Event Notification Report for October 05, 2022

EN Revision Imported Date: 10/5/2022

EN Revision Text: AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"At 0001 EDT on September 26, 2022, James A. FitzPatrick (JAF) removed the generator from service as part of a planned shutdown for refueling.

"At 0306 EDT, with the mode switch in Startup/Hot Standby and inserting rods, JAF experienced a spurious Scram and closure of seven out of eight main steam isolation valves (MSIV's). The reactor protection system (RPS) actuated during the event, resulting in all control rods being fully inserted.

"The cause of the closure of MSIV's and the Scram is being investigated.

"This condition is being reported as a four-hour NRC report per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for RPS actuation, and as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for the safety system actuation based on the multiple main steam isolation valves closing on an isolation signal.

"There was no impact to the health and safety of the public. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

* * * UPDATE ON 10/4/22 AT 2047 EDT FROM ANDREW WEAVER TO KERBY SCALES * * *

The following update was provided by the licensee via email:

"This Event Notification is being updated to clarify that the reactor was not critical when this event occurred. Therefore, the reporting requirement is changed from 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A) for Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation along with Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV) system actuation.

"An analysis of reactor criticality was performed for the period of time prior to the RPS actuation event. Operators were inserting control rods per the shutdown Reactivity Management Plan. The Intermediate Radiation Monitoring (IRM) readings preceding the scram signal demonstrate a negative reactivity direction without control rod movement. The analysis concluded that the reactor was subcritical when RPS was actuated."

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

Notified R1DO (Young).

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST RADIOPHARMACEUTICAL PACKAGE

The following information was provided by the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (The Agency) via email:

"At approximately 2100 CDT on 9/16/22, the Agency received notice of a radiopharmaceutical package lost in the care of a commercial carrier while in transit from Arlington Heights, IL to Austin, TX. As of 9/27/22, the carrier continues to search for the package, which contained 2 vials of I-123 with an activity of 32 millicuries (mCi) (at the time of shipment, 9/14/22). The 32 mCi of I-123 have now decayed beneath 3 nanocuries.

"The carrier has indicated that the last known scan was the night of 9/14/22, when it arrived in Austin. They are actively searching the facility and have escalated to the local station management teams. There is no reason to believe the radioactive material was stolen, diverted, or is in the public domain. Texas program staff were notified along with the United Stated Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center."

Illinois Event Number: IL220035

* * * UPDATE ON 9/30/2022 AT 1659 EDT FROM GARY FORSEE TO MIKE STAFFORD * * *

The following information was provided by the Illinois Emergency Management Agency via email:

"This source was found by the carrier and delivered. This matter is considered closed."

Notified R3DO (Szwarc) and R4DO (Kellar). Notified via email: NMSS Event Notification and ILTAB

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

FITNESS FOR DUTY REPORT (FFD)

A supplemental supervisor violated the station's FFD policy. The individuals access to the plant has been terminated.

The licensee notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector.

60-DAY OPTIONAL TELEPHONIC NOTIFICATION OF INVALID ACTUATION OF CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"This 60-day optional telephone notification is being made in lieu of an LER submittal as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1). This notification is made pursuant to the reporting requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for invalid actuations of one of the systems listed in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B).

"At approximately 0628 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) on August 6, 2022, an invalid actuation of group 6 Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs) (i.e., containment atmospheric control/monitoring and post accident sampling isolation valves) occurred. The group 6 isolation signal resulted from the reactor building ventilation radiation monitor `A' channel exceeding the setpoint value. This condition recurred at approximately 1305 EDT on August 12, 2022. In both instances, the `B' channel, located in the same plenum, remained steady and below the setpoint value through the entire event. This, along with readings made by radiation protection technicians, confirmed that there were no actual high radiation conditions in the reactor building exhaust in either instance. Following each invalid actuation, upon returning unit 2 reactor building ventilation to service, the `A' channel readings returned to be consistent with the `B' channel. It was determined that these invalid actuations likely resulted from degradation of circuit components associated with the radiation monitor. The `A' channel radiation monitor was replaced on September 22, 2022.

"During these two events, the PCIVs functioned successfully and the actuations were complete. The actuations were not initiated in response to actual plant conditions, they were not an intentional manual initiation, and there were no parameters satisfying the requirements for initiation of the system. Therefore, these events have been determined to be invalid actuations.

"These events did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public."

FITNESS FOR DUTY REPORT

A non-licensed supervisor had a confirmed positive during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.