Event Notification Report for January 07, 2022

EN Revision Imported Date: 1/7/2022

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - CESIUM SOURCE UNABLE TO FULLY RETRACT

The state of Texas (the Agency) reported the following via phone and email:

"On December 30, 2021, the Agency was notified by the licensee that on December 29, 2021, one of its technicians was unable to fully retract a 10 millicurie cesium-137 source to its fully shielded position. The source is installed in a Humboldt 5001EZ moisture density gauge. The technician had performed 3 samples that morning and the failure came at the end of the [fourth] exposure. The technician placed the gauge into its transport container and returned the gauge to the shop. The radiation safety officer (RSO) performed a survey of the gauge and found the highest reading 1 meter from the gauge was 0.4 millirem per hour. The RSO stated the transport index for the gauge measured that morning was 0.2. The RSO stated that the source was stuck about 2 inches outside from the fully shielded [position]. The RSO stated they used a hammer and anchor bolt and drove the source back into the shielded position. The RSO stated they noticed wet clay material oozing out of the area between the source shaft and the gauge case. The RSO believes the clay is what was preventing the source from fully retracting. The RSO stated they were taking a leak test of the cesium source. The RSO was instructed to isolate the hammer and bolt used to drive the source to the shielded position. The Agency went to the licensee's location and performed fixed and removable contamination survey on the hammer and anchor bolt used to drive the source back to the shielded position. No contamination was detected. The RSO's hands and clothing was surveyed for contamination. No contamination was detected. The RSO stated the gauge will be sent to the service company after the results of the leak test are received. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."

Texas Incident Number: 9905

EN Revision Imported Date: 1/7/2022

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST AND RECOVERED GAUGE

The state of Nevada reported the following via email:

"On 12/29/21 an Authorized User failed to secure a portable nuclear gauge in its type A shipping container and transported the nuclear device from one work site to another. The unsecured gauge fell off the back of the truck's tailgate and was missing from approximately [1545 PST] until it was located at a nearby gas station at [1625 PST]. It had been placed next to an air pump refill station and left there by an unknown person. The Authorized User recovered the gauge and returned it to the licensee's use location.

"The RSO performed leak test sampling on 12/29/21 at [1900 PST] and the tests were sent to lnstroTek 's California testing facility for analysis on 12/30/21 at [0930 PST]. The gauge has been properly secured with 2 tangible barriers and isolated from use by other employees. The Radiation Control Program performed surveys and swipe testing of the damaged gauge and all results were within twice background. As soon as the licensee receives leak test results, the gauge will be prepared and shipped to the lnstroTek - California for disposal. Licensee will provide the RCP [Radiation Control Program] with additional results and information as it becomes available.

"Troxler Model 3440 S/N 23813 Americium-241/Be 40 mCi and Cesium-137 8 mCi. Last periodic leak test performed 12/14/21 - Passed"

Nevada Item Number: NV210022

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

EN Revision Imported Date: 1/7/2022

EN Revision Text: HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY SYSTEM DECLARED INOPERABLE
The Licensee provided the following information via fax:
"During performance of a surveillance of the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) service water system on January 1, 2022, the HPCS system was declared inoperable for performance of the surveillance. During the surveillance, pump discharge pressure and flow were above the action range curve specified in the surveillance. For the given flow rate, pump discharge pressure was too high. This condition prevents declaring the HPCS service water system and HPCS system operable. The HPCS service water and HPCS systems remain inoperable.

"The station entered Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.2.A and TS 3.5.1.B at 0910 [PST] on January 1, 2022. In accordance with TS 3.5.1.B, the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system was verified to be operable. TS 3.5.1 Action B provides a 14-day completion time to restore HPCS to an operable status.

"All other Emergency Core Cooling systems (ECCS) are operable. This event is being reported as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function credited for mitigating the consequences of an accident per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The HPCS system is a single train system at Columbia.

"The NRC resident has been notified."

The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:

The licensee is investigating the cause of the high pump discharge pressure and verifying instrumentation accuracy.

* * * RETRACTION ON 1/6/22 AT 1715 EST FROM CHASE WILLIAMS TO TOM KENDZIA * * *

"This Notification is to retract EN 55682, Unplanned High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) Inoperability. On 1/1/2022 at [1735 EST], Columbia Generating Station notified the NRC under 10 CPR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) of the inoperability of a single train of safety system (HPCS) for performance of the surveillance. During the surveillance pump discharge pressure and flow were above the action range curve specified in the surveillance.

"Engineering performed an analysis of this event and concluded the HPCS was operable during the event and would have performed its required safety function.

"The results of initial IST testing of HPCS-P-2 via OSP-SW/IST-Q703 on 01/01/22 resulted in measured parameters falling outside of the acceptable range specified for this pump. Systematic error was suspected as the cause of the failure and the test was reperformed following taking actions to eliminate the suspected systematic errors. The second performance of the test on 01/01/22 resulted in acceptable pump performance. Evidence exists that the initial performance of the test failed due to imprecise averaging techniques due to difficulties in averaging continuously changing values on the test instrument. The second performance of OSP-SW/IST-Q703 should be considered a successful test and the test of record as the systematic error was eliminated and measured parameters are considered valid.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

The HOO notified R4DO (Rolando-Otero).

EN Revision Imported Date: 1/7/2022

EN Revision Text: OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO ONSITE FIRE

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"At 0907 CST, a small fire was reported in the Intake Structure at Fort Calhoun Station. Offsite fire departments were notified at 0909 CST and responded at 0922 CST. Fire was confirmed extinguished at 0949 CST. Fire was extinguished using offsite resources per the Station Fire Plan. There were no injuries reported. The fire occurred in the Non-Radiological area of the plant and there was no release of radioactivity or hazardous materials."

UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO A FIRE IN THE AUX CABLE VAULT

The following information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:

On 01/06/22 at 1044 (EST), an Unusual Event was declared due to a Fire Detection Actuation in the Unit 1, auxiliary cable vault (EAL H.U 4.1). No fire was detected. Unit 1 and Unit 2 remain at 100 percent power.

The Llcensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, the state, and local authorities.

Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central, FEMA NWC (email), and DHS Nuclear SSA (email).

* * * UPDATE FROM DAN WALTER TO TOM KENDZIA AT 1452 (EST) ON 01/06/2022 * * *

At 1441 (EST), DC Cook Unit 1 terminated their notification of unusual event. The basis for termination was that the inspection identified no damage to cables or cable trays. The fire protection system is out of service for the auxiliary cable vault with compensatory measures in effect.

The licensee has notified the state and local authorities and will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R3DO (Skokowski), IRD MOC (Grant), NRR EO (Felts), IR (Kennedy)(email), NRR (Veil)(email), R3 DRA (Shuaibi)(email), DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION - AUTO START EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR

"At 0603 CST on 1/6/2022, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the South Texas Project (STP) south switchyard electrical bus was de-energized momentarily and re-energized approximately 40 seconds later. Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) 22 automatically started in response to loss of offsite power on Train B Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) Bus.

"This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that resulted in the valid actuation of an emergency AC electrical power system (50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B)(8)).

"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:

Unit 2 is in a 72 hour LCO per TS 3.8.1.1.A for the loss of one offsite power supply. The plant is in a normal electrical lineup. There was no impact on Unit 1.

SHUTDOWN INITIATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

"On January 6, 2022 at 1937 [EST], St Lucie Unit 2 commenced a reactor shutdown as required by Technical Specification 3.1.3.1 Action 'e', due to Control Element Assembly number 27 slipping from 133 inches to 120 inches withdrawn and unable to be recovered within the prescribed time limits."

The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:

Unit 2 entered 6 hour LCO to shutdown to mode 3 at 1539 EST as required by Technical Specification 3.1.3.1 Action 'e'. There was no impact on Unit 1.