Event Notification Report for August 11, 2023

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FIXED GAUGE SHUTTER STUCK IN THE ON POSITION

The following information was provided by the Washington State Office of Radiation Protection via email:

"During the semi-annual routine shutter tests on a fixed gauge, the gauge was found to be stuck in the 'ON' position. This malfunction did not pose any additional risk to personnel in the 'ON' position; it only inhibited the ability to lock the gauge in the 'OFF' position for maintenance. The gauge manufacturer was contacted, and a service engineer was able to move the source tube assembly to the 'OFF' position by applying lubricant to the handle rod and gently twisting and pulling on it. This event appears to have occurred due to a lack of lubricant on the handle rod, or from the dust conditions that the gauge is located in, resulting in the source tube assembly becoming stuck inside the source housing. Going forward, a few drops of lubricant will be added during the semi-annual shutter checks to prevent the source tube assembly from becoming stuck again."

There were no personnel overexposures due to this event.

Device/Source Details: VEGA Americas, Inc., model number: HLG-2, serial number: 13570676, containing a 2 Ci (original activity) Cs-137 source.

Reference Document Number: WA-23-013.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The following report was received by the California Department of Public Health , Radiation Health Branch (RHB) via email:

"On 08/01/23, a portable moisture density gauge containing radioactive materials (Humboldt Model 5001C082, Serial number HIS 1767, containing 10 mCi Cs-137 and 40 mCi Am-241/Be) was run over by a piece of heavy equipment, on a construction site. The licensee cordoned off the area where the gauge was damaged and contacted Pacific Nuclear Technology (PNT) for assistance. The top shell of the gauge was crushed and found in several pieces, the source rod was bent, and there was no damage to the area where the Cs-137 source was contained. PNT was able to place the rod containing Cs-137 into its original shielding position. The Am-241/Be source was found undamaged in its original position attached to the base. PNT had surveyed the area using a Ludlum model 3, 44-9 detector, and no radiation levels above background were detected. The gauge was placed in the undamaged transit case (transportation index measured 0.2 mR/hr) and transported to the PNT facility where the gauge was leak tested. The leak test performed on the damaged gauge did not indicate any contamination. Currently, the gauge is in storage awaiting approval for disposal.

"RHB will be following up on this investigation."

California incident number: 080123

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST TRITIUM EXIT SIGNS

The following is a summary of information received from the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment via email:

The licensee reported three lost exit signs, each containing 9.21 Ci of tritium.

Colorado Event Report ID Number: CO230025

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

AGREEMENT STATE - REMOTE SHUTTER INDICATION FAILURE

The following information was provided by the New Hampshire Radiological Health Section (NHRHS) via email:

"On August 2, 2023, Nylon Corporation of America (NYCOA) reported that a specifically-licensed fixed level gauge (Berthold, Serial No. 175-02-07) installed on the `Capro Recovery Unit' apparently failed a semi-annual detector test. The detector provides a remote indication of tank level and shutter position. In the absence of remote indication, shutter position can be noted visually. The gauge shutter is manually operated and performs as designed. Additional testing performed on August 3, 2023, verified the detector failure. NYCOA formally reported their findings to the NHRHS via email on August 3, 2023 at 1316 [EDT].

"The fixed gauge (Berthold Model LB-300L) houses a 32.9 MBq (0.89 mCi) Co-60 source assayed on January 1, 2006. The current activity is calculated as 3.3 MBq (0.088 mCi). The gauge is affixed to a tank that is suspended about 9 feet above the process room floor. The location cannot be accessed without a ladder. The surrounding area contains process piping and is not normally occupied.

"On August 4, 2023, at 0930, NHRHS inspectors arrived to perform a reactive inspection. As found, the level gauge shutter was closed and appropriately locked-out/tagged-out of service. The highest measured exposure rate was 0.327 mR/hour in contact with the gauge housing (shutter closed). At head height, below the gauge, the exposure rate was 0.010 mR/hr, which approximates normal background. A Ludlum 9DP ion chamber was utilized for these measurements.

"There is no indication of personnel overexposure.

"NYCOA stated that the Capro Recovery Unit has been offline for about five years and there are no near-term plans to bring it back online. NYCOA will investigate removal and disposal of the level gauge rather than repair the detector."

NMED Report Number: NH-23-0001

AGREEMENT STATE - STOLEN MOISTURE-DENSITY GAUGE

The following information was provided by the California Department of Public Health via email:

"On August 4, 2023, the Radiation Safety Officer for Anbessaw Consulting, Inc. contacted Los Angeles County Radiation Management to report a stolen moisture density gauge. After receiving the report, the information was forwarded to the California Department of Public Health. The gauge was a CPN International model MC-3, Serial Number M320500859 [10 mCi Cs-137 (nominal), 50 mCi Am-241:Be (nominal)].

"The gauge was stolen from a 20 foot [long] Container Express (CONEX) box stored at a fenced in and secured construction site with security guards. The gauge was placed in storage around 1700 [PDT] on August 3, 2023, and discovered to be missing around 0600-0615 on August 4, 2023. The lock on the CONEX box had been cut and the transport case containing the gauge was removed from the CONEX box. No other items were stolen from the CONEX box. The transport box was secured with a lock, and a lock was placed on the trigger of the gauge.

"After a search of the area near the CONEX box was conducted without finding the gauge, the Los Angeles Police Department was contacted, and a burglary report was filed. After the report was filed, a further search of the construction site and the area surrounding the site was made without finding the gauge or its transport case. The licensee's investigation into this event is ongoing and will be reviewed further by the California Department of Public Health."



THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"At 0039 [EDT] on 8/10/23, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped during a reactor protection system (RPS) bus shift. All systems responding normally post-trip. There was no equipment inoperable at the time of the trip. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Reactor water level being maintained via feedwater. Decay heat is being removed by cycling safety relief valves.

"An actuation of high-pressure core spray, division 3 diesel generator, and reactor core isolation cooling occurred during the scram and main steam line isolation closure. The reason for the auto-start was reaching Level 2 (130 inches in the reactor pressure vessel) during the transient. The systems automatically started as designed and injected to the reactor vessel when the Level 2 signal was received.

"The RPS actuation is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). The emergency core cooling system (ECCS) injection is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The ECCS actuation is being reported as a eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A).

"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."