Event Notification Report for April 06, 2022

EN Revision Imported Date: 4/6/2022

EN Revision Text: FITNESS FOR DUTY REPORT

A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

* * * UPDATE ON 4/5/22 AT 1651 (EDT) FROM D.TOWNSEND TO T. HERRITY * * *

The initial event notification should have characterized the test type as a follow-up fitness-for-duty test, rather than a random test.

R4DO (Dixon) and FFD Group via email.

EN Revision Imported Date: 4/6/2022

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST GD-153 and CO-57 SOURCES

The following information was received from the state of New York (NYSDOH) via fax:

"Four transmission/reference/calibration sources were shipped out in two separate shipments via [a common carrier] to Eckert & Ziegler on 3/17/2022 under two-day shipping and have been listed as 'delayed' since 3/18/2022. Upon contacting [the common carrier], an incident (No. C-61803614) was opened to attempt to locate the sources as [the common carrier] was unable to locate the two shipments. The licensee formally reported the sources as missing to NYSDOH on 3/28/2022.

"The Gd-153 source, (1.27 mCi as of 3/17/22), is deemed a reportable quantity under 20.2201 (a)(1)(ii), as greater than 10 times the Appendix C to Part 20 value (10 microCi), but less than 1000 times. The three other sources (Cobalt-57) fall below the values in Appendix C of 10 CFR 20 and are not reportable under 10 CFR 20.2201.

"The licensee is continuing to contact [the common carrier] regarding these sources and keeping NYSDOH updated on the status. NYS is consistently monitoring this situation under Incident No. 1389:
Device Manufacturer: Eckart & Zeigler
Device Model: TBD
Device S/N: S5-864
Source Manufacturer: Eckart & Zeigler
Source Model: TBD
Source S/N: S5-864
Isotope: Gd-153
Activity: 1.27 millicuries on 3/17/2022 (10 mCi assayed on 4/1/2020)

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

EN Revision Imported Date: 4/6/2022

EN Revision Text: PART 21 - ELECTRO-MOTIVE DIESEL (EMD) CYLINDER HEAD WITH FIREFACE THICKNESS BELOW SPECIFICATION

The following is a summary of the information provided by Engine Systems, Inc. (ESI) via fax:

ESI reported that a fatigue crack was discovered in the fireface of an EMD cylinder head, P/N 40121485, D/C 18K, installed on an emergency diesel generator set. The crack initiated on the coolant side and propagated through the fireface wall of the combustion side resulting in a water leak. Fatigue failure was likely caused by a reduced fireface thickness which reduced overall rigidity of the fireface, allowing increased deformation and ultimately failure due to high tensile stress at the blend between the fireface and valve seat. A reduced fireface thickness could result in a through wall crack that would introduce jacket water into the combustion chamber. Over time if the crack propagated or went undetected engine damage may occur. Ultimately, a crack in the fireface could lead to a failure of the diesel engine which would prevent the emergency diesel generator set from performing during a safety-event.

This Part 21 applies to the Cylinder heads from D/C 18K, supplied within some power pack assemblies at Watts Bar Nuclear Power Plant.

Corrective Actions:
ESI recommends an ultrasonic thickness inspection on the fireface to confirm thickness is within specified range to plants with these power pack assemblies. ESI has also revised its dedication package to increase the number of ultrasonic thickness inspection points. An additional enhancement is the inclusion of an inspection map for guidance and clarity of the locations to be measured. The revision was implemented on March 15, 2022.

Technical questions concerning this notification can be directed to Dan Roberts, Quality Manager and John Kriesel, Engineering Manager at (252) 977-2720.

EN Revision Imported Date: 4/6/2022

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK OPEN SHUTTER

The following information was obtained from the state of Iowa via e-mail:

"When conducting routine shutter checks on an Ohmart/Vega SHLG-2 fixed gauge, the operator was not able to extend the plunger to move the source into a shielded position (use of hands and basic tools). The device is in a facility that is restricted access and unmanned due to chemical production. Unless manually operated for shutter checks or vessel maintenance, the standard position of this device is open. No increase of radiation levels compared to standard operating conditions. Radiation Safety Officer has contacted Vega for corrective action guidance and direct support. Initial guidance is the application of a coil lubricant and rotating the handle. Any action above this will be performed by a Vega service technician. The Licensee has a scheduled shutdown of the production line next week when they will schedule the Vega tech for support."

"Source/Radioactive Material: SEALED SOURCE GAUGE
Manufacturer: OHMART CORP.
Model Number: A-2102 IAEA Category: 3
Serial Number: 9849CN
Radionuclide: Cs-137
Activity: 4 Ci (148 GBq)
Iowa Event Number: IA220002"

EN Revision Imported Date: 4/6/2022

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FIXED GAUGE STUCK SHUTTER

The following is a summary of information provided by the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (the Department) via email and phone:

On 3/4/2022, the Department was notified by the licensee's Radiation Safety Officer that while an engineer was attempting to retract the source from a fixed gauge, the gauge became locked with the source in an unshielded position. The source was subsequently retracted to a shielded position. The source is a 70 milliCi Cs-137 source (serial number 6280CO) contained in a VEGA SHLM-CR-2 housing. The manufacturer is expected to come to the plant on March 31, 2022 to evaluate the gauge and make any necessary repairs.

No overexposures occurred as a result of this event.

EN Revision Imported Date: 4/6/2022

EN Revision Text: SCRAM ON LOW LEVEL

The following information was provided by the licensee via telephone and email:

"On 4/5/2022, at time 0223, during maintenance on Feedwater Level Control Valve 2FWS-LV10B, a Feedwater transient occurred resulting in an RPS Automatic Reactor Scram on Low Level (Level 3, 159.3 inches). Following the scram, reactor water level dropped below Level 2 (108.8 inches) resulting in a Group 2 Recirculation Sample System Isolation, Group 3 TIP [(Traversing Incore Probe)] Isolation Valve Isolation, Group 6 and 7 Reactor Water Cleanup Isolation and Group 9 Containment Purge Isolations.

"All control rods inserted as expected. High Pressure Core Spray and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling initiated and injected as expected. ECCS Systems have been secured and normal reactor pressure and level control has been established for hot shutdown. Nine Mile Point Unit 2 is stable in Mode 3.

"These 4 hour and 8-hour non-emergency ENS [(Emergency Notification System)] reports are being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A), 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).

"The NRC Resident was informed."

The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:

There was no impact on Unit 1.