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Event Notification Report for June 03, 2019

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
5/31/2019 - 6/3/2019

** EVENT NUMBERS **


536535391654082540845408654088540955409654097


Part 21 Event Number: 53653
Rep Org: CURTISS WRIGHT
Licensee: CURTISS WRIGHT
Region: 3
City: CINCINNATI   State: OH
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TIM FRANCHUK
HQ OPS Officer: OSSY FONT 		Notification Date: 10/08/2018
Notification Time: 14:54 [ET]
Event Date: 08/07/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/31/2019
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(a)(2) - INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION
Person (Organization):
STEVE ORTH (R3DO)
- PART 21/50.55 REACTORS (EMAIL)

Event Text



EN Revision Imported Date : 6/3/2019

EN Revision Text: PART 21 NOTIFICATION - NAMCO LIMIT SWITCH FAILED TEST DUE TO INSUFFICIENT LUBRICATION

The following information was received via email from Curtiss Wright:

"Curtiss-Wright was notified on August 7, 2018 by Exelon's Dresden Plant that a Curtiss-Wright Supplied Namco Limit Switch, P/N: EA700-90964 had failed during a planned maintenance test.

"The switch contacts were found to be sluggish in returning to the normal shelf state after actuation, or would not return at all. The switch was identified as Curtiss-Wright Tag Number 5T34603 and was provided as a safety related component to Exelon in September 2005. According to Exelon, the item was stored for 8 years, then failure occurred approximately 5 years into service. The part has a manufacturer date coded as August 2005.

"The switch was subsequently sent to Exelon Powerlabs where a detailed failure evaluation was performed. Exelon Powerlabs confirmed the failure mode and determined that there was insufficient lubrication in place to support normal switch function. The switch was then sent to Namco for further evaluation and Namco confirmed the lack of lubricant was the likely cause of the failure.

"Curtiss-Wright is currently investigating this issue and will provide a follow up report by November 15, 2018."


* * * UPDATE FROM TIM FRANCHUK TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1335 EST ON 11/16/2018 * * *

The following information was received via E-mail:

"In reference to the Curtiss-Wright Interim Notification Report dated 10/8/2018 for an EA700-90964 limit switch failure, the following clarifications and updates are provided.

"The subject switch was originally supplied by Curtiss-Wright to Exelon's Dresden plant. Subsequently Dresden transferred the switch to Quad Cities where it was installed and found degraded and inoperable during a planned maintenance test. The initial notification of failure to Curtiss-Wright was by Quad Cities personnel, and not Dresden personnel. The switch was previously identified as Curtiss-Wright Tag Number 5T34603, which was incorrect. The actual Tag Number of the failed unit is 5T36403.

"The failure is still under investigation and Curtiss-Wright has been in communication with the manufacturer, Quad Cities personnel and Exelon Powerlabs personnel concerning the failure and application. A key factor in the failure appears to be heat related, specifically the switches operating temperature. As such, additional operating temperature data is being taken by Exelon personnel which will conclude in late February or early March 2019. Once this data is made available, a final conclusion as to the root cause of the failure can be determined.

"We therefore request additional time to complete our evaluation and should have our final report issued by March 8th, 2019."

Notified R3DO (Peterson) and Part 21/50.55 Reactors E-mail group.

* * * UPDATE ON 3/8/2019 AT 1320 EST FROM MARGIE HOOVER TO ANDREW WAUGH * * *

The following information was received via email:

"In reference to the Curtiss-Wright Interim Notification Report dated 10/8/2018 for an EA700-90964 limit switch failure, the following updates are provided.

"Curtiss-Wright's investigation is ongoing, with the current focus being the evaluation of in-service switch operating temperatures and results from a recent disassembly/inspection of similar switches (same model but different date codes). Additional inspection of other switches currently in-service at the plant is needed to finish the investigation. Evaluation of these switches is expected to be completed by mid-May. Once this data is made available, a final conclusion as to the root cause of the failure can be determined.

"We therefore request additional time to complete our evaluation and should have our final report issued by May 31, 2019."

Notified R3DO (Hills) and Part 21/50.55 Reactors group (email).

* * * UPDATE AT 1106 EDT ON 5/31/19 FROM MARGIE HOVER TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

The following information was received via e-mail:

"ln reference to the Curtiss-Wright Interim Notification Report dated 10/8/2018 (Event No. ML18289A457lLoC No. 2018-24-00) for an EA700-90954 limit switch failure, the following updates are provided.

"Curtiss-Wright was notified on August 7th, 2018 by Exelon's Quad Cities Plant that a Curtiss-Wright Supplied Namco Limit Switch, PIN: EA 700-90954 had failed during a planned maintenance test.

"CW Conclusion:

"Based upon similar wear patterns, the presence of 'significant grease' does not resolve wear pattern issue caused in a shorter period of time, thus the lack of grease can be considered to 'not be a significant credible failure mechanism' (same or no grease between shuttle and housing). Based upon the NAMCO report, the presence or lack of grease has no impact on wear or operability and thus does not affect the safety function.

"In addition, the CQ14100801 S/N 03 installed for 9 months, the O-Ring measured an 81 durometer hardness (showing aging) but not brittle. The other 3 installed for 6 years were brittle but did not affect operability. Thus the hardness of the O-Rings can be considered to 'not be a significant credible failure mechanism'.

"All four switches in Report QDC-62770 had paint scrapings caused by wear which was present and operated properly after being in service for an extended period of time. Thus the presence of paint residue due to wear can be considered to 'not be a significant credible failure mechanism'.

"There have been no other reported failures of this type. The root cause failure mechanism has not been identified, thus this switch failure does not appear to represent a common mode failure."

Notified the R3DO (Daley) and Part 21/50.55 Reactors group (via email).


Agreement State Event Number: 53916
Rep Org: ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: GTS, INC.
Region: 4
City: ROGERS   State: AR
County:
License #: ARK-0995-03121
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHRISTOPHER TALLEY
HQ OPS Officer: JEFFREY WHITED 		Notification Date: 03/08/2019
Notification Time: 09:50 [ET]
Event Date: 03/05/2019
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 05/31/2019
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
GREG WERNER (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)

Event Text



EN Revision Imported Date : 6/3/2019

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - TROXLER GAUGE DESTROYED WHEN RUN OVER

The following was received from the Arkansas Department of Health via e-mail:

"The Department [Arkansas Department of Health Radioactive Materials Program] received notification on March 5, 2019, from licensee GTS, Inc. that a Troxler gauge model 3440 [serial number: 73390, 40 mCi Am-241, 8 mCi Cs-137] had been struck by a skid steer while performing routine measurements at a road construction site. As a result of the incident, the source had been pulled from its testing position and become partially exposed.

"Upon review of the event, it was noted that the technician quickly created a thirty (30) foot containment barrier and notified his company's Radiation Safety Officer [RSO]. The [RSO] for GTS mobilized to the event location and contacted the [Department].

"Upon receiving an exemption from the Department, the RSO was able to manipulate the source into the shielded position and place the remnants into the transportation container for transport to the permanent storage location. The gauge was returned to the permanent storage location at approximately 1330 [CST] on March 5, 2019. The licensee performed leak tests of the sources, surveys of the gauge transport container, and surveys of the storage location.

"[Department] inspectors visited the licensee on March 6, 2019, to investigate the event. Surveys at the exterior of the transport container were determined to be 3-5 mR/hr. Surveys performed inside of the transport container were measured to be a maximum of 15 mR/hr at a location close to the surface of the shielded source.

"The [Department] considers this investigation open pending receipt and review of the licensee's 30 day report"

State of Arkansas Event Report No. : AR-2019-002

* * * UPDATE AT 1437 EDT ON 4/10/19 FROM CHRISTOPHER TALLEY TO KARL DIEDERICH * * *

The following was received via e-mail:

"Upon review of the licensee's 30 day report, received April 5, 2019, it was noted that the dosimetry badge worn by the RSO during the retraction and transportation of the source showed no measurable dose. The dosimetry badge was new for the month of March.

"The report also contained leak test results for the sources both prior to the event, January 19, 2019, and after the event, March 6, 2019. The results for the leak tests in both instances were measured to be below 185 Bq (0.005 microCuries), considering the sources to be non-leaking sources.

"The company conducted mandatory safety meetings with all staff who work with the portable gauges and also sent a companywide e-mail to all employees as a result of the event. Topics discussed during the meetings and e-mail included radiation safety, worksite safety, portable gauge specific safety and use, emergency response procedures, and gauge security. The contractor responsible for the skid steer also conducted an on-site safety meeting immediately following the event on March 5, 2019.

"The Department now considers this event to be closed providing that no new information is received by the Department."

Notified R4DO (Werner) and NMSS Events (via e-mail).

* * * UPDATE ON 5/31/19 AT 1037 EDT FROM CHRISTOPHER TALLEY TO THOMAS KENDZIA * * *

The following was received via e-mail:

"The Licensee has transferred the radioactive sources and associated nuclear gauge remnants to the manufacturer for disposal/repair. The sources are now listed under North Carolina Radioactive Materials License #032-0182-1."

The Department now considers this event to be closed.

Notified R4DO (Kozal) and NMSS Events (via e-mail).


Agreement State Event Number: 54082
Rep Org: FLORIDA BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: FLORIDA CANCER SPECIALISTS - NEW PORT RICHEY
Region: 1
City: NEW PORT RICHEY   State: FL
County:
License #: 3825-13
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MATTHEW SENISON
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH 		Notification Date: 05/23/2019
Notification Time: 16:55 [ET]
Event Date: 05/21/2019
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/23/2019
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
FRANK ARNER (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - ACTUAL DOSE GREATER THAN PRESCRIBED DOSE BY 87.6%

The following information was obtained from the state of Florida via email:

"On May 22, 2019, [the licensee Radiation Safety Officer] notified the BRC [Florida Bureau of Radiation Control] of an overdose of radiation treatment to a female 60 year-old Caucasian patient. Patient was prescribed ten 340 cGy planning target volume (ptv) fractionated treatments: 2 per day for 5 days. Minimum dose of 340 cGy per fraction, mean dose value 625 cGy per fraction, actual dose administered 1167.3 cGy in single fraction. Source S/N: 24-01-7403-001-032119-13092-68. Licensee has notified the patient that an overdose did occur, and expects no harm to the patient due to this fraction of treatment. Patient has five more treatments."

The machine used was a Varying GammaMed+, SN 641053, using a 7.385 Ci Iridium-192 GammaMed 232 source.

Florida Incident number: FL19-071

A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.


!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Agreement State Event Number: 54084
Rep Org: IOWA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH
Licensee: UNIVERSITY OF IOWA HOSPITAL
Region: 3
City: IOWA CITY   State: IA
County:
License #: 0037-1-52-AAB
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: STUART JORDAN
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH 		Notification Date: 05/24/2019
Notification Time: 12:01 [ET]
Event Date: 05/22/2019
Event Time: 12:52 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/30/2019
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
JAMNES CAMERON (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - UNDERDOSE OF Y-90 THERASPHERE TREATMENT

The following information was obtained from the state of Iowa via email:

"The University of Iowa Radiation Safety Officer notified the Iowa Department of Public Health (IDPH) on May 23, 2019, of a possible medical event that had occurred at the University of Iowa Hospital on May 22, 2019. The event occurred during a therapeutic Yttrium-90 (Y-90) microsphere (TheraSphere) administration to the liver. The signed written directive from the authorized user was 1.37 GBq (37.03 milliCuries). During the administration, it appeared that the spheres were being administered without incident until the point at which the flow of spheres ceased. The interventional radiologist determined that stasis had been reached, which prevented the remainder of the prescribed dose from being administered and appeared to be the only explanation for what happened. Based on the final survey reading of the source vial and tubing in the waste container, the initial determined dose was 0.586 GBq (15.84 milliCuries) which is 42% of the written directive.

"The following morning, May 23, 2019, routine imaging of the patient indicated no Y-90 activity in the patient's liver or abdominal areas. A second whole-body scan to determine any migration of activity was also negative for Y-90. The University of Iowa Radiation Safety Staff initiated an investigation into the location of the remainder of activity that was not remaining in the dose vial by surveying the procedure room and patient's room which were background levels and verified correct imaging protocol for the patient. The dose vial was re-surveyed and was found to contain all the original activity and no Y-90 TheraSpheres.

"The licensee's preliminary probable cause is an occluded needle in the vial that could have prevented either the flow of saline into the source vial, or the flow of microspheres out of the vial to the patient. The authorized user, the interventional radiologist, and the patient have been informed of the issue with this administration. No direct harm to the patient has occurred because no radioactivity had been delivered to the patient.

"This is a preliminary report and IDPH will be conducting an investigation to provide additional updated information. Items to initially get resolved include but are not limited to the licensee's issue with how dosages are measured before and after the procedure, independently verifying that no dose had been delivered to the patient, examine the integrity of the tubing and needles used in the procedure, and communication with the manufacturer about the circumstances surrounding this event and if they or the NRC are aware of any similar events."

NMED Report No.: IA190001

* * * RETRACTION AT 1641 EDT ON 5/30/19 FROM STUART JORDAN TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

The following retraction was received from the Iowa Bureau of Radiological Health via email:

"The Iowa Department of Public Health requests to retract the NRC Event Notification No. 54084 (Item No. IA190001) that was transmitted to the NRC Operations Center on May 24, 2019. After conversations with the licensee's radiation safety officer and review of information provided by the licensee we have determined that no detectable amount of Y-90 TheraSpheres was administered to the patient, and therefore no dose was delivered. Based on a discussion with NRC Region III Office, we have determined that the circumstances surrounding this incident do not meet the reportable medical event described in 10 CFR 35.3045."

Notified the R3DO (Daley), NMSS Events (via email).

A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.


Non-Agreement State Event Number: 54086
Rep Org: TRACERCO
Licensee: TRACERCO
Region: 4
City: PASADENA   State: TX
County:
License #: 07-28386-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MONTY POPE
HQ OPS Officer: CATY NOLAN 		Notification Date: 05/24/2019
Notification Time: 16:22 [ET]
Event Date: 05/22/2019
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/25/2019
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
Person (Organization):
FRANK ARNER (R1DO)
HEATHER GEPFORD (R4DO)
ILTAB (EMAIL)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
- CNSNS (MEXICO) (EMAIL)
This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

LOST SOURCE DURING SHIPMENT

The following is a synopsis of an event received via phone call:

During a shipment from Pasadena, TX to Billings, MT, a 4 milliCurie Cobalt-60 (Co-60) source was lost in transit. The last known location was Memphis, TN. It was shipped on May 17, 2019 and was identified lost on May 22, 2019. The shipper and the common carrier are investigating.

* * * UPDATE ON 05/25/2019 AT 1045 EDT FROM MONTY POPE TO JOANNA BRIDGE * * *

The following is a summary of a phone call with Mr. Pope:

On May 24, 2019, the source that was misplaced by the common carrier was able to be located. New shipping documents are being generated.

Notified R1RDO (Arner), R4RDO (GEPFORD), ILTAB (e-mail), NMSS Events (e-mail) and CNSNS Mexico (email).

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.p


Agreement State Event Number: 54088
Rep Org: VIRGINIA RAD MATERIALS PROGRAM
Licensee: FROEHLING & ROBERTSON, INC.
Region: 1
City: CHESAPEAKE   State: VA
County:
License #: 087-096-2
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHARLES COLEMAN
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH 		Notification Date: 05/24/2019
Notification Time: 17:43 [ET]
Event Date: 05/24/2019
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/24/2019
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
FRANK ARNER (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - UNABLE TO RETRACT SOURCE ON MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The following information was obtained from the Commonwealth of Virginia via email:

"On May 24, 2019, the Radiation Safety Office for the licensee made a preliminary report of an incident which occurred earlier on that day. The technician extended the source rod while using a portable moisture density gauge but was unable to retract it. The technician placed the gauge, with source rod extended, in the bed of his truck and drove back to his office, approximately 15 miles.

"When he arrived at his office, the other technicians were able to retract the source. A radiation survey confirmed the source was secured in its shield.

The Virginia Office of Radiological Health will perform a reactive inspection to investigate this incident. This notification will be updated with additional information determined during the inspection."

Virginia Event Report ID: VA 19-001


Part 21 Event Number: 54095
Rep Org: PARAGON ENERGY SOLUTIONS LLC
Licensee: ATC NUCLEAR
Region: 1
City: OAK RIDGE   State: TN
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RAY CHALIFOUX
HQ OPS Officer: JOANNA BRIDGE 		Notification Date: 05/31/2019
Notification Time: 14:27 [ET]
Event Date: 05/29/2019
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/31/2019
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
GLENN DENTEL (R1DO)
ALAN BLAMEY (R2DO)
ROBERT DALEY (R3DO)
JASON KOZAL (R4DO)
- PART 21/50.55 REACTORS (EMAIL)

Event Text

PART 21 NOTIFICATION - INTROL POSITIONERS POTENTIAL LATENT DEFECT

The following is an excerpt of the part 21 information received via email:

"Introl Positioners used by stations in G32 Terry Turbine control applicators have the potential to contain a latent defect. The defect is the result of internal corrosion which has been identified in Tl Operational Amplifiers Part No.TL084CN on the SL3EX Controller Boards of the turbine throttle valve positioner. It is believed the likely cause is associated with the ingress of solder flux into the IC Chip package on the controller board due to delamination caused by the soldering process during fabrication. The corrosion over time can result in intermittent open circuiting and high resistance in the aluminum metallization. Chlorine ionic contamination can also result in high leakage currents within the component circuitry. Failures may be manifested by a reduced valve position signal disproportional to the expected demand condition, no actuation signal (i.e. throttle valve remaining full open), or other anomalous unexpected behavior. There are three TL084CN chips on each SL3EX Controller Board within the positioner assembly. There have been two documented failures to date occurring in 2015 and 2019 in installed systems.

"Date determination was made: May 29, 2019

"Affected sites: Farley, SONGS, Cooper, Almaraz Trillo Nuclear Power Plant (Spain), Clinton, Harris, Wolf Creek, Point Beach, Hatch, Watts Bar, Sequoyah.

"Stations are advised to work directly with Curtiss-Wright SAS via the technical contacts below.

"Randy F. Lantorno Project Manager, T: 585.596.3831, M: 585.596.9248, email riantorno@curtisswright.com

"or Justin Pierce 585.596.3866."


Power Reactor Event Number: 54096
Facility: RIVER BEND
Region: 4     State: LA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: ALFONSO CROEZE
HQ OPS Officer: JEFFREY WHITED 		Notification Date: 06/01/2019
Notification Time: 03:15 [ET]
Event Date: 05/31/2019
Event Time: 23:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/01/2019
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
JASON KOZAL (R4DO)
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 M/R Y 30 Power Operation 0 Hot Shutdown

Event Text

MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO HIGH REACTOR WATER LEVEL

"At 2345 CDT at River Bend Station (RBS) Unit 1, a manual Reactor scram was inserted in anticipation of receiving an automatic Reactor Water Level 3 (9.7") scram due to the isolation of the 'B' Heater String with the 'A' Heater String already isolated. The 'B' heater string isolation caused loss of suction and subsequent trip of the running Feed Water Pumps 'A' and 'C'. All control rods fully inserted with no issues. Subsequently Reactor level was controlled by the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system. Feed Water Pump 'C' was restored 4 minutes after the initial trip and the RCIC system secured. Currently RBS-1 is stable and is being cooled down using Turbine Bypass Valves.

"No radiological releases have occurred due to this event from the unit."

The plant is currently under a normal shutdown electrical lineup.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.


Power Reactor Event Number: 54097
Facility: SOUTH TEXAS
Region: 4     State: TX
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: PAUL BURTON
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA 		Notification Date: 06/01/2019
Notification Time: 17:58 [ET]
Event Date: 06/01/2019
Event Time: 16:18 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/01/2019
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
JASON KOZAL (R4DO)
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO GASOLINE LEAKAGE TO SITE DRAINAGE SYSTEM

"On June 1,2019, at 1618 [CDT], a notification under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2) is being made due to notification to offsite agencies as a result of gasoline leakage to the site drainage system in the owner controlled area at South Texas Project.

"During a routine tour, the facilities department notified the site environmental group about a gasoline leak on fuel tank sight glass at the fuel island on site. The site environmental [group] has determined the leak amount requires notification to the Texas Commission of Environmental Quality and the Environmental Protection Agency National Response Center.

"The Texas Commission of Environmental Quality was notified at 1618 on June 1, 2019, and the Environmental Protection Agency National Response Center at 1626 on June 1, 2019.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

The licensee stated that approximately 1,384 gallons of gasoline leaked over a period of time. The spill is located at an equipment warehouse area at a distance from the plant. The leak has been isolated and the cleanup is expected to be completed by tomorrow.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, March 24, 2021