EA-97-047 - Perry 1 (Centerior Service Company)
November 18, 1997
EAs 96-482, 96-542, 97-047, and 97-430
Mr. Lew W. Myers
Vice President - Nuclear
Centerior Service Company
P.O. Box 97, A200
Perry, OH 44081
SUBJECT: NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTY - $100,000 (Reports 50-440/96016 (DRS), 50-440/96017 (DRP), 50-440/96018 (DRP), and 50-440/97008(DRS)) and EXERCISE OF ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION
Dear Mr. Myers:
This refers to three routine safety inspections conducted from December 28, 1996 through February 3, 1997, and a special inspection conducted from July 21 through August 27, 1997, at the Centerior Service Company's (Centerior) Perry 1 Nuclear Power Plant (PNPP).
Among the more significant findings from the three routine safety inspections were failures to: (1) take effective corrective action following an earlier event to prevent repetition; (2) protect cables and equipment in the same fire control zone outside of primary containment from hot shorts; and (3) restore operability of a motor control center (MCC) within the time specified in the Perry Plant Technical Specifications (TS). The reports documenting these inspections and transmitting the apparent violations were sent to Centerior by letters dated January 23, 1997, February 4, 1997, and March 19, 1997. An open predecisional enforcement conference (PEC) was held in the NRC Region III office on April 18, 1997, at which time the violations, root causes and corrective actions were discussed. A follow-up conference was held on October 7, 1997, to discuss the corrective actions.
The purpose of the special inspection (Inspection Report No. 50-440/97008(DRS)) was to follow up on issues identified during the NRC Design Inspection conducted at PNPP from February 17 through March 27, 1997 (Inspection Report No 50-440/97201). An apparent violation involving a change to the emergency closed cooling (ECC) system was identified during this inspection. This issue also appeared to represent an unreviewed safety question (USQ). The exit meeting for the special inspection was conducted on August 27, 1997. The inspection report for the special inspection was mailed to Centerior by letter, dated September 23, 1997. On October 7, 1997, an open PEC was held in the NRC Region III office to discuss the apparent violation, and the report of the PEC was sent to Centerior by letter, dated October 16, 1997.
Based on the information developed during the inspections and the information provided by representatives of Centerior at the conferences, the NRC has determined that several significant violations of NRC requirements occurred. The violations are cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice) and the circumstances surrounding them are described in detail in the subject inspection reports.
Violation A (EA 97-047) of the enclosed Notice pertains to a November 9, 1996 event. This violation is considered significant because it concerns a failure to take lasting corrective actions following a similar event in 1994. The November 9, 1996 event occurred as operators were returning a hydraulic power unit (HPU) for the reactor recirculation system 'A' Flow Control Valve to service. The operators were required to confirm that output power was available from the HPU programmable logic controller prior to restarting the HPU. A technician reported that a fuse was blown, indicating an operate/isolate solenoid valve had no power. The shift supervisor consulted with one of the responsible system engineers and decided the HPU could be restarted with the blown fuse in place. The reactor operator then proceeded to restart the HPU. However, the operator was notifying plant personnel of the HPU restart and he was not attentive to critical reactor parameters. Approximately 12 seconds after the HPU was started, the shift supervisor recognized that the flow control valve was opening and reactor power was increasing. He then took action to stop the reactivity addition. Nevertheless, reactor power increased from 98 percent to 100.2 percent during the transient. The significance of this event is that, even though several people were involved in developing the plan to return the flow control valve to service, the actions taken did not take into consideration lessons learned from a prior similar event. Operator training following the 1994 event apparently failed to adequately inform the operators of the potential consequences of an HPU subloop operate/isolate solenoid failure and the impact on reactivity.
Violation A represents a breakdown in the implementation of corrective actions following an incident on July 27, 1994, as corrective actions from that event were insufficient to prevent recurrence of a similar event on November 9, 1996. The violation also represents a potentially significant lack of attention toward reactivity control. Therefore, Violation A is categorized in accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," (Enforcement Policy) NUREG 1600 as a Severity Level III violation. In addition to the violation, we are concerned that the shift supervisor became overly focused on restarting the flow control valve HPU instead of maintaining a broad perspective of operational conditions.
In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amount of $50,000 is considered for a Severity Level III violation (Violation A) occurring prior to November 12, 1996. Since the Perry Plant has been the subject of an escalated enforcement action within the last two years1, the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for Identification and Corrective Action in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. Credit was not warranted for Identification because the event was self-identifying and a similar event in 1994 provided prior opportunity to identify that starting the HPU with a blown fuse could result in reactivity excursions. Also, several workers from differing disciplines were involved in developing the plan to return the flow control valve to service. This provided plant personnel with additional opportunities to identify anticipated problems prior to actually restarting the HPU.
Credit for Corrective Action was warranted for Violation A. The NRC recognizes that high level management attention was given to the November 9, 1996 event and an investigation into the event was completed. It was also recognized that Centerior took corrective actions to address operational performance weaknesses associated with the event. Other corrective actions include, but are not limited to: remedial action for the crew that caused the event; training on the event for the other crews; and modifications to improve HPU reliability. To emphasize the importance of reactivity controls and the need for effective corrective actions in response to events, I have been authorized, after consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, to issue the enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $50,000.
Violation B (EA 96-542) pertains to a miswired electrical breaker installed in an MCC which supplies safety related loads for various systems, including the Control Room Emergency Recirculation (CRER) system. Violation B represents a significant failure to comply with an Action Statement for a Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation (TS LCO) where the appropriate action was not taken within the required time on at least four occasions from March 10 to September 17, 1996. Therefore, Violation B is categorized in accordance with the Enforcement Policy as a Severity Level III violation.
Since the Perry Plant was the subject of the previously described escalated enforcement action, within the last two years, the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for Identification and Corrective Action for violation B in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. Credit was warranted for Identification because the event was self-identifying, but without reasonable prior opportunities to discover the miswired breaker. Also, Centerior proactively identified other similar breakers purchased and installed at the same time and performed appropriate inspections. Credit was also warranted for Corrective Actions because, even though the vendor considered this event an isolated case, Centerior performed an additional comprehensive evaluation of the susceptibility of other breakers from this vendor to miswiring and developed a method to test the polarity of the signals to the solid state trip device. Therefore, to encourage prompt identification and comprehensive correction of violations, I have been authorized after consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, not to propose a civil penalty for Violation B.
Violation C (EA 97-430) involves the failure to identify a USQ for the ECC surge tanks. The ECC surge tanks were designed to ensure adequate net positive suction head (NPSH) was provided to the ECC pumps. Further, the design of the surge tanks provided a 7-day supply of water with normal system leakage, 0.5 gallons per hour (gph), before makeup water was needed.
As part of the corrective actions for an earlier event involving ECC leakage, the PNPP staff established allowable system leakage limits of 3.0 gallons per minute (gpm) for ECC Loop A and 3.5 gpm for Loop B. The increased allowable leakage reduced the 7-day supply of water to a 30 minute supply and introduced the need for local operator action at the 30 minute point to ensure adequate NPSH to the ECC cooling pumps. The PNPP staff also changed the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) and applicable drawings and procedures to support the new allowable leakage. However, the 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation performed by the PNPP staff incorrectly concluded the changes did not constitute a USQ, and prior NRC approval was not required. The change to the USAR was later incorporated in a periodic update of the USAR and it was not submitted to the NRC for review.
At the October 7, 1997 PEC, the Centerior representatives agreed that this change constituted a USQ and a violation of 10 CFR 50.59, but disagreed with the NRC's basis for coming to that conclusion. The NRC determined that this was a USQ because the change in allowable system leakage increased the consequences of an accident, and it increased the probability of failure of safety related equipment due to the potential failure of time-critical required actions by operators in a high radiation area. However, your staff concluded that this change was a USQ because it reduced the margin to safety as described in the licensing basis for the PNPP.
The change to increase allowable leakage rates was initiated because the ECC was leaking in excess of 0.5 gph. Therefore, the PNPP staff considered the ECC as degraded. However, this leakage was in the reverse direction from accident conditions. Following the Design Inspection Team's questioning of the test methodology used on the system, the PNPP staff disassembled portions of the system (i.e., piping and valves) and tested the system in the proper direction. The resultant total system leakage was less than 0.5 gph, and that equated to a 10 day supply of water in the surge tank. Following that testing, the PNPP staff rescinded the proposed change to the USAR. However, while it is fortuitous that the potential safety consequences were low, the regulatory significance is high. The NRC depends on a licensee performing adequate safety analyses to determine whether or not a USQ exists. A licensee's safety analysis for the existence of a USQ is fundamental to ensuring the bases on which the plant was licensed are maintained. In this case, multiple levels of the PNPP staff and management reviewed the changes, but did not identify the safety implications. The violation described in the Notice concerns a significant failure to meet the regulatory requirements of 10 CFR 50.59, including a failure such that a required license amendment was not sought. Therefore, this violation has been categorized in accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions" (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600 at Severity Level III.
In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amount of $50,000 is considered for a Severity Level III violation occurring prior to November 12, 1996. Because your facility has been the subject of escalated enforcement actions within the last 2 years, the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for Identification and Corrective Action in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process described in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. Identification credit was not warranted because the NRC identified the violation.
The NRC evaluated whether credit for Corrective Action was also warranted. Your corrective actions were comprehensive, and included, but were not limited to: training, both current and future refresher, emphasizing the importance of effective safety reviews; reviewing a number of past safety evaluations to determine if they failed to identify any USQs; and revising your procedure for reviewing changes to consider any change that results in any reduction in the margin to safety, as described in the licensing basis, as a USQ. Your definition of reduction in margin is more conservative than the NRC definition of reduction in margin as defined in the basis for a technical specification. While your corrective actions did not directly address part of the root cause of the violation (i.e., poor understanding of the 10 CFR 50.59 criteria regarding increased consequences and increased equipment failure probability) the NRC concluded that your conservative definition of reduction in margin would likely prevent recurrence of this violation in the vast majority of cases. In addition, we are aware that the nuclear industry's formal position on USQs is based on the same principles you applied in reviewing the potential for increased consequences and probability of equipment failure. Therefore, we have determined that on balance, credit is warranted for corrective action. Nonetheless, in your response to this letter, you should describe additional corrective actions that you have taken, or plan to take, to ensure that your review criteria appropriately identify changes that would result in increased consequences of an accident or increased probability of failure of safety related equipment.
Therefore, to emphasize the importance of promptly identifying violations and to ensure that safety reviews related to 10 CFR 50.59 are broad and sufficiently detailed, I have been authorized, after consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, to issue the enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the base amount of $50,000 for the Severity Level III violation.
EA 96-482 concerns a period of approximately two years (August 1994 to July 1996) when a means had not been established to protect cables and equipment of at least one redundant train of safe shutdown equipment from hot shorts during a postulated fire in the control room. This design issue is a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R and represents a system designed to prevent or mitigate a serious safety event not being able to perform its intended safety function (i.e., ensuring that a redundant train remained free from fire damage and available to maintain hot shutdown of the unit). This issue was considered for escalated enforcement and possible civil penalty. However, after consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, I have been authorized to neither issue a Notice of Violation nor propose a civil penalty in this case, in accordance with Section VII.B.3 of the Enforcement Policy. This decision was made after considering that the issue was discovered by the PNPP staff. In addition, the initial evaluation by plant staff of NRC Information Notice (IN) No. 92-18, "Potential for Loss of Remote Shutdown Capability During a Control Room Fire," dated March 28, 1992, was adequate based on the available information. While there was an opportunity to identify this issue during the 1994 refueling outage, the PNPP staff was focused at that time on providing sufficient margins to assure MOV actuation and not on hot short concerns. The hot short weakness in post-safe shutdown capability was later identified through the engineering design change process. The NRC also considered that Centerior's corrective actions following identification of additional information in 1996 were adequate. Modifications have been made to all affected equipment, and Centerior improved the process for multi-disciplined design change reviews. Further, the NRC considered that this issue is not reasonably linked to current performance. The exercise of discretion acknowledges your good efforts to identify and correct significant design problems.
You are required to respond to this letter, with the exceptions noted in the following paragraph, and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response for the issues cited in Violations A and C. The NRC will use your responses, in part, to determine whether further enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements.
The NRC has concluded that the information regarding Violation B, the corrective actions taken and planned to correct the violation and prevent recurrence, and the date when full compliance was achieved are already adequately addressed on the docket in License Event Report (LER) No. 96-008, dated November 4, 1996. Therefore, you are not required to respond to Violation B unless the description therein does not accurately reflect your corrective actions or your position. In that case, or if you choose to provide additional information, you should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR).
Sincerely, A. Bill Beach Regional Administrator
Docket No. 50-440
License No. NPF-58
Enclosure: Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty
H. L. Hegrat, Manager, Regulatory Affairs
T. S. Rausch, Director, Quality and Personnel Development
R. Schreader, Director, Nuclear Engineering Department
W. R. Kanda, General Manager, Nuclear Power Plant Department
H. W. Bergendahl, Director, Nuclear Services Department
Terry J. Lodge, Esq., State Liaison Officer, State of Ohio
Robert E. Owen, Ohio, Department of Health
C. A. Glazer, State of Ohio
Public Utilities Commission
NOTICE OF VIOLATION
PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTY
Centerior Service Company Docket No.50-440 Perry Nuclear Power Plant License No.NPF-58 EAs 96-482,96-542,97-047,97-430
During NRC inspections conducted from December 28, 1996 to February 3, 1997, and from July 21 through August 27, 1997, violations of NRC requirements were identified. In accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," NUREG-1600, the NRC proposes to impose a civil penalty pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (Act), 42 U.S.C. 2282, and 10 CFR 2.205. The particular violations and associated civil penalty are set forth below:
A. Violation Assessed a Civil Penalty Associated with Reactor Recirculation System Flow Control
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Actions," requires, in part, that measures shall be established to assure conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective materials and equipment, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected. In the case of significant conditions adverse to quality, the measures shall assure that the cause of the condition is determined and corrective action taken to preclude repetition.
Contrary to the above, as of November 9, 1996, the licensee failed to take adequate measures to determine the causes of a significant condition adverse to quality and failed to take corrective action to preclude repetition. Specifically, on July 27, 1994, an uncontrolled reactivity change, a significant condition adverse to quality, occurred during unintended movement of a reactor recirculation flow control valve. As of November 9, 1996, when a similar event occurred, the licensee had not determined the causes of the July 24, 1994 event, and the licensee had not implemented adequate corrective actions to preclude repetition of an uncontrolled reactivity change caused by movement of a reactor recirculation flow control valve. Further, (1) Operator training following the July 27, 1994 event failed to adequately inform the operators of the potential consequences of a hydraulic power unit (HPU) subloop operate/isolate solenoid valve failure, and (2) on November 9, 1996, when a blown fuse was found in an HPU while the reactor recirculation 'A' flow control valve (FCV) was being returned to service, the shift supervisor authorized the HPU to be returned to service with a blown fuse based on a misunderstanding that a mispositioned solenoid valve would have no impact on the FCV even though the July 27, 1994 event demonstrated that a mispositioned solenoid valve could cause a positive reactivity addition by allowing the reactor recirculation FCV to open further. (01013)
This is a Severity Level III violation (Supplement I).
Civil Penalty - $50,000.
B. Violation Associated with the Control Room Emergency Recirculation System
Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.22, Action A., requires with the unit in operational conditions (Modes) 1, 2, or 3, with one Control Room Emergency Recirculation (CRER) subsystem inoperable, the inoperable subsystem must be restored to operable status within 7 days or be in hot shut down (Mode 3) within the next 12 hours and in cold shutdown (Mode 4) within the following 24 hours.
TS LCO 3.7.3, Action D requires when two CRER subsystems are inoperable with the unit in Modes 1, 2, or 3, TS LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately.3 Once entered, TS LCO 3.0.3 requires action to be initiated within 1 hour to place the unit in Mode 4 within 37 hours.
TS LCO 3.0.4 prohibits entry into an operating mode when an LCO is not met and the associated action statements do not permit continued operation in that operating mode.
Contrary to the above, the listed TS LCOs were not met for varying periods of time due to a miswired breaker causing motor control center (MCC) No. EF-1-D-09, which supplies CRER Train B, to be inoperable.
1. Between March 10 and September 17, 1996, with the unit in Mode 1, an incorrectly wired power supply breaker for MCC EF-1-D-09, which supplies power to CRER Train B subsystem, caused the CRER subsystem to be inoperable. The CRER subsystem was not restored to operable status within the allowed outage time specified in the applicable TS LCO (3.7.2 or 3.7.3) action statement and the unit was not taken to the appropriate Mode, Mode 4, as required.
2. For about 41 hours from August 5 to 6, 1996, two CRER subsystems were inoperable (CRER Train A due to maintenance and CRER Train B due to the inoperable MCC), and TS 3.0.3 action to place the unit in Mode 4 was not initiated.3. On June 10 and 11, 1996, contrary to TS LCO 3.0.4, the unit entered operating Modes 2 and 1, respectively, with the CRER Train B subsystem inoperable, when TS LCO 3.7.2 was not met and the associated action statements did not permit continued operation in Operating Modes 1 and 2. (02013)
This is a Severity Level III problem (Supplement I).
C. Violation Assessed a Civil Penalty Associated With Emergency Closed Cooling Systems Surge Tanks
10 CFR 50.59, permits the licensee, in part, to make changes to the facility and procedures as described in the safety analysis report without prior Commission approval provided the changes do not involve an unreviewed safety question. Records of these changes must include a written safety evaluation which provides the bases for the determination that the changes do not involve an unreviewed safety question.
10 CFR 50.59 (a)(2)(i) states, in part, that a proposed change shall be deemed to involve an unreviewed safety question if, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the safety analysis report may be increased.
Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) Section 184.108.40.206 "Emergency Closed Cooling System - Safety evaluation" states, the emergency closed cooling surge tanks are designed to maintain a 7-day supply of water with normal system leakage without the need to provide makeup water.
Contrary to the above, Safety Evaluation No. 96-128 prepared by the licensee on October 10, 1996, and approved on October 21, 1996, evaluated a change in the design basis for the emergency closed cooling system surge tanks. The licensee changed the sizing basis of the surge tanks from a 7-day supply as stated in USAR Section 220.127.116.11 to a 30-minute supply, and the licensee's analysis failed to identify that the change was an unreviewed safety question. Specifically, the safety evaluation did not adequately assess the increased probability of a malfunction of equipment important to safety associated with an increased potential for operator error as operators replenished the surge tanks on a 30-minute post accident basis instead of the previously evaluated period of 7 days. The safety evaluation also failed to recognize the increased consequences of a design basis loss of coolant accident associated with an increased projected dose to the operators as they refilled the surge tanks on an increased frequency. (03013)
This is a Severity Level III violation (Supplement I).
Civil Penalty - $50,000.
The NRC has concluded that information regarding the reasons for Violation B, the corrective actions taken and planned to correct the violation and prevent recurrence, and the date when full compliance was achieved is already adequately addressed on the docket in Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 96-008, dated November 4, 1996. However, you are required to submit a written statement or explanation pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201, if the description there does not accurately reflect your corrective actions or your position. In that case, if you choose to respond, clearly mark your response as a "Reply to a Notice of Violation," and send it to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555, with a copy to the Regional Administrator, NRC Region III, Suite 255, 801 Warrenville Road, Lisle, IL 60532-4351, with a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector at the Perry Nuclear Power Plant, within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice of Violation.
Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Centerior Service Company (Licensee) is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation for Violations A and C to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, within 30 days of the date of this Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a "Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each alleged violation: (1) admission or denial of the alleged violation, (2) the reasons for the violation if admitted, and if denied, the reasons why, (3) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, (4) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (5) the date when full compliance will be achieved. If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an order or a Demand for Information may be issued as to why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Consideration may be given to extending the response time for good cause shown. Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 2232, this response shall be submitted under oath or affirmation.
Within the same time as provided for the response required above under 10 CFR 2.201, the Licensee may pay the civil penalty by letter addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, with a check, draft, money order, or electronic transfer payable to the Treasurer of the United States in the amount of the civil penalty proposed above, or may protest imposition of the civil penalty in whole or in part, by a written answer addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Should the Licensee fail to answer within the time specified, an order imposing the civil penalty will be issued. Should the Licensee elect to file an answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 protesting the civil penalty, in whole or in part, such answer should be clearly marked as an "Answer to a Notice of Violation" and may: (1) deny the violations listed in this Notice, in whole or in part, (2) demonstrate extenuating circumstances, (3) show error in this Notice, or (4) show other reasons why the penalty should not be imposed. In addition to protesting the civil penalty in whole or in part, such answers may request remission or mitigation of the penalty.
In requesting mitigation of the proposed penalty, the factors addressed in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy should be addressed. Any written answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 should be set forth separately from the statement or explanation in reply pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201, but may incorporate parts of the 10 CFR 2.201 reply by specific reference (e.g., citing page and paragraph numbers) to avoid repetition. The attention of the Licensee is directed to the other provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, regarding the procedure for imposing a civil penalty.
Upon failure to pay any civil penalty due which subsequently has been determined in accordance with the applicable provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, this matter may be referred to the Attorney General, and the penalty, unless compromised, remitted, or mitigated, may be collected by civil action pursuant to Section 234c of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 2282c.
The response noted above (Reply to Notice of Violation, letter with payment of civil penalty, and Answer to a Notice of Violation) should be addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852-2738, with a copy to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region III, 801 Warrenville Road, Lisle, IL 60532-4351, and a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector at the Perry Nuclear Power Plant.
Because your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR), to the extent possible, it should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR without redaction. If personal privacy or proprietary information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, then please provide a bracketed copy of your response that identifies the information that should be protected and a redacted copy of your response that deletes such information. If you request withholding of such material, you must specifically identify the portions of your response that you seek to have withheld and provide in detail the bases for your claim of withholding (e.g., explain why the disclosure of information will create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or provide the information required by 10 CFR 2.790(b) to support a request for withholding confidential commercial or financial information). If safeguards information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, please provide the level of protection described in 10 CFR 73.21.
Dated at Lisle, Illinois
this 18th day of November 1997
1. A Notice of Violation without civil penalty was issued for EA 96-367. The issue was categorized as a Severity Level III problem for the failure to consider ECC or ECC loops inoperable under conditions specified in PNPP Technical Specification 18.104.22.168
2. On July 14, 1996, the licensee replaced TS 3.7.2 with improved TS 3.7.3. Improved TS LCO 3.7.3., Action A.1. requires that an inoperable Control Room Emergency Recirculation (CRER) subsystem be restored to operable within 7 days. TS Actions B.1. and B.2. further require the Unit be placed in Mode 3 within the next 12 hours and in Mode 4 within the next 36 hours if the CRER subsystem is not restored to operable status.
3. The licensee implemented improved TS LCO 3.0.3 on July 14, 1996.