Information Notice No. 89-59: Suppliers of Potentially Misrepresented Fasteners
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555
August 16, 1989
Information Notice No. 89-59: SUPPLIERS OF POTENTIALLY MISREPRESENTED
FASTENERS
Addressees:
All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power
reactors.
Purpose:
This information notice is being provided to inform addressees of the names of
suppliers and/or manufacturers of suspected counterfeit fasteners that were
identified as a result of information reported in response to NRC Bulletin
No. 87-02, "Fastener Testing To Determine Conformance With Applicable Material
Specifications," and Supplements 1 and 2 thereto. Information is also
provided on a Grand Jury indictment, dated June 27, 1989, of AIRCOM Fasteners,
Incorporated, for allegedly providing nonconforming and falsely identified
fasteners to Comanche Peak, the Department of Defense, and other customers.
It is expected that recipients will review the information for applicability
to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar
problems. However, suggestions contained in this information notice do not
constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response
is required.
Description of Circumstances:
On November 6, 1987, the NRC issued Bulletin No. 87-02 to all holders of
operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power reactors in order
to determine whether counterfeit fasteners were a concern in the nuclear power
industry. The bulletin requested addressees to determine whether fasteners
obtained for use in their facilities met the chemical and mechanical specifi-
cations stipulated in the procurement documents by sampling typical studs,
bolts, cap screws, and nuts. The bulletin also required addressees to provide
the names of suppliers and manufacturers of the fasteners. The NRC staff has
compiled the information submitted by the addressees and determined that some
fasteners supplied to the nuclear industry may have been misrepresented or
counterfeit.
A summary of the fastener testing data can be found in NUREG-1349,
"Compilation of Fastener Testing Data Received in Response to NRC Compliance
Bulletin 87-02." The NUREG summarizes the data according to licensee,
manufacturer, supplier, and fastener specification. NUREG documents can be
obtained from:
8908100128
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August 16, 1989
Page 2 of 3
1. The Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Post
Office Box 37082, Washington, D.C. 20013-7082.
2. The National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161.
Discussion:
Over the past several years, the presence of counterfeit fasteners has been
identified throughout various industries, associations, and Federal agencies.
These fasteners have been mismarked to indicate a material content and
composition different from the actual bolt content.
The primary problem has been with SAE J429 Grade 8.2 fasteners that were
marked and sold as Grade 8. Grade 8 refers to the highest standard strength
achieved in the manufacture of bolts and hex cap screws. Grade 8 bolts are
medium carbon alloy steel, quenched and tempered at a minimum temperature of
800� F. The carbon content is between 0.28 and 0.55 weight percent with no
specification for boron. Grade 8 fasteners are heat treated to achieve a
hardness of 33 to 39 on the Rockwell C scale. Grade 8.2 fasteners are low
carbon martensite steel, fully killed, fine grain, and quenched and tempered
at a minimum temperature of 650� F. Grade 8.2 bolts have a carbon content of
0.15 to 0.25 weight percent and a minimum of 0.0005 weight percent boron.
Grade 8.2 fasteners are heat treated to achieve a hardness of 35 to 42 on the
Rockwell C scale.
Two concerns arise with regard to the use of Grade 8.2 fasteners in Grade 8
applications. The first concern is the failure of Grade 8.2 bolts from
relaxation under load at elevated temperatures. Because of the lower temper-
ing temperature, Grade 8.2 bolts will relax at a lower temperature than Grade
8 bolts. Secondly, industry experience has shown that bolts with hardness
values exceeding 39 on the Rockwell C scale are prone to embrittlement if not
properly processed during manufacture. In certain applications, the use of
mismarked Grade 8.2 bolts in Grade 8 applications could result in failure.
The mismarking and selling of SAE J429 Grade 5.2 as Grade 5 fasteners is
similar to the Grade 8 issue. Grade 5 and Grade 5.2 fasteners are both
tempered at a minimum temperature of 800� F; therefore, relaxation at ele-
vated temperatures is not a problem for these bolts. However, the mismarking
of the bolts is indicative of product substitution which may extend to other,
more critical products.
The companies listed below have been identified from addressee responses as
providing suspected counterfeit fasteners to the nuclear industry.
Supplier Name Address
Bennett Bolt Works Unknown
Bolts & Nuts, Inc. Chattanooga, Tennessee
Glasser & Associates El Cerrito, California
Knoxville Bolt & Screw Knoxville, Tennessee
Metal Fastener Supply Decatur, Alabama
Phoell Manufacturing Co. Minneapolis, Minnesota
Service Supply Co. Unknown
Southeastern Bolt & Screw Chattanooga, Tennessee
Sure-Loc, Inc. Charlotte, North Carolina
Victory Bolt, Inc. Knoxville, Tennessee
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August 16, 1989
Page 3 of 3
On June 27, 1989, a Fort Worth, Texas, Grand Jury handed down an indictment of
AIRCOM Fasteners, Incorporated, of Arlington, Texas, and Yamaguchi-Seisakusho
Company, Limited, of Japan, for allegedly providing nonconforming and falsely
identified fasteners to Comanche Peak and other customers.
The indictment further alleges that false, fictitious, and fraudulent docu-
ments were made and caused to be made at AIRCOM for delivery to the Department
of Defense, Peterbilt Motors Company, and Texas Utilities at Comanche Peak
Nuclear Power Plant to execute and cover up the scheme, including certificates
of conformance, certified material test reports, laboratory reports,
metallurgical reports, plating certificates, gage certifications, heat treat
certifications, purchase orders, vendor quote sheets, correspondence,
invoices, quality assurance records, and affidavits.
As a result of the above information and the indictments identifying alleged
record falsification and misrepresentation, addressees may wish to review
nuclear procurements from these vendors to ensure that appropriate bases exist
for the use of fasteners that they may have supplied for safety-related
applications or to be upgraded for use in safety-related applications.
Further, it is important for addressees performing audits of fastener manu-
facturers and suppliers to include a review of the basis for certifications
provided by vendors and the supporting tests and records of traceability.
Addressees may wish to review the adequacy of previous vendor audits and their
general vendor approval process in light of this information (reference
Information Notice No. 88-35, "Inadequate Licensee Performed Vendor Audits").
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact
the technical contact listed below or the appropriate NRR project manager.
Charles E. Rossi, Director
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contact: Gregory C. Cwalina, NRR
(301) 492-3221
Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
. Attachment
IN 89-59
August 16, 1989
Page 1 of 1
LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
NRC INFORMATION NOTICES
____________________________________________________________________________
Information Date of
Notice No._____Subject_______________________Issuance_______Issued to_______
89-58 Disablement of Turbine-Driven 8/3/89 All holders of OLs
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Due or CPs for PWRs.
to Closure of One of the
Parallel Steam Supply Valves
89-57 Unqualified Electrical 7/26/89 All holders of OLs
Splices in Vendor-Supplied or CPs for nuclear
Environmentally Qualified power reactors.
Equipment
89-56 Questionable Certification 7/20/89 All holders of OLs
of Material Supplied to the or CPs for nuclear
Defense Department by Nuclear power reactors.
Suppliers
89-45, Metalclad, Low-Voltage 7/6/89 All holders of OLs
Supp. 1 Power Circuit Breakers or CPs for nuclear
Refurbished With Substandard power reactors.
Parts
89-55 Degradation of Containment 6/30/89 All holders of OLs
Isolation Capability by a or CPs for nuclear
High-Energy Line Break power reactors.
89-54 Potential Overpressurization 6/23/89 All holders of OLs
of the Component Cooling or CPs for nuclear
Water System power reactors.
89-53 Rupture of Extraction 6/13/89 All holders of OLs
Steam Line on High or CPs for nuclear
Pressure Turbine power reactors.
88-46, Licensee Report of 6/8/89 All holders of OLs
Supp. 3 Defective Refurbished or CPs for nuclear
Circuit Breakers power reactors.
89-52 Potential Fire Damper 6/8/89 All holders of OLs
Operational Problems or CPs for nuclear
power reactors.
89-51 Potential Loss of Required 5/31/89 All holders of OLs
Shutdown Margin During or CPs for nuclear
Refueling Operations power reactors.
____________________________________________________________________________
OL = Operating License
CP = Construction Permit
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