United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment

Escalated Enforcement Actions Issued to Reactor Licensees - F

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Farley 1 & 2 - Docket Nos. 050-00348; 050-00364

NRC Action Number(s) and
Facility Name
Action Type
(Severity) &
Civil Penalty
(if any)
Date
Issued
Description
EA-14-017
Farley Nuclear Plant
NOV
(White)
02/14/2014 On February 14, 2014 the NRC issued a Notice of Violation associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding to Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. for a violation of 10 CFR Part 50.54(q)(2), Emergency Plans, involving the failure to maintain the effectiveness of their emergency plan. Specifically, the licensee failed to maintain a standard emergency classification scheme which included facility effluent parameters in that effluent parameter classification threshold values for RG1 (General Emergency) and RS1 (Site Area Emergency) were significantly non-conservative at both Farley Unit 1 and 2. These monitors were being relied upon to continuously assess the impact of the release of radioactive materials as well as provide criteria for determining the need for notification and participation of local and State agencies.
EA-12-145
Farley Nuclear Plant
ORDER 05/06/2013

On May 6, 2013, the NRC issued a Confirmatory Order to Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (SNC) to formalize commitments made as a result of an ADR mediation session held on March 15, 2013.  The commitments were made as part of a settlement agreement between SNC and the NRC regarding apparent violations of NRC requirements. The agreement resolves the apparent deliberate violations involving falsification of radiation worker training exams by security officers at Farley Nuclear Plant.  The proctors and security officers self-proctoring the radiation worker exams were not ensuring that the exams were not compromised either by someone providing answers, hinting to the answers, or using material such as study guides during the exams.  As such, the security officers did not complete their radiation worker training requalification exams in accordance with SNC procedures in order to maintain unescorted access to Protected/Vital Areas or Radiation Controlled Areas; yet they continued to have unescorted access to those areas.  SNC agreed to a number of corrective actions, issuing fleet-wide messages that will clearly articulate that willful misconduct is incompatible with safe nuclear construction and operation, conducting fleet-wide stand-downs with all employees and contractors to address trustworthiness and integrity, and modifying guidance involving investigations based on allegations to include an initial evaluation of potential nuclear safety implications and to identify any appropriate immediate mitigating measures to be taken while the investigation is ongoing.

EA-12-240
Farley 1 & 2
NOV
(SL III)
03/04/2013

On March 4, 2013, a Notice of Violation (NOV) was issued to Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. for a Severity Level III problem for the failure to implement: (1) 10 CFR 50.48, “Fire Protection,” and (2) 10 CFR 50.9(a), “Completeness and Accuracy of Information.” Between September and December 2011, four contract employees willfully failed to complete fire watch rounds required to ensure that Farley remained in compliance with 10 CFR 50.48. In addition, these same employees falsified fire watch logs by annotating that hourly fire watches were completed when in fact they had not been performed. These actions caused Farley to be in violation of 10 CFR 50.48 and 10 CFR 50.9(a).

EA-09-103
Farley 1 & 2
NOV
(White)
07/10/2009

On July 10, 2009, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation to Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (SNC) for a violation of 10 CFR 50.54(q) which states, in part, that the licensee shall follow and maintain emergency response plans which must meet planning standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b). 10 CFR 50.47(b) requires, in part, that the licensee establish a means to provide early notification and clear instruction to the populace within the plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ). SNC emergency plan identifies both tone alert radios (TARs) and sirens as the means by which it provides alert and notification to the populace within the plume exposure pathway. This violation is associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding.

Specifically, in January 2008, the licensee identified that approximately 109 TARs had not been provided to residences that were outside the limits of the sirens but within the 10 mile EPZ of Farley Nuclear Plant. The licensee's subsequent review identified additional residences within the 10 mile EPZ which were required to have TARs in accordance with the Farley emergency plan, but were not provided TARs.

EA-08-192
Farley 1 & 2
NOV
(White)
09/04/2008 On September 4, 2008, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White Significance Determination Finding to Southern Nuclear Operating Company, as a result of overhaul of its 1B emergency diesel generator (EDG) at the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant. The violation cited the licensee for failure to install a new exhaust header system correctly, as required by vendor documents, causing the 1B EDG to be declared inoperable.
EA-07-173
Farley 2
NOV
(Yellow)
10/31/2007 On October 31, 2007, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a Yellow Significance Determination finding involving a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI. Specifically, the licensee failed to promptly identify and correct a significant condition adverse to quality that resulted in the Unit 2 containment sump suction to residual heat removal pump 2A, an encapsulated valve, failing to stroke full open during testing on April 29, 2006, and on January 5, 2007. The licensee did not assure that the causes of the condition, including rust/corrosion accumulation on valve components in the valve encapsulation dating back to 2001, were determined and corrective action taken to preclude repetition.
EA-07-155
Farley 1 & 2
NOV
(White)
08/17/2007 On August 17, 2007, parallel White finding was issued to Southern Nuclear Operating Company as a result of inspections at the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant. The parallel White finding was identified during a supplemental inspection to assess the licensee's evaluation associated with unreliability and unavailability reporting in the Support Cooling Water Systems Performance Indicator (PI) within the Mitigating Systems Performance Index (MSPI). Failures of the licensee's existing safety-related breakers associated with this PI predominantly contributed to the indicator crossing the threshold to White in the second quarter of 2006. This PI was subsequently reported Green in the 3rd quarter of 2006. The supplemental inspection for the White PI identified significant weaknesses related to the thoroughness and quality of several root cause evaluations that challenged the licensee's ability to implement effective overall corrective actions. The licensee's evaluations of the individual failures that contributed to the White PI did not effectively review for systemic aspects of circuit breaker failures. In addition, more recent problems were identified concerning the thoroughness of design reviews for the installation of new breakers. Based on these NRC-identified weaknesses, a parallel PI inspection finding (White) was opened to allow the NRC to continue to monitor activities in this area.
EA-96-410
Farley 1 & 2
NOVCP
(SL III)

$ 50,000
12/04/1996 The action involved a violation related to the implementation of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix R and the licensee's Fire Protection Program. Specifically, three examples were identified in which the licensee failed to assure that one-hour fire barriers, in this case Kaowool enclosures, were installed on Unit 1 electrical cables associated with systems required for safe shutdown. The violation was categorized as a Severity Level III violation.

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Fermi 2 - Docket No. 050-00341

NRC Action Number(s) and
Facility Name
Action Type
(Severity) &
Civil Penalty
(if any)
Date
Issued
Description
EA-01-092
Fermi 2
NOV
(White)
09/14/2001 On September 14, 2001, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White SDP finding involving a catastrophic bearing failure of the emergency diesel generator (EDG). The violation was cited against the licensee's failure to establish adequate design control measures for modifying the oil sight glass indicator and associated piping for the EDG outboard bearing.
EA-99-263
Fermi 2
NOV
(SL III)
12/15/1999 Violation based on the licensee's failure to comply with their Commission-approved physical security plan that resulted in a loaded handgun being entered into the protected area of the facility.
EA-97-201
Fermi 2
NOVCP
(SL III)

$ 50,000
09/23/1997 Multiple corrective action deficiencies.
EA-96-095
Fermi 2
NOVCP
(SL III)

$ 50,000
05/21/1996 Backleakage through discharge check valve for DGSW pump frozen under certain weather conditions resulting in the inoperability of the pump and associated diesel generator.

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FitzPatrick - Docket No. 050-00333

NRC Action Number(s) and
Facility Name
Action Type
(Severity) &
Civil Penalty
(if any)
Date
Issued
Description
EA-10-090; EA-10-248; EA-11-106
FitzPatrick
ORDER 01/26/2012

On January 26, 2012, the NRC issued a Confirmatory Order (Effective Immediately) to Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc (licensee). to confirm commitments made as a result of an ADR mediation session held on November, 9, 2011. During three investigations, the NRC discovered information associated with violations, the majority of which were willful, related to the adherence to site procedures related to radiation protection (RP). Specifically, technicians willfully failed to (1) test required individuals for respirator fit, as required by 10 CFR 20.1703; (2) maintain accurate documentation of completed respirator fit tests, as required by 10 CFR 50.9; (3) perform and/or accurately document independent verification of Drywell Continuous Atmospheric Monitoring System (DWCAM) valve positions after the valves were manipulated, as required by technical specifications (TS) and 10 CFR 50.9; (4) document a personal contamination event as required by TS; (5) perform a contamination survey prior to removing an item from a radiologically controlled area, as required by TS; and (6) perform daily radiological surveys of the reactor building 326 foot elevation airlock, as required by 10 CFR 20.1501(a).

Entergy agreed to take a number of actions as part of this Confirmatory Order, including but not limited to: (1) committing to maintain the safety culture monitoring processes as described in NEI 09-07 “Fostering a Strong Nuclear Safety Culture,” or similar processes; (2) assessing Entergy’s procedure for implementing the safety culture processes described in the NEI guidance to determine if potential enhancements should be provided to NEI that would improve licensees’ ability to detect weaknesses in safety culture (if such enhancements could have prevented such violations as were the subject of this action); (3) conducting an assessment of the RP departments at each Entergy nuclear power plant to ensure activities are being conducted in accordance with NRC regulations; (4) preparing and presenting case studies at each Entergy nuclear power plant; and (5) delivering a presentation to industry representatives in each NRC geographical region which will discuss these events, including lessons learned and corrective actions. In addition, Entergy took several corrective actions prior to the ADR mediation session.

In recognition of Entergy’s proposed extensive corrective actions, in addition to corrective actions already taken, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation, associated with the violations discussed above, with no civil penalty assessed.

EA-99-325
FitzPatrick
NOV
(White)
03/20/2000 On March 20, 2000, a Notice of Violation was issued in conjunction with a White SDP finding involving a high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system overspeed event. The violation cited the licensee's failure to identify and correct problems with the HPCI system.

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Fort Calhoun - Docket No. 050-00285

NRC Action Number(s) and
Facility Name
Action Type
(Severity) &
Civil Penalty
(if any)
Date
Issued
Description
EA-13-222
Fort Calhoun
NOV
(White)
04/25/2014 On April 25, 2014, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding to Omaha Public Power District for a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, involving the failure to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis were correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures and instructions. Specifically, the licensee failed to fully incorporate applicable tornado missile protection design requirements for components needed to ensure the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition.
EA-12-023
Fort Calhoun
NOV
(Red)
04/10/2012 On April 10, 2012, the NRC issued a Red Significance Determination Process finding and a Notice of Violations for three violations to Omaha Public Power District as a result of inspections at the Fort Calhoun Station.  The Red finding was based on deficient modification and maintenance of the safety-related 480 Vac electrical distribution system that resulted in a catastrophic switchgear fire.  There were three violations associated with the Red finding:  (1) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, “Design Control” associated with modifications to safety-related breakers, (2) 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, “Corrective Action” associated with inadequate electrical maintenance, and (3) License Condition 3.D, “Fire Protection Program” associated with train separation.  At the time of the event the plant was in cold shutdown for a planned refueling outage.
EA-11-025
Fort Calhoun
NOV
(White)
07/18/2011 On July 18, 2011, the NRC issued a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding involving the failure to assure that the cause of a significant condition adverse to quality was determined and corrective actions taken to preclude repetition. Specifically, between November 3, 2008 and June 14, 2010, the licensee failed to preclude shading coils from repetitively becoming loose material in the M2 reactor trip contactor. The licensee failed to identify that the loose parts in the trip contactor represented a potential failure of the contactor if they became an obstruction; and therefore, failed to preclude repetition of this significant condition adverse to quality, that subsequently resulted in the contactor failing.
EA-10-084
Fort Calhoun
NOV
(Yellow)
10/06/2010 On October 6, 2010, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation to Omaha Public Power District for a violation of Technical Specification 5.8.1.a, “Procedures,” at Fort Calhoun Station. This violation, which is associated with a Yellow Significance Determination Process finding, involved the licensee's failure to develop an adequate procedure for protecting vital facilities and equipment from external flooding events to the level described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. Specifically, the inspectors identified that the licensee's strategy of using sandbags stacked on top of floodgates would not be effective in protecting the auxiliary building, intake structure, and turbine building basement because the tops of the floodgates were too small to support the necessary number of sandbags. This could have resulted in flooding impacting multiple, redundant trains of equipment required for safe shutdown of the plant.
EA-07-194
Fort Calhoun
NOV
(White)
12/07/2007 On December 7, 2007, a Notice of Violation was issued for violations associated with a White Significance Determination finding involving a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, and a violation of the Fort Calhoun Technical Specifications. Specifically, the licensee failed to promptly identify and correct a significant condition adverse to quality involving high resistance across the field flash contacts of a relay in the Train A emergency diesel generator voltage regulator circuit and failed to provide a written procedure for maintenance that could affect the performance of safety-related EDG voltage regulator relay auxiliary contacts.
EA-07-047
Fort Calhoun
NOV
(White)
05/29/2007 On May 29, 2007, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White Significance Determination Finding involving the improper installation of the valve disk of a Containment Spray Header Isolation Valve. The improper installation resulted in a condition in which the actual position of the valve was nearly opposite of the indicated position. This condition resulted in an inoperable train of the containment spray system for an entire operating cycle and also provided a reactor coolant system diversion flow path if shutdown cooling was initiated following certain postulated accident conditions. The violation was cited against 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," for conducting maintenance activities without procedures that were appropriate to the circumstances. Specifically, the maintenance and post-maintenance procedures did not require actions to verify the correct orientation of the valve.
EA-05-038
Fort Calhoun
NOV
(White)
04/15/2005 On April 15, 2005, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White SDP finding involving a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, and Fort Calhoun Technical Specification 2.7(1). Specifically, the licensee failed to investigate a drop in diesel generator output voltage at the conclusion of a surveillance test. In addition, the licensee failed to properly respond to an Emergency Facility Computer System alarm that annunciated for low diesel generator output voltage when the diesel generator output breaker was opened.
EA-02-123
Fort Calhoun
NOV
(White)
07/30/2002 On July 30, 2002, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a white SDP finding involving the failure to prevent radiation levels from exceeding the Department of Transportation and NRC limits on the external surface of a radioactive waste shipment package.
EA-97-432
Fort Calhoun
NOVCP
(SL III)

$110,000
10/24/1997 Inoperable containment spray system due to personnel error during surveillance.
EA-97-251
Fort Calhoun
NOVCP
(SL III)

$ 55,000
07/30/1997 Appendix R violations.
EA-96-204
Fort Calhoun
NOV
(SL III)
07/31/1996 Disabled LTO function of pressurizer PDR's during pressurizer cooldown, disabling primary system overpressure protection.

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Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, October 02, 2014