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Palisades - Docket No. 050-00255

NRC Action Number(s) and
Facility Name
Action Type
(Severity) &
Civil Penalty
(if any)
Date
Issued
Description
EA-15-039
Palisades
ORDER 05/16/2016 On May 16, 2016, the NRC issued a Confirmatory Order to Palisades Nuclear Plant (Palisades) to formalize commitments made as a result of an alternative dispute mediation session. The commitments were made by Palisades as part of a settlement agreement between Palisades and the NRC regarding apparent violations of NRC requirements. The agreement resolves the apparent violations identified during an investigation into a Palisades leaking Safety Injection Refueling Water Tank (SIRWT). Palisades agreed to a number of corrective actions, including, but not limited to: (1) ensuring site personnel understand lessons learned from this matter, (2) sharing lessons learned from this matter with other reactor licensees, (3) reviewing the applicable procedures in light of the lessons learned from events associated with leakage of the SIRWT and revise these procedures as appropriate, and (4) modification to its current program of public outreach at Palisades. In consideration of these commitments, the NRC has agreed to refrain from issuing a proposed imposition of a civil penalty and a Notice of Violation.
EA-15-171
Palisades
NOV
(SL III)
11/24/2015 On November 24, 2015, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation, characterized as Severity Level III, to Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. for a violation of 10 CFR Part 50.9, "Completeness and accuracy of information." This violation involved the failure to provide information to the Commission that was complete and accurate in all material respects. Specifically, the licensee submitted Letter No. PNP 2014-015 to the NRC, which inaccurately stated the effective full power years for which the ASME Code acceptance criteria would be met at Palisades Nuclear Plant. The NRC staff used this information to grant the licensee's proposed alternative to regulatory requirements. On May 22, 2015, the licensee submitted Letter PNP 2015-037 with a corrected analysis. The error in letter PNP 2014-015, and resultant change to the analysis results in letter PNP 2015-037, represented a significant reduction in the time to reach the ASME Code acceptance criteria limits. Therefore, the information is considered material to the NRC for review of the proposed alternative to regulatory requirements in letter PNP 2014-15.
EA-14-168
Palisades
NOV
(White)
02/23/2015 On February 23, 2015, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding to Entergy Operations, Inc., for two violations involving the failure to comply with the requirements of 10 CFR 20.1201(c) and Technical Specification 5.4.1.a during control rod drive housing replacement activities between February 6 and March 8, 2014 at the Palisades Nuclear Plant. Specifically, the licensee failed to (1) properly use the deep-dose equivalent, and (2) determine the effective dose equivalent using a dosimetry method approved by the NRC, as required by 10 CFR 20.1201(c). In addition, the licensee failed to establish a procedure for personnel monitoring covering all practical worker positions and shielding geometries as required by Technical Specification 5.4.1.a.
EA-14-013
Palisades
ORDER 07/21/2014 On July 21, 2014, the NRC issued a Confirmatory Order (CO) to Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Entergy), to formalize commitments made as a result of an alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mediation session held on May 14, 2014. The commitments were made as part of a settlement agreement between Entergy and the NRC regarding the apparent violation of 10 CFR Part 73, Appendix B, II B., "Qualification Requirements" and Palisades Security Plan Section 3.1. The violation involved the willful actions of the licensee's security staff, which failed to follow the security plan requirements when a security manager assigned a security operations supervisor to perform duties without confirming whether the supervisor had the appropriate qualifications. Entergy agreed that an individual inappropriately held a position for which he was not qualified, contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 73, Appendix B, II B., "Qualification Requirements" and the Palisades Security Plan, but disagreed that the violation was committed willfully. The NRC and Entergy agreed to disagree on the issue of willfulness. In response to the incident, Entergy completed a number corrective actions and enhancements, and agreed to complete additional corrective actions and enhancements, as fully discussed in the CO. In consideration of the corrective actions and commitments outlined in the CO, the NRC agreed not to issue a civil penalty or a Notice of Violation.
EA-11-243
Palisades
NOV
(Yellow)
02/14/2012 On February 14, 2012, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation to Palisades Nuclear Plant for a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings" that was categorized as a Yellow Significance Determination Process finding. The licensee failed to ensure that the work performed on Electrical Bus D11-2 was prescribed by documented instructions or procedures of a type appropriate to the circumstances and accomplished in accordance with the instructions or procedures. Specifically, on September 25, 2011, the work order instructions did not provide critical steps and also lacked proper step progression. The work order instructions also included action steps to, "Insulate or support load side bus bars to ensure they do not fault," which were not implemented. Finally, the electricians performing work in the field attempted to remove a positive horizontal bus bar in Bus D11-2, which was not a prescribed step in the work order instructions. As a result, these performance deficiencies caused an electrical fault which caused the loss of the left train 125-Volt DC safety-related system and loss of both preferred AC sources associated with the left train DC system.
EA-11-241
Palisades
NOV
(White)
02/14/2012 On February 14, 2012, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation to Palisades Nuclear Plant for violations of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III "Design Control" and Criterion XVI "Corrective Action" that were categorized as one White Significance Determination Process finding Specifically, in December 2007, the licensee failed to verify the adequacy of the safety related service water pump (SWP) coupling design to confirm that the coupling material was adequate for the environment and working conditions for which it would be subjected. As a result, the licensee failed to identify and evaluate a new failure mechanism which was introduced into the system in the form of intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC). In addition, on August 9, 2011, the licensee failed to preclude repetition of a significant condition adverse to quality when a coupling on a SWP failed due to IGSCC.
EA-11-214
Palisades
ORDER 01/25/2012

On January 25, 2012, an immediately effective Confirmatory Order was issued to Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Entergy), to confirm commitments made as a result of an Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) mediation session held on December 12, 2011. This enforcement action is based on a Technical Specification apparent violation. An at-the-controls reactor operator left the at-the-controls area of the Control Room without providing a turnover to a qualified individual and without obtaining permission from the Control Room Supervisor. Although the operator left the Control Room, another qualified individual resumed the at-the-controls responsibility.

During the ADR session, Entergy agreed to take the following actions: 1) development of a case study as related to the events that gave rise to the Confirmatory Order and present it to Entergy licensed reactor operators fleet wide, 2) a senior Entergy nuclear executive will send a letter fleet wide to each Entergy licensed reactor operator re-emphasizing the responsibilities of their position and associated safety responsibilities and obligations to the public, 3) a presentation at the appropriate industry forum(s) based on the facts and lessons learned from this event, 4) a review of the three Entergy procedures that are applicable to this event and address any relevant observations, findings, or recommendations in their Corrective Action Program, 5) conduct a safety culture assessment of the Palisades Operations Department, 6) perform a review of the planning for the next refueling outage, focusing on stressful or complex work evolutions to ensure that they are properly planned, and 7) inform the NRC, in writing, their plan to monitor and manage the reactor operator associated with event. In consideration of these commitments, and other corrective actions already completed by Entergy, the NRC agreed to refrain from proposing a civil penalty and issuing a Notice of Violation.

EA-11-227
Palisades
NOV
(White)
01/03/2012 On January 3, 2012, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation to Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. for a violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding involving Entergy's failure to prescribe maintenance on the safety-related turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump, an activity affecting quality, by documented instructions of a type appropriate to the circumstances, as well as a failure to accomplish the maintenance in accordance with their procedure. Specifically, on October 17, 2010, procedure FWS-M-6, "Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Maintenance," failed to prescribe inspections of wear conditions on the knife edge and latch plate, or to replace the trip spring, although these inspections and replacements had been identified as necessary by the turbine vendor. Palisades' personnel also failed to perform a step in the surveillance procedure which required lubricating a pin and instead greased the knife edge of the mechanical overspeed/manual trip mechanism. These deficiencies resulted in the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump being inoperable from October 29, 2010 to May 11, 2011.
EA-09-269
Palisades
NOV
(White)
01/20/2010 On January 20, 2010, a Notice of Violation was issued to Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. for a violation associated with a White Significance Determination Finding as a result of inspections at the Palisades Nuclear Plant. This White finding involved the licensee's failure to meet the requirements of Technical Specification (TS) for fuel storage in the spent fuel pool (SFP). Specifically, the Region I spent fuel pool storage rack neutron absorber had deteriorated over the life of the plant and was less than required by TS. Corrective actions are currently in place for additional controls of the spent fuel pool.
EA-08-322
Palisades
NOV
(White)
01/30/2009 On January 30, 2009, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White Significance Determination finding involving a violation of 10 CFR 20.1501 which requires the performance of surveys (evaluations) necessary for the licensee to comply with the regulations in Part 20. The violation involved the failure to evaluate radiological hazards and assess dose to workers that handled tools used for reconstituting failed fuel during work on the refueling floor in October 2007, as required by 10 CFR 20.1501 to demonstrate compliance with the dose limits of 20.1201.
EA-01-223
Palisades
NOV
(White)
10/26/2001 On October 26, 2001, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White SDP finding involving smoke detectors in the cable spreading room. The violation cited the licensee's failure to properly locate and install the smoke detectors in accordance with requirements including the applicable National Fire Protection Association code.
EA-01-088
Palisades
NOVCP
(SL III)

$ 55,000
06/27/2001 On June 27, 2001, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $55,000 was issued for a Severity Level III violation. The action was based on the licensee's failure to provide complete and accurate information in letters to the NRC requesting enforcement discretion and an exigent Technical Specification change.
EA-98-433
Palisades
NOV
(SL III)
12/11/1998 Violation occurred when the HPSI system was made inoperable for approximately 90 minutes during a surveillance test.
EA-97-567 & EA-97-569
Palisades
NOVCP
(SL III)

$ 55,000
04/02/1998 Work control - operations.
EA-96-131
Palisades
NOVCP
(SL III)

$ 50,000
08/13/1996 Appendix R violations.

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Palo Verde 1, 2 & 3 - Docket Nos. 050-00528; 050-00529; 050-00530

NRC Action Number(s) and
Facility Name
Action Type
(Severity) &
Civil Penalty
(if any)
Date
Issued
Description
EA-20-128
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Units 1, 2, and 3
NOV
(SL III)
03/04/2021 On March 4, 2021, the NRC issued a severity level III Notice of Violation to Arizona Public Service Company’s Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Units 1, 2, and 3 for a violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 50.9(a) and 55, for providing information to the NRC that was not complete and accurate concerning the medical fitness of a licensed reactor operator.
EA-20-054
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station
ORDER 11/17/2020 On November 17, 2020, the NRC issued a Confirmatory Order (CO) to Arizona Public Service Company (APS) memorializing commitments reached during an alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mediation session held on September 16, 2020.  The ADR session was associated with apparent violations that involved APS Company’s failure to (1) perform a written evaluation for a change to the NAC MAGNASTOR® dry cask storage system and obtain a license amendment for a change in methodology for performing tip-over calculations; and (2) adequately analyze the consequences of a hypothetical MANGASTOR CC5 spent fuel cask tip-over accident on the independent spent fuel storage installation pad.  As a result of the confirmatory order, the NRC will not cite the apparent violations. As a result of the CO, the NRC will not cite the apparent violations.
EA-07-162
Palo Verde
ORDER 10/19/2007 On October 19, 2007, a Confirmatory Order (Effective Immediately) was issued to Arizona Public Service Company (APS) to formalize commitments made as a result of a successful alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mediation session. The commitments were made by APS as part of a settlement agreement between APS and the NRC concerning the falsification, by a qualified senior reactor operator, at the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS), of a record related to a steam generator blowdown. As part of the settlement agreement, APS agreed to take a number of actions. In recognition of these actions, and those corrective actions already completed by APS, the NRC is satisfied that its concerns will be addressed.
EA-06-296
Palo Verde
NOV
(White)
02/21/2007 On February 21, 2007, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a WHITE Significance Determination Process finding involving the failure to develop adequate instructions or procedures for corrective maintenance activities on the Unit 3, EDG A K-1 relay and the failure to identify and correct the cause of the erratic K-1 relay operation prior to installation of the relay. This resulted in the emergency diesel generator being inoperable for almost four weeks. The violation was cited against 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criteria V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings" and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criteria XVI, "Corrective Action."
EA-05-037
Palo Verde

NOV
(SL III)

06/27/2005 On June 27, 2005, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation of 10 CFR 50.54(q). Specifically, the licensee made an emergency plan change that decreased the plan's effectiveness, and did so without prior NRC approval. This violation was assessed in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy because making this plan change without NRC approval impacted the regulatory process.
EA-05-051
Palo Verde
NOVCP
(SL III)

$ 55,000
04/08/2005 On April 8, 2005, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of a Civil Penalty in the amount of $50,000 was issued for a Severity Level III violation involving the licensee's failure to perform a written safety evaluation and obtain Commission approval prior to making a procedural change which resulted in a change to the facility as described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report that increased the probability of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the safety analysis report.
EA-04-221
Palo Verde
NOV
(SL III)
04/08/2005 On April 8, 2005, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a Yellow SDP finding involving a failure to maintain portions of the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) filled with water in accordance with design control requirements. The violation cited the licensee's failure to establish adequate design control measures to assure that the design basis for the ECCS was appropriately translated into specifications, procedures, and instructions.
EA-95-192
Palo Verde 1, 2 & 3
NOV
(SL III)
01/08/1996 The Atlantic Group, a contractor to the Arizona Public Service Company, discriminated against one of its employees at the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station for raising safety concerns.

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Peach Bottom 2 & 3 - Docket Nos. 050-00277; 050-00278

NRC Action Number(s) and
Facility Name
Action Type
(Severity) &
Civil Penalty
(if any)
Date
Issued
Description
EA-18-107
Peach Bottom Power Station
NOV
(White)
12/11/2018 On December 11, 2018, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation to Exelon Generation Company (Exelon) for a violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI at Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding. Contrary to the requirements, Exelon failed to assure that a condition associated with the E-3 EDG scavenging air check valve was promptly identified and corrected. Specifically, after identifying on April 1, 2017, that the E-3 EDG scavenging air check valve assembly was loose due to wear around the interference fit pin, and identifying on September 20, 2017, that there was an oil leak on the scavenging air check valve dashpot assembly, Exelon did not take adequate corrective actions to address these adverse conditions. Additionally, the unavailability of the EDG resulted in a violation of Technical Specification 3.8.1, "ECCS-Operating," which requires all four EDGs to be operable in Mode 1, and if any EDG is inoperable that it be returned to operable status within 14 days or the unit shall down and in Mode 3 within 12 hours.
EA-09-007; EA-09-059
Peach Bottom 2 & 3
ORDER 12/1/2009 On December 1, 2009, an immediately effective Confirmatory Order was issued to Exelon Generating Company, LLC (Exelon) to confirm commitments made as a result of an Alternative Dispute Resolution mediation session held on September 3, 2009. This enforcement action is based on two violations of NRC requirements at Exelon's Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (Peach Bottom), including the deliberate failure of a former reactor operator to report an arrest in a timely manner and the deliberate failure of a former maintenance supervisor to provide complete and accurate information on a personal history questionnaire. Exelon agreed to take the following actions: (1) provide additional training on deliberate misconduct at Peach Bottom and other Exelon sites, for both employees and supervisors; (2) perform an assessment to verify the effectiveness of the deliberate misconduct training; (3) conduct training with licensed operators on the special obligations associated with holding an NRC license; (4) perform an assessment of Peach Bottom employee conduct, including trending; (5) conduct additional Exelon fleet-wide training on the Behavioral Observation Program, fitness for duty requirements, and the Employee Assistance Program; (6) submit a lessons-learned article to two professional organizations requesting publication in their respective newsletters; and (7) discuss with the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations the possibility of incorporating training on deliberate misconduct into its supervisor and operator development programs. In consideration of these commitments, and other actions already completed by Exelon, the NRC agreed to refrain from issuing a civil penalty or Notice of Violation for these violations.
EA-08-298
Peach Bottom 2 & 3
NOVCP
(SL III)

$ 65,000
01/06/2009 On January 6, 2009, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $65,000 was issued for a Severity Level III problem involving inattentive security officers at Exelon's Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station. An investigation conducted by the NRC Office of Investigations determined that multiple security officers at Peach Bottom were deliberately inattentive on multiple occasions. In addition, multiple security officers deliberately failed to report observations of inattentiveness to their supervision. These security officers put Exelon in violation of 10 CFR 73.55, which requires armed responders to maintain continuous communication with each alarm station and be available to immediately respond to threats, and Peach Bottom License Condition 2.C(3), which requires, in part, reporting of aberrant behavior.

EA-03-224
Peach Bottom 2 & 3

NOV
(White)
02/03/2004 On February 3, 2004, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White SDP finding involving a performance problem associated with one of the emergency diesel generators. The violation cited the licensee's failure to maintain adequate maintenance procedures and failure to take adequate corrective actions for a condition adverse to quality.

EA-02-142
Peach Bottom 2 & 3

NOV
(White)
11/26/2002 On November 26, 2002, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation involving a white SDP finding involving the untimely declaration of an Alert during an actual event. The violation cited the failure of the operations crew to properly use the standard emergency classification and action level scheme.

EA-01-188
Peach Bottom 2 & 3

NOV
(SL III)
10/23/2001 On October 23, 2001, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III problem involving the willful creation of inaccurate and incomplete siren testing maintenance records by two former maintenance technicians and deficiencies with the ability to provide early notification to the populace surrounding the facility in the event of an emergency.
EA-01-148
Peach Bottom 2 & 3
NOV
(White)
08/22/2001 On August 22, 2001, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White SDP finding. The violation involved the licensee's failure to maintain adequate emergency facilities and equipment (public address and evacuation alarm system) required to support an emergency response.
EA-00-125
Peach Bottom 2 & 3
NOV
(White)
08/03/2000 On August 3, 2000, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation that was assessed as a White SDP finding involving the improper classification of radioactive waste for shallow land burial.
EA-98-221;
Peach Bottom 2 & 3
NOVCP
(SL III)

$ 55,000
06/11/1998 Inoperable CS Pump.
EA-96-243
Peach Bottom 2 & 3
NOV
(SL III)
02/03/1997 Secretary enter text file for entire physical security plan onto LAN. Failure to protect aperture cards containing safeguards information.
EA-96-370
Peach Bottom 2 & 3
NOV
(SL III)
01/03/1997 The action was based a Maintenance Rule base-line inspection that determined PECO Nuclear was not adequately monitoring the performance of numerous systems and components against established goals, nor had PECO Nuclear demonstrated the effectiveness of preventive maintenance on these systems and components. Both of these deficiencies were requirements of the Maintenance Rule.

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Perry 1 - Docket No. 050-00440

NRC Action Number(s) and
Facility Name
Action Type
(Severity) &
Civil Penalty
(if any)
Date
Issued
Description
EA-17-043
Perry Nuclear Power Plant
NOV
(White)
08/24/2017 On August 24, 2017, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation to FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FirstEnergy) for a violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Appendix B at Perry Nuclear Power Plant, associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding. Contrary to the requirements, FirstEnergy failed to conduct adequate design control of a modification to the electrical circuitry for emergency start of the site Standby Diesel Generators. Specifically, FirstEnergy failed to evaluate the effect of a shorted diode on the emergency start circuitry. Additionally, there is an associated violation of Technical Specification 3.8.1, "AC Sources Operating," for one Standby Diesel Generator being inoperable for greater than the allowed outage time of 14 days.
EA-11-148
Perry 1
NOV
(White)
08/25/2011 On August 25, 2011, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation to First Energy Nuclear Operating Company for three violations associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding involving work activity during the retraction of a stuck source range monitor (SRM) from the reactor vessel. The first violation involved the failure to perform an evaluation of the potential radiological hazards associated with the work activity, as required by 10 CFR 20.1501. The second violation involved the failure to perform a complete radiological characterization of the SRM, as required by Technical Specification (T.S.) 5.7.1.b. The third violation involved the failure to establish a procedure that addressed the control of highly radioactive materials removed from the reactor vessel, as well as, the failure to implement a procedure to ensure that the licensee's ALARA plan contained steps to ensure that the ambient radiation field in the work areas were being controlled and that the workers actions were in accordance with ALARA considerations, as required by T.S. 5.4.1.
EA-04-214
Perry 1
NOV
(White)
03/29/2005 On March 29, 2005, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White SDP finding involving the failure to follow the requirements of the Perry Emergency Plan during an event that was classified at the Alert level. The violation cited the licensee's failure to properly implement the required standard emergency classification and action level scheme.
EA-01-083
Perry 1
NOVCP
(SL III)
02/24/2005 On February 24, 2005, the NRC issued a Severity Level III Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $55,000 for violation of NRC's employee protection regulations by a licensee contractor, Williams Power Corporation, at the Perry site.
EA-03-208
Perry 1
NOV
(SL III)
04/01/2004 On April 1, 2004, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation involving the willful failure of two key maintenance personnel responsible for testing motor operated valves, a safety-related function, to follow Technical Specification overtime guidelines.
EA-04-020
Perry 1
NOV
(White)
03/12/2004 On March 12, 2004, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White SDP finding involving the air binding of the common low pressure core spray and residual heat removal (RHR) 'A' water leg pump following a loss of offsite power event. The violation cited the failure to establish adequate written procedures to periodically vent the highest point on the discharge of the common low pressure core spray and RHR 'A' water leg pump.
EA-03-197
Perry 1
NOV
(White)
01/28/2004 On January 28, 2004, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White SDP finding involving the failure of the Essential Service Water Pump A shaft on September 1, 2003 due to improper reassembly. The violation cited the licensee's failure to have adequate procedures for assembly of the pump.
EA-03-194
Perry 1
NOV
(White)
01/23/2004 On January 23, 2004, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White SDP finding involving an undue delay in declaring an actual emergency condition on April 24, 200e, when the shift manager did not follow the emergency classification and action level scheme as required by the emergency plan when damage to irradiated fuel caused a high alarm in the fuel handling building ventilation exhaust gaseous radiation monitor. The violation cited the licensee's failure to promptly declare the Alert as a violation of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4).
EA-03-007
Perry 1
NOV
(White)
03/04/2003 On March 4, 2003, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White SDP finding involving the failure of the high pressure core spray system to start during routine surveillance testing. The violation cited the licensee's failure to implement procedures during the installation and inspection of the high pressure core spray pump breaker from 1994 through October 23, 2002.
EA-99-012
Perry 1
NOVCP
(SL II)

$110,000
05/20/1999 Discriminated against a Radiation Protection Supervisor (RPS) as a result of the RPS engaging in protected activities.
CPORDER
$110,000
08/03/2000 On August 3, 2000, an Order Imposing Civil Monetary Penalty in the amount of $110,000 was issued. The action was based on a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $110,000 that was issued on May 20, 1999, for a violation of the employee protection requirement. The Licensee's February 25, 2000, response denied the violation and requested that the violation be withdrawn and the civil penalty rescinded. After considering the licensees response, the NRC concluded that the violation occurred as stated and that there was not an adequate basis for withdrawing the civil penalty.
EAs-96-482, 96-542, 97-047, and 97-430
Perry 1
NOVCP
(SL III)

$100,000
11/18/1997 Inadequate corrective actions regarding repetitive reactivity excursions and failure to incorporate design aspects into plant construction and failure to identify USQ.
ORDERCP
$ 50,000
04/09/1998
EA-96-367
Perry 1
NOV
(SL III)
11/06/1996 Criteria XVI - associated with cooling systems emergency closed cooling system and CRHVAC chillers.
EA-96-253
Perry 1
NOVCP
(SL II)

$160,000
10/09/1996 Discrimination against 5 insulators who sued licensee after they were contaminated while working in plant.

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Pilgrim 1 - Docket No. 050-00293

NRC Action Number(s) and
Facility Name
Action Type
(Severity) &
Civil Penalty
(if any)
Date
Issued
Description
EA-15-247
Pilgrim
NOV
(SL III)
04/11/2016 On April 11, 2016, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation to Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. for a Severity Level III Problem involving two related violations of NRC requirements. The first violation involved the failure to conduct compensatory fire watches as required by Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station's corporate procedures and 10 CFR 50.48. Specifically, on multiple occasions between June 1, 2012, and June 26, 2014, fire watch personnel failed to examine the areas involved in the hourly fire watch postings for evidence of fire or conditions that may lead to a fire. The second violation involved the failure to maintain complete and accurate records as required by 10 CFR 50.9(a). Specifically, on multiple occasions during the same time frame, log sheets for hourly fire watches were falsified when an individual initialed that fire watches were completed when in fact, these fire watches had not been performed.
EA-15-081
Pilgrim
NOV
(White)
09/01/2015 On September 1, 2015 the NRC issued a Notice of Violation associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding to Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. for a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action". This violation involved the failure to establish measures to promptly identify and correct a significant condition adverse to quality, or take corrective actions to preclude repetition, relating to a component that is essential to performing the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) safety-related functions. Specifically, the licensee failed to identify that the ADS 'A' safety/relief valve (SRV) did not open upon manual actuation on February 9, 2013. The licensee therefore did not take action to preclude repetition, which resulted in the failure of the ADS 'C' SRV to operate upon manual actuation on January 27, 2015. Additionally, because the licensee was not aware of the 'A' SRV's inoperability from February 9, 2013 until January 27, 2015, a period greater than the allowed Technical Specification (TS) outage time, the required actions of the TS were not followed.
EA-11-260
Pilgrim
NOV
(SL III)
07/17/2013 On July 17, 2013, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation to Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Entergy) for a Severity Level III problem involving two violations of NRC requirements associated with licensed reactor operator medical examinations and reporting at the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS). The first violation involved Entergy's failure to ensure licensed operators at PNPS meet medical prerequisites for performing NRC-licensed operator activities and Entergy's failure to obtain prior NRC approval, as required by 10 CFR 55.3, 10 CFR 55.31 and 10 CFR 55.23. Specifically, on various dates, licensed reactor operators performed duties without meeting medical prerequisites (blood pressure limits and stamina tests) and without prior NRC approval. The second violation involved Entergy's failure to provide the NRC with information that is complete and accurate in all material respects, as required by 10 CFR 50.9. Specifically, Entergy submitted NRC Form-396s for renewal of two reactor operator licenses that certified that the operators met the medical requirements of ANSI/ANS 3.4-1983, when, in fact, the facility licensee had not verified, via conducting a stamina test, that the operators had met the requirements.
EA-11-174
Pilgrim
NOV
(White)
11/21/2011 On November 21, 2011, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation to Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. for a violation of Technical Specification 5.4, "Procedures," associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding involving multiple examples of Entergy's failure to conduct safety-related activities as described in written procedures prior to and during a reactor startup operation. Specifically, on May 10, 2011, Pilgrim personnel failed to implement conduct of operations and reactivity control standards and procedures during a reactor startup which resulted in a reactor scram.
EA-05-039
Pilgrim
NOVCP
(SL III)

$ 60,000
07/14/2005 On July 14, 2005, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the base amount of $60,000 for a Severity Level III problem consisting of three violations was issued. The violations involved the failure of the Control Room Supervisor (CRS), the Reactor Operator (RO), and the Shift Manager (SM) to follow the requirements in 10 CFR 26.20 and procedures in Technical Specification 5.4.1. The violations cited: (1) the CRS being asleep, and therefore, not in a condition to respond to plant conditions or emergencies (Violation A); (2) the RO observing the CRS asleep, but failing to take immediate actions to awaken the CRS, inform appropriate site personnel, and initiate a CR (Violation B.1) and the SM failing to inform appropriate site personnel and initiate a CR (Violation B.2); and (3) the CRS not being relieved of duty and for-cause FFD tested (Violation C).
EA-98-191
Pilgrim 1
NOVCP
(SL III)

$ 55,000
05/19/1998 Equipment failures associated with protected area assessment system.
EA-96-271
Pilgrim 1
NOV
(SL III)
10/21/1996 Improper setpoints for 12 containment electrical penetration circuit breakers.

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Point Beach 1 & 2 - Docket Nos. 050-00266; 050-00301

NRC Action Number(s) and
Facility Name
Action Type
(Severity) &
Civil Penalty
(if any)
Date
Issued
Description
EA-13-125
Point Beach Nuclear Plant
NOV
(White)
08/09/2013 On August 9, 2013, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation (NOV) to NextEra Energy, Point Beach, LLC for a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding involving the failure of Point Beach personnel to have a procedure appropriate to the circumstances to address flooding as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). Specifically, from January 19, 1996, to March 13, 2013, procedure PC 80 Part 7, "Lake Water Determination," as implemented, would not protect safety-related equipment in the turbine building or pump house because the procedure: (1) did not appropriately prescribe the installation of barriers such that gaps between the barriers were eliminated to prevent water intrusion, (2) did not protect equipment by requiring barriers to be placed in front of the doors, from 1996 to 2008, as described in the FSAR, and (3) did not require the barriers to protect the plant to an elevation of at least 9 feet as described in the FSAR.
EA-12-220
Point Beach 1
NOV
(White)
01/02/2013 On January 2, 2013, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation to NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC for a violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding involving the failure of Point Beach personnel to prescribe maintenance on the safety-related turbine driven auxiliary feedwater (TDAFW) pump, an activity affecting quality, by documented instructions of a type appropriate to the circumstances. Specifically, Work Order 40101094 used to perform maintenance on the TDAFW pump specified a first time evolution of unbolting the steam exhaust piping to the turbine, aligning the turbine to the pump, and then re-bolting the steam piping to the turbine. The documented instructions were not appropriate to the circumstances in that they did not ensure the final turbine-to-pump alignment was performed after the bolting of the steam exhaust piping to the turbine flange. This led to the failure of the turbine-to-pump coupling on May 21, 2012.
EA-12-106
Point Beach 1 & 2
NOV
(White)
07/24/2012 On July 24, 2012, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation to NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC for a violation of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10) associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding involving the failure of Point Beach personnel to develop and have in place guidelines for the choice of protective actions during an emergency that were consistent with Federal guidance. Specifically, an apparent logic error in a Point Beach emergency planning implementing procedure required the emergency director to revisit the question of impediments to evacuation after a prior decision to evacuate affected downwind sectors had been implemented by local authorities, resulting in a contradictory recommendation for sheltering being given during an exercise.
EA-09-012
Point Beach 1 & 2
NOV
SL III
06/26/2009

On June 26, 2009, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation to NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC for a Severity Level III problem involving the failure to implement: (1) 10 CFR 50.74(c) which requires that each licensee notify the appropriate NRC Regional Administrator within 30 days of a permanent disability or illness, as described in 10 CFR 55.25, of a licensed operator or a senior licensed operator; (2) 10 CFR 50.9 which requires, in part, that information provided to the Commission by an applicant for a license or by a licensee or information required by statute or by the Commission's regulations, Orders, or license conditions to be maintained by the applicant or the licensee shall be complete and accurate in all material respects; and (3) 10 CFR 55.23 requires, in part, that to certify the medical fitness of the applicant, an authorized representative of the facility licensee shall complete and sign NRC Form-396, "Certification of Medical Examination by Facility Licensee."

Specifically, the licensee was informed in February 1993 that the non-licensed operator was taking prescribed medication for hypertension, a permanent disability or illness. The non-licensed operator applied for an NRC operating license in May 1999. The NRC issued the operator a reactor operator license August 27, 1999 and a senior reactor operator license on February 22, 2002, with no restrictions. The licensee did not inform the NRC of the operator's medical condition until October 20, 2008.

Also, the licensee submitted an NRC Form 396 for renewal of a senior reactor operator's license and the NRC Form 396 certified that the applicant met the medical requirements of ANSI/ANS 3.4 1996 with no restrictions. However, in February 1993, the operator was prescribed medication to adequately compensate for a disqualifying medical condition. The certification by the senior licensee facility representative was material to the NRC because the NRC relied upon this certification to renew the senior reactor operator's license pursuant to 10 CFR Part 55 when the license should have been modified with a restriction that the senior reactor operator was required to take medication as prescribed to maintain his qualification.

EA-06-274
Point Beach 1 & 2
NOV
SL III
01/29/2007 On January 29, 2007, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation. The violation involved the licensee's failure to update its FSAR in 1983 which, combined with the licensee's continued failure to fully understand the facility's licensing and design basis since that time, impacted the licensee's ability in 2005 to understand the current Point Beach licensing and design basis, and resulted in a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency also impacted the NRC's ability to perform its regulatory function. The licensee's failure to update the FSAR and understand the facility's licensing and design basis represented a challenge to the regulatory envelope upon which certain activities were licensed, such as reactor vessel head lift activities.
EA-06-178
Point Beach 1 & 2
ORDER 01/03/2007 On January 3, 2007, a Confirmatory Order (Effective Immediately) was issued to the Nuclear Management Company, LLC (NMC), documenting a number of actions the licensee has agreed to take as part of an Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) settlement agreement. An ADR session was held at the licensee's request to address the apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.7, "Employee protection." The actions the licensee has agreed to take include: (1) revising NMC's policy on writing corrective action program reports; (2) training NMC supervisory employees on safety conscious work environment principles; (3) communicating NMC's safety culture policy to its employees; and (4) conducting a safety culture survey at the Point Beach Nuclear Plant. As reflected in the Order, in response to these actions, the NRC agreed not to pursue further enforcement action on this issue.
EA-05-192
Point Beach 1 & 2
NOV
(White)
12/16/2005 On December 16, 2005, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White Significance Determination Process (SDP) finding. The violation of 10 CFR 50.47 associated with a White finding involved the licensee's failure to self-identify the untimely declaration of an Alert classification during an August 2002 emergency preparedness (EP) drill.
EA-05-191
Point Beach 1 & 2
NOVCP
(SL III)

$60,000
12/16/2005 On December 16, 2005, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $60,000 was issued for a Severity Level III violation of 10 CFR 50.9 involving the licensee's failure to provide accurate information to the NRC associated with a critique of an August 2002 Emergency Preparedness drill.
EA-03-181
Point Beach 1 & 2
NOVCP
(SL III)

$60,000
03/17/2004 On March 17, 2004, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $60,000 was issued for a Severity Level III violation involving changes made to the Emergency Action Level scheme that reduced the effectiveness of the Emergency Plan without requesting and receiving prior NRC approval.
EA-03-057
Point Beach 1 & 2
NOV
(Red)
12/11/2003 On December 11, 2003, a Notice of Violation for a violation associated with a Red SDP finding involving the potential common mode failure of all trains of the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system. The violation cited the licensee's failure to establish adequate measures to assure that the AFW system design bases were correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions (modification packages).
EA-03-059
Point Beach 1 & 2
NOV
(Red)
04/02/2003 On April 2, 2003, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a previously identified Red SDP finding involving the potential common mode failure of the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pumps due to inadequate operator response to a loss of instrument air. The violation cited the licensee's failure to implement corrective actions to preclude repetition of a significant condition adverse to quality associated with an AFW system potential common mode failure.
EA-02-031
Point Beach 1 & 2
NOV
(Red)
07/12/2002 On July 12, 2002, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a Red SDP finding involving the potential common mode failure of the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pumps during specific accident scenarios. The violation cited the licensee's failure to ensure that activities affecting quality were prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances and failure from at least 1997 to 2001, to promptly identify and correct a condition adverse to quality.
EA-02-090
Point Beach 2
NOV
(White)
06/13/2002 On June 13, 2002, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White SDP finding involving the self-revealing failure of safety injection system pump 2P-15B due to nitrogen gas binding. The violation cited the licensee's failure to promptly identify and correct a significant condition adverse to quality regarding leakage from the 2T-34A safety injection accumulator.
EA-99-002
Point Beach 1 & 2
NOV
(SL III)
04/28/1999 Violation occurred because the on-shift crew, the operations support group, and the WEPCo site management team failed to acknowledge the validity of the temperature alarm and appreciate the significance of low temperature readings for the Unit 1 SI pumps' minimum flow line.
EA-97-075
Point Beach 1 & 2
NOV
(SL III)
08/08/1997 Multiple violations associated with corrective action program and application of Technical Specification requirements.
EA-96-273
Point Beach 1 & 2

NOVCP
(SL III)

$325,000

12/03/1996 The action was based on two inspections performed at the Point Beach Nuclear Power Plant. Three Severity Level III problems were cited for failing to adequately: 1) conduct control room activities; 2) maintain plant configuration control; and 3) conduct independent fuel dry cask storage activities. In addition, a single Severity Level III violation was cited for the licensee failing to take prompt corrective actions following the identification that the Technical Specifications for the safety-related service water system were non-conservative.

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Prairie Island 1 & 2 - Docket Nos. 050-00282; 050-00306

NRC Action Number(s) and
Facility Name
Action Type
(Severity) &
Civil Penalty
(if any)
Date
Issued
Description
EA-12-273
Prairie Island 1
NOV
(White)
03/26/2013 On March 26, 2013, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation to Northern States Power Company, Minnesota for a violation of 10 CFR 50.54, "Conditions of Licenses," and risk significant planning standards 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and (b)(8) associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding. The finding involved the failure to recognize that the 1R-50 shield building high range vent gas radiation detector at Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (Prairie Island) was a single piece of equipment necessary for emergency preparedness action levels and failure to recognize its importance to the emergency preparedness program. Specifically, from July 24, 2011, to May 18, 2012, the 1R-50 high range detector was inoperable, which degraded Prairie Island's ability on Unit 1 to classify and declare general emergencies or site area emergencies. Prairie Island did not take timely corrective actions to restore the monitor, which is a piece of equipment necessary to support the emergency preparedness program.
EA-11-110
Prairie Island 1 & 2
NOV
(White)
08/17/2011 On August 17, 2011, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation to Northern States Power Company for a violation associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding. The violation involved the failure to maintain the direct current electrical power subsystems operable in Modes 1 through 4, as required by Technical Specification 3.8.4. Specifically, from December 21, 1994 to approximately October 22, 2010, all battery chargers in Unit 1 were susceptible to a common mode failure under design basis accident conditions. Under those conditions, the battery chargers would stop providing an output, or "lock-up," when their alternating current input voltage dropped below their nameplate minimum voltage at the battery charger motor control center.
EA-09-193
Prairie Island 1 & 2
NOV
(SL III)
10/27/2009 On October 27, 2009, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation for a Severity Level III violation to Northern States Power Company, Minnesota. The licensee violated 10 CFR 50.9 which requires, in part, that information provided to the Commission by an applicant shall be complete and accurate in all material respects. Specifically, on May 11, 2007, the licensee failed to report a medical condition, as required by 10 CFR 55.23 "Certification," of a senior reactor operator (SRO) on a license renewal form. This resulted in the NRC renewing the SRO's license without a restriction for the medical condition.
EA-09-167
Prairie Island 1 & 2
NOV
(White)
09/03/2009 On September 3, 2009, a Notice of Violation was issued to Northern States Power Company - Minnesota for a violation associated with a White Significance Determination Finding involving a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control" which requires, in part, that measures be established to assure that the design basis for safety related functions of structures, systems, and components are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. Contrary to this requirement, Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant failed to implement design control measures to ensure that the design basis for the component cooling water system was correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure that the safety-related function of the component cooling water system was maintained following a high energy line break, seismic, or tornado events in the turbine building.
EA-08-349
Prairie Island 1 & 2
NOV
(White)
05/06/2009 On May 6, 2009, a Notice of Violation was issued to Northern States Power Company for a violation associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding at Prairie Island. Specifically, the licensee failed to meet the requirements of 49 CFR 173.441(a), which requires shipments of radioactive material to be packaged such that under conditions normally incident to transportation, dose rates on all external surfaces of the package are less than 200 mrem per hour, and 49 CFR 172.704, which requires training for personnel involved in packaging and shipping radioactive materials. Specifically, on October 31, 2008, a shipment of radioactive material sent from Prairie Island to a Westinghouse facility in Pennsylvania was found to have a dose rate on an external surface in excess of 200 mrem per hour. Subsequent investigation identified that a number of the personnel involved in preparing this shipment had not been properly trained, as required.
EA-08-272
Prairie Island 1
NOV
(White)
01/27/2009 On January 27, 2009, a Notice of Violation was issued to Northern States Power Company for a violation of Technical Specifications associated with a White Significance Determination finding at Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant. Specifically, the licensee failed to adequately control the position of a normally open pressure switch block valve for the Unit 1 turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump. The valve was inadvertently left closed, causing the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump to fail to operate as required following a July 31, 2008, Unit 1 reactor trip. The pump was subsequently determined to have been inoperable for 138 days, a time period that significantly exceeded that allowed by the Technical Specifications.
EA-06-162
Prairie Island 1 & 2
NOV
(SL III)
09/28/2006 On September 28, 2006, a Severity Level III Notice of Violation was issued to the Nuclear Management Company, Inc. (NMC), for a violation of 10 CFR 50.9, "Completeness and Accuracy of Information." The violation is associated with information that NMC provided to the NRC on July 21, 2005, in two applications for reactor operator licenses at the licensee's Prairie Island facility. Specifically, the facility licensee provided information on each application indicating the applicant performed reactivity control manipulations on the Prairie Island plant simulator on January 18, 2005, and that the simulator had a current core model that replicated the plant as verified by performance testing. However, the licensee failed to retain records for simulator performance testing associated with reactivity control manipulations that was conducted on the plant-referenced simulator.
EA-02-068
Prairie Island 1 & 2
NOVCP
(SL III)

$60,000
12/13/2002 On December 13, 2002, Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $60,000 was issued for a Severity Level III violation involving the failure to provide complete and accurate information to the NRC from April 13 to 16, 2001, regarding Prairie Island's request for a Notice of Enforcement Discretion (NOED) involving an emergency diesel generator (EDG). Although the normal civil penalty assessment process would have fully mitigated the civil penalty in this case, the NRC exercised discretion in accordance with Section VII.A.1.(c) of the Enforcement Policy and assessed a base civil penalty. Discretion was warranted based on Prairie Island's particularly poor performance leading up to and during the EDG degradation, during the request for an NOED, and during the time period the NOED was in effect.
EA-00-282
Prairie Island 1 & 2
NOV
(White)
02/20/2001 On February 20, 2001, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White SDP finding involving the potential inability of the deep cooling water (service water) pumps to perform their intended safety function. The violation was based on the licensee's failure to ensure that design control measures would verify the adequacy of the design and would assure that appropriate quality standards were specified.
EA-97-290
Prairie Island 1 & 2
NOVCP
(SL III)

$ 50,000
10/14/1997 Violations associated with AFW system.
EA-97-073
Prairie Island 1 & 2
NOV
(SL III)
04/30/1997 Failure to follow procedures for control of heavy loads.
EA-96-402
Prairie Island 1 & 2
NOVCP
(SL III)

$ 50,000
01/23/1997 Licensee was taking credit for manual operator actions to isolate cooling H20 loads

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Purdue University - Docket No. 050-00182

NRC Action Number(s) and
Facility Name
Action Type
(Severity) &
Civil Penalty
(if any)
Date
Issued
Description
EA-20-144
Purdue University (Purdue University Research Reactor) 
NOV
(SLIII)
02/16/2021 On February 16, 2021, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation to Purdue University for a Severity Level III problem involving two violations.  The first violation involves the Purdue University Research Reactor operating at steady state power levels in excess of 12 kilowatts (thermal) on several occasions between October 31, 2019, and September 15, 2020, contrary to Purdue University Research Reactor License Condition 2.C.1.  Specifically, the reactor was inadvertently operated at power levels greater than 12 kW(t) during this time due to nuclear instrument (NI) calibration calculation errors that caused the NIs to indicate reactor power levels that were approximately three times lower than actual reactor power. Therefore, when the licensee operated the reactor above 4 kW(t) (indicated power) several times between October 31, 2019, and September 15, 2020, the actual reactor power exceeded the maximum authorized power level of 12 kW(t).  The second violation involves Purdue University’s failure to perform appropriate surveillance testing before considering the NI system operable following replacement of the NI system and detectors in 2019, contrary to Purdue University Research Reactor Technical Specification 4.2.g.

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Page Last Reviewed/Updated Tuesday, February 08, 2022