United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment

Escalated Enforcement Actions Issuedto Reactor Licensees - B

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Beaver Valley 1 & 2 - Docket Nos. 050-00334; 050-00412

NRC Action Number(s) and
Facility Name
Action Type
(Severity) &
Civil Penalty
(if any)
Date
Issued
Description
EA-12-254
Beaver Valley 1 & 2
(ORDER) 02/20/2013 On February 20, 2013, a Confirmatory Order was issued to the FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC), confirming FENOC’s commitment to submit a license amendment request to transition its two units to the National Fire Protection Association Standard 805. FENOC had originally planned to submit its application on September 30, 2012. The NRC reviewed FENOC’s justification for the delay, and accepted the proposed new submittal date of December 31, 2013.
EA-06-152
Beaver Valley 1 & 2
NOV and
(ORDER)
12/19/2006 On December 19, 2006, a Notice of Violation (NOV) and a Confirmatory Order (Effective Immediately) were issued as part of a settlement agreement that was prepared as a result of an Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) session that was held to resolve the results of an investigation of deliberate wrongdoing by a former contract mechanical engineer. The NOV includes two violations (categorized as one Severity Level III problem) which are cited against 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," and the licensee's procedures for engineering changes and design interface reviews and evaluations. Based on the ADR session, both parties agreed, among other things, that: (1) the former contract engineer deliberately failed to adhere to procedural requirements; (2) the licensee took multiple corrective actions to prevent recurrence; (3) there was a need for additional corrective actions at the licensee's facilities as well as an opportunity for other licensees in the industry to learn from this incident; (4) in light of the corrective actions the licensee has taken and has committed to take, the NRC would issue a Severity Level III violation with no civil penalty; and (5) the NRC would issue a Confirmatory Order confirming the agreement.
EA-06-215
Beaver Valley 1 & 2
NOV
(White)
12/12/2006 On December 12, 2006, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a WHITE Significance Determination Process finding involving an inadequate emergency preparedness implementing procedure that would be used during certain emergency conditions to assess the offsite radiological consequences for the purpose of developing protective action recommendations (PAR). The violation was cited against 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9) because the licensee's emergency plan failed to have an adequate method for assessing actual and potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency.
EA-03-054
Beaver Valley 1 & 2
NOV
(White)
07/10/2003 On July 10, 2003, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation involving a white SDP finding involving the inability of the licensee's emergency response organization to meet Emergency Preparedness Plan (EPP) staffing requirements during emergencies. The violation cited the failure (identified during an unannounced drill) of the on-site Emergency Response Organization to augment radiation protection technicians within the required times to cover four radiation protection functions.
EA-02-041
Beaver Valley 1 & 2
NOV
(White)
06/24/2002 On June 24, 2002, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White SDP finding involving the public alert and notification system. The violation cited the failure to establish a means to provide early notification to the public because a majority of personal home alerting devices were degraded or removed.
EA-00-045
EA-00-053
Beaver Valley 1 & 2
NOV
(SL III)
05/03/2000 On May 3, 2000, a Notice of Violation was issued for two Severity Level III violations and one Severity Level III problem. This first Severity Level III violation was based on the failure to correct a condition adverse to quality involving the service water and river water pump vacuum break check valves that rendered a SW pump inoperable. The second Severity Level III violation involved the failure to perform an adequate design review of a temporary modification to the filtered water system (a source of seal water to the RW pumps). The Severity Level III problem was based on design deficiencies associated with the seal water supply to the RW pumps, and the failure of the RW pump testing program to identify one of those deficiencies.
EA-99-212
Beaver Valley 1 & 2
NOV
(SL III)
10/21/1999 Multiple violations involving failure to implement corrective actions to prevent biofouling of the service water system, and failure to provide adequate acceptance criteria in the procedure for chemical treatment of the service water sytem.
EA-97-517
Beaver Valley 1 & 2
NOV
(SL III)
01/06/1998 Failure to prevent repetitive gas binding of high head safety injection pump.
EA-97-255
Beaver Valley 1 & 2
NOV
(SL III)
07/03/1997 Misread technical specification surveillances.
EA-97-076
Beaver Valley 1 & 2
NOV
(SL III)
03/24/1997 This action was based on numerous failures to follow procedures and implement appropriate work controls involving configuration control, failure to take appropriate corrective actions for past configuration control problems, and for operators inadvertently deenergizing the waste decay tank oxygen analyzers.
EA-96-462;
Beaver Valley 1 & 2
NOVCP
(SL III)

$100,000
03/10/1997 The action was based on (1) a Severity Level III problem related to deficiencies associated with inadequate control of leak sealant repairs on the Unit 2 reactor head vent system (HVS) and (2) a Severity Level III violation related to the licensee's failure to correct an adverse condition to quality at Unit 1 involving the operation of the reactor with two out of three pressurizer power operated relief valve (PORV) block valves shut for 13 years.
EA-96-244
Beaver Valley 1 & 2
NOV
(SL III)
09/11/1996 AMSAC failure.

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Big Rock Point - Docket No. 050-00155

NRC Action Number(s) and
Facility Name
Action Type
(Severity) &
Civil Penalty
(if any)
Date
Issued
Description
EA-97-197
Big Rock Point
NOV
(SL III)
08/12/1997 Breakdown in radiation protection program.

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Braidwood 1 & 2 - Docket Nos. 050-00456; 050-00457

NRC Action Number(s) and
Facility Name
Action Type
(Severity) &
Civil Penalty
(if any)
Date
Issued
Description
EA-09-259
Braidwood
NOV
(White)
02/25/2010

On February 25, 2010, a Notice of Violation was issued to Exelon Generation Company, LLC, for a violation associated with a White Significance Determination Finding as a result of inspections at the Braidwood Nuclear Power Station. This finding involved a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," which requires, in part, that measures be established for the selection and review for suitability of application of materials, parts, equipment, and processes that are essential to the safety-related functions of the structures, systems, and components.

Specifically, on June 24, 2009, a safety-related valve failed to stroke full open during a surveillance testing procedure. Following the test failure, the licensee determined that water entered the valve actuator through conduit penetration and caused corrosion to the valve internals, which caused the valve not to fully open.

EA-06-081
Braidwood
NOV
(White)
06/29/2006 On June 29, 2006, a Notice of Violation associated with a White SDP finding was issued for a finding involving multiple failures by the licensee to adequately evaluate the radiological hazards associated with the leaks from the circulating water blowdown line vacuum breakers and to assess the environmental impact of the resultant onsite and offsite tritium contamination.
EA-02-118
Braidwood 1
NOV
(White)
07/23/2002 On July 23, 2002, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a white SDP finding involving pressurizer power operated relief valve (PORV) air accumulator check valve failures. The violation cited the licensee's failure to correct and prevent recurrence of the Unit 1 PORV air accumulator check valves leak-through, a significant condition adverse to quality.
EA-00-010
Braidwood 1 & 2
NOV
(SL III)
05/18/2000 On May 18, 2000, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation based on a radiation protection technician deliberate failure to follow required procedures when he activated the alarms on the portal monitors a total of 14 times and failed to contact the radiation protection department before leaving the station.
EA-97-265
Braidwood 1 & 2
NOVCP
(SL III)

$ 55,000
10/03/1997 Violation of TS surveillance requirements.
EA-97-110
Braidwood 1 & 2
NOV
(SL III)
10/02/1997 Appendix R - safe shutdown concerns.
EA-96-070
Braidwood 1 & 2
NOVCP
(SL III)

$100,000
05/16/1996 Severity Level III problem involving failure to properly control the configuration and alignment of plant systems and the failure to promply identify and correct recurrent problems in the area of plant configuration control.

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Browns Ferry 1, 2 & 3 - Docket Nos. 050-00259; 050-00260; 050-00296

NRC Action Number(s) and
Facility Name
Action Type
(Severity) &
Civil Penalty
(if any)
Date
Issued
Description
EA-14-005
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant
NOV
(White)
04/30/2014

On April 30, 2014, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation to Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), as a result of the failure to maintain plant staffing levels in accordance with the radiological emergency plan at Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant. This White finding, an issue with low to moderate significance to safety, which may require additional NRC inspections, involved the failure of the licensee's process for maintaining minimum emergency response shift staffing to adequately maintain staffing of the Shift Technical Advisor and Incident Commander to ensure initial accident response in all key functional areas.

Additionally, NRC identified two examples of a violation of 10 CFR 50.9 based on the licensee's failure to provide complete and accurate information associated with emergency response on-shift staffing requirements and a violation of 10 CFR 50.90 for the failure to submit an application requesting an amendment to their operating license concerning on-shift staffing levels. On May 1, 2014, the NRC issued a Confirmatory Order to TVA to formalize commitments made as a result of an ADR mediation session. The commitments were made by TVA as part of a settlement agreement between TVA and the NRC regarding the violation(s) of 50.9 and 50.90. TVA agreed to a number of corrective actions, including correcting the Conduct of Operations procedure to reflect adequate staffing levels and comprehensive fleet-wide and plant-specific corrective actions.

EA-13-118
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 2
NOV
(White)
08/23/2013 On August 23, 2013, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation (NOV) to Tennessee Valley Authority for a violation of Technical Specification Section 5.4.1, Procedures, associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding involving the failure of Browns Ferry personnel to properly implement a procedure recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, dated February 1978. Specifically, on December 22, 2012, the licensee failed to properly implement the procedure for Startup, Operation, and Shutdown of the Reactor Protection System, 2-OI-99, Reactor Protection System, step 5.1[3], when an operator incorrectly opened the RPS motor generator set tie to battery board 2 Breaker on the A RPS bus motor generator set while attempting to start the B RPS bus motor generator set. The failure to properly implement 2-OI-99 caused a Unit 2 reactor SCRAM and MSIV closure.
EA-12-133
Browns Ferry 1, 2 & 3
NOV
(White)
08/13/2012 On August 13, 2012, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation to Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) for a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding involving TVA’s failure to accomplish the requirements contained in procedure NPG-SPP-09.3 “Plant Modifications and Engineering Change Control,” which required that an evaluation of training needs be completed to support implementation of procedures developed in response to design changes. Specifically, on September 13, 2011, TVA issued several Safe Shutdown Instructions in support of Design Change Notice 69957, which installed a new three-hour fire barrier in the Intake Tunnel Structure, without performing an evaluation of training needs. As a result, the Safe Shutdown Instructions could not be satisfactorily performed by plant operators and staff.
EA-12-071
Browns Ferry 1, 2 & 3
ORDER 05/18/2012 On May 18, 2012, an immediately effective Confirmatory Order was issued to the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), confirming TVA’s commitment to submit a license amendment request to transition the three units at the Browns Ferry plant to the National Fire Protection Association Standard 805. TVA had originally planned to submit its application to transition Browns Ferry on March 4, 2012. However, TVA requested a delay to ensure it could submit a high-quality application. Based on TVA’s commitment to maintain acceptable compensatory measures, and a review of TVA’s status and planned key activities, including the intended NFPA 805 modifications, the NRC determined that TVA provided adequate justification for its commitment to submit a license application by March 29, 2013. The NRC has therefore extended TVA’s enforcement discretion until March 29, 2013.
EA-11-252
Browns Ferry 1
NOV
(SL III)
01/23/2012 On January 23, 2012, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation to Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) for a violation of 10 CFR 50.9, “Completeness and Accuracy of Information,” associated with a Severity Level III violation involving TVA’s failure to provide information to the Commission that was complete and accurate in all material respects, related to its NRC Generic Letter 89-10, “Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve Testing and Surveillance” testing program. Specifically, in a letter dated January 6, 1997, TVA stated that “Closure of valves FCV-74-52 and FCV-74-66 is not required by plant procedures to operate the residual heat removal (RHR) system in the suppression pool cooling mode. Therefore, these valves have no ‘redundant’ safety function and will not be included in the GL 89-10 program.” In a letter dated May 5, 2004, TVA stated that valves FCV-74-52 and FCV-74-66, “are not in the GL 89-10 program, since the valves are normally in their safety position.” This information was inaccurate because the FCV-74-52 and FCV-74-66 valves do have a safety function to shut to operate the RHR system in the suppression pool cooling mode and should therefore have been included in Browns Ferry’s GL 89-10 MOV monitoring program.
EA-11-018
Browns Ferry 1
NOV
(Red)
05/09/2011 On May 9, 2011, the NRC issued a violation of Technical Specifications associated with a Red Significance Determination Process finding involving the failure to implement an IST program in accordance with the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME), Code for Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants (OM Code), 1995 Edition, 1996 Addenda, Section ISTC 4.1. In a letter dated June 8, 2011, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) appealed the Final Significance Determination of this Red Finding. The NRC performed an independent review of this finding and in a letter dated August 16, 2011, concluded that TVA failed to establish adequate programs, as required by 10 CFR Part 50.55a(b)3(ii), to ensure that motor-operated valves continued to be capable of performing their design basis safety functions. The inadequacy of TVA programs resulted in the Unit 1 LPCI outboard injection valve, 1-FCV-74-66, being left in a significantly degraded condition and the Unit 1 LPCI/RHR Loop II unable to fulfill its safety function. The basis and outcome of the final risk significance determination evaluation on this Red finding remained unchanged.
EA-09-307
Browns Ferry 1, 2 & 3
NOV
(Yellow & White)
04/19/2010 On April 19, 2010, a Notice of Violations was issued to Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) for violations associated with Yellow and White Significance Determination Findings as a result of inspections at the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant. The Yellow finding involved the licensee's failure to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, III.G, fire protection of safe shutdown capability. There were multiple examples of the licensee not providing fire protection features capable of limiting fire damage and failing to ensure one train of systems or components was free of fire damage by approved methods. Compensatory measures are currently in place and long term corrective actions will be implemented. The White finding involved the licensee's failure to meet the requirements of a Technical Specification. This involved the inappropriate revision to a procedure which could have delayed proper operator response to a major disabling fire event. The procedure has been revised to prevent such an issue from occurring.
EA-09-009; EA-09-203
Browns Ferry 1, 2 & 3
ORDER 12/22/2009 On December 22, 2009, a Confirmatory Order (effective immediately) was issued to the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) to confirm commitments made as a result of an Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) mediation session held on December 4, 2009. At issue were two apparent violations of the NRC's employee protection regulation (10CFR50.7) identified during two separate investigations conducted by the NRC Office of Investigations at the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN). The NRC acknowledged that TVA, prior to the ADR session, had taken numerous actions which address the issues underlying the apparent violations. As part of the agreement, TVA agreed to take a number of additional actions. These actions include, implementing a process to review proposed adverse employment actions before they are taken to ensure compliance with 10CFR50.7 and to ensure the action could not negatively impact the Safety Conscious Work Environment (SCWE), issuing a fleet-wide written communication from TVA's executive management communicating TVA's policy and management expectations regarding the employee's right to raise concerns without fear of retaliation, performing two additional independent safety culture surveys before the end of calendar year 2013, and modifying contractor in-process training and new supervisor training to improve awareness of TVA's policy on SCWE. In recognition of these commitments, and the other actions already completed by TVA, the NRC agreed to refrain from issuing a civil penalty or Notice of Violation for these apparent violations.
EA-04-063
Browns Ferry 1, 2 & 3
NOV
(SL III)
05/12/2004 On May 12, 2004, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation involving four examples of a failure to adhere to the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V. All four examples were associated with the Long-Term Torus Integrity Program and involved failure to evaluate or incorporate numerous deficient welds into Deficiency Fix Requests sketches; failure to perform numerous repairs on the correct welds; omission of numerous welds requiring repair from Work Orders; and failure of Quality Control to independently verify the correct location of numerous weld repairs.
EA-00-163
Browns Ferry 1, 2 & 3
NOV
(SL III)
10/27/2000 On October 27, 2000, a Notice of Violation was issued for a severity Level III violation involving the failure to perform required evaluations for out-of-tolerance measuring and test equipment.
EA-96-199
Browns Ferry 1, 2 & 3
NOV
(SL III)
08/01/1996 Violation of TS 3.5.F.1 inoperability of RCIC from inadequate design And inadequate post-modification testing.
EA-95-252
Browns Ferry 1, 2 & 3
NOVCP
(SL III)

$ 80,000

W/drawal
of CP

02/20/1996 Discrimination.

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Brunswick 1 & 2 - Docket Nos. 050-00325; 050-00324

NRC Action Number(s) and
Facility Name
Action Type
(Severity) &
Civil Penalty
(if any)
Date
Issued
Description
EA-11-251
Brunswick
NOV
(White)
12/27/2011 On December 27, 2011, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation to Carolina Power and Light Company for a violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, “Corrective Action,” associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding involving the failure of Brunswick personnel to promptly identify and correct a condition adverse to quality involving the external flood barrier for the emergency diesel generator fuel oil tank rooms as of April 20, 2011. Specifically, the entrance enclosures which house the emergency diesel generator fuel oil tanks had several openings, unsealed pinholes, and a narrow gap along the perimeter of the base walls, which would allow water intrusion into the emergency diesel generator fuel oil tank rooms during a design basis external event (hurricane).
EA-10-192
Brunswick
NOV
(White)
12/21/2010 On December 21, 2010, the NRC issued a violation of 10 CFR 50.54(q) associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding involving the failure to follow and maintain in effect Emergency Plans which required activation of the Operations Support Center (OSC), Technical Support Center (TSC), and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) within 60 to 75 minutes following the declaration of an Alert or higher emergency classification. Specifically, on June 6, 2010, the licensee failed to activate the OSC, TSC, and EOF until approximately two and one-half hours after an Alert was declared.
EA-07-024
Brunswick
NOV
(White)
04/20/2007 On April 20, 2007, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White SDP finding involving: (1) inadequate corrective actions to prevent a repeat failure of the #9 main crankshaft bearing on emergency diesel generator (EDG) #1: (2) the failure to follow the foreign material exclusion procedure during maintenance performed on EDG #1; and (3) the failure to promptly identify and implement adequate actions to prevent EDG #1 from tripping on low lubricating oil pressure. These conditions ultimately contributed to an EDG #1 trip and a bearing failure during a Unit 2 loss-of-offsite-power event. The violation was cited against Technical Specification 3.8.1, "AC Sources-Operating," because EDG #1 was inoperable from October 30 to November 7, 2006. As a result, while Unit 1 was operating in Mode 1, only three of four EDGs were operable for a period in excess of 7 days.
EA-04-076
Brunswick 2

NOV
(White)

06/02/2004 On June 2, 2004, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White SDP finding involving the failure to take adequate corrective action for conditions adverse to quality associated with the No. 3 emergency diesel generator (EDG 3) jacket water cooling (JWC) system. The corrective maintenance performed to stop a pipe coupling leak on the JWC supply line to the turbo charger for EDG 3 failed to correct the leak. The violation also cited the failure to comply with Technical Specification 3.8.1, AC Sources Operating, because due to the ongoing leak the EDG 3 was inoperable while the plant was in Mode 1 for a period in excess of seven days.
EA-04-028
Brunswick 1 & 2
NOVCP
(SL II)

$88,000
04/07/2004 On April 7, 2004, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $88,000 was issued for a Severity Level II violation for discriminating against the former Corporate Superintendent of Site Access Authorization for Carolina Power & Light for raising safety concerns.
EA-97-056
Brunswick 1 & 2
NOV
(SL III)
04/24/1997 Several access authorization and fitness-for-duty violations.
EA-96-442
Brunswick 1 & 2
NOV
(SL III)
12/13/1996 The action was based on two violations. The first violation involved the failure to operate Unit 2 within steady state reactor core power level limit of 2436 (Mw) (thermal) and during power operation. The second violation involved the failure to maintain the calculated Average Planar Linear Heat Generation Rate (APLHGR) within the limits of Technical Specification 3.2.1. The violations were categorized as A Severity Level III problem.
EA-96-354
Brunswick 1 & 2
NOVCP
(SL III)

$150,000
11/19/1996 Programmatic EQ issues.
EA-96-181
Brunswick 1 & 2
NOV
(SL III)
07/12/1996 SW pump failed due to galvanic corrosion of bolt mod. 10 affected pumps which established conditions for the corrosion.
EA-96-054
Brunswick 1 & 2
NOV
(SL III)
04/04/1996 Failure to identify presumptive positive drug test results during on-site pre-screening operations.

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Byron 1 & 2 - Docket Nos. 050-00454; 050-00455

NRC Action Number(s) and
Facility Name
Action Type
(Severity) &
Civil Penalty
(if any)
Date
Issued
Description
EA-11-014
Byron 2
NOV (White) 03/14/2011 On March 14, 2011, the NRC issued a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding involving the failure to provide appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria related to maintenance on the 2A emergency diesel generator. Specifically, on January 17, 2010, a work order package did not contain a final torque verification to ensure that the 2A diesel generator upper lube oil cooler spool piece connections were torqued to the required values. As a result, the spool piece flange connection to the upper lube oil cooler did not meet the minimum torque ranges, and, subsequently, during routine testing on November 17, 2010, the flange connection on the 2A diesel generator upper lube oil cooler failed. Because the 2A diesel generator was inoperable since January 17, 2010, and because the licensee was not aware of the inoperability, the Technical Specification allowed outage time of 14 days was also exceeded.
EA-08-046
Byron 1 & 2
NOV (White) 04/01/2008 On April 1, 2008, a Notice of Violation (NOV) was issued for violations associated with a White Significance Determination Finding. The NOV involved violations of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Actions", and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control". Specifically, the licensee failed to take timely corrective actions after the identification of extensive corrosion on essential service water riser pipes and failed to verify the adequacy of the methodology and design inputs in calculations that supported the decision to accept three degraded essential service water riser pipes for continued service.
EA-05-159
Byron 1 & 2
NOV (SL III) 10/27/2005 On October 27, 2005, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III problem involving violations of the Byron Station Technical Specifications. Specifically, an engineer engaged in deliberate misconduct when he failed to perform assigned surveillances of ventilation systems and falsified the records to show the surveillances as completed, a violation of 10 CFR 50.9, "Completeness and Accuracy of Information."
EA-02-124
Byron 1 & 2
(ORDER applies to
multiple Exelon and
AmerGen facilities)
ORDER 10/03/2002 On October 3, 2002, an immediately effective Confirmatory Order was issued to Exelon and AmerGen in order to confirm certain commitments to assure the Licensees' compliance with the Commission's employee protection regulations, 10 CFR 50.7. In view of the Confirmatory Order and consent by the Licensees thereto, dated September 27, 2002, the NRC exercised its enforcement discretion pursuant to Section VII.B.6 of the NRC Enforcement Policy, and refrained from issuing a Notice of Violation or proposing a civil penalty.
EA-97-446
Byron 1 & 2
NOV
(SL III)
11/25/1997 Multiple examples of fire protection analyses deficiencies.
EA-97-264
Byron 1 & 2
NOVCP
(SL III)

$ 55,000
10/03/1997 Violation of TS surveillance requirements.
EA-96-508
Byron 1 & 2
NOVCP
(SL III)

$100,000
07/27/1997 Four violations categorized as two Severity Level III problems related to the identification of excessive silt accumulation in the essential service water (ESW) cooling tower basins and the river screen house intake channel. The first problem involved the failure to (1) translate design configuration information into volumetric requirements for the ESW cooling tower makeup calculation and (2) develop an appropriate acceptance criteria for surveillance procedures to assure ESW operability. The second problem involved two failures to take appropriate corrective actions for conditions adverse to quality involving the silt accumulation and degraded ESW trash racks.

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Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, December 04, 2014