NRC Action Number(s) and
Facility Name |
Action Type
(Severity) &
Civil Penalty
(if any) |
Date
Issued |
Description |
EA-21-155
Davis Besse |
NOV (White) |
03/01/2022 |
On March 1, 2022, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding to Energy Harbor Nuclear Corporation (Licensee) Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station. The white finding, an issue of low to moderate safety significance, involved the licensee’s failure to establish the required voltage specifications for emergency diesel generator (EDG) speed control switches as required by Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, “Design Control.” As a result, on May 27, 2021, the Division 1 EDG failed to reach required voltage and frequency during surveillance testing. |
EA-18-008
Davis Besse |
NOV (White) |
04/13/2018 |
On April 13, 2018, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation to FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC) for a violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V at Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding. Contrary to the requirements, FENOC failed to assure that activities affecting quality were prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings. Specifically, FENOC failed to provide appropriate instructions to calibrate the turbine bearing oil sight glasses for the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) pumps. This failure resulted in failure of the inboard turbine bearing on the number 1 AFW pump due to low bearing oil levels when the pump was tested in September 2017. Additionally, there are associated violations of Technical Specification 3.7.5, "Emergency Feedwater," which requires three trains of emergency feedwater available at power or restored to operable within 72 hours and plant shutdown if the 72 hour requirement cannot be met. |
EA-16-022
Davis Besse |
ORDER |
09/01/2016 |
On September 1, 2016, the NRC issued a Confirmatory Order to Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (Davis-Besse) to formalize commitments made as a result of an alternative dispute mediation session. The agreement resolves the apparent failure of a licensed operator who deliberately failed to comply with a condition of his license, and failed to provide Davis-Besse with information, that was complete and accurate in all material respects, for the submittal of required updates on the operator's medical condition. Davis-Besse agreed to a number of corrective actions, including: (1) a management discussion with each licensed operator in regard to this event, (2) revisions to operator requalification training materials to incorporate facts and lessons learned from this event, (3) management communications regarding expectations and requirements for complete and accurate medical reporting to operations personnel subject to those requirements, (4) training to address the provisions of 10 CFR 50.9, (5) revisions to existing fleet procedures governing licensed operator medical reports, (6) a presentation at the Nuclear Medical Resources Professionals User Group on the facts of this case, and (7) submission of an article to a widespread trade publication based on the facts and lessons learned from this event. In consideration of these commitments, the NRC agreed to refrain from issuing a Notice of Violation and will consider this Order as an escalated enforcement action for a period of one year from its effective date. |
EA-14-094
Davis Besse |
ORDER |
06/30/2014 |
On June 30, 2014, a Confirmatory Order was issued to FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC), confirming FENOC's commitment to submit a license amendment request to transition Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 to the National Fire Protection Association Standard 805. FENOC had originally planned to submit its application on July 1, 2014. The NRC reviewed FENOC's justification for the delay, and accepted the proposed new submittal date of December 31, 2015. |
EA-10-332
Davis Besse |
NOV
(SL III) |
04/30/2010 |
On April 30, 2010, a Notice of Violation (NOV) was issued to FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company for a Severity Level III problem for the failure to implement: (1) 10 CFR 50.71 "Maintenance of records, making of reports" and (2) 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design control." In July 1999, the licensee submitted a license amendment request to eliminate as found testing criteria by using the past data for double O ring data and was approved by the NRC. However, the licensee staff did not update this fact in their updated final safety analysis report. The licensee also changed from the double O ring design to a flat gasket design which did not have the same reliable history as the double O ring and failed to translate this fact into the licensing basis at time of installation. |
EA-09-283
Davis Besse |
NOV
(White) |
02/25/2010 |
On February 25, 2010, a Notice of Violation was issued to FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company for a violation associated with a White Significance Determination Finding as a result of inspections at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station. This finding involved a violation of 10 CFR 50.54(q) which requires, in part, that a holder of an operating license shall follow emergency plans which meet the standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b). 10 CFR 50.47(b) requires, in part, that the licensee have a standard emergency classification and action level scheme in use. The Davis-Besse Emergency Plan requires, in part, that the Shift Manager shall verify the indication of an off-normal event and classify the situation.
Specifically, on June 25, 2009, the Shift Manager failed to verify the indications of an off-normal event or reported sighting, assess the information available from valid indications or reports of an explosion, and classify the situation as an Alert in accordance with the Emergency Action Level Conditions during an actual event.
|
EA-07-199
Davis Besse |
ORDER |
08/15/2007 |
On August 15, 2007, a Confirmatory Order (Effective Immediately) was issued to FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC) to formalize commitments made by FENOC following the NRC staff's issuance of a Demand for Information (DFI) on May 14, 2007. The DFI was issued in response to the information provided by FENOC relative to its re-analysis of the time line and root causes for the 2002 Davis-Besse reactor pressure vessel head degradation event following its receipt of a report prepared by Exponent Failure Analysis Associates and Altran Solutions Corporation (Exponent). On June 13, 2007, FENOC provided its response to the DFI. On July 16, 2007, FENOC provided a supplemental response to the DFI which provided additional detail regarding the planned implementation of commitments established in its June 13, 2007, response to the DFI. |
EA-07-123
Davis Besse |
DFI |
05/14/2007 |
On May 14, 2007, a Demand for Information (DFI) was issued to FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC) in response to information provided by FENOC in a report, dated December 15, 2006, prepared by its contractor, Exponent Failure Analysis Associates and Altran Solutions Corporation (Exponent), associated with the root causes and time line for the 2002 Davis Besse reactor pressure vessel head degradation event. In particular, the DFI required FENOC to provide detailed and specific information relative to the timing of FENOC's review of the Exponent Report and the factors FENOC considered when determining whether the conclusions in the report should be communicated to the NRC. The DFI also required FENOC to provide information in order for the NRC to understand the depth and completeness of FENOC's evaluation of the assumptions, methods, and conclusions of the Exponent Report and to understand the differences between the Exponent Report and the technical and programmatic root cause reports previously developed by FENOC relative to the 2002 Davis-Besse event. In addition, the DFI required information in order for the NRC to understand FENOC's position regarding a second contractor report prepared for FENOC entitled, "Report of Reactor Pressure Vessel Wastage at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant," dated December 2006. Regarding the second report, the DFI required specific information relative to FENOC's endorsement of the report's conclusions and the implications of any new positions taken by FENOC compared to those previously communicated to the NRC in response to the Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties, dated April 21, 2005. After reviewing FENOC's response to the DFI the NRC will determine whether further action is necessary to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements. |
EA-04-224
Davis Besse |
ORDER |
07/15/2005 |
On July 15, 2005, an immediately effective Confirmatory Order was issued to establish certain requirements as set forth in the Order including training related to employee protection for contractor personnel who are granted unescorted access at Davis-Besse and the other FENOC nuclear facilities. The Order was discussed during Alternative Dispute Resolution and, subject to satisfactory implementation of said requirements, the NRC will not pursue further enforcement action on this issue. |
EA-04-231
Davis Besse |
NOV
(White) |
05/05/2005 |
On May 5, 2005, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White SDP finding involving the failure of the emergency planning zone (EPZ) sirens. The violation cited the licensee's failure to implement the means to provide early notification and clear instruction to the populace within the plume exposure pathway EPZ. |
EA-05-071
EA-05-068
EA-05-066
EA-05-067
EA-05-072
EA-03-025
EA-05-069
EA-05-070
Davis-Besse |
NOVCP
(SLI, Red)
$5,450,000 |
04/21/2005 |
On April 21, 2005, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties in the amount of $5,450,000 was issued for multiple violations (some willful) related to the significant degradation of the reactor pressure vessel head identified in February and March 2002. The significant violations included, (1) operation with reactor coolant system pressure boundary leakage (associated with a Red SDP finding, $5,000,000), (2) failure to provide complete and accurate information (Severity Level I, $110,000), (3) failure to promptly identify and correct a significant condition adverse to quality (Severity Level II, $110,000), (4) failure to implement procedures (Severity Level II, $110,000), (5) failure to provide complete and accurate information (Severity Level I, $120,000), (6) failure to promptly identify and correct a significant condition adverse to quality (associated with a Red SDP finding), (7) failure to implement procedures (associated with a Red SDP finding), and (8) failure to provide complete and accurate information (Severity Level III). |
EA-03-209
Davis-Besse |
NOV
(SL III) |
05/07/2004 |
On May 7, 2004, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation involving the failure to provide the NRC with complete and accurate information in the licensee's response to NRC Generic Letter (GL) 98-04 regarding protective coating deficiencies and foreign material in containment. |
EA-03-214
Davis-Besse
|
ORDER |
03/08/004 |
On March 8, 2004, an immediately effective Confirmatory Order was issued to confirm certain commitments, as set forth in the Order, that requires annual independent assessments for five years, in the areas of operations, engineering, corrective actions and safety culture and requires inspection of key reactor coolant system pressure boundary components during a mid-cycle outage to ensure effective assessment and sustained safe performance. The Order was issued in conjunction with the NRC's decision to approve the restart of the facility. |
EA-03-172
Davis-Besse |
NOV
(White) |
03/05/2004 |
On March 5, 2004, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White SDP finding involving the potential inability of the high pressure injection (HPI) pumps to perform their safety function under certain accident scenarios due to potential pump degradation. The violation cited the licensee's failure to adequately implement design control measures for verifying the adequacy of the design of the HPI pumps to mitigate all postulated accidents. |
EA-03-131
Davis-Besse |
NOV
(Yellow) |
10/07/2003 |
On October 7, 2003, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a Yellow SDP finding involving the inability of the emergency core cooling system sump to perform its safety function under certain accident scenarios due to potential clogging of the sump screen. The violation cited the licensee's failure to promptly identify and correct significant conditions adverse to quality involving the potential to clog the emergency core cooling and containment spray system sump with debris following a loss of coolant accident (LOCA). |
EA-02-117
EA-02-257
Davis-Besse |
NOV
(White) |
02/19/2003 |
On February 19, 2003, a Notice of Violation was issued for violations associated with two White SDP findings associated with the radiological controls related to steam generator nozzle dam installation conducted on February 20, 2002. The violations cited the failure of the licensee to conduct an adequate evaluation of the radiological hazards in order to characterize the radiological work conditions and to take timely and suitable measurements to adequately monitor the occupational intake of the material by workers during and following steam generator nozzle dam installation. |
EA-99-138
Davis-Besse |
NOV
(SL III) |
08/06/1999 |
Violations involving failure to maintain the design of a pressurizer spray valve and inadequate corrective action for the degraded condition. |
EA-96-304
Davis-Besse |
NOVCP
(SL III)
$ 50,000 |
10/22/1996 |
Failure to take actions to address hot shorts in circuits controlling as many as 41 MOV's and to take corrective action to address the use of combustibles for radiant energy shields. |
EA-96-122
Davis-Besse |
NOV
(SL III) |
06/13/1996 |
Missing HPI system high point. |