United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment

NMSS Licensee Newsletter March - April 2000

NUREG/BR-0117; No. 00-1

To top of page

ADAMS Public Document Collection Help Readily Available by Several Methods

On November 1, 1999, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) began placing publicly available documents in the electronic form of the Agency-Wide Document and Access Management System (ADAMS). The system is on the Internet at http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/ autoinstall.html and is available to anyone in the public, including licensees, Agreement States, other Federal agencies, or any other interested parties. Help for users, answers to questions, and instructions for using the system are available by several means. NRC invites interested individuals or organizations to find information about using ADAMS, on NRC's public Web Site, at www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html.

For those who cannot find their answer there or who simply prefer talking to a human being, the staff of NRC's Public Document Room (PDR) is available at 2026343273 or 1 8003974209, to provide support to users outside NRC. The PDR staff can also be reached by e-mail at pdr@nrc.gov . The PDR staff is backed up by NRC's ADAMS staff and the full resources of NRC's computer staff members of the Chief Information Officer, should questions arise for which the PDR staff members do not have answers at their fingertips.

One interesting issue that was recently resolved was traced partly to the strong network security "firewalls" used at some locations where employees were trying to access ADAMS. Most people who connect to the Internet via one of the many large public Internet services will probably not have this problem, as it mainly occurs at some of the "institutional" facilities that maintain their own computer networks. A firewall is a combination of computer hardware and software designed to protect the site from intruders. A typical firewall automatically inspects every attempted Internet access to try and distinguish between legitimate users and suspicious or unauthorized users. The firewall then allows the authorized requests to communicate with computers inside the facility and refuses access to the rest. In this way, the firewall computer acts for the Internet very much as a facility's guard force operates at the entrances to the building. Firewalls are sometimes used to control outgoing connections, as well. The details of any corporate or agency firewall are naturally closely kept secrets, as are the details of any other security arrangement.

NRC's firewall, acting as designed, allows anyone on the Internet to access the publicly available information and prevents anyone from going beyond what is permitted. ADAMS uses a special type of communications technology called CITRIX. This special connection was apparently blocked by some facility's firewalls that are possibly more restrictive than others. Naturally, the Agency cannot tell another organization how to secure its own computer network. Nevertheless, we can help it recognize ADAMS connections so it can decide for itself when and if to permit access. An alternate solution available to sites that choose to exclude ADAMS access from their internal networks is to select individual computers, and install them "outside" the firewall; these could then be used to access ADAMS.

A second problem, also mainly affecting users inside institutional facilities, is that some facilities maintain strict controls on installed software on individual PCs. Since ADAMS requires a special downloadable program, available at the internet address noted above, such users may need to have their network support staffs complete the installations before their first use. Again, this is a decision by the individual site, but NRC is happy to provide all the information needed to support the installation.

To help the outside facilities resolve these problems, NRC's Office of the Chief Information Officer has worked to develop a set of detailed instructions, in cooperation with the first licensees to have reported the issue. It explains precisely what a firewall would have to accept for ADAMS to be used by employees within the facility's computer network. Making those changes is a job--and indeed a decision--for the facility in question, but NRC is ready to provide the technical details a facility's employees would need to implement it. At the direction of Acting Chief Information Officer Stuart Reiter, a copy of the instructions is available from the help page noted above, and the PDR staff is ready to work with anyone, outside NRC, who has further questions about these instructions at the phone numbers or e-mail address noted above.

(Contact: Lewis Clayman, OCIO, 3014157965; e-mail: lpc@nrc.gov)

To top of page

New NRC Fuel Cycle Facility Inspection Program

In 1999, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) started an initiative for substantially revising its regulatory oversight program for fuel cycle facilities. The facilities subject to the oversight program include gaseous diffusion plants, highly enriched uranium fuel fabrication facilities, low-enriched uranium fuel fabrication facilities, and one uranium hexafluoride production facility. These facilities possess large quantities of materials that are potentially hazardous (i.e., radioactive, toxic, and/or flammable) to the workers, public, and environment.

The goals are to establish objective indications of acceptable and changing licensee performance; increase stakeholder confidence in NRC; increase realism and regulatory effectiveness and efficiency; and reduce unnecessary regulatory burden. In this regard, the staff is revising the fuel cycle facility oversight program to: 1) increase the risk/performance-based approach, focusing on the more significant risks at fuel cycle facilities; 2) establish more objective safety and safeguards performance indicators (PIs) with accompanying performance thresholds; and 3) adapt the NRC inspection program to reflect these new approaches.

The PIs, together with inspection findings that provide risk and performance insights, are intended to provide an objective and reliable basis to determine if a fuel cycle facility is safe and special nuclear material is safeguarded, as well as to provide early indications of declining performance. A licensee performance assessment process will integrate information from PI and safety/safeguards inspection findings. This will facilitate clear and predictable regulatory decisions such as determining overall safety/safeguards performance; identifying needed changes in Agency regulatory emphasis; and supporting Agency actions, including enforcement actions. Harmonizing changes in the inspection findings significance determination process, licensee performance assessment process, and regulatory action (including enforcement) process, are also under consideration. The revised Oversight Program places heavy emphasis on a robust Problem Identification, Resolution, and Corrective Action Program aggressively pursued by the licensee.

A task force consisting of two teams is evaluating and proposing oversight program revisions. The teams are an oversight program framework development team, consisting of branch chiefs from Headquarters and regions that are responsible for fuel cycle facility oversight activities; and an inspection procedure writing team consisting of fuel cycle facility inspectors representing Headquarters and regions, which will revise the inspection procedures to reflect the new approach.

Relevant lessons learned from NRC's ongoing improvement of the reactor oversight program are being used by the teams. Revision of the regulatory oversight program is being closely integrated with other Agency initiatives and involves frequent stakeholder interactions, through public meetings and workshops, to provide opportunities to exchange and explain information and receive feedback.

The following are to be developed to comprise the Oversight Program: 1) PIs with thresholds reported voluntarily by licensees to indicate risk and performance-significant changes in performance at licensee facilities; 2) NRC Risk Informed Baseline Inspections of facilities to verify PIs and to inspect areas without PIs; 3) NRC Supplemental Inspections (in addition to the Baseline Inspection Program) warranted by increased risk or poor performance at facilities; 4) a Significance Determination Process for understanding the risk and performance significance of inspection findings; 5) an Enforcement Policy that is commensurate with risk and performance significance; 6) an Assessment Process for an integrated evaluation of licensee risk-related performance; 7) an Agency Response Process for causing improvement in licensee performance commensurate with risk; and 8) a Communications Process for informing the public and other stakeholders about licensee risk-related performance, and NRC actions to improve performance, commensurate with risk.

Five noticed public stakeholder meetings have been held during the past 7 months. These meetings will continue at the rate of roughly one a month to exchange views with stakeholders concerning revision, pilot testing, and full implementation of the revised oversight program. Plans for PIs, with accompanying thresholds, risk-informed inspections, and communications with the public and other stakeholders, will be discussed at noticed public meetings during the next few months. Revised oversight program stakeholder training will be provided immediately before beginning a pilot program involving certain fuel cycle facilities, to evaluate the revised oversight program.

A description of the oversight program revision, and stakeholders' views from transcribed public meetings, are provided on the NRC internet web page at www.nrc.gov. SECY99188, entitled, "Evaluation and Proposed Revision of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facility Safety Inspection Program," summarizes plans for revising the inspection program.

(Contact: Walter Schwink, 3014157253, e-mail: wss@nrc.gov)

To top of page

Streamlined Inspection And Enforcement For Materials Licensees--Implementation of an Initiative

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is implementing an initiative to improve the focus of inspection and enforcement, for materials licensees, on risk-informed outcomes and licensee performance. As an initial step, NRC is conducting a pilot program in the medical area and will evaluate the effectiveness of the initiative in accomplishing the objective. If the pilot program is successful, the approach will be considered for inspection and enforcement of other material licenses.

NRC is beginning this new approach with a 1-year pilot program for certain medical use licenses, specifically for nuclear medicine programs using only unsealed byproduct material (use under 10 CFR 35.100, 35.200, and 35.300). These nuclear medicine licenses represent approximately 21 percent of current NRC material licenses. The pilot program will start in calendar year 2000.

NRC has developed inspection and enforcement guidance for the pilot program. The guidance focuses inspector attention on licensee performance for radiation safety program elements having safety-significant outcomes. The central element of this new approach will be the use of Focus Elements (FEs) for program performance assessment.

Each of the six safety-based and outcome-oriented FEs relates to at least one important safety outcome. Collectively, they will be used to provide an overall assessment of the adequacy and acceptability of the licensee's radiation protection and materials control program performance. A nuclear medicine program for which all the FEs are verified will be considered to be operating satisfactorily, and to be able to protect the public health and safety from significant unintended radiation exposures.

This initiative is expected to improve the inspection and enforcement processes for both the licensees and NRC, by reducing the impact of inspections and the regulatory burden on licensees, and by more effective use of NRC resources. To make the public aware of this initiative and to provide an opportunity for public input and comment, a public meeting was held on January 8, 1999, in Rockville, MD. An electronic copy of the draft inspection guidance for the medical licensee inspection pilot program has been accessible on NRC'S Home page (http://www.nrc.gov), under "What's New," since that time. The final version of the inspection guidance will be available soon at the same site.

(Contact: Dr. Ronald Zelac, 3014156316; e-mail: rez@nrc.gov)

To top of page

New Source Calibration And Dosimetry For Palladium-103 Interstitial Sources

The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) introduced a new primary air-kerma strength standard for the TheraSeed Model 200 Palladium-103 (103Pd) interstitial seed source in early 1999. Before this, there was no primary standard for air-kerma strength, and apparent activity was used to specify the source strength for these seed sources. This apparent activity was determined by an in-house assay method developed and maintained by the seed vendor. This in-house assay method relied on apparent activity measurements made using a NaI(Tl) photon spectrometer calibrated with a Cadmium-109 (109Cd) source standard with an activity calibration traceable to NIST. From the introduction of these seed sources, the reported apparent activity and the corresponding air-kerma strength ratio remained constant until the fall of 1997. In the fall of 1997, the air-kerma strength ratio increased by 10.7 percent, corresponding to a decrease in apparent activity that was observed by several physicists in 1997. This abrupt change corresponds with a calibration source (109Cd) replacement by the seed vendor.

After the introduction of the new NIST primary air-kerma strength standard for these sources, the American Association of Physicists in Medicine (AAPM) undertook a comprehensive review of 103Pd dosimetry. This review included an evaluation of the administered-to-prescribed dose ratios from the introduction of the 103Pd sources in 1987 to the present, and a comparison of the vendor calibrations with the NIST calibration standard over this same time period. This review indicated that for a prescribed dose of 115 Gy (115,000 rad), the administered doses were: 124 Gy (124,000 rad) for the period between 1988 and the fall of 1997; and 135 Gy (135,000 rad) for the period from the fall of 1997 until the present. Based on this review, the AAPM recommends that the following three steps should be undertaken concurrently to correctly implement the 1999 dosimetry data and the NIST 1999 standard for the 103 Pd source: (1) the vendor should provide calibrations in terms of air-kerma strength traceable to the 1999 NIST standard; (2) the medical physicist should update his/her treatment planning system with properly normalized (to the 1999 NIST standard) dosimetry parameters for the selected 103Pd source model; and (3) the authorized user, in collaboration with the medical physicist, should decide which clinical experience he/she wishes to duplicate--the one before 1997 (124 Gy) or the one from 1997 to the present (135 Gy).

The AAPM's comprehensive review of 103Pd dosimetry, along with its recommendations on the proper implementation of this new dosimetry for these sources, is presented in a draft AAPM Report 69 entitled "Recommendations of the American Association of Physicists in Medicine on 103 Pd Interstitial Source Calibration and Dosimetry: Implications for Dose Specification and Prescription." This draft report will be published in the April issue of Medical Physics and is presently available on the AAPM website at the following URL address: http://www.aapm.org/pubs/reports/report069.pdf. All licensees using 103Pd seeds are encouraged to obtain a copy of this report and consider implementing the recommendations contained therein.

(Contact: Robert L. Ayres, 3014155746; e-mail: rxa1@nrc.gov)

To top of page

Generic Assessment Panel

The Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards (NMSS) has established a program to screen all aspects of operational information (including radiation safety, chemical safety, security, etc.), to identify generic issues, and track follow-up actions. The Division of Industrial and Medical Nuclear Safety (IMNS), Generic Assessment Panel (GAP), has been formed, to conduct a weekly review of event reports and other operational information, to identify generic issues and determine follow-up actions necessary to address those issues.

The panel is composed of the Deputy Director of IMNS, the Chiefs of the Materials Safety and Inspection Branch(MSIB) and the Rulemaking and Guidance Branch, the Regional Coordinator, and the GAP Coordinator of MSIB.

Each week, GAP reviews the available information for new events and follow-up actions, to determine whether each event has any generic implications. In the review, GAP: (1) assesses the safety significance of each event: (2) identifies any generic safety issues (GSIs) associated with the operational data being reviewed: and (3) prioritizes each GSI. If additional information is needed, GAP may assign actions to IMNS staff to obtain the needed information. The events that involve operations and facilities outside of IMNS responsibilities are referred to the appropriate NMSS Division, for evaluation of generic implications.

The results of the operational data review and follow-up actions are documented and tracked by the Division Tracking System. Each item will be tracked until all appropriate follow-up actions have been taken and the item is closed out. Periodically, GAP will request IMNS staff to review certain types of events for a specific class of licensees related to IMNS programs, to identify trends or frequency of occurrence. Any generic issues identified as a result of these reviews will also be tracked to completion.

Each month, GAP will identify, for the monthly Operational Event Briefing for the NMSS Director, events that have high safety significance. At a minimum, potential abnormal occurrences and new generic safety issues will be reviewed at the monthly Operational Events Briefing.

(Contact: Sean Soong, 3014158155; e-mail: axs5@nrc.gov)

To top of page

Selected Federal Register Notices

(January 1 - March 31, 2000)

NOTE: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) contacts may be reached by mail at the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 205550001.

To top of page

Final Rules

"List of Approved Spent Fuel Storage Casks: NACMPC Addition, 65 FR 12444, March 9, 2000. Contact: Merri Horn, 3014158126, e-mail: mlh1@nrc.gov.

"List of Approved Spent Fuel Storage Casks; Revision: NUHOMS 24P and NUHOMS 52B," 65 FR 16299, March 27, 2000. Contact: Stan Turel, 3014156234, e-mail: spt@nrc.gov.

To top of page

Proposed Rules

"List of Approved Spent Fuel Storage Casks: NAC UMS Addition," 65 FR 3397, January 21, 2000. Contact: Stan Turel, 3014156234, e-mail: spt@nrc.gov.

"Revision of Fee Schedules; 100% Fee Recovery, FY 2000," 65 FR 16250, March 27, 2000. Contact: Glenda Jackson, 3014156057, e-mail: gcj@nrc.gov.

To top of page

Other Notices

"Memorandum of Understanding between the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, and the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Waste Management, Concerning the Management of Sealed Sources," 65 FR 1184, January 7, 2000. Contact: Douglas A. Broaddus, 3014155847; Fax: 3014155369, e-mail: dab@nrc.gov.

Notice of availability of NUREG1717, "Systematic Radiological Assessment of Exemptions for Source and Byproduct Materials," 65 FR 3529, January 20, 2000. Contact: David L. Meyer, ADM, 3014157162, or, toll-free: 18003685642, or e-mail: dlm1@nrc.gov.

Donald A. Barbour, "Philotechnics; Receipt of Petition for Rulemaking on Effective Control of Depleted Uranium Aircraft Counterweights," 65 FR 3394, January 21, 2000. Contact: David L. Meyer, ADM, 3014157162, or, toll-free: 18003685642, or e-mail: dlm1@nrc.gov.

"Request for Comments on High-Level Guidelines for Performance-Based Activities," 65 FR 3615, January 24, 2000. Contact: N. Prasad Kadambi, RES, 3014155896, e-mail: npk@nrc.gov.

"Staff Meetings Open to the Public: Proposed Policy Statement," 65 FR 3892, January 25, 2000. Contact: John Craig, RES, 3014158703, e-mail: jwc1@nrc.gov.

"Notice of Availability of NUREG1718, Standard Review Plan for the Review of an Application for a Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility," 65 FRN 4856, February 1, 2000. Contact: Andrew Persinko, 3014156522, e-mail: axp1@nrc.gov.

"Notice of the Staff's Intention to Combine Draft Regulatory Guide DG4006, `Demonstrating Compliance with the Radiological Criteria for License Termination,' with the Standard Review Plan for Decommissioning," 65 FR 11096, March 1, 2000. Contact: Dominick A. Orlando, 3014156749, e-mail: dao@nrc.gov.

"Letter of Agreement between the U.S. Department of Interior Minerals Management Service, Gulf of Mexico, OCS Region, and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Concerning the Radiation Safety Inspections of Nuclear Regulatory Commission Licensed Activities on Offshore Facilities and Laybarges in Federal Jurisdiction," 65 FR 11612, March 3, 2000. Contact: Roberto J. Torres, 3014158112, Fax: 3014155369, e-mail: rjt@nrc.gov.

"Notice of Intent to Prepare a Draft Supplement to the Generic Environmental Impact Statement on Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities and to Hold Public Meetings for the Purpose of Scoping and to Solicit Public Input into the Process," 65 FR 13797, March 14, 2000. Contact: Dino C. Scaletti, NRR, 18003685642, extension 1104.

"List of Approved Spent Fuel Storage Casks: TN32 Addition," 65 FR 14790, March 20, 2000. Contact: Merri Horn, 3014158126, e-mail: mlh1@nrc.gov.

"Notification of Relocation of the NRC Public Document Room," 65 FR 16672, March 29, 2000. Contact: Thomas E. Smith, 2026343381, or, toll-free, 18003974209.

(General Contact: Paul Goldberg, 3014157842, e-mail: pfg@nrc.gov)

To top of page

Generic Communications Issued

(December 1, 1999 February 29, 2000)

Note that these are only summaries of U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) generic communications. If one of these documents appears relevant to your needs and you have not received it, please call one of the technical contacts listed below. The Internet address for the NRC library of generic communications is-- www.nrc.gov/NRC/GENACT/GC/index.html. Please note that this address is case-sensitive and must be entered exactly as shown.

To top of page

Information Notices (INs)

IN 9932, "The Effect of the Year 2000 Issue on Medical Licensees," was issued on December 17, 1999. This notice was issued to all medical licensees to remind them of potential problems their computer systems and software may encounter as a result of the change to the Year 2000. Contact: Gary Purdy, 3014157897, e-mail: gwp1@nrc.gov.

IN 9933, "Management of Wastes Contaminated with Radioactive Materials," was issued on December 21, 1999. This notice was issued to all medical licensees to remind them to carefully monitor all waste that may be contaminated with radioactive materials. Waste management facilities not authorized to receive radioactive materials are finding contaminated waste in shipments from hospitals and other medical facilities. Contact: Anita Turner, 3014155508, e-mail: alt@nrc.gov.

IN 9934, "Potential Fire Hazard in the Use of Polyalphaolefin in Testing of Air Filters," was issued on December 28, 1999. This notice was issued to all reactor licensees and all fuel cycle facilities to alert them to a recent event in which a flame was emitted from a thermal aerosol generator being used for in-place testing of a high-efficiency particulate air filter. Contacts: Todd J. Jackson, RI, 6103375308, e-mail: tjj@nrc.gov; John P. Segala, NRR, 3014151858, e-mail: jps1@nrc.gov; Candice M. Drummond, 3014156433, e-mail: cmd@nrc.gov.

General Contact: Mark A. Sitek, 3014155799, e-mail: mas3@nrc.gov.

To top of page

Significant Enforcement Actions

Detailed information about these enforcement actions can be accessed via the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission homepage (http://www.nrc.gov). Click on "Nuclear Materials," then "Enforcement," then "Enforcement Actions." Cases are listed alphabetically. To access the complete enforcement action, click on the highlighted text following the name of the case.

To top of page

Gauges

Material Testing Consultants, Inc., Grand Rapids, Michigan, EA 99253. A Severity Level III violation was issued based on the failure to control licensed material in an unrestricted area. Credit was given for identification and corrective action, and a civil penalty was not assessed, in accordance with the Enforcement Policy.

Roof Survey and Consultants, Inc., Roanoke, Virginia, EA 99223. An Order Modifying Order Suspending License (Effective Immediately) and Order Revoking License was issued October 4, 1999. The Order was issued because the Company did not comply with an Order Suspending the License, and the Company did not pay the annual fee for fiscal year 1996. The license was terminated November 16, 1999.

Southeastern Plastics Corporation, New Brunswick, New Jersey, EA 99297. A Severity Level III violation was issued for the unauthorized transfer of an Ohmart scanning gauge to a non-licensed warehouse to be sold at auction. Credit was given for corrective action, and a civil penalty was not assessed, in accordance with the Enforcement Policy.

Victor E. Rivera Associates, Geotechnical Engineers, Ponce, Puerto Rico, EA 99269. A Severity Level III violation was issued for failure to secure licensed materials from unauthorized removal or access, and for failure to meet 10 CFR Part 20 labeling and posting requirements. Credit was given for corrective action, and a civil penalty was not assessed, in accordance with the Enforcement Policy.

Medical

Department of Veterans Affairs, Edward Hines, Jr. Hospital, Hines, Illinois, EA 99284. A Severity Level III violation was issued based on a violation associated with a brachytherapy misadministration. Ineffective training resulted in data entry failures. Credit was given for corrective action, and a civil penalty was not assessed in accordance with the Enforcement Policy.

Department of Veterans Affairs Medical Center, Iowa City, Iowa, EA 99174. A Severity Level III violation was issued based on the failure to determine the prospective public dose resulting from release of human research subjects administered therapeutic dosages of Sn-117m. Credit was given for corrective action, and a civil penalty was not assessed, in accordance with the Enforcement Policy.

Fox Chase Cancer Center, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, EA 99294. A Severity Level III violation was issued based on the facility's approval to allow 13 physicians to use radioactive material without meeting all the training requirements set forth in the NRC regulations. Credit was given for corrective action, and a civil penalty was not assessed, in accordance with the Enforcement Policy.

Holy Redeemer Hospital and Medical Center, Meadowbrook, Pennsylvania, EA 99246. A Severity Level III violation was issued, based on a violation associated with the misadministration of iodine-131. A written directive was not prepared before administration of 1.96 E8 Bq (5.3 mCi) of iodine-131, rather than an intended dosage of 1.11 E7 Bq (300 ?Ci) of iodine-123. Credit was given for corrective action, and a civil penalty was not assessed, in accordance with the Enforcement Policy.

John Urban, IA 99053. "A Confirmatory Order Requiring Notice to Certain Employers and Prospective Employers and Notification, of NRC, of Certain Employment in NRC-Licensed Activities" (Effective Immediately) was issued November 26, 1999. The action was based on a misadministration involving a patient undergoing treatment for thyroid carcinoma. The Order is effective for a period of 2 years, and requires Mr. Urban to notify prospective employers of the Order, and to notify NRC of his acceptance of an employment offer involving NRC-licensed activities, within 10 days.

MidMichigan Medical Center, Midland, Michigan, EA 99215. A Severity Level III violation was issued based on violations involving failure to consult a written directive before administering a therapeutic quantity of iodine-131 to a patient, which resulted in a misadministration, and failure to report the incident to NRC in a timely manner. Credit was given for corrective action, and a civil penalty was not assessed, in accordance with the Enforcement Policy.

St. John Hospital and Medical Center, Detroit, Michigan, EA 99289. A Severity Level III violation was issued based on the failure of two individuals to verify that the activity of the dosage administered to a patient did not differ from the prescribed dosage. This failure resulted in a misadministration. Credit was given for corrective action, and a civil penalty was not assessed, in accordance with the Enforcement Policy.

St. Peter's Community Hospital, Helena, Montana, EA 99245. A Severity Level III violation was issued based on the failure of the licensee to secure from unauthorized removal, or limit access to, 3.7 E7 Bq (1.0 mCi) quantities of iodine-131. Credit was given for corrective action, and a civil penalty was not assessed, in accordance with the Enforcement Policy.

Other

To top of page

Jorge A. Labarraque, IA 99059. A Notice of Violation was issued December 20, 1999, based on a deliberate violation involving discrimination against an employee who engaged in protected activities.

Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc., Erwin, Tennessee, EA 99218. A Severity Level III violation was issued based on the failure to assure that movement of 7 grams of uranium-235 contained in highly enriched uranium was properly documented. Credit was given for corrective action, and a civil penalty was not assessed, in accordance with the Enforcement Policy.

Radiography

To top of page

Jasen Mallahan, IA 99047. An Order Prohibiting Involvement in NRCLicensed Activities (Effective Immediately) was issued October 22, 1999. The action was based on a deliberate failure to conduct radiography with at least two qualified individuals to observe operations and failure to supervise a radiographer's assistant while performing radiographic operations. The Order prohibits the individual from engaging in NRC-licensed activities for a period of 1 year and requires him to notify NRC, within 20 days of acceptance, of each employment involving NRC-licensed activities, for a period of 1 year after the 1-year prohibition.

Michael Hibbens, IA 99048. A Notice of Violation was issued October 22, 1999, because the individual deliberately conducted licensed activities without the supervision of a radiographer.

Professional Service Industries, Inc., Lombard, Illinois, EA 99194. A Severity Level II violation, and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $8600, was issued because of the deliberate failure to conduct radiography with at least two qualified individuals to observe operations, and failure to supervise a radiographer's assistant while performing radiographic operations. (Contact: Sally Merchant, 3014152747; e-mail: slm2@nrc.gov)

To top of page

Corrections

In the last issue of the NMSS Licensee Newsletter, No. 994, December 1999/January 2000, the e-mail address of Kathy Allen of the Illinois Department of Radiation Safety was printed incorrectly on page 5. The correct address is k_allen@idns.state.il.us.

Comments, and suggestions you may have for information that is not currently being included, that might be helpful to licensees, should be sent to:
E. Kraus
NMSS Licensee Newsletter Editor
Office of Nuclear Material Safety
and Safeguards
Two White Flint North, Mail Stop 8-A-23
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555-0001
(or send e-mail to: eek@nrc.gov

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 29, 2012