Event Notification Report for August 03, 2023
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
08/02/2023 - 08/03/2023
Agreement State
Event Number: 56642
Rep Org: Colorado Dept of Health
Licensee: Geotech Environmental Equimnt, Inc.
Region: 4
City: Denver State: CO
County:
License #: GL002700
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Matthew Gift
HQ OPS Officer: Thomas Herrity
Licensee: Geotech Environmental Equimnt, Inc.
Region: 4
City: Denver State: CO
County:
License #: GL002700
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Matthew Gift
HQ OPS Officer: Thomas Herrity
Notification Date: 07/26/2023
Notification Time: 18:22 [ET]
Event Date: 07/19/2023
Event Time: 00:00 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 07/26/2023
Notification Time: 18:22 [ET]
Event Date: 07/19/2023
Event Time: 00:00 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 07/26/2023
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
10 CFR Section:
Agreement State
Person (Organization):
Young, Cale (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
ILTAB, (EMAIL) (EMAIL)
Bickett, Carey (R1DO)
CNSC (Canada), - (EMAIL)
Young, Cale (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
ILTAB, (EMAIL) (EMAIL)
Bickett, Carey (R1DO)
CNSC (Canada), - (EMAIL)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST GAUGE
The following information was provided by the Colorado Department of Health (the Department) via email:
"On July 19, 2023, Geotech Environmental Equipment, Inc. informed the Department that they rented a generally licensed Viken PB200i XRF device (SN: 1015) containing a 5 millicurie, cobalt-57 sealed source to Hi-Tech Environmental located in Brooklyn, New York on July 7, 2021. Geotech Environmental Equipment, Inc. stated that as of October 25, 2022, Hi-Tech Environmental stopped replying to emails, stopped paying their rental balance, and was not providing information for returning the device. Geotech Environmental Equipment also stated that as of June 26, 2023, they made the decision to report the XRF device as a transferred device on their 2023 general radioactive material license registration inventory.
"Based on the description of the event, the device was not transferred and as of July 19, 2023 the Department has determined that Geotech Environmental Equipment, Inc. lost the generally licensed Viken PB200i XRF device (SN: 1015)."
Colorado Event Report ID Number: CO230022
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
The following information was provided by the Colorado Department of Health (the Department) via email:
"On July 19, 2023, Geotech Environmental Equipment, Inc. informed the Department that they rented a generally licensed Viken PB200i XRF device (SN: 1015) containing a 5 millicurie, cobalt-57 sealed source to Hi-Tech Environmental located in Brooklyn, New York on July 7, 2021. Geotech Environmental Equipment, Inc. stated that as of October 25, 2022, Hi-Tech Environmental stopped replying to emails, stopped paying their rental balance, and was not providing information for returning the device. Geotech Environmental Equipment also stated that as of June 26, 2023, they made the decision to report the XRF device as a transferred device on their 2023 general radioactive material license registration inventory.
"Based on the description of the event, the device was not transferred and as of July 19, 2023 the Department has determined that Geotech Environmental Equipment, Inc. lost the generally licensed Viken PB200i XRF device (SN: 1015)."
Colorado Event Report ID Number: CO230022
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 56647
Facility: American Centrifuge Plant
Region: 2 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: Uranium Enrichment Facility
NRC Notified By: Mike Blair
HQ OPS Officer: Ernest West
Region: 2 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: Uranium Enrichment Facility
NRC Notified By: Mike Blair
HQ OPS Officer: Ernest West
Notification Date: 08/01/2023
Notification Time: 10:50 [ET]
Event Date: 08/01/2023
Event Time: 09:06 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/01/2023
Notification Time: 10:50 [ET]
Event Date: 08/01/2023
Event Time: 09:06 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/01/2023
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
70.50(b)(2) - Safety Equipment Failure
10 CFR Section:
70.50(b)(2) - Safety Equipment Failure
Person (Organization):
Miller, Mark (R2DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
Miller, Mark (R2DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
PREPLANNED OUTAGE OF A REQUIRED SAFETY MONITORING SYSTEM
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"The American Centrifuge Plant (ACP) criticality accident and alarm system (CAAS) is designed to detect a nuclear criticality accident and provide audible and visual alarms that alert personnel to evacuate the immediate area, as required by 10 CFR 70.24, criticality accident requirements.
"The CAAS will be temporarily disabled (declared inoperable in accordance with approved plant procedures) to perform periodic CAAS testing activities. The planned CAAS outage is expected to last for approximately 48 hours, commencing at approximately 0800 EDT, on Wednesday, August 2, 2023. The planned maintenance activities will affect the CAAS in X-3001 North.
"Essential personnel will be present inside the controlled access area during the maintenance activities. Compensatory measures will be implemented in accordance with section 5.4.4 of the license application for the ACP. These measures include the following: evacuation of non-essential personnel from the area of concern and the immediate evacuation zone (IEZ) before removing CAAS equipment from service; limiting access into the area; restricting fissile material movement; and the use of personal alarming dosimeters for personnel that must access the area during the CAAS outage. These measures will be implemented until CAAS coverage is verified to be operational, and the CAAS is declared operable in accordance with approved plant procedures.
"American Centrifuge Operating, LLC will notify the NRC when CAAS coverage is returned to normal operation.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Project Manager."
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"The American Centrifuge Plant (ACP) criticality accident and alarm system (CAAS) is designed to detect a nuclear criticality accident and provide audible and visual alarms that alert personnel to evacuate the immediate area, as required by 10 CFR 70.24, criticality accident requirements.
"The CAAS will be temporarily disabled (declared inoperable in accordance with approved plant procedures) to perform periodic CAAS testing activities. The planned CAAS outage is expected to last for approximately 48 hours, commencing at approximately 0800 EDT, on Wednesday, August 2, 2023. The planned maintenance activities will affect the CAAS in X-3001 North.
"Essential personnel will be present inside the controlled access area during the maintenance activities. Compensatory measures will be implemented in accordance with section 5.4.4 of the license application for the ACP. These measures include the following: evacuation of non-essential personnel from the area of concern and the immediate evacuation zone (IEZ) before removing CAAS equipment from service; limiting access into the area; restricting fissile material movement; and the use of personal alarming dosimeters for personnel that must access the area during the CAAS outage. These measures will be implemented until CAAS coverage is verified to be operational, and the CAAS is declared operable in accordance with approved plant procedures.
"American Centrifuge Operating, LLC will notify the NRC when CAAS coverage is returned to normal operation.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Project Manager."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 56648
Facility: Vogtle 3/4
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [4] [] []
RX Type: [3] W-AP1000,[4] W-AP1000
NRC Notified By: Will Garrett
HQ OPS Officer: Bill Gott
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [4] [] []
RX Type: [3] W-AP1000,[4] W-AP1000
NRC Notified By: Will Garrett
HQ OPS Officer: Bill Gott
Notification Date: 08/01/2023
Notification Time: 11:48 [ET]
Event Date: 07/31/2023
Event Time: 15:06 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/01/2023
Notification Time: 11:48 [ET]
Event Date: 07/31/2023
Event Time: 15:06 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/01/2023
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - Fitness For Duty
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - Fitness For Duty
Person (Organization):
Miller, Mark (R2DO)
FFD Group, (EMAIL)
Miller, Mark (R2DO)
FFD Group, (EMAIL)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4 | N | N | 0 | Defueled | 0 | Defueled |
FAILED FITNESS FOR DUTY TEST
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"At 1506 EDT on July 31, 2023, it was determined that a contractor supervisor failed a test specified by the fitness for duty testing program. The individual's authorization for site access has been terminated.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"At 1506 EDT on July 31, 2023, it was determined that a contractor supervisor failed a test specified by the fitness for duty testing program. The individual's authorization for site access has been terminated.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 56650
Facility: Fermi
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: Whitney Hemingway
HQ OPS Officer: Kerby Scales
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: Whitney Hemingway
HQ OPS Officer: Kerby Scales
Notification Date: 08/01/2023
Notification Time: 15:53 [ET]
Event Date: 08/01/2023
Event Time: 09:55 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/01/2023
Notification Time: 15:53 [ET]
Event Date: 08/01/2023
Event Time: 09:55 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/01/2023
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - Loss Comm/Asmt/Response
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - Loss Comm/Asmt/Response
Person (Organization):
Nguyen, April (R3DO)
Nguyen, April (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 59 | Power Operation | 59 | Power Operation |
ACTIVE SEISMIC MONITORING SYSTEM INOPERABLE
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"On 08/01/2023 at 0955 EDT, the Fermi 2 active seismic monitoring system provided indication of a potential seismic activity event. Plant abnormal procedures were entered, and compensatory measure were met and remain in place. Neither the [United States Geological Survey] (USGS) nor the next closest nuclear power plant could confirm or validate the readings obtained at Fermi. The seismic monitoring system was declared nonfunctional to validate the calibration of the system. Femi 2 has two active seismic monitors: one on the reactor pressure vessel pedestal and one in the high-pressure core injection (HPCI) room. Only the HPCI room accelerometer was declared inoperable. The HPCI accelerometer is the sole 'trigger' for the seismic recording system, which outputs peak accelerations experienced during a seismic event. This is used in assessment of the magnitude of an earthquake for EAL HU 2.1.
"The loss of the active seismic monitoring system is reportable to the NRC within 8 hours of discovery in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"No seismic activity has been felt onsite and the USGS recorded no seismic activity in the area.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"On 08/01/2023 at 0955 EDT, the Fermi 2 active seismic monitoring system provided indication of a potential seismic activity event. Plant abnormal procedures were entered, and compensatory measure were met and remain in place. Neither the [United States Geological Survey] (USGS) nor the next closest nuclear power plant could confirm or validate the readings obtained at Fermi. The seismic monitoring system was declared nonfunctional to validate the calibration of the system. Femi 2 has two active seismic monitors: one on the reactor pressure vessel pedestal and one in the high-pressure core injection (HPCI) room. Only the HPCI room accelerometer was declared inoperable. The HPCI accelerometer is the sole 'trigger' for the seismic recording system, which outputs peak accelerations experienced during a seismic event. This is used in assessment of the magnitude of an earthquake for EAL HU 2.1.
"The loss of the active seismic monitoring system is reportable to the NRC within 8 hours of discovery in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"No seismic activity has been felt onsite and the USGS recorded no seismic activity in the area.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 56570
Facility: Fermi
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: Jonathan Holdwick
HQ OPS Officer: Sam Colvard
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: Jonathan Holdwick
HQ OPS Officer: Sam Colvard
Notification Date: 06/13/2023
Notification Time: 06:02 [ET]
Event Date: 06/12/2023
Event Time: 23:33 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/03/2023
Notification Time: 06:02 [ET]
Event Date: 06/12/2023
Event Time: 23:33 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/03/2023
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - Accident Mitigation
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - Accident Mitigation
Person (Organization):
Peterson, Hironori (R3DO)
Peterson, Hironori (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 0 | Power Operation | 0 | Power Operation |
EN Revision Imported Date: 8/4/2023
EN Revision Text: ACCIDENT MITIGATION - HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION DECLARED INOPERABLE
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"At 2333 EDT on June 12, 2023, the division 2 Mechanical Draft Cooling Tower (MDCT) Fan `D' was declared inoperable due to a trip of the fan while running in high speed. The MDCT fans are required to support operability of the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS). The UHS is required to support operability of the division 2 Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) system. The EECW system cools various safety related components, including the High-Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system room cooler. An unplanned HPCI inoperability occurred based on a loss of the HPCI room cooler. The cause of MDCT Fan `D' trip is currently unknown with trouble shooting being developed for remediation of the condition. This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) based on an unplanned HPCI inoperability.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * RETRACTION AT 1540 EDT ON 8/8/2023 FROM WHITNEY HEMINGWAY TO BILL GOTT * * *
"The purpose of this notification is to retract a previous event notification (EN) 56570 reported on June 13, 2023, at 0602 EDT.
"The cause of the fan trip was a failed vibration switch. At 0429 EDT on June 14, 2023, the vibration switch was replaced, the MDCT fan "D" was tested satisfactory for operability, and the UHS, emergency diesel generator 13/14, and MDCT were declared operable.
"Following the initial EN, further analysis of the condition was performed utilizing a previously performed gothic analysis model (to perform HPCI room heat-up calculations) which bounded this condition. Based on the initial conditions at the time of the indication loss, specifically HPCI room and suppression pool temperature, it was determined that the resulting worst case post-accident room temperature was sufficiently low enough to provide margin to HPCI operability without the room cooler in service for the required mission time.
"No other concerns were noted during the event. HPCI remained operable and there was no loss of safety function. The fan trip did not involve a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).
"Therefore, the NRC non-emergency 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) report was not required and the NRC report 56570 can be retracted, and no licensee event report under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) is required to be submitted."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R3DO (Nguyen)
EN Revision Text: ACCIDENT MITIGATION - HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION DECLARED INOPERABLE
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"At 2333 EDT on June 12, 2023, the division 2 Mechanical Draft Cooling Tower (MDCT) Fan `D' was declared inoperable due to a trip of the fan while running in high speed. The MDCT fans are required to support operability of the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS). The UHS is required to support operability of the division 2 Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) system. The EECW system cools various safety related components, including the High-Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system room cooler. An unplanned HPCI inoperability occurred based on a loss of the HPCI room cooler. The cause of MDCT Fan `D' trip is currently unknown with trouble shooting being developed for remediation of the condition. This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) based on an unplanned HPCI inoperability.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * RETRACTION AT 1540 EDT ON 8/8/2023 FROM WHITNEY HEMINGWAY TO BILL GOTT * * *
"The purpose of this notification is to retract a previous event notification (EN) 56570 reported on June 13, 2023, at 0602 EDT.
"The cause of the fan trip was a failed vibration switch. At 0429 EDT on June 14, 2023, the vibration switch was replaced, the MDCT fan "D" was tested satisfactory for operability, and the UHS, emergency diesel generator 13/14, and MDCT were declared operable.
"Following the initial EN, further analysis of the condition was performed utilizing a previously performed gothic analysis model (to perform HPCI room heat-up calculations) which bounded this condition. Based on the initial conditions at the time of the indication loss, specifically HPCI room and suppression pool temperature, it was determined that the resulting worst case post-accident room temperature was sufficiently low enough to provide margin to HPCI operability without the room cooler in service for the required mission time.
"No other concerns were noted during the event. HPCI remained operable and there was no loss of safety function. The fan trip did not involve a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).
"Therefore, the NRC non-emergency 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) report was not required and the NRC report 56570 can be retracted, and no licensee event report under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) is required to be submitted."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R3DO (Nguyen)
Power Reactor
Event Number: 56652
Facility: Nine Mile Point
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: Ryan Bracht
HQ OPS Officer: Bill Gott
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: Ryan Bracht
HQ OPS Officer: Bill Gott
Notification Date: 08/03/2023
Notification Time: 16:58 [ET]
Event Date: 08/03/2023
Event Time: 10:03 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/03/2023
Notification Time: 16:58 [ET]
Event Date: 08/03/2023
Event Time: 10:03 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/03/2023
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - Fitness For Duty
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - Fitness For Duty
Person (Organization):
Bickett, Brice (R1DO)
FFD Group, (EMAIL)
Bickett, Brice (R1DO)
FFD Group, (EMAIL)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
FAILED FITNESS FOR DUTY TEST
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
A licensed employee had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated.
The NRC Senior Resident Inspector was notified.
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
A licensed employee had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated.
The NRC Senior Resident Inspector was notified.
Part 21
Event Number: 56653
Rep Org: Paragon Energy Solutions
Licensee:
Region: 2
City: State:
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Richard Knott
HQ OPS Officer: Bill Gott
Licensee:
Region: 2
City: State:
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: Richard Knott
HQ OPS Officer: Bill Gott
Notification Date: 08/03/2023
Notification Time: 17:05 [ET]
Event Date: 08/03/2023
Event Time: 00:00 []
Last Update Date: 08/03/2023
Notification Time: 17:05 [ET]
Event Date: 08/03/2023
Event Time: 00:00 []
Last Update Date: 08/03/2023
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
21.21(a)(2) - Interim Eval Of Deviation
10 CFR Section:
21.21(a)(2) - Interim Eval Of Deviation
Person (Organization):
Miller, Mark (R2DO)
Nguyen, April (R3DO)
Part 21/50.55 Reactors, - (EMAIL)
Miller, Mark (R2DO)
Nguyen, April (R3DO)
Part 21/50.55 Reactors, - (EMAIL)
INITIAL PART 21 REPORT - DEFECT WITH EATON/CUTLER HAMMER SIZE 4 AND 5 FREEDOM SERIES CONTACTORS
The following information was provided by Paragon Energy Solutions, LLC via email:
"Pursuant to 10CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i), Paragon Energy Solutions, LLC is providing this initial notification of a potential defect with Eaton/Cutler Hammer size 4 and 5 freedom series contactors that have been modified to include either a special coil and/or to improve the securing of shading coils. These contactors may have been supplied integral to a motor control center (MCC) cubicle or as spare parts. This condition, if left uncorrected, could potentially cause a substantial safety hazard.
"Paragon completed an initial evaluation of a failure of a size 4 freedom series contactor (PN: NLI-CN15NN3A-T16-MOD-M) supplied to Perry Nuclear Power Plant. The reported failure occurred 26 days following installation into its associated MCC Cubicle. Perry identified the screws holding the contact bar to the push bars had fallen out and were laying in the bottom of the molded base. This allowed the movable contact bar to sit on the stationary contacts and significantly degrade due to arcing and then fail in the energized position. This condition could prevent the contactor from performing its safety function to either energize or de-energize the attached load.
"The loose hardware is most likely a workmanship error since the contactor must be disassembled to complete the special coil and RTV modifications to the shading coils. In the fully re-assembled condition, inspection of this hardware for tightness is not possible."
Affected plants: North Anna, Turkey Point, Harris, and Perry.
The following information was provided by Paragon Energy Solutions, LLC via email:
"Pursuant to 10CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i), Paragon Energy Solutions, LLC is providing this initial notification of a potential defect with Eaton/Cutler Hammer size 4 and 5 freedom series contactors that have been modified to include either a special coil and/or to improve the securing of shading coils. These contactors may have been supplied integral to a motor control center (MCC) cubicle or as spare parts. This condition, if left uncorrected, could potentially cause a substantial safety hazard.
"Paragon completed an initial evaluation of a failure of a size 4 freedom series contactor (PN: NLI-CN15NN3A-T16-MOD-M) supplied to Perry Nuclear Power Plant. The reported failure occurred 26 days following installation into its associated MCC Cubicle. Perry identified the screws holding the contact bar to the push bars had fallen out and were laying in the bottom of the molded base. This allowed the movable contact bar to sit on the stationary contacts and significantly degrade due to arcing and then fail in the energized position. This condition could prevent the contactor from performing its safety function to either energize or de-energize the attached load.
"The loose hardware is most likely a workmanship error since the contactor must be disassembled to complete the special coil and RTV modifications to the shading coils. In the fully re-assembled condition, inspection of this hardware for tightness is not possible."
Affected plants: North Anna, Turkey Point, Harris, and Perry.