United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment

Escalated Enforcement Actions Issued to Reactor Licensees - D

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D.C. Cook 1 & 2 - Docket Nos. 050-00315; 050-00316

NRC Action Number(s) and
Facility Name
Action Type
(Severity) &
Civil Penalty
(if any)
Date
Issued
Description
EA-12-005
D.C. Cook
ORDER 06/28/2012 On June 28, 2012, an Immediately Effective Confirmatory Order was issued to the Indiana Michigan Power Company to confirm commitments made as a result of an ADR mediation session held on May 23, 2012. This action is based on a violation involving two D. C. Cook supervisory-level individuals who failed to ensure that an individual, who was offsite when selected for fitness-for-duty testing, was tested at the earliest reasonable and practical opportunity when both the donor and collectors were available. This was contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 26, Sections 4(b) and 31(d)(2)(v) of the Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) program. Indiana Michigan Power Company has completed a number of corrective actions and agreed to implement additional corrective actions and enhancements. In consideration of the corrective actions and commitments outlined in the order, the NRC agreed to refrain from proposing a civil penalty and issuing a Notice of Violation for this matter.
EA-06-295
D.C. Cook
ORDER 04/04/2007 On April 4, 2007, a Confirmatory Order (Effective Immediately) was issued to the Indiana Michigan Power Company (I&M) as part of a settlement agreement between I&M and the NRC regarding an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.7, "Employee Protection," issued by the NRC to I&M. In response to an NRC choice letter, I&M requested Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) to resolve the apparent violation. As part of the settlement agreement that resulted from the ADR session, I&M agreed to complete a number of actions, including the completion of the training of all non-supervisory plant workforce and long-tern contractors on the subject of a safety-conscious work environment (SCWE), the completion of a Nuclear Safety Culture (including SCWE) survey, the reinforcement of I&M's policy and expectation of its management relating to a SCWE as communicated by an executive level manager, and the implementation of a periodic assessment of I&M's compliance with its hours of work limitation program and evaluation of the results for trends. In exchange for I&M's actions, the NRC agreed to not pursue further enforcement action; however, the NRC will evaluate the implementation of the Confirmatory Order during future inspections.
EA-06-177
D.C. Cook, Units 1, 2
NOVCP
(SL III)

$ 60,000
10/06/2006 On October 6, 2006, a Severity Level III Notice of Violation and Proposed Civil Penalty in the amount of $60,000 was issued to the Indiana Michigan Power Company (I&M). The violation resulted from changes the licensee made to its D. C. Cook Emergency Plan in April 2003. In accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q), a licensee may make changes to emergency plans without Commission approval only if the changes do not decrease the effectiveness of the plans and the plans, as changed, continue to meet the standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b). In April 2003, I&M made changes, without Commission approval, to the Fission Product Barrier Matrix Emergency Action Level (EAL) in the D. C. Cook Emergency Plan that decreased the effectiveness of the plan and resulted in use of a non-standard scheme of EALs.
EA-05-171
D.C. Cook, Units 1, 2
NOVCP
(SL III)

$ 60,000
11/23/2005 On November 23, 2005, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of a Civil Penalty in the amount of $60,000, was issued for a Severity Level III problem involving the licensee's failure to provide complete and accurate information, and meet reporting requirements regarding NRC-licensed operators at the D. C. Cook Nuclear Plant. Specifically, the licensee failed to: (1) provide complete and accurate information to the NRC concerning corrective actions associated with a previous Severity Level III violation (EA-04-109); (2) notify the NRC within 30 days of NRC-licensed operators experiencing a permanent disability or illness; and (3) provide complete and accurate information concerning the medical condition of individuals on new or renewal NRC reactor operator license applications.
EA-04-109
D.C. Cook, Units 1, 2
NOV
(SL III)
09/29/2004 On September 29, 2004, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation involving an application for renewal of a Senior Reactor Operator license that was not complete and accurate in all material respects.
EA-04-006
D.C. Cook, Units 1, 2
NOV
(White)
03/12/2004 On March 12, 2004, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White SDP finding involving the failure to properly prepare a package of radioactive material for shipment. The violation cited the licensee's failure to prepare the radioactive material package for shipment so that the radiation level did not exceed 200 millirem per hour at any point on the external surface of the package.
EA-01-286
D.C. Cook, Units 1, 2
NOV
(White)
10/03/2002 On October 3, 2002, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White SDP finding involving a failed essential service water (ESW) strainer basket that resulted in a debris intrusion event. The violation cited that the installation instructions for the ESW strainer baskets, an activity affecting quality, were not appropriate.
EA-02-010
D.C. Cook, Unit 2
NOV
(White)
05/06/2002 On May 6, 2003, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White SDP finding involving the failure to take corrective action to preclude a repetitive failure of the Unit 2 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump, a significant condition adverse to quality.
EA-99-329
D.C. Cook 1 & 2
NOV
(SL III)
05/05/2000 On May 5, 2000, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation based on discrimination against an employee for engaging in protected activities.
EA-98-113
D.C. Cook 1 & 2
NOV
(SL III)
04/21/1998 Transportation violations; no shipping papers or emergency contact number.
EA-96-020
D.C. Cook 1 & 2
NOV
(SL III)
03/11/1996 Both centrifugal charging pumps were rendered inoperable and action was not taken within the technical specification requirements.
EA-93-059
D.C. Cook 1 & 2
NOVCP
(SL III)

$ 25,000
08/05/1993 Withdrawal of Notice of Violation and proposed imposition of Civil Penalty on an action based on discrimination against a technician for engaging in protected activity.

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Davis-Besse - Docket No. 050-00346

NRC Action Number(s) and
Facility Name
Action Type
(Severity) &
Civil Penalty
(if any)
Date
Issued
Description
EA-14-094
Davis Besse
ORDER 06/30/2014 On June 30, 2014, a Confirmatory Order was issued to FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC), confirming FENOC’s commitment to submit a license amendment request to transition Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 to the National Fire Protection Association Standard 805.  FENOC had originally planned to submit its application on July 1, 2014.  The NRC reviewed FENOC’s justification for the delay, and accepted the proposed new submittal date of December 31, 2015.
EA-10-332
Davis Besse
NOV
(SL III)
04/30/2010 On April 30, 2010, a Notice of Violation (NOV) was issued to FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company for a Severity Level III problem for the failure to implement: (1) 10 CFR 50.71 “Maintenance of records, making of reports” and (2) 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, “Design control.” In July 1999, the licensee submitted a license amendment request to eliminate as found testing criteria by using the past data for double O ring data and was approved by the NRC. However, the licensee staff did not update this fact in their updated final safety analysis report. The licensee also changed from the double O ring design to a flat gasket design which did not have the same reliable history as the double O ring and failed to translate this fact into the licensing basis at time of installation.
EA-09-283
Davis Besse
NOV
(White)
02/25/2010

On February 25, 2010, a Notice of Violation was issued to FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company for a violation associated with a White Significance Determination Finding as a result of inspections at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station. This finding involved a violation of 10 CFR 50.54(q) which requires, in part, that a holder of an operating license shall follow emergency plans which meet the standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b). 10 CFR 50.47(b) requires, in part, that the licensee have a standard emergency classification and action level scheme in use. The Davis-Besse Emergency Plan requires, in part, that the Shift Manager shall verify the indication of an off-normal event and classify the situation.

Specifically, on June 25, 2009, the Shift Manager failed to verify the indications of an off-normal event or reported sighting, assess the information available from valid indications or reports of an explosion, and classify the situation as an Alert in accordance with the Emergency Action Level Conditions during an actual event.

EA-07-199
Davis Besse
ORDER 08/15/2007 On August 15, 2007, a Confirmatory Order (Effective Immediately) was issued to FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC) to formalize commitments made by FENOC following the NRC staff's issuance of a Demand for Information (DFI) on May 14, 2007. The DFI was issued in response to the information provided by FENOC relative to its re-analysis of the time line and root causes for the 2002 Davis-Besse reactor pressure vessel head degradation event following its receipt of a report prepared by Exponent Failure Analysis Associates and Altran Solutions Corporation (Exponent). On June 13, 2007, FENOC provided its response to the DFI. On July 16, 2007, FENOC provided a supplemental response to the DFI which provided additional detail regarding the planned implementation of commitments established in its June 13, 2007, response to the DFI.
EA-07-123
Davis Besse
DFI 05/14/2007 On May 14, 2007, a Demand for Information (DFI) was issued to FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC) in response to information provided by FENOC in a report, dated December 15, 2006, prepared by its contractor, Exponent Failure Analysis Associates and Altran Solutions Corporation (Exponent), associated with the root causes and time line for the 2002 Davis Besse reactor pressure vessel head degradation event. In particular, the DFI required FENOC to provide detailed and specific information relative to the timing of FENOC's review of the Exponent Report and the factors FENOC considered when determining whether the conclusions in the report should be communicated to the NRC. The DFI also required FENOC to provide information in order for the NRC to understand the depth and completeness of FENOC's evaluation of the assumptions, methods, and conclusions of the Exponent Report and to understand the differences between the Exponent Report and the technical and programmatic root cause reports previously developed by FENOC relative to the 2002 Davis-Besse event. In addition, the DFI required information in order for the NRC to understand FENOC's position regarding a second contractor report prepared for FENOC entitled, "Report of Reactor Pressure Vessel Wastage at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant," dated December 2006. Regarding the second report, the DFI required specific information relative to FENOC's endorsement of the report's conclusions and the implications of any new positions taken by FENOC compared to those previously communicated to the NRC in response to the Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties, dated April 21, 2005. After reviewing FENOC's response to the DFI the NRC will determine whether further action is necessary to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements.
EA-04-224
Davis Besse
ORDER 07/15/2005 On July 15, 2005, an immediately effective Confirmatory Order was issued to establish certain requirements as set forth in the Order including training related to employee protection for contractor personnel who are granted unescorted access at Davis-Besse and the other FENOC nuclear facilities. The Order was discussed during Alternative Dispute Resolution and, subject to satisfactory implementation of said requirements, the NRC will not pursue further enforcement action on this issue.
EA-04-231
Davis Besse
NOV
(White)
05/05/2005 On May 5, 2005, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White SDP finding involving the failure of the emergency planning zone (EPZ) sirens. The violation cited the licensee's failure to implement the means to provide early notification and clear instruction to the populace within the plume exposure pathway EPZ.
EA-05-071
EA-05-068
EA-05-066
EA-05-067
EA-05-072
EA-03-025
EA-05-069
EA-05-070
Davis-Besse
NOVCP
(SLI, Red)

$5,450,000
04/21/2005 On April 21, 2005, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties in the amount of $5,450,000 was issued for multiple violations (some willful) related to the significant degradation of the reactor pressure vessel head identified in February and March 2002. The significant violations included, (1) operation with reactor coolant system pressure boundary leakage (associated with a Red SDP finding, $5,000,000), (2) failure to provide complete and accurate information (Severity Level I, $110,000), (3) failure to promptly identify and correct a significant condition adverse to quality (Severity Level II, $110,000), (4) failure to implement procedures (Severity Level II, $110,000), (5) failure to provide complete and accurate information (Severity Level I, $120,000), (6) failure to promptly identify and correct a significant condition adverse to quality (associated with a Red SDP finding), (7) failure to implement procedures (associated with a Red SDP finding), and (8) failure to provide complete and accurate information (Severity Level III).
EA-03-209
Davis-Besse
NOV
(SL III)
05/07/2004 On May 7, 2004, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation involving the failure to provide the NRC with complete and accurate information in the licensee's response to NRC Generic Letter (GL) 98-04 regarding protective coating deficiencies and foreign material in containment.

EA-03-214
Davis-Besse

ORDER 03/08/004 On March 8, 2004, an immediately effective Confirmatory Order was issued to confirm certain commitments, as set forth in the Order, that requires annual independent assessments for five years, in the areas of operations, engineering, corrective actions and safety culture and requires inspection of key reactor coolant system pressure boundary components during a mid-cycle outage to ensure effective assessment and sustained safe performance. The Order was issued in conjunction with the NRC's decision to approve the restart of the facility.
EA-03-172
Davis-Besse
NOV
(White)
03/05/2004 On March 5, 2004, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White SDP finding involving the potential inability of the high pressure injection (HPI) pumps to perform their safety function under certain accident scenarios due to potential pump degradation. The violation cited the licensee's failure to adequately implement design control measures for verifying the adequacy of the design of the HPI pumps to mitigate all postulated accidents.
EA-03-131
Davis-Besse
NOV
(Yellow)
10/07/2003 On October 7, 2003, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a Yellow SDP finding involving the inability of the emergency core cooling system sump to perform its safety function under certain accident scenarios due to potential clogging of the sump screen. The violation cited the licensee's failure to promptly identify and correct significant conditions adverse to quality involving the potential to clog the emergency core cooling and containment spray system sump with debris following a loss of coolant accident (LOCA).
EA-02-117
EA-02-257
Davis-Besse
NOV
(White)
02/19/2003 On February 19, 2003, a Notice of Violation was issued for violations associated with two White SDP findings associated with the radiological controls related to steam generator nozzle dam installation conducted on February 20, 2002. The violations cited the failure of the licensee to conduct an adequate evaluation of the radiological hazards in order to characterize the radiological work conditions and to take timely and suitable measurements to adequately monitor the occupational intake of the material by workers during and following steam generator nozzle dam installation.
EA-99-138
Davis-Besse
NOV
(SL III)
08/06/1999 Violations involving failure to maintain the design of a pressurizer spray valve and inadequate corrective action for the degraded condition.
EA-96-304
Davis-Besse
NOVCP
(SL III)

$ 50,000
10/22/1996 Failure to take actions to address hot shorts in circuits controlling as many as 41 MOV's and to take corrective action to address the use of combustibles for radiant energy shields.
EA-96-122
Davis-Besse
NOV
(SL III)
06/13/1996 Missing HPI system high point.

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Diablo Canyon 1 & 2 - Docket Nos. 050-00275; 050-00323

NRC Action Number(s) and
Facility Name
Action Type
(Severity) &
Civil Penalty
(if any)
Date
Issued
Description
EA-12-075
Diablo Canyon 1 & 2
NOV
(SL III)
05/04/2012 On May 4, 2012, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation to Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) for a violation of 10 CFR 50.9, “Completeness and Accuracy of Information,” associated with a Severity Level III violation involving PG&E's failure to provide information to the Commission that was complete and accurate in all material respects, related to its NRC Generic Letter 2003-01 response. Specifically, in a letter dated April 22, 2005, PG&E stated that: (1) test results confirmed that no unfiltered control room in-leakage existed; and (2) tracer gas in-leakage testing was performed in the alignment that results in the greatest consequence to the control room operator. This information was inaccurate because control room ventilation testing conducted prior to PG&E's response to Generic Letter 2003-01 indicated that the unfiltered in-leakage was greater than the value assumed in the design basis radiological analyses, and the system test was not performed in an alignment that resulted in the greatest consequence to the control room operator.
EA-96-123
Diablo Canyon 1 & 2
NOV
(SL III)
06/07/1996 Licensee granted unescorted access when there was derogatory information and a request to hold from contractor.

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Dresden 2 & 3 - Docket Nos. 050-00237; 050-00249

NRC Action Number(s) and
Facility Name
Action Type
(Severity) &
Civil Penalty
(if any)
Date
Issued
Description
EA 13-068
Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3
ORDER 10/28/2013 On October 28, 2013, the NRC issued a Confirmatory Order (CO) to Exelon Generating Company, LLC. (Exelon) to formalize commitments made as a result of an alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mediation session held on September 18, 2013. The commitments were made as part of a settlement agreement between Exelon and the NRC regarding the apparent violation of 10 CFR 73.56, “Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants.” The agreement resolves the apparent violation which involved the failure of several Dresden Nuclear Power Station (Dresden) individuals to immediately inform a reviewing official of the questionable behavior of a now former Dresden senior reactor operator (SRO). This individual, along with another former Dresden SRO, planned and attempted to recruit another former employee to commit a violent off-site crime. As part of the ADR settlement agreement, Exelon has completed or intends to complete a number of corrective actions. These actions include fleet wide procedure revisions and training, fleet wide briefings, a presentation at an appropriate industry forum and submittal of an operating experience summary to an industry wide organization. In consideration of the corrective actions and commitments outlined in the CO, the NRC agreed to refrain from issuing a Notice of Violation and to preclude consideration of this CO as enforcement history for the Dresden Station.
EA-13-079
Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3
NOV
(White)
07/31/2013 On July 31, 2013, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation (NOV) to Exelon Generation Company, LLC for a violation of Technical Specification Section 5.4.1, Procedures, associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding involving the failure of Dresden personnel to establish a written procedure to address the effect of an external flooding scenario on the plant.  Specifically, prior to November 21, 2012, procedure DOA 0010-04, Floods, did not account for reactor vessel inventory make-up during an external flooding scenario up to and including the probable maximum flood event which could result in reactor vessel water level lowering below the top of active fuel.
EA-09-172
Dresden 3
NOV
(White)
10/26/2009 On October 26, 2009, a Notice of Violation was issued to Exelon Generation Company, LLC for a violations associated with a White Significance Determination Finding as a result of inspections at the Dresden Nuclear Power Station Unit 3. The White finding involved multiple violations including: (a) 10 CFR 50.54(j), in which non-licensed operators, during a maintenance activity, manipulated the control rod drive system hydraulic control unit insert riser isolation valves and the withdraw riser isolation valves, an action which affected the reactivity of the reactor in that the valve manipulations caused three control rods, D-7, E-7, and E-6 to move out of the core to positions 06, 18, and 16, respectively; (b) Technical Specification 3.1.1, in which the reactor was in Mode 4, the shutdown margin was not ≥ 0.38 ∆k/k and the licensee failed to initiate immediate actions to insert control rods; (c) Technical Specification 5.4.1, in which maintenance that affected the performance of the control rods, which are safety-related equipment, was performed in accordance with a written procedure that was not appropriate to the circumstances; (d) Technical Specification 5.4.1, in which the control room operators failed to implement a section of a procedure in that they did not aggressively investigate annunciators and alarms and did not accept the alarms as correct until demonstrated otherwise; and (e) Technical Specification 5.4.1, in which the licensee failed to implement its written procedure which addressed the inability to drive control rods.
EA-07-200
Dresden 2 & 3
NOVCP
SL III

$65,000
11/27/2007 On November 27, 2007, a Notice of Violation and Exercise of Discretion for Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $65,000 was issued for a Severity Level III problem consisting of four violations involving the licensee's failure to comply with 10 CFR 74.19 between 1959 and 2007. In summary, the licensee failed to (a) keep complete records showing the inventory (including location and unique identity), transfer, and disposal of all special nuclear material (SNM) in its possession; (b) establish, maintain, and follow written MC&A procedures that were sufficient to enable the licensee to account for SNM in its possession; and (c) conduct a physical inventory of all SNM in its possession at intervals not to exceed 12 months. This resulted in the failure to account for two fuel pellets and a number of incore detectors containing SNM.
EA-03-102
Dresden 2 & 3
NOV
SL III
08/29/2003 On a August 29, 2003, Notice of Violation was issued for a violation involving the failure by Exelon to provide complete and accurate information to the NRC regarding a request to renew a reactor operator license.
EA-02-265
Dresden 3
NOVCP
SL III

$60,000
06/23/2003 On a June 23, 2003, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $60,000 was issued for the willful failure to provide complete and accurate information to the NRC Region III staff concerning the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system during a telephone conference call on September 27, 2001. A Notice of Violation was also issued for a violation associated with a White SDP finding.
EA-02-264
Dresden 3
NOV
(White)
06/23/2003 On a June 23, 2003, Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White SDP finding involving the operability of the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system. The violation cited the licensee's failure to promptly correct a damaged HPCI system support resulting in the equipment being inoperable for greater than the allowed outage time. A Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $60,000 was also issued in conjunction with this case.
EA-99-313
Dresden 2 & 3
NOV
(SL III)
09/06/2000 On September 6, 2000, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation based on discrimination against a radiation protection technician for engaging in protected activities.
EA-96-532
Dresden 2 & 3
NOV
(SL III)
05/21/1997 Failure to adequately test control room emergency ventilation system.
EA-96-493
Dresden 2 & 3
NOV
(SL III)
09/18/1998 Problems are rooted in practices associated with the control of examination materials and the lack of personal integrity of the individuals involved.
EA-96-391
Dresden 2 & 3
NOV
(SL III)
05/30/1997 U-3 main steam line drain valve LLRT failures. Primary containment inoperable.
EA-96-115
Dresden 2 & 3
NOVCP
(SL III)

$ 50,000
06/13/1996 Corner rooms structural steel in a condition outside FSAR caused by failure to account for modifications and errors in original design calculations.

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Duane Arnold - Docket No. 050-00331

NRC Action Number(s) and
Facility Name
Action Type
(Severity) &
Civil Penalty
(if any)
Date
Issued
Description
EA-13-223
Duane Arnold
NOV
(White)
02/11/2014

On February 11, 2014, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation (NOV) to NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC for a violation of Technical Specification 3.5.3, “Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System”, associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding involving the failure of Duane Arnold personnel to perform an immediate operability determination in accordance with NextEra’s procedures.  Specifically, on June 21, 2013, Duane Arnold personnel failed to consider the degraded speed indication’s impact on RCIC operability.  As a result, the RCIC system was inoperable from June 21, 2013, to August 24, 2013.

EA-13-182
Duane Arnold
NOV
(White)
12/18/2013 On December 18, 2013, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation (NOV) to NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC for a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, “Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings,” associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding involving the failure of Duane Arnold personnel to prescribe a work instruction of a type appropriate to the circumstances for the re-assembly of the ‘A’ standby diesel generator lube oil heat exchanger. Specifically, on October 18, 2012, the licensee completed work order 40132858, which replaced the ‘A’ standby diesel generator lube oil heat exchanger tube bundle. The work order did not contain a specific and detailed sequence for re-assembly of the heat exchanger and connected piping system to achieve uniform and appropriate compression of the tube bundle-to-shell gasket. This contributed to the catastrophic failure of the tube bundle-to-shell gasket during a maintenance run of the engine on March 8, 2013, rendering the ‘A’ standby diesel generator unavailable.
EA-09-083
Duane Arnold
NOV
(White)
06/06/2009 On June 6, 2009 a Notice of Violation was issued to Florida Power and Light Energy Duane Arnold, LLC for a violation associated with a White Significance Determination Finding involving a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, “Corrective Actions.” Specifically, the licensee initially identified and corrected a condition adverse to quality regarding overspeed trip alarms on the Train B emergency diesel generator (B EDG), a safety-related component covered under 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, in February and March 2008. However, when spurious overspeed trip alarms began recurring in June 2008, the licensee did not perform any additional evaluation to identify the cause for the new condition adverse to quality and did not correct the recurring spurious overspeed trip alarms. This allowed the overspeed switch degradation to continue, resulting in the failure of the B EDG during the monthly surveillance test conducted in November 2008.
EA-07-017
Duane Arnold
NOV
(SL III)
04/02/2007 On April 2, 2007, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White Significance Determination Finding involving the failure of the licensee's 2006 full-scale exercise critique to identify a weakness associated with a Risk Significant Planning Standard which was also a Drill and Exercise Participation Performance Indicator. The NRC has determined that this failure is a performance deficiency and is also a violation of emergency preparedness planning standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14) and associated risk significant planning standard 10 CFR 50.54(b)(4).
EA-06-047
Duane Arnold
NOV
(SL III)
05/01/2006 On May 1, 2006, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation involving failure to complete a pre-fuel-move checklist prior to relocating three irradiated fuel bundles in the spent fuel/cask pool Duane Arnold spent fuel/cask pool. Specifically, a designated fuel handling supervisor failed to complete the checklist, as required by a Duane Arnold fuel handling procedure, before moving the irradiated fuel bundles.
EA-04-053
Duane Arnold
NOV
(SL III)
05/01/2006 On May 1, 2006, a Notice of Violation and Exercise of Enforcement Discretion was issued for a Severity Level III violation involving a Refueling Floor Supervisor who deliberately directed an operator to relocate irradiated items in the cask pool without notifying health physics or ensuring that health physics personnel were present prior to relocating the irradiated items on July 23, 2003. Enforcement discretion in accordance with Section VII.B.6 of the Enforcement Policy was exercised to refrain from issuing a civil penalty for the violation because it involved special circumstances.

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Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, July 23, 2014