AGREEMENT:  Y  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  02/26/1999|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |ELMO COLLINS         R4      |
|                                                |JOHN HICKEY          NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  MIKE ZORN                    |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|BAAA 20.1906(d)          SURFACE CONTAMINATION E|                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| PACKAGE RECEIVED WITH SURFACE CONTAMINATION ABOVE LIMITS                     |
|                                                                              |
| At 0810 PST, a courier delivered a shipment of radiopharmaceuticals from the |
| SYNCOR pharmacy in San Diego, CA.  Upon receipt, the licensee performed a    |
| routine wipe sample of the external surfaces of the outer container (ammo    |
| box), and discovered contamination in excess of the reporting requirements   |
| of 10 CFR 20.1906.  Initial wipes indicated up to 30,000 CPM of gross        |
| activity for a swab that had been run over all surfaces of the container.    |
| The package contained two vials of radiopharmaceuticals; 10 mCi of Tc-99m    |
| META solution, and 10 mCi of Ga-67 (not NRC regulated).  The licensee did    |
| not report any damage to the vials, and they were administered to patients.  |
| No contamination occurred at the medical center as a result of this          |
| shipment.                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| A more detailed survey of the container revealed up to 50,000 cpm/300cm2.    |
| The licensee did not determine the isotope of the contaminant.  A            |
| representative of SYNCOR visited the medical center, and took several wipe   |
| samples for isotopic identification.  The licensee plans to investigate this |
| event with SYNCOR.                                                           |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35416       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: COOK                     REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/27/1999|
|    UNIT:  [] [2] []                 STATE:  MI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 00:31[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        02/26/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        21:30[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  BRIAN MUTZ                   |LAST UPDATE DATE:  02/27/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |BRUCE JORGENSEN      R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ADAS 50.72(b)(2)(i)      DEG/UNANALYZED COND    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|2     N          N       0        Cold Shutdown    |0        Cold Shutdown    |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - Potentially excessive thermal stress on two containment penetrations due   |
| to blocked cooling flow -                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| At 2130 on 02/26/99, with Unit 2 in cold shutdown mode in a refueling        |
| outage, the Licensee determined that on 08/02/96, with Unit 2 at 100% power, |
| a temporary plant modification was implemented on Unit 2 which allowed for   |
| continued power operation with component cooling water (CCW) to containment  |
| penetrations #CPN-3 and #CPN-4 isolated.  These penetrations contain the     |
| steam generator #2 and #3 main steam headers. This condition is reportable   |
| under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i) as an event found while the reactor is shutdown,   |
| that, had it been found while the reactor was in operation, would have       |
| resulted in the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety          |
| barriers, being in a seriously degraded condition that significantly         |
| compromised plant safety.  The component cooling water return header         |
| upstream of the containment isolation valve, #2-CCR-441, (containment        |
| penetrations #CPN-3 and #CPN-4 inner cooling coils CCW outlet containment    |
| isolation valve) was discovered to contain blockage during a post            |
| maintenance activity associated with the repair of valve #2-CCR-441.  The    |
| blocked line eliminated cooling flow to the penetration inner coolers, which |
| is designed to assure integrity of the penetration sleeve.  The result of    |
| operating with the CCW isolated to penetrations #CPN-3 and #CPN-4 was the    |
| creation of potentially excessive thermal stress on the penetration sleeves. |
| Design basis information indicates that the penetration sleeve may be        |
| exposed to temperatures of as high as 150F without experiencing             |
| degradation.  It is estimated that the penetration sleeves on penetrations   |
| #CPN-3 and #CPN-4 were operated at a temperature approximating main steam    |
| temperature of approximately 600F.                                          |
|                                                                              |
| This condition was identified during an expanded system readiness review.    |
| No immediate corrective action is planned since the main steam system is     |
| currently out of service and containment integrity is not required in the    |
| current operational mode.  Further analysis and corrective action will be    |
| considered during ongoing investigation under the corrective action          |
| program.                                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35417       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: CRYSTAL RIVER            REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/27/1999|
|    UNIT:  [3] [] []                 STATE:  FL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:07[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [3] B&W-L-LP                         |EVENT DATE:        02/27/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        08:10[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  LARRY MOFFATT                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  02/27/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |ROBERT HAAG          R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|APRE 50.72(b)(2)(vi)     OFFSITE NOTIFICATION   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|3     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - STATE NOTIFIED OF A KEMP'S RIDLEY SEA TURTLE RETRIEVED FROM THE PLANT      |
| INTAKE WATER -                                                               |
|                                                                              |
| At 2232 on 02/26/99, a  young Kemp's Ridley sea turtle was taken from the    |
| water at the intake of Crystal River Unit 3.  The turtle was found pinned    |
| against the bar rack and was retrieved by site personnel in accordance with  |
| the Florida Power Corporation Turtle Protection Guidelines.  Crystal River   |
| Mariculture Center personnel took custody of the sea turtle and will return  |
| it to the Gulf of Mexico In the afternoon of 02/27/99.  At 0810 on 02/27/99, |
| the Florida Department of Environmental Protection was notified of the       |
| retrieval of the sea turtle.                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35418       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: GINNA                    REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/27/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:37[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-2-LP                           |EVENT DATE:        02/27/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        11:39[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  DOUGLAS GOMEZ                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  02/27/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |RICHARD BARKLEY      R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       70       Power Operation  |70       Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION DURING I&C WORK ON RADIATION MONITOR       |
|                                                                              |
| "During Instrument and Control (I/C) activities on radiation channel R-12,   |
| an unexpected Containment Ventilation Isolation (CVI) occurred. The planning |
| activities for this maintenance recognized the potential of generating a CVI |
| signal and directed the technicians to install a jumper to prevent the       |
| actuation. Even with the jumper installed an unexpected CVI occurred when    |
| the R-12 drawer was deenergized. The CVI was therefore due to maintenance    |
| activities and was not the result of an actual high radiation condition.     |
|                                                                              |
| "No plant system other than the containment ventilation monitoring system    |
| was affected by this event. The plant is stable at approximately 70% power   |
| with a plant coastdown in progress.                                          |
|                                                                              |
| "This event is reportable under lOCFR50.72(b)(2)(ii), 'Any condition that    |
| results in a manual or automatic actuation an Engineered Safety Feature.'"   |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this notification.           |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35419       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: FITZPATRICK              REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/27/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 22:39[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4                             |EVENT DATE:        02/27/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        21:56[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  STEVE CAROLIN                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  02/27/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |RICHARD BARKLEY      R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AINT 50.72(b)(1)(vi)     INTERNAL THREAT        |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |65       Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FIRE ONSITE LASTING LESS THAN 10 MINUTES                                     |
|                                                                              |
| At 2156, the 'A' circulating water pump tripped, and the control room        |
| received indication of a fire in the pump motor.  The onsite fire brigade    |
| responded, and the fire was extinguished at 2204.  The licensee reported     |
| that the pump motor does not appear to be extensively damaged, and that no   |
| other equipment was involved in the fire.  Reactor power was reduced to 65%  |
| of rated due to the unavailability of the circulating water pump.  No        |
| personnel injuries were reported.                                            |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee will inform the NRC resident inspector of this event.           |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35420       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SALEM                    REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/28/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  NJ |NOTIFICATION TIME: 02:55[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        02/28/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        01:38[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  JACK GRANT                   |LAST UPDATE DATE:  02/28/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |RICHARD BARKLEY      R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     RPS ACTUATION          |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     A/R        Y       60       Power Operation  |0        Hot Standby      |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - AUTO Rx TRIP FROM 60% DUE TO MAIN TURBINE TRIP DUE TO LOW AUTO STOP OIL    |
| PRESSURE  -                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| AT 0130 ON 02/28/99, THE UNIT 1 REACTOR AUTO TRIPPED FROM 60% POWER DUE TO A |
| MAIN TURBINE TRIP (WITH REACTOR POWER ABOVE THE P-9 SETPOINT OF 50% POWER)   |
| DUE TO LOW AUTO STOP OIL PRESSURE.  ALL CONTROL RODS INSERTED COMPLETELY.    |
| THE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM AUTO STARTED TO MAINTAIN STEAM GENERATORS AT  |
| NORMAL WATER LEVELS.  NO SAFETY OR RELIEF VALVES LIFTED AND STEAM IS BEING   |
| DUMPED TO THE MAIN CONDENSER.  UNIT 1 IS STABLE IN MODE 3 (HOT STANDBY).     |
| THE LICENSEE IS INVESTIGATING THE CAUSE OF THE LOW AUTO STOP OIL PRESSURE.   |
|                                                                              |
| THE LICENSEE PLANS TO INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.                     |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35421       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: VOGTLE                   REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/28/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  GA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 03:14[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        02/27/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        23:40[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  CHUCK MEYER                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  02/28/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |ROBERT HAAG          R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     RPS ACTUATION          |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     M/R        Y       18       Power Operation  |0        Hot Standby      |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| -MAN Rx TRIP FROM 18% DUE TO NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTS ANOMALY DURING PLANT        |
| SHUTDOWN-                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| WHILE SHUTTING UNIT 1 DOWN FOR A PLANNED REFUELING OUTAGE, CONTROL ROOM      |
| OPERATORS MANUALLY TRIPPED UNIT 1 FROM 18% POWER DUE TO A CONCERN THAT THE   |
| NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTS INTERMEDIATE RANGE FLUX TRIP WOULD NOT RESET BEFORE THE  |
| POWER RANGE (P-10) AUTO UNBLOCK OCCURRED.  ALL CONTROL RODS INSERTED         |
| COMPLETELY.  NO SAFETY OR RELIEF VALVES LIFTED.  CONTROL ROOM OPERATORS      |
| MANUALLY ACTUATED THE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM TO MAINTAIN STEAM           |
| GENERATORS AT THEIR NORMAL WATER LEVELS.  UNIT 1 IS STABLE IN MODE 3 (HOT    |
| STANDBY).  THE LICENSEE PLANS TO INVESTIGATE THE CAUSE OF THE NUCLEAR        |
| INSTRUMENTS ANOMALY AND PROCEED WITH THE PLANNED REFUELING OUTAGE.           |
|                                                                              |
| THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35422       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: KEWAUNEE                 REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/28/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  WI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:41[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-2-LP                           |EVENT DATE:        02/28/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        16:50[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  CRAIG BYALL                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  02/28/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |BRUCE JORGENSEN      R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AUNA 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(A)  UNANALYZED COND OP     |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       97       Power Operation  |97       Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| UNIT PLACED IN UNANALYZED CONDITION DUE TO CLOSURE OF CONTAINMENT ISOLATION  |
| VALVE                                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| At 0400 CST on 02/28/99, the plant was incorrectly placed in an unanalyzed   |
| condition when a manual valve between the reactor coolant drain tank and the |
| chemical volume control holdup tank was closed.  This manual valve was       |
| located downstream of two containment isolation valves that had failed       |
| timing tests, and the manual valve was being relied upon to maintain         |
| containment integrity in accordance with NRC Generic Letter 96-06.  However, |
| when the manual valve was closed, overpressure protection for that line was  |
| lost.  The valve subsequently was reopened, restoring the penetration at     |
| 0800 CST on 02/28/99.  The reportability of this condition was identified at |
| 1650 CST.  The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this              |
| notification.                                                                |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35423       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SUSQUEHANNA              REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/28/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 22:54[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4                    |EVENT DATE:        02/28/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        22:00[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  DAVID WALSH                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  02/28/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |RICHARD BARKLEY      R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B)  OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS   |                             |
|AINB 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(B) POT RHR INOP           |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| UNIT OUTSIDE OF DESIGN BASIS DUE TO SHEARED VALVE STEM IN RHR SYSTEM         |
|                                                                              |
| "On 2/11/99 the Unit 1 'B' RHR Loop was removed from service for a scheduled |
| maintenance work window. During the system restoration at 2330 Hrs, it was   |
| identified that the keepfill system did not respond as expected. An          |
| investigation into the degraded keepfill condition was initiated. An         |
| Operability Determination was performed and it was determined that the RHR   |
| system was operable with the degraded keepfill system.                       |
|                                                                              |
| "On 2/16/99 at 0400 hrs, the Unit 1 'A' RHR Loop was removed from service to |
| perform a scheduled maintenance work window. The 'A' RHR Loop was returned   |
| to service at 2115 hrs on 2/16/99 and is currently operable.                 |
|                                                                              |
| "On 2/26/99, after further trouble shooting of the degraded keepfill         |
| condition on the 'B' RHR Loop it was determined that the most likely cause   |
| was the RHR Loop 'B' Injection Flow Control Valve, HVI51F017B, being failed  |
| closed. The 'B' RHR Loop was declared inoperable at 1600 Hrs on 2/26/99. The |
| valve was inspected and found to have the stem sheared from the disk.        |
| Following a review of the time line of the events, it was identified that    |
| both the 'A' and 'B' RHR Loops were inoperable from 0400 hrs to 2115 hrs on  |
| 2/16/99 during the scheduled maintenance work windows for the 'A' RHR Loop.  |
|                                                                              |
| "This report is being made due to the Plant being Outside of the Design      |
| Basis requiring a 1 Hr ENS Notification under 10CFR50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) and a  |
| Loss of a Safety System requiring a 4 Hr ENS notification under              |
| 1OCFR50.72(b)(2)(iii)(B)."                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this notification.           |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35424       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: OCONEE                   REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/01/1999|
|    UNIT:  [] [2] []                 STATE:  SC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 00:17[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-L|EVENT DATE:        02/28/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        20:40[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  MIKE HILL                    |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/01/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |ROBERT HAAG          R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     RPS ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|2     A/R        Y       98.5     Power Operation  |0        Hot Shutdown     |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| -AUTO Rx TRIP ON HIGH RCS PRESSURE DUE TO MAIN TURBINE CONTROL VALVES        |
| FAILING CLOSED-                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| At 1609 on 02/28/99, the Unit 2 electro-hydraulic control system lost        |
| various power supplies. Main steam pressure increased from a normal 900 psig |
| to 942 psig and reactor power increased from 100% to 100.4%.  The main       |
| turbine control valves had throttled closed for unknown reasons causing the  |
| main steam pressure to increase.  Main feedwater was throttled to reduce     |
| main steam header pressure since the turbine header pressure control station |
| had no effect.  Unit 2 was stabilized at 98.5% power with the main steam     |
| pressure at 938 psig and the main feedwater master control stations and the  |
| reactor control station in manual.                                           |
|                                                                              |
| At 2040 on 02/28/99, Unit 2 automatically tripped from 98.5% power due to a  |
| reactor protection system actuation (reactor coolant system high pressure    |
| trip).  All control rods inserted completely.  The main steam code safety    |
| valves lifted to dump steam to the atmosphere for approximately 10 minutes.  |
| Plant operators verified that the valves reseated properly.  Steam is being  |
| dumped to the main condenser.  The main feedwater system remained            |
| operational throughout the event.  The reactor control station was in        |
| automatic at the time of the trip.  Unit 2 is stable in hot shutdown mode.   |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee is investigating the cause of the main turbine control valves   |
| failing closed and plans to make necessary repairs.                          |
|                                                                              |
| Units 1 and 3 remain at 100% power and were unaffected by this event.        |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+