Escalated Enforcement Actions Issued to Reactor Licensees - F

On July 10, 2009, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation to Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (SNC) for a violation of 10 CFR 50.54(q) which states, in part, that the licensee shall follow and maintain emergency response plans which must meet planning standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b). 10 CFR 50.47(b) requires, in part, that the licensee establish a means to provide early notification and clear instruction to the populace within the plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ). SNC emergency plan identifies both tone alert radios (TARs) and sirens as the means by which it provides alert and notification to the populace within the plume exposure pathway. This violation is associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding.

Specifically, in January 2008, the licensee identified that approximately 109 TARs had not been provided to residences that were outside the limits of the sirens but within the 10 mile EPZ of Farley Nuclear Plant. The licensee's subsequent review identified additional residences within the 10 mile EPZ which were required to have TARs in accordance with the Farley emergency plan, but were not provided TARs.

On January 26, 2012, the NRC issued a Confirmatory Order (Effective Immediately) to Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc (licensee). to confirm commitments made as a result of an ADR mediation session held on November, 9, 2011. During three investigations, the NRC discovered information associated with violations, the majority of which were willful, related to the adherence to site procedures related to radiation protection (RP). Specifically, technicians willfully failed to (1) test required individuals for respirator fit, as required by 10 CFR 20.1703; (2) maintain accurate documentation of completed respirator fit tests, as required by 10 CFR 50.9; (3) perform and/or accurately document independent verification of Drywell Continuous Atmospheric Monitoring System (DWCAM) valve positions after the valves were manipulated, as required by technical specifications (TS) and 10 CFR 50.9; (4) document a personal contamination event as required by TS; (5) perform a contamination survey prior to removing an item from a radiologically controlled area, as required by TS; and (6) perform daily radiological surveys of the reactor building 326 foot elevation airlock, as required by 10 CFR 20.1501(a).

Entergy agreed to take a number of actions as part of this Confirmatory Order, including but not limited to: (1) committing to maintain the safety culture monitoring processes as described in NEI 09-07 “Fostering a Strong Nuclear Safety Culture,” or similar processes; (2) assessing Entergy’s procedure for implementing the safety culture processes described in the NEI guidance to determine if potential enhancements should be provided to NEI that would improve licensees’ ability to detect weaknesses in safety culture (if such enhancements could have prevented such violations as were the subject of this action); (3) conducting an assessment of the RP departments at each Entergy nuclear power plant to ensure activities are being conducted in accordance with NRC regulations; (4) preparing and presenting case studies at each Entergy nuclear power plant; and (5) delivering a presentation to industry representatives in each NRC geographical region which will discuss these events, including lessons learned and corrective actions. In addition, Entergy took several corrective actions prior to the ADR mediation session.

In recognition of Entergy’s proposed extensive corrective actions, in addition to corrective actions already taken, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation, associated with the violations discussed above, with no civil penalty assessed.