Event Notification Report for August 29, 2022

EN Revision Imported Date: 8/29/2022

EN Revision Text: PART 21 REPORT - POTENTIAL DEFECT IN QUICK DISCONNECT CONNECTOR CABLE ASSEMBLIES

The following is a synopsis of information received via facsimile:

On April 24, 2022, a potential defect was discovered in a configuration of the 1 « inch Quick Disconnect Connector (P/N: 913602-111) cable assemblies supplied to Duke [(McGuire Nuclear Station)] under procurement document 30129014. During post installation testing by Duke, it was found that one of the cable wires was shorted to ground. This damage could cause the cable assembly to not perform its intended safety function. Upon further investigation, Duke found 9 other cable assemblies to have similar damage. Duke returned the identified cable assemblies to Curtiss Wright who is investigating the issue. Although some testing and verification activities have been completed, additional testing and research is necessary and in progress. The current testing and research is projected to take 30 days and a follow-up letter with results and status will be provided by July 24, 2022.

Currently, McGuire Nuclear Station is the only affected facility.

For additional information, please contact Jim Tumlinson, Director of Operations (256-425-8037), Christopher Covan, Quality Assurance Manager (256-624-7301), or Tim Franchuk of Quality (513-201-2176).

* * * UPDATE ON 07/25/2022 AT 1417 EDT FROM CHRIS COVAN TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

The following is an update received via facsimile:

"After further research on this condition, we have determined there was a defect that was provided to this utility. The nature of the defect is a bushing supplied with these cable assemblies. This bushing was found to have burr edges near the interface of the connector. This burr, when moved up and down the wires during the installation process, has the potential to cause damage. This damage could compromise the integrating of the dielectric characteristic of the supplied connector which could lead to the component not to perform its intended safety function.

"Based on history, where we have never had an issue of this defect being detected either by Curtiss-Wright or Duke Energy, Curtiss-Wright is confident that this is a recent issue and efforts/research are being done to bound this issue to determine the extent of condition. Due to the nature of the damage, we also have a high degree of confidence that the defect would be evident and caught during the pre/post installation testing/inspection of this device which would further prevent them from being installed in the plants.

"All configuration that utilize this defective component were supplied to Duke Energy and installed in the McGuire, Oconee and Catawba operating plants. As of this time, we have identified 11 cables which have this defect and we are working closely with Duke to determine the full extent of condition. These 11 cables have been returned to Curtiss-Wright. Further evaluation will require a projected addition 30 days to continue our evaluation with the help of the utility. Another follow up letter will be issued to the NRC on August 26, 2022."

Notified R3DO (Peterson), R2DO (Miller), and Part 21 Group (by email).

* * * UPDATE ON 08/26/2022 AT 1411 EDT FROM CHRIS COVAN TO ADAM KOZIOL * * *

The following is an update received via facsimile:

"In pursuance of compliance to Federal Regulation 10CFR21, this letter is issued to provide closure for notification issued June 24, 2022 of the potential defect in a configuration of the 1 1/2 Inch Quick Disconnect Connector (P/N: 913602-111) cable assemblies supplied to Duke Energy under procurement documents 30129014, 03121479, 03114993 and 03124438 for of a total of 19 connectors at the McGuire and Catawba Nuclear Power Stations. We have a high degree of confidence that this is limited to these supply of cables.

"Of the 19 connectors, 11 have been returned to Curtiss-Wright and have been confirmed to have the suspected defect. Curtiss-Wright will be working with Duke Energy to have these connector assemblies replaced. Due to the nature of the defect and installation routines of the plant, for items installed at Duke Energy we have reasonable assurance that these connectors do not pose an immediate safety risk but could cause damaged during routine maintenance associated with the connectors and should be replace at earliest convenience.

"To prevent this from reoccurring, Curtiss-Wright will implement an inspection activity to verify the absence of burrs and/or sharp edges of all fittings that could potentially cause damage which could prevent the items from performing its intended safety function.

"For additional information, please contact Jim Tumlinson, Director of Operations (256-425-8037), Christopher Covan, Quality Assurance Manager (256-624-7301), or Tim Franchuk Director of Quality (513-201-2176)."

Notified R3DO (Pelke), R2DO (Miller), and Part 21 Group (by email).

EN Revision Imported Date: 9/20/2022

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - BROKEN WINDOW ON NUCLEAR GAUGE

The following information was provided by the State of South Carolina, Department of Health & Environmental Control (DHEC) via email:

"On August 18, 2022, at 0948 EDT, DHEC inspector Leland Cave received a call from Mitsubishi Polyester Films, LLC (S.C. Lic. No. 036) to report an incident that had occurred at the plant. The licensee stated that earlier that morning the thin window film was torn on one of their Thermo EGS Gauging, LLC beta gauges [1.25 Ci of Kr-85]. The result of the tear was that the production line was stopped until the film could be replaced. The representative from Thermo was already onsite and needed verbal permission to begin the repair on the unit. The permission was given, and the reciprocity notification was sent in.

"The DHEC inspector called in the incident [to the NRC] at 0936 EDT on August 19, 2022, and is preparing to go to the licensee to review the cause of the incident."

* * * RETRACTION ON 9/19/22 AT 1622 EDT FROM LELAND CAVE TO BRIAN LIN * * *

The following information was submitted by the State of South Carolina, Department of Health & Environmental Control (DHEC) via email:

"The inspector called in the incident at 0936 EDT on August 19, 2022 and left to go to the licensee to review the cause of the incident. Upon the inspector's arrival, the Radiation Safety Officer (RSO), the representative from ThermoFisher, and other members of management sat down with him in a conference room to discuss the events that led to the call. The representative discussed with everyone about the gauging device and how it has a source side and a detector side. He stated that the detector side foil is an approximately six-inch circular piece of aluminum foil. He brought a piece that had torn before as well as the one that had been damaged the day before. He also brought an example of what the source side foil looks like and what it would look like when it would be damaged. The representative stated that the foil on the detector side ripped, and it shut down the machine as designed. The source was safe with no damage to any part. It was determined that this was not a reportable incident. They reviewed the specific unit and the RSO and representative best assessed that when the product is cut, it can leave a sharp edge on it that can lead to a tear. It is also possible for the product to bunch after it has been cut. The licensee and representative will continue to observe if this happens and potentially how often."

Notified R1DO (Arner) and NMSS via email.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGES

The following information was provided by the Florida Bureau of Radiation Control (BRC) via email:

"On 8/20/2022 at approximately 2130 EDT, the RSO for Rummel, Klepper and Kahl, LLP (RK & K) called the BRC to report that two moisture density gauges were stolen from their facility. They noticed the missing gauges sometime this evening and immediately contacted the BRC and the Orlando Police Department (OPD). At the time of the call, the Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) was only able to provide the serial number for both gauges (24588 & 23489) but no additional information as OPD was on site making a report. A follow-up call is scheduled to gather further details.

"Follow-up with the RK & K RSO on 8/22/22:

"RK & K has two field office trailers located in a yard in Orlando , FL, which is operated by CSX Transportation. On the evening of Saturday 8/20/22, at approximately 2000 EDT, CSX maintenance noticed the fence and lock chains were cut and contacted the senior project engineer. He arrived at the facility around 2045 EDT and noticed the Conex was breached with two gauges missing. They have video of the vehicle entering the complex, but, unfortunately, the plates were taken off. A report was filed with Orlando Police Department. Report #2022-00288935.

"An inspector will be stopping by the facility today for further investigation."

FL Incident Number: FL22-098


THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOPHARMACEUTICAL PACKAGE LOST IN TRANSIT

The following information was received via email:

"The Illinois Emergency Management Agency (the Agency) was contacted on 8/16/22 by GE Healthcare to advise that a radiopharmaceutical package containing one vial of Iodine-123 had not arrived at a Rochester, NY radiopharmacy as scheduled. The package contained one vial of Iodine-123 with an activity of 20 millicuries at the time of shipment (shipment date 8/11/2022). The last confirmed scan was 8/11/2022, at 1721 EDT, at the Greater Rochester International Airport. The package now contains approximately 0.0206 microcuries. The licensee is in continuous communication with the carrier, who is still actively looking for the package. This matter has a 30-day reporting requirement to the US NRC and is being phoned into the NRC HOO under event number IL220029. There is no indication of intentional theft or diversion, and the contents would not be useful for illicit intent."

Illinois Reference Number: IL220029

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILED TO FUNCTION - CRITICALITY ACCIDENT ALARM SYSTEM LOSS OF POWER
The following information was provided by Westinghouse via email:

"At approximately 1430 [EDT] on 8/23/2022, a ground fault caused a circuit breaker to trip, causing a loss of power to the Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) Stations 18 and 19 at the Columbia Fuel Fabrication Facility (CFFF). This removed all power to the stations, as the circuit breaker is between the UPS (ultimate power source) and the detectors. Upon the loss of power, a signal was received at the manned guard station, as designed, providing both visual indication and an audible alarm that Stations 18 and 19 were disabled. Notifications and actions were performed in accordance with internal response procedures. It was determined that the area of lost coverage was limited to part of the outdoor UF6 cylinder storage pad. Special Nuclear Material (SNM) movements at the UF6 cylinder storage pad were immediately suspended. No personnel were in the affected area at the time. Power was restored to the circuit at approximately 1540 and CAAS detectors 18 and 19 were placed back in operation at approximately 1600. Operations were cleared to resume at that time. A reportability evaluation was performed and determined there was redundant equipment available and operable to perform the safety function of the out of service detectors and, therefore, was not reportable.

"On 8/25/2022, site electrical engineering staff completed their causal analysis and extent of condition review of the incident on 8/23/2022. The understanding of the condition during the event was that two breakers on the sub-panel tripped, one which removed power from Criticality Stations 18 and 19.

"In fact, the ground fault caused the breaker to the sub-panel to trip and the extent of condition review on 08/25/2022 at 0919 determined that a CAAS horn loop consisting of 7 horns and one strobe light were also disabled. If the CAAS is out-of-service, CFFF is required within one hour to suspend movement and processing of SNM in the coverage area until the process is brought to a safe shutdown condition. In the unlikely event of a criticality anywhere in the plant, the emergency response is to evacuate the entire plant. Therefore, since a portion of the horn system was unavailable all SNM movements should have been suspended in the plant within an hour. It was not recognized until completion of the extent of condition review that the horn loop was out of service for approximately 90 minutes due to this incident. The fire alarm speaker system was operable at the time and the station guard would have made an announcement in the event of a criticality. The fire alarm system does not meet all the requirements in ANSI/ANS-8.3 (1997) for CAAS response.

"The condition is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 70.50(b)(2). Specifically, the equipment required by 70.24, was inoperable for approximately 30 minutes outside the window allowed by the license, without a cessation of movement and processing of SNM, and with no redundant equipment available and operable that met all the requirements of ANSI/ANS-8.3."

The NRC Region was notified.

TURBINE TRIP DUE TO MAIN TRANSFORMER FIRE

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"At 0810 EDT on August 27, 2022, with Unit 2 at 27% power, the operating crew received an annunciator for a Turbine Trip Without Reactor Trip. At 0812 EDT, a report came in from the field of a fire in the north yard due to an "A" Main Transformer upper bushing failure. The station fire brigade was dispatched and offsite assistance was requested. However, at 0842 EDT the fire was put out, prior to needing the offsite assistance. No Emergency Action Level threshold was exceeded for this event. The switchyard is in a normal alignment for providing offsite power to Unit 2. At 1015 EDT, the Virginia Department of Emergency Management (VDEM) was notified of the event. Additionally, a notification to the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality will be made due to approximately 100 gallons of oil reaching the ground. As such, this issue is being reported per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) for "'Any event or situation for which a news release is planned or notification to other government agencies has been or will be made.'"

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.

MANUAL REACTOR TRIP AND AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM ACTUATION

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"[On 8/28/2022] at 0329 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT), with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100% power, the reactor was manually tripped due to a 'B' train main feedwater pump trip. The trip was not complex with all systems responding normally post-trip. The auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system started automatically as expected. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Steam generator levels are being maintained by AFW through the AFW flow control valves. Decay heat is being removed by using the steam generator power-operated relief valves. The reason for the 'B' train main feedwater pump trip is under investigation.

"Due to the reactor protection system actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). This event is also being reported per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that resulted in a valid actuation of the auxiliary feedwater system. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:

The cause of the 'B' train main feedwater pump trip is suspected to be the result of an electrical transient due to the alarms that the operators received. In addition, the 'A' train main feedwater pump also tripped subsequent to the reactor trip and that cause is still under investigation.

AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO REACTOR COOLANT PUMP TRIP

The following information was provided by the licensee via fax or email:

"On August 28, 2022 at 1348 EDT, DC Cook Unit 1 reactor automatically tripped due to a trip of the #13 Reactor Coolant Pump.

"This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation as a four (4) hour report, and under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), specified system actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System, as an eight (8) hour report. The DC Cook Resident NRC Inspector has been notified.

"Unit 1 is being supplied by offsite power. All control rods fully inserted. All Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps started properly. Decay heat is being removed via the Steam Dump System. Preliminary evaluation indicates all plant systems functioned normally following the Reactor Trip. DC Cook Unit 1 remains stable in Mode 3 while conducting the Post Trip Review. No radioactive release is in progress as a result of this event.

"Unit 2 remains stable at 100% power / Mode 1."