Event Notification Report for July 14, 2022

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST TRITIUM EXIT SIGNS

The following summary was received from the Wisconsin Department of Public Health (the Department) via email:

"During a recent routine inspection, the licensee told the Department that they disposed all their tritium exit signs in 2021; however, the licensee had no disposal records for six tritium exit signs which were distributed to the licensed location in 2012 and 2017. The licensee has thoroughly searched its facility and nearby buildings owned by the licensee but the signs could not be located. The licensee suspects the signs were discarded when the storage cabinet they were in was repurposed. Five of the signs were Isolite Model SLX60 (s/n 12-14613, 12-14615, 12-14616, 12-14617 and 12-14618, each originally containing 6.2 Ci of tritium). One sign was an Isolite Model 2000 (s/n H76360, originally containing 7.5 Ci of tritium).

"The Department considers this matter to be closed."

Wisconsin Event Report ID No.: WI220013

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POTENTIAL HIGH DOSE TO OTHER THAN TREATMENT SITE

The following was received from the state of Oregon via email:

"On June 29, a deviation on the length of the transfer tube was identified where the tube was found to be 2.9 centimeters longer than the vendor's specification (122.9 cm vs. 120 cm). This tube is used specifically with Channel 1 of the afterloader [(source: 10 Ci Ir-192; model: VS2000; s/n: 02-01-0235-001-031622-11038-12)] with a tandem and ring (T and R) applicator. Treatments therefore will be 2.9 centimeters shorter than the programmed distance for treatments and involving 1.5-2 cm of unintended tissue which shall exceed 50 rem and quite probably 50 percent to the location. The transfer tube length was last measured on July 27, 2020 and the licensee noted that the tube "measured length appeared to reflect the specified length by the manufacturer at the time." Because of this, the licensee believes they may have under-dosed some of their T and R patients using this transfer tube with Channel 1 of the afterloader. The licensee has already indicated two T and R treatments where this may be the case, May 13 and June 22, and is putting together a list of all cases since the most recent tube length verification in 2020.

Oregon Report ID Number: 22-0031

A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.

AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO TURBINE TRIP ON HIGH REACTOR WATER LEVEL

The following information was provided by the licensee via fax or email:

"At 0803 EDT on 7/12/2022, with the Unit 2 in Mode 1 at 100% power, an automatic scram was received on Unit 2 following a turbine trip due to high reactor water level. The trip was uncomplicated with all systems responding normally post trip. All rods inserted to their full-in positions.

"Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B).

"The cause of the transient is under investigation.

"Operations responded using the Emergency Operating Procedure and stabilized the plant in Mode 3. Decay heat is being removed using the steam bypass valves to the condenser and the safety relief valves did not lift as a result of the trip. Reactor vessel inventory and pressure are being maintained in normal control bands.

"Unit 3 was not affected by this transient.

"There was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

INADVERTENT SIREN ACTIVATION

The following information was provided by the licensee via fax or email:

"At 1051 EDT on July 12, 2022, Seabrook Station received report of inadvertent siren activation. Local authorities have been contacted to apprise them of inadvertent activation of sirens. No press release is planned at this time.

"This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi).

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
The inadvertent activation involved one group of nine (9) sirens in the Seabrook Beach area. The cause of the activation is under investigation.

HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION INOPERABLE

The following information was provided by the licensee via fax or email:

"At 0917 CDT on 7/12/2022, during the performance of U1 [Unit 1] High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) rated flow test, the 1-FCV-73-19 (HPCI governor valve) failed to operate as expected. This condition results in U1 HPCI being inoperable; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). The Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system remain operable.

"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

"U1 entered TS LCO 3.5.1 Condition C, 14-day Shutdown LCO [Limiting Condition for Operation], due to the HPCI inoperability."

PART 21 REPORT - FAILURE OF AN EATON ELECTRICAL CUTLER HAMMER RELAY

The following information was provided by Framatome Inc. via email:

"Framatome Inc. (Framatome) supplied an Eaton Electrical Cutler Hammer, Inc. (Eaton) D26MRD704A1 Relay to Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, McGuire Nuclear Station, that failed to change state during testing of their load sequencer. This relay was supplied as a safety related component by Framatome. A molded contact bar in the D26 top adder deck prevented a contact spring from settling into its proper position. Top adder decks manufactured between 2003 and 2022 were inspected for the existence of flashing, but no specific time frame where the excess flashing was found could be identified.

"Testing of additional relays with this similar excess flashing condition, by both Framatome and Eaton, showed that contact springs tended to stay in place and were unaffected by the excess flashing. There have been no past similar relay reports by Framatome customers despite there being at least 587 other relays with top adder decks supplied as commercially dedicated components. Eaton has also indicated that they have had no other reports of this condition or failures associated with it.

"The extent of condition determined that the failure is an isolated incident. Only one relay, supplied to McGuire Nuclear Station, failed to change state.

"In the future, as a precaution, the Framatome commercial grade dedication process will include the inspection of the adder deck contact bars. Relays containing contact bars with excess flashing will be rejected."