U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Reports For 11/29/2018 - 11/30/2018 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED.THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | Power Reactor | Event Number: 53267 | Facility: BROWNS FERRY Region: 2 State: AL Unit: [1] [2] [3] RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4 NRC Notified By: DREW MITCHELL HQ OPS Officer: DAVID AIRD | Notification Date: 03/16/2018 Notification Time: 22:04 [ET] Event Date: 03/16/2018 Event Time: 00:00 [CDT] Last Update Date: 11/29/2018 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION | Person (Organization): REBECCA NEASE (R2DO) | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | 3 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | Event Text UNANALYZED CONDITION AFFECTING RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM
"At 1604 [CDT] on March 16, 2018, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) Engineering reported an unanalyzed condition affecting the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) heat exchangers in a postulated fire event. It was discovered that the Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) heat exchanger piping associated [with] the credited heat exchangers in the NFPA 805 Nuclear Safety Capability Analysis (NSCA) could experience water hammer damage.
"Fire damage to the cables for the RHRSW outlet motor operated valves could cause the valves to spuriously open and drain the RHRSW piping. Subsequent starting of the RHRSW pumps on the affected header could cause water hammer loads and damage the piping.
"Review of NFPA 805 analyses show the cables associated with this condition are routed in Fire Areas 01-03, 02-03, 02-04, 03-03, 16 and 23. There are 11 cases where the deterministically credited heat exchanger could be affected.
"Compensatory fire watch measures have been established.
"This event requires an 8 hour report in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), 'Any event or condition that results in: (B) The nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.
"CR 1139620 documents this condition in the Corrective Action Program."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
* * * RETRACTION AT 2215 EST ON 11/29/2018 FROM NEEL SHUKLA TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
"NRC notification 53267 was made to ensure that the eight-hour non-emergency reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 were met when the licensee discovered an unanalyzed condition with the potential to significantly degrade plant safety.
"On August 22, 2018, an independent analysis was completed which determined that the RHRSW system would remain functional during the postulated scenario. Based on this analysis, a revised functional evaluation was performed by BFN which determined that the condition did not constitute an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety. For credited RHR heat exchangers for fire events in Fire Areas 01-03, 02-03, 02-04, 03-03, 16, and 23, the RHRSW piping will remain intact and the valves will operate manually after a water hammer event. This condition did not significantly degrade plant safety and is therefore not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(a)(2)(ii)(B).
"On November 16, 2018, TVA canceled the 60 day report which had been submitted for this condition.
"TVA's evaluation of this event notification is documented in the corrective action program.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
Notified the R2DO (Shaeffer). |
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED.THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | Power Reactor | Event Number: 53754 | Facility: SEQUOYAH Region: 2 State: TN Unit: [] [2] [] RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP NRC Notified By: STEPHEN FRIESE HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE | Notification Date: 11/26/2018 Notification Time: 08:31 [ET] Event Date: 11/26/2018 Event Time: 00:00 [EST] Last Update Date: 11/29/2018 | Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT 10 CFR Section: 50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED 50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION | Person (Organization): STEVE ROSE (R2DO) CATHY HANEY (R2 RA) HO NIEH (NRR) BILL GOTT (IRD MOC) | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | 2 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown | Event Text UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED FOR EXCESSIVE SMOKE IN CONTAINMENT
At 0816 EST, a Notification of Unusual Event was declared for Unit 2 under Emergency Action Level H.U.4 for excessive smoke in the lower level of containment with a heat signal. Onsite fire brigade is responding to the event. A command post is established. Offsite support is requested by the fire brigade. No flames have been observed as of this report.
The NRC Resident Inspector and State and Local government agencies will be notified.
Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, DHS NICC, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).
* * * UPDATE ON 11/26/18 AT 1036 EST FROM BILL HARRIS TO JEFFREY WHITED * * *
At 1036 EST, Sequoyah Nuclear Station Unit 2 terminated the Notice of Unusual Event. The licensee determined that the source of the smoke in containment was oil on the pressurizer beneath the insulation, that heated up during plant heatup. The licensee did not see visible flame during the event. The licensee is still working to determine if there was any damage to the pressurizer.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R2DO (Rose), R2RA (Haney), NRR (Nieh), IRD MOC (Gott), DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, DHS NICC, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).
* * * UPDATE ON 11/26/18 AT 1337 EST FROM STEPHEN FRIESE TO KARL DIEDERICH * * *
Following declaration of the Notification of Unusual Event, TVA media relations communicated with the local media regarding the event.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R2DO (Rose).
* * * UPDATE ON 11/26/18 AT 1551 EST FROM STEPHEN FRIESE TO DONG PARK * * *
"At 1036 EDT, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN) terminated the Notification Of Unusual Event (NOUE) due to initial report of heat and smoke in Unit 2 Lower Containment.
"At 1000 EDT, it was determined that no fire had occurred. Due to difficulty of access to some of the areas being searched, the source could not be identified prior to 1000 EDT. No visible flame (heat or light) was observed.
"The source of the smoke was determined to be residual oil from a hydraulic tool oil in contact with pressurizer piping. The pressurizer piping was being heated up to support Unit 2 start-up following U2R22 refueling outage. Once the residual oil dissipated, the smoke stopped. It has been concluded that no fire or emergency condition existed.
"Unit 2 is currently in Mode 5, maintaining reactor coolant temperature 160F-170F and pressure 325psig-350psig with 2A Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system in service in accordance with U2R22 refueling outage plan."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R2DO (Rose).
* * * RETRACTION ON 11/29/2018 AT 1358 EST FROM FRANCIS DECAMBRA TO ANDREW WAUGH * * *
"Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN) is retracting this notification based on the following additional information not available at the time of the notification:
"Following a full Reactor Building inspection, it was concluded that a fire did not exist. The source of the smoke originally reported was later determined to be residual oil from a hydraulic tool in contact with pressurizer piping. Once the residual oil dissipated, the smoke stopped. The source of heat originally reported was normal heated conditions associated with the pressurizer commensurate with plant conditions. SQN reported initially based on the available information at the time and to ensure timeliness with emergency declaration and reporting notification requirements."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R2DO (Shaeffer). |
Power Reactor | Event Number: 53760 | Facility: SEABROOK Region: 1 State: NH Unit: [1] [] [] RX Type: [1] W-4-LP NRC Notified By: JOSH GREENE HQ OPS Officer: ANDREW WAUGH | Notification Date: 11/29/2018 Notification Time: 12:56 [ET] Event Date: 10/01/2018 Event Time: 00:00 [EST] Last Update Date: 11/29/2018 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION | Person (Organization): ART BURRITT (R1DO) WILLIAM GOTT (IRD) | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | 1 | N | N | 0 | Hot Standby | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text INVALID SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION
"This 60-day telephone notification is being made under reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an invalid actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS).
"At 0147 [EST] on October 1, 2018, Seabrook Unit 1 was in Mode 3 shutdown, when an invalid Reactor Protection System actuation occurred due to a high Source Range detector.
"All equipment responded in accordance with the plant design. Specifically, all actuations were complete and successful.
"There were no safety consequences or impacts on the health and safety of the public. The event was entered into Seabrook's corrective action program for resolution.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The Source Range detector which gave the invalid input has been replaced. |
Power Reactor | Event Number: 53762 | Facility: CATAWBA Region: 2 State: SC Unit: [1] [2] [] RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP NRC Notified By: STEVEN ANDREWS HQ OPS Officer: THOMAS KENDZIA | Notification Date: 11/30/2018 Notification Time: 04:22 [ET] Event Date: 11/30/2018 Event Time: 00:00 [EST] Last Update Date: 11/30/2018 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION | Person (Organization): SCOTT SHAEFFER (R2DO) CHRIS MILLER (NRR EO) WILLIAM GOTT (IRD) | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | 1 | N | N | 0 | Defueled | 0 | Defueled | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO CONTRACTOR FATALITY
"At 2300 EST on November 29, 2018 Catawba Nuclear Station (CNS) requested offsite transport for treatment of a contractor to an offsite medical facility. Upon arrival of the offsite medical personnel, the individual was declared deceased at 2354 EST on November 29, 2018. "The fatality was not work-related and the individual was outside of the Radiological Controlled Area. "No news release by CNS is planned. Notifications are planned to the South Carolina Division of Occupational Safety and Health.
"This is a four hour notification, non-emergency for a notification of other government agency. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." |
Part 21 | Event Number: 53763 | Rep Org: ENGINE SYSTEMS, INC Licensee: ENGINE SYSTEMS, INC Region: 1 City: ROCKY MOUNT State: NC County: License #: Agreement: Y Docket: NRC Notified By: DAN ROBERTS HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 11/30/2018 Notification Time: 16:08 [ET] Event Date: 11/30/2018 Event Time: 00:00 [EST] Last Update Date: 12/21/2018 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE | Person (Organization): ART BURRITT (R1DO) SCOTT SHAEFFER (R2DO) ERIC DUNCAN (R3DO) JASON KOZAL (R4DO) - PART 21/50.55 REACTORS (EMAIL) | Event Text PART-21 - EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR EMD FUEL AND SOAKBACK PUMPS LOOSE BOLTS
The following report was received via fax:
"ESI [Engine Systems, Inc.] was notified by a nuclear customer of two instances where a bolt was found loose or backed out of the cover of an EMD [Electro-Motive Diesel] engine driven fuel pump P/N 8410219. Following notification, ESI inspected remaining pumps in inventory and found instances where one or more of the pump cover bolts were loose or lightly torqued.
"EMD fuel pump, P/N 8410219, is commonly used on all 12, 16, and 20-cylinder EMD model 645E4 and E4B engines. The pump is either mechanically driven from the engine (via the scavenging tube oil pump) or motor driven (as in the case of a backup/redundant fuel pump). The pump transfers fuel oil from the day tank to the fuel injectors to support fuel combustion. Without the supply of fuel oil, the diesel engine is unable to produce power which adversely affects the safety-related operation of the emergency diesel generator set.
"ESI recommends inspecting the bolts of all pumps for proper bolt tightness. Use a torque wrench and ensure all bolts are tightened to 108 to 120 in-lbs (12 to 13 Nm).
"This activity should be performed at the earliest opportunity; however, it is more important for the inspection to be performed on newly installed pumps. It is expected that for pumps supplied with low bolt torque, if a problem were to develop it would be in the form of a fuel leak soon after installation. For pumps that have been successfully installed for several months or years with no detectable leakage, it is less likely that bolt(s) are loose and therefore the urgency of this inspection is reduced."
Points of Contact: (252) 977-2720 Dan Roberts, Quality Manager John Kriesel, Engineering Manager
Affected Plants: Region 1: Nine Mile Point, Fitzpatrick Region 2: Brown's Ferry, Savannah River, Oconee, St Lucie, Surry Power Station, Turkey Point, Watts Bar Region 3: La Salle, Point Beach, Dresden, Clinton Region 4: Grand Gulf, River Bend, Energy Northwest,, Entergy Operations Inc - Arkansas, Omaha Public Power - Fort Calhoun
* * * UPDATE FROM DAN ROBERTS TO JEFFREY WHITED AT 1202 EST ON 12/21/18 * * *
The following was received via fax:
Revision 1 involves updates on page 2 of the 10 CFR Part 21 Report which include:
"In item (iv), added reference to F4B engine application.
Revised Item (vii):
"For all affected customers: "ESI recommends inspecting the bolt tightness for all pumps. The recommended bolt torque is 108 to 120 in-lbs (12 to 13 Nm). After verifying bolt torque, a shaft freeness check is recommended. The pump shaft should be capable of being rotated by hand in either direction. Due to the small shaft size, this check is commonly performed with a small crescent wrench or with the coupling half installed on the shaft. Inability to rotate by hand indicates loss of end clearance and the pump should be returned to ESI for rework or replacement.
"Note: For installed pumps where it is not possible to check shaft freeness, ESI recommends using a reduced bolt torque of 60 to 70 in-lbs (7 to 8 Nm). This is sufficient to ensure the bolts are snug while safeguarding against loss of end clearance that would otherwise go undetected.
"This activity should be performed at the earliest opportunity; however, it is more important for the inspection to be performed on newly installed pumps. It is expected that for pumps supplied with low bolt torque, if a problem were to develop it would be in the form of a fuel leak soon after installation. For pumps that have been successfully installed for several months or years with no detectable leakage, it is less likely that bolt(s) are loose and therefore the urgency of this inspection is reduced.
"For ESI: The dedication procedures for these pumps have been revised or are being revised to add a step to verify proper bolt torque. This will be completed prior to any future shipments. In addition, ESI is in correspondence with the pump manufacturer to implement corrective actions to prevent reoccurrence."
Notified R1DO (Jackson), R2DO (Bonser), R3DO (Stone), R4DO (Alexander), and Part 21/50.55 Reactors (e-mail). | |