Event Notification Report for November 03, 2022

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DROPPED FIXED NUCLEAR GAUGE

The following information was provided by the Washington Office of Radiation Protection via email:

"A fixed nuclear gauge was mounted to a standpipe about a foot above the floor. The mounting bracket failed. The weld broke from vibration, and the fixed nuclear gauge fell about 1 foot to the floor. The fixed gauge appears to be undamaged. It appears that nobody was working near the fallen gauge, so nobody was exposed to the radiation beam. A radiation survey was conducted by the Radiation Safety Officer (RSO), who closed the shutter, locked out the fixed gauge, and chained and locked the fixed gauge to a support column. The area was flagged off, and is in an area away from where personnel are working. The RSO notified the state regulatory agency, who will be sending a health physicist to investigate. The RSO contacted the gauge manufacturer to have them inspect the fixed gauge, repair the mounting, and reinstall the fixed gauge.

"Device: Gauge, fixed.
"Source: Sealed source, gauge.
"Manufacturer: VEGA Americas, Inc.
"Model Number: SHLD1. (SS and D registration certificate number OH-0522-D-120-B.)
"Serial Number: 6023CO. (Manufactured October 2011.)
"Radionuclide: Cesium-137.
"Activity: 0.005 curies when manufactured in October 2011. Current activity of 0.004 curies."

Reference Document Number: WA-22-019.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING TRITIUM EXIT SIGNS
The following information was provided by the New Jersey Bureau of Environmental Radiation via email:
"After an inspection of their specific license on September 13, 2022, the licensee was requested to reconcile an inventory of their generally licensed tritium exit signs. Two signs could not initially be located. After searching the facility, previous receipt records, and contacting the sign manufacturer, the devices were declared missing on October 27, 2022.
"Isotope and activity; manufacturer, model and serial number, leak test results as applicable: H-3, 10 Ci; Isolite Corporation, Model SLX-60, Serial Numbers H60803 and H60804"


THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

PART 21 - BOLTS PROVIDED WITHOUT ZINC PLATING

The following information was provided by Emerson via fax:

A deficiency was identified in Rosemount 3153N series pressure transmitters with Rosemount 3159 remote seals with the LG1 option. The remote seal bolts in this single manufacturing lot were lacking the zinc-plating specified for corrosion resistance. Non-conforming bolts in Emerson inventory have been returned to the vendor for zinc-plating. Backlogged orders were confirmed to have correct zinc-plating. Rosemount recommends end users evaluate the significance of this notice to their specific pressure transmitter applications and environments. Rosemount further recommends that end users replace the un-plated bolts in susceptible applications to mitigate the potential for corrosion induced failure over time.

Contact Information: Gerard Hanson, Vice President and General Manager of Rosemount Nuclear Instruments, Inc. (952-949-5200)

Affected plants: LaSalle and Dresden

PART 21 REPORT - SOLA / HEVI-DUTY UNINTERRUPTIBLE POWER SUPPLY OUT-OF-SPECIFICATION

The following is a synopsis of information provided by Nutherm International via fax:

Nutherm was notified by the customer that a Sola / Hevi-Duty uninterruptible power supply provided under an Exelon purchase order did not power up properly. The unit was returned to Nutherm for failure analysis. Inspection of the internals showed damage to transistors. When energized, the output was out of specification.

This UPS had been supplied for use at Clinton Power Station.

No other units are impacted by this defect or failure to comply. This issue has been identified as a single failure on this component only. This issue will not impact any future procurements.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) PRESSURE BOUNDARY DEGRADED

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"At 1433 EDT on November 1, 2022, it was determined that a single relevant indication in the RCS pressure boundary did not meet the acceptance criteria under ASME, Section XI IWB-3514-2. 'Allowable Planar Flaws.' The condition will be resolved prior to plant startup.

"This event is being reported as an eight-hour non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A).

"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

OPERATION WITH NON COMPLIANT FUEL

The following information was provided by the Nuclear Engineering Teaching Laboratory (NETL) at the University of Texas via email:

"We identified a potential non-compliance with Technical Specifications for the University of Texas research reactor on October 17 while shutdown. Our facility license specifies TRIGA fuel elements with stainless steel cladding, and we operated from January to October [2022] with two aluminum clad fuel elements in the core. On discovery, we suspended operations, removed the aluminum clad elements from the core, and compared the event to each reportable category identified in our Technical Specifications. The closest reporting criteria is:

"An observed inadequacy in the implementation of administrative or procedural controls such that the inadequacy causes or could have caused the existence or development of an unsafe condition with regard to reactor operations.

"However, we were unable to identify the implementation of facility administrative controls or procedures that led to this event. Furthermore, analysis indicates all operations maintained a margin to the safety limit for aluminum fuel, and aluminum clad TRIGA fuel elements are used in other TRIGA reactors. Regardless, we felt strongly that NRC should be informed and notified our program manager and designated inspector before initiating investigation and causal analysis.

"In developing corrective action, NETL staff identified changes in procedures and administrative controls that would have been adequate to prevent insertion of disqualified fuel in NETL reactor core. Since insertion of disqualified fuel has the potential to cause existence or development of an unsafe condition with regard to reactor operations, NETL management is now reporting this as a potentially reportable event under the category described."

NRC Project Manager and NPR Inspector have been notified.

PART 21 REPORT - FAIRBANKS MORSE ENGINE EMERENCY DIESEL GENERATOR ELECTRONIC SPEED CONTROL MODULE

The following information was provided by Fairbanks Morse (FM) via email:

Facilities affected:
FM Sales Order Item Affected Facility Serial Number
40135890 12996949 Farley 22436624
40132483 12996949 Limerick 22444358
40130845 12996949 Limerick 22444359
40130158 12996949 Hope Creek 22277182

"Basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect: Emergency Diesel Generator Electronic Speed Control Module, Woodward 2301A

"Nature of defect: In some 2301A controls, 1 nF capacitors may have been loaded in place of 150 pF capacitors. This could affect circuitry controlling the units' crystal, speed signal and reset dynamics, and power supply operation.

"Safety hazard which could be created by such defect: This issue can prevent affected 2301A controls from starting up or may lead to unscheduled shutdown of affected controls. It can also prevent the prime mover from obtaining a stable speed response, causing it to hunt or overspeed. In some cases, the RESET potentiometer may run out of range to adjust the unit for stable operation or desired prime mover speed response, resulting in prime mover performance outside of specification limits.

"Fairbanks Morse Engine will notify affected licensees no later than 3 Nov 2022, and repair returned affected units. Additional corrective actions will be documented in the Fairbanks Morse corrective system under PD-1102.

"Any installed affected Speed Control should be removed from service as soon as practical and returned to Fairbanks Morse for repair. If affected controller is installed and licensee experiences unstable speed response, the electronic speed control should be turned off and the emergency diesel generator should be allowed to operate using the mechanical governor system."

POC: Martin Kurr, Quality Assurance Manager (608) 364-8247