Event Notification Report for February 08, 1999

- OFFSITE NOTIFICATION REGARDING A CHEMICAL SPILL INTO THE WOLF CREEK COOLING LAKE -

AT 0958 CST ON 02/08/1999, THE LICENSEE NOTIFIED THE STATE OF KANSAS THAT APPROXIMATELY 2000 GALLONS OF WATER CONTAINING AT MOST 50 GALLONS OF SODIUM HYPOCHLORITE AND 13 GALLONS OF SODIUM BROMIDE HAD SPILLED INTO THE WOLF CREEK COOLING LAKE. A CHEMICAL INJECTION PUMP MECHANICAL SEAL FAILED AND CAUSED THE CHEMICAL SPILL AT THE PLANT INTAKE STRUCTURE. THE CONCENTRATIONS OF THE CHEMICAL SPILL EXCEEDED THE ALLOWABLE KANSAS STATE PERMIT LIMITS. THE LICENSEE STOPPED THE SPILL, PLACED ABSORBENT MATERIAL ON THE GROUND SURROUNDING THE SPILL AND REMOVED THE ABSORBENT MATERIAL.

THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.

- SAFETY PARAMETER DISPLAY SYSTEM INOPERABLE DUE TO A FAILED COMPUTER -

DURING COMPUTER TESTING (INCLUDING Y2K), THE UNIT 2 PLANT MONITORING SYSTEM COMPUTER FAILED, RENDERING THE UNIT 2 SAFETY PARAMETER DISPLAY SYSTEM INOPERABLE. PLANT TECHNICIANS ARE RESTORING THE FAILED COMPUTER. THE LICENSEE WILL INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.

* * * UPDATE AT 2213 ON 02/08/99 FROM JIM KOVALCHICK TO JOLLIFFE * * *

AT 2157, THE LICENSEE RESTORED THE UNIT 2 SAFETY PARAMETER DISPLAY SYSTEM TO OPERABLE STATUS. THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. THE NRC OPERATIONS OFFICER NOTIFIED R1DO (LAURIE PELUSO).

24-HOUR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 REPORT

On February 8, 1999, at 2220 hours, Cascade operations personnel discovered that two Nuclear Criticality Safety Approval (NCSA) requirements were not being maintained within the X-326 process building. A plastic bag of soiled, oily 3M absorbent pads was discovered in the Area 4 Seal Exhaust Station with the top open and without holes. NCSA-PLANT_018.A02 requirements #9 and #11 state in part: "Dry active waste (DAW) bags and containers shall be closed or covered with a rigid lid when unattended, and have holes in the bottom to allow for solution drainage.

The Non-Compliance of requirements #9 and #11 constitute a loss of one (1) control, (control "B") in the double contingency matrix for contingency event A/B 1.1. Control "A" (mass and moderation) was maintained throughout this event. The deficiency (loss of control "B") was corrected at 2256 hours per the direction of the Portsmouth Nuclear Criticality Staff.

Safety significance of events: A bag of absorbent waste was not closed and did not have holes in the bag. If a leak occurred in the area and the bag was in the path of the leak, there could be a potential for a criticality.

Potential criticality pathways involved (brief scenarios) of how criticality could occur: A leak of uranium bearing oil would have to occur, such that the DAW bag collected the uranium-bearing oil. (The oil that was absorbed In the cloth was essentially new oil).

Controlled parameters (mass, moderation, geometry, concentration, etc.): The controlled parameters were mass and moderation. In addition, a leak would have to occur in the area to be a concern.

Estimated amount, enrichment, form of licensed material (include process limit and % worst case of critical mass): Approximately 10% U-235.

Nuclear criticality safety control(s) or control system(s) and description of the failures or deficiencies: NCS controls limit mass and moderation. In addition, a leak would have to occur in the area before a criticality was possible. Two requirements were violated that controlled material addition to the waste bag. Other controls on mass remained in place.

Corrective actions to restore safety system and when each was implemented: The bag in question was closed and placed into a DAW barrel at 2256 hours.

There was no loss of hazardous or radioactive material nor radioactive or radiological contamination exposure as a result of this event.

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.