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Event Notification Report for February 10, 1999

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           02/09/1999 - 02/10/1999

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

35333  35356  35357  35358  35359  35360  

!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35333       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: COOPER                   REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/29/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  NE |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:20[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4                             |EVENT DATE:        01/29/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        14:50[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  GREEN                        |LAST UPDATE DATE:  02/09/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |LAWRENCE YANDELL     R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION    |                             |
|NLCO                     TECH SPEC LCO A/S      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| THE PLANT DECLARED RCIC INOPERABLE DUE TO LOW TURBINE OIL LEVEL.             |
|                                                                              |
| THE RCIC OUTBOARD TURBINE BEARING OIL LEVEL WAS SLIGHTLY BELOW THE LOW LEVEL |
| MARK AND THE RCIC SYSTEM WAS THEREFORE DECLARED INOPERABLE AT 1450.  HPCI    |
| HAS BEEN VERIFIED TO BE OPERABLE.  THIS CONDITION CAUSED ENTRY INTO A 14 DAY |
| LCO DUE TO RCIC BEING INOPERABLE.  AN INSPECTION OF THE OIL SYSTEM DID NOT   |
| INDICATE ANY LEAKAGE AND OIL LEVEL HAD ONLY LOWERED SLIGHTLY FROM THE        |
| PREVIOUS DAY.  MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL HAVE BEEN CALLED IN TO ADD OIL TO THE   |
| BEARING.  THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED.                               |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE ON 1/29/99 @ 2135 BY WHEELER TO GOULD * * *                     |
|                                                                              |
| RCIC  RETURNED TO OPERABLE CONDITION AT 1848 WHEN THE OIL LEVEL ON THE       |
| OUTBOARD TURBINE BEARING WAS RESTORED TO ITS PROPER LEVEL.  THE RESIDENT     |
| INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED.                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| THE REG 4 RDO (YANDELL) WAS INFORMED.                                        |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1446 ON 02/09/99 BY BILL GREEN TO JOLLIFFE * * *             |
|                                                                              |
| UPON FURTHER REVIEW OF THIS EVENT, THE LICENSEE DETERMINED THAT THE RCIC     |
| SYSTEM TURBINE HAD BEEN OPERABLE DURING THIS EVENT BECAUSE OF THE FOLLOWING  |
| REASONS:                                                                     |
| 1)  THE SHAFT DRIVEN OIL PUMP PROVIDES PRIMARY LUBRICATION TO THE TURBINE    |
| AND OIL LEVEL BEING BELOW THE LOW LEVEL MARK WILL NOT PREVENT THE PUMP FROM  |
| PROVIDING ADEQUATE LUBRICATION, AND 2) THE OIL SLINGER RING WAS STILL        |
| SUBMERGED BY APPROXIMATELY 1/4 INCH.                                         |
| THUS, THE RCIC SYSTEM WAS CAPABLE OF OPERATING THROUGHOUT THIS EVENT AND     |
| THEREFORE, THE LICENSEE DESIRES TO RETRACT THIS EVENT.  THE LICENSEE         |
| INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.                                         |
|                                                                              |
| THE NRC OPERATIONS OFFICER NOTIFIED THE R4DO JOHN PELLET.                    |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35356       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SAINT LUCIE              REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/09/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] []                STATE:  FL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:09[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] CE,[2] CE                        |EVENT DATE:        02/07/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        17:00[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  CALVIN WARD                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  02/09/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |THOMAS DECKER        R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NLTR                     LICENSEE 24 HR REPORT  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - STATE NOTIFIED OF A SMALL DEAD GREEN TURTLE FOUND IN A NET IN THE PLANT    |
| INTAKE CANAL -                                                               |
|                                                                              |
| THE LICENSEE FOUND A DEAD 7.5 POUND GREEN TURTLE IN A CAPTURE NET IN THE     |
| PLANT INTAKE CANAL.  THE LICENSEE NOTIFIED THE FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF         |
| ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (DEP) AND PLANS TO SEND THE TURTLE TO A FLORIDA DEP |
| LAB FOR NECROPSY.  THE LICENSEE IS DETERMINING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS AND PLANS  |
| TO SUBMIT A WRITTEN REPORT TO THE NRC WITHIN 30 DAYS.                        |
|                                                                              |
| THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   35357       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT   |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/09/1999|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:45[EST]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        02/08/1999|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        22:00[EST]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  02/09/1999|
|    CITY:  PIKETON                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  PIKE                      STATE:  OH |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-2                 AGREEMENT:  N  |GARY SHEAR           R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707002                              |JOHN GREEVES         NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  ERIC SPAETH                  |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 24-HOUR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 REPORT                                            |
|                                                                              |
| On February 8, 1999, at 2220 hours, Cascade operations personnel discovered  |
| that two Nuclear Criticality Safety Approval (NCSA) requirements were not    |
| being maintained within the X-326 process building.  A plastic bag of        |
| soiled, oily 3M absorbent pads was discovered in the Area 4 Seal Exhaust     |
| Station with the top open and without holes.  NCSA-PLANT_018.A02             |
| requirements #9 and #11 state in part: "Dry active waste (DAW) bags and      |
| containers shall be closed or covered with a rigid lid when unattended, and  |
| have holes in the bottom to allow for solution drainage.                     |
|                                                                              |
| The Non-Compliance of requirements #9 and #11 constitute a loss of one (1)   |
| control, (control "B") in the double contingency matrix for contingency      |
| event A/B 1.1.  Control "A" (mass and moderation) was maintained throughout  |
| this event.  The deficiency (loss of control "B") was corrected at 2256      |
| hours per the direction of the Portsmouth Nuclear Criticality Staff.         |
|                                                                              |
| Safety significance of events:  A bag of absorbent waste was not closed and  |
| did not have holes in the bag.  If a leak occurred in the area and the bag   |
| was in the path of the leak, there could be a potential for a criticality.   |
|                                                                              |
| Potential criticality pathways involved (brief scenarios) of how criticality |
| could occur:  A leak of uranium bearing oil would have to occur, such that   |
| the DAW bag collected the uranium-bearing oil. (The oil that was absorbed In |
| the cloth was essentially new oil).                                          |
|                                                                              |
| Controlled parameters (mass, moderation, geometry, concentration, etc.):     |
| The controlled parameters were mass and moderation.  In addition, a leak     |
| would have to occur in the area to be a concern.                             |
|                                                                              |
| Estimated amount, enrichment, form of licensed material (include process     |
| limit and % worst case of critical mass):  Approximately 10% U-235.          |
|                                                                              |
| Nuclear criticality safety control(s) or control system(s) and description   |
| of the failures or deficiencies:  NCS controls limit mass and moderation.    |
| In addition, a leak would have to occur in the area before a criticality was |
| possible.  Two requirements were violated that controlled material addition  |
| to the waste bag. Other controls on mass remained in place.                  |
|                                                                              |
| Corrective actions to restore safety system and when each was implemented:   |
| The bag in question was closed and placed into a DAW barrel at 2256 hours.   |
|                                                                              |
| There was no loss of hazardous or radioactive material nor radioactive or    |
| radiological contamination exposure as a result of this event.               |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35358       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: DUANE ARNOLD             REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/09/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  IA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:52[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4                             |EVENT DATE:        02/09/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        16:00[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  DICK FOWLER                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  02/09/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |GARY SHEAR           R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |JOSE CALVO, EO       NRR     |
|ASHU 50.72(b)(1)(i)(A)   PLANT S/D REQD BY TS   |                             |
|NLCO                     TECH SPEC LCO A/S      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED PLANT SHUTDOWN DUE TO INOPERABLE  CONTROL   |
| BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| WITH THE TRAIN 'A' CONTROL BUILDING VENTILATION (CBV) SYSTEM STANDBY FILTER  |
| UNIT (SFU) INOPERABLE FOR PLANNED MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES, THE LICENSEE       |
| DISCOVERED THAT THE PHOTOCELL FOR THE 'B' TRAIN DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE SWITCH |
| (DPS) (#7304B) WAS NOT ILLUMINATED.  THIS CONDITION PREVENTS THE DPS FROM    |
| PERFORMING ITS FUNCTION TO CONTROL THE TRAIN 'B' SFU HEATERS, RENDERING THE  |
| TRAIN 'B' CBV SYSTEM SFU INOPERABLE.                                         |
|                                                                              |
| WITH BOTH TRAINS OF THE CBV SYSTEM SFUs INOPERABLE, THE LICENSEE ENTERED     |
| TECH SPEC LCO A/S 3.0.3 WHICH REQUIRES THE LICENSEE TO BEGIN SHUTTING THE    |
| PLANT DOWN WITHIN ONE HOUR AND TO PLACE THE PLANT IN AT LEAST CONDITION 2    |
| (STARTUP) WITHIN NINE HOURS.                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| THE LICENSEE PLANS TO REPLACE THE FAILED DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE SWITCH WITHIN |
| EIGHT HOURS.                                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35359       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: BEAVER VALLEY            REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/09/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:37[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP                |EVENT DATE:        02/09/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        18:20[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  JEFF SHIPE                   |LAST UPDATE DATE:  02/09/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |LAURIE PELUSO        R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B)  OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       98       Power Operation  |98       Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - Non-conservative dose calculation methodology is a condition outside the   |
| design basis of the plant -                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| As a result of LER 2-97-008 corrective actions, non-conservative inputs have |
| been identified that is associated with the Beaver Valley Power Station      |
| (BVPS) methodology in calculating radiation doses for accidents which must   |
| analyze for a concurrent iodine spike as part of their radiological          |
| analyses.  The identified non-conservative factors during past operation,    |
| could have resulted in the calculated control room personnel dose values     |
| exceeding 10CFR50 Appendix A, Criterion 19 thyroid limits.  Since BVPS no    |
| longer has reasonable assurance that acceptance criteria for control room    |
| personnel dose limits per Criterion 19 would have been met during past       |
| operation, the identified non-conservative dose calculation methodology was  |
| a condition which was outside the design basis of the plant per              |
| 10CFR50.72(b)(1)(ii).  This condition is also being evaluated for the        |
| criteria in 10CFR Part 21.                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| For BVPS, the only Design Basis Accidents (DBAs) which involve a concurrent  |
| iodine spike analysis are Main Steam Line Break, Small Line Breaks (e.g.,    |
| letdown line break outside containment), and Steam Generator Tube Rupture.   |
| The most significant of the non-conservative issues is purification (i.e.,   |
| letdown) flow, which was given as 60 gpm.  This is the lower limit of the    |
| plant design flow rate range of 60-120 gpm.  Analysis using 60 gpm results   |
| in a significant underestimation of the concurrent iodine spike source term  |
| as compared to operation at the upper design limit of 120 gpm.  Of lesser    |
| importance were underestimated demineralizer decontamination factor,         |
| overestimated reactor coolant system (RCS) mass and inadequate use of RCS    |
| leakage as an iodine removal mechanism.  It has been determined that         |
| correcting the above identified non-conservative factor would raise          |
| calculated control room personnel dose values of those events analyzed for   |
| concurrent iodine spikes by at least 40% and potentially as high as 140%.    |
|                                                                              |
| Until the BVPS dose calculations can be formally revised to address the      |
| identified non-conservative factors, the station has placed administrative   |
| controls on the extent of steady state letdown flow to ensure that plant     |
| operation remains within past analyzed limits.  The influence of the other   |
| identified non-conservative factors have also been reviewed and determined   |
| not to be an operability concern at this time.                               |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee plans to notify the NRC Resident Inspector.                     |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35360       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: TURKEY POINT             REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/09/1999|
|    UNIT:  [3] [4] []                STATE:  FL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 21:50[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP                |EVENT DATE:        02/09/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        21:00[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  ANDRE DALL'AU                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  02/09/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |THOMAS DECKER        R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AARC 50.72(b)(1)(v)      OTHER ASMT/COMM INOP   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|3     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|4     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - BOTH UNIT ERDS LOST DUE TO ERDADS COMPUTER FAILURE -                       |
|                                                                              |
| AT 2100 ON 02/09/99, THE COMMON EMERGENCY RESPONSE DATA ACQUISITION AND      |
| DISPLAY SYSTEM (ERDADS) COMPUTER FAILED CAUSING A LOSS OF THE EMERGENCY      |
| RESPONSE DATA SYSTEM (ERDS) FOR BOTH UNITS.  THE LICENSEE IS INVESTIGATING   |
| THE CAUSE OF THE LOSS.  AT 2110, THE LICENSEE RESTORED THE UNIT 3 ERDS TO    |
| OPERABLE STATUS AND IS RESTORING THE UNIT 4 ERDS.                            |
|                                                                              |
| THE LICENSEE PLANS TO INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.                     |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+


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