Event Notification Report for April 29, 2022
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
04/28/2022 - 04/29/2022
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 55871
Facility: FitzPatrick
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: Caleb Wallace
HQ OPS Officer: Lloyd Desotell
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: Caleb Wallace
HQ OPS Officer: Lloyd Desotell
Notification Date: 04/29/2022
Notification Time: 20:44 [ET]
Event Date: 04/29/2022
Event Time: 12:51 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/15/2022
Notification Time: 20:44 [ET]
Event Date: 04/29/2022
Event Time: 12:51 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/15/2022
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - Accident Mitigation
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - Accident Mitigation
Person (Organization):
Young, Matt (R1DO)
Young, Matt (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
EN Revision Imported Date: 7/18/2022
EN Revision Text: HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) INOPERABLE
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"At 1251 EDT on April 29, 2022, while troubleshooting the failure of the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Exhaust Drain Pot High Level Alarm to clear, it was discovered that the High Pressure Coolant Injection exhaust line condensate drain system was not functioning as designed to support removal of condensate from the turbine exhaust. This resulted in some water accumulation in the turbine casing. Subsequently, the High Pressure Coolant Injection System was declared inoperable. As a result, this condition is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of the safety function at the time of discovery. "
* * * RETRACTION ON 07/15/22 AT 1943 EDT FROM EVAN THOMPSON TO LLOYD DESOTELL * * *
"A technical evaluation of this event was performed and concluded that the HPCI system would have been operable with this condition. If HPCI turbine actuated with the estimated amount of condensate accumulated in the casing and connecting piping, it would have performed its safety function; the HPCI Turbine Exhaust Rupture Disc would not have been challenged by calculated peak pressures; and calculated water hammer loads were within specified load capacities of the turbine flange, downstream piping, struts, snubber, and spring hanger. Based on this, the condition reported in EN 55871 is being retracted."
Notified R1DO (Bickett)
EN Revision Text: HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) INOPERABLE
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"At 1251 EDT on April 29, 2022, while troubleshooting the failure of the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Exhaust Drain Pot High Level Alarm to clear, it was discovered that the High Pressure Coolant Injection exhaust line condensate drain system was not functioning as designed to support removal of condensate from the turbine exhaust. This resulted in some water accumulation in the turbine casing. Subsequently, the High Pressure Coolant Injection System was declared inoperable. As a result, this condition is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of the safety function at the time of discovery. "
* * * RETRACTION ON 07/15/22 AT 1943 EDT FROM EVAN THOMPSON TO LLOYD DESOTELL * * *
"A technical evaluation of this event was performed and concluded that the HPCI system would have been operable with this condition. If HPCI turbine actuated with the estimated amount of condensate accumulated in the casing and connecting piping, it would have performed its safety function; the HPCI Turbine Exhaust Rupture Disc would not have been challenged by calculated peak pressures; and calculated water hammer loads were within specified load capacities of the turbine flange, downstream piping, struts, snubber, and spring hanger. Based on this, the condition reported in EN 55871 is being retracted."
Notified R1DO (Bickett)
Power Reactor
Event Number: 55868
Facility: Harris
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: Timothy Manfredi
HQ OPS Officer: Bethany Cecere
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: Timothy Manfredi
HQ OPS Officer: Bethany Cecere
Notification Date: 04/29/2022
Notification Time: 07:49 [ET]
Event Date: 04/29/2022
Event Time: 04:05 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/29/2022
Notification Time: 07:49 [ET]
Event Date: 04/29/2022
Event Time: 04:05 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/29/2022
Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS Actuation - Critical 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - Valid Specif Sys Actuation
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS Actuation - Critical 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - Valid Specif Sys Actuation
Person (Organization):
Miller, Mark (R2DO)
Miller, Mark (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | M/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
MANUAL REACTOR TRIP AND AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM ACTUATION
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"At 0405 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT), with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to degrading condenser vacuum. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post-trip. The Auxiliary Feedwater System started automatically as expected.
"Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by the Main Steam System to the main condenser using the turbine bypass valves.
"Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). This event is also being reported per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that resulted in a valid actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System.
"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
No Tech Spec limits were exceeded. Offsite power is available. The suspected cause for the loss of condenser vacuum is when performing the scheduled monthly swap of condenser vacuum pumps, a suction valve failed to shut.
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"At 0405 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT), with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to degrading condenser vacuum. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post-trip. The Auxiliary Feedwater System started automatically as expected.
"Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by the Main Steam System to the main condenser using the turbine bypass valves.
"Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). This event is also being reported per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that resulted in a valid actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System.
"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
No Tech Spec limits were exceeded. Offsite power is available. The suspected cause for the loss of condenser vacuum is when performing the scheduled monthly swap of condenser vacuum pumps, a suction valve failed to shut.