| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
10/23/2018 - 10/24/2018 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
| !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED.THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 53646 | Facility: COOPER
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TERRELL HIGGINS
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO | Notification Date: 10/05/2018
Notification Time: 09:52 [ET]
Event Date: 10/05/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/24/2018 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4DO) | | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | Event Text MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVES EXCEEDED PRIMARY CONTAINMENT LOCAL LEAK RATE ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA
"At 0520 (CDT), on October 05, 2018, it was discovered that a Primary Containment local leak rate test performed on Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV) exceeded its acceptance criteria.
"During Mode 1, 2, and 3, Surveillance Requirement 3.6.1.3.10 requires MSIV leakage for a single MSIV line to be less than or equal to 106 standard cubic feet per hour (scfh) when tested at 29 psig and Surveillance Requirement 3.6.1.3.12 requires the combined leakage rate for all MSIV leakage paths to be less than or equal to 212 scfh when tested at 29 psig.
"As-found for the 'C' MSIV line leakage results were unquantifiable and gave a [minimum] path value greeter than 160 scfh. This leakage rate lead to Surveillance Requirement 3.6.1.3.10 and 3.6.1.3.12 limits to be exceeded. This event is being reported as a condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) since the Primary Containment Isolation Valves leakage limits for MSIVs were exceeded.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * RETRACTION AT 2320 EDT ON 10/24/2018 FROM THOMAS FORLAND TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
"CNS [Cooper Nuclear Station] is retracting the 8-hour non-emergency notification made on October 5, 2018 at 0520 CDT (EN# 53646). Subsequent evaluation concluded that overall as-found 'C' MSIV leakage rate was not at a level that exceeded the surveillance requirement 3.6.1.3.10 and 3.6.1.3.12 limits and thus the Primary Containment Isolation Valve leakage rate limits for the MSIVs were not exceeded.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."
Notified the R4DO (Drake). |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 53667 | Rep Org: NE DIV OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS
Licensee: BECTON DICKINSON & CO.
Region: 4
City: HOLDREGE State: NE
County:
License #: NE-37-03-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BRYAN MILLER
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 10/15/2018
Notification Time: 13:45 [ET]
Event Date: 10/14/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/15/2018 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
GREG PICK (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL) | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK IRRADIATOR SOURCE RACK
The following was received from the State of Nebraska via email:
"This morning at approximately 1030 [CDT], the State of Nebraska was contacted by the RSO of Becton, Dickinson and Company located in Holdrege, NE (NE license # 37-03-01) concerning a 24 hour reportable event. I believe the reporting requirement could be 10 CFR 36.83(a)(1), source stuck in the unshielded position or 10 CFR 36.83(a)(4), failure of the cable or drive mechanism used to move the source rack.
"Event: Approximately 1930 [CDT] on the night of October 14, 2018, there was an alarm of the source positioning indicators alerting the operators of a moving source. When the source rack failed to reach the rack down position in the allotted time period, a fault was recorded at the control panel. It appeared that the rack was stuck in the up position. The RSO called in at approximately 1940 [CDT] to help investigate the situation. Soon after arriving at the facility, [the RSO] placed a call into MDS Nordion for help with the situation. During the 2 hour time period for MDS Nordion to call back, [the RSO] successfully returned source rack #2 to the shielded position and tried to lower the source rack #1 to its shielded position but was unable to lower source rack #1. They also did some preliminary investigations and assumed that one of the guide cables for source rack #1 had busted. Once MDS Nordion returned their call, it was verified that the guide cable for source rack #1 had busted. MDS Nordion had the operators raise source rack #2 and with source rack #2 in its up position, lower source rack #1. After a couple attempts, they were successful in lowering the source rack #1 to its shielded position. Once source rack #1 was in its shielded position, the operators lowered the source rack #2 to its shielded position. Both were verified by the source down positioning switch.
"Note: After about 3.5 hours of the sources being stuck in the up position, the rack deluge system (rack sprinkler system) was deployed as a precautionary step to cool the sources and the product close to the sources. The overall time the sources were in the up position was approximately 5 hours. This was Nordion Model JS-8900 commercial irradiator.
"It was reported that nobody entered the vault while the sources were in the up position and that there is no reason to believe that any addition exposure to the workers was involved in this incident." |
| Non-Agreement State | Event Number: 53669 | Rep Org: CLOROX
Licensee: CLOROX
Region: 1
City: SAN JUAN State: PR
County:
License #: GL
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TRACY GLOVER
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO | Notification Date: 10/16/2018
Notification Time: 10:12 [ET]
Event Date: 09/19/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/16/2018 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
| Person (Organization):
MATT YOUNG (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL)
ILTAB (EMAIL) | | This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text MISSING FIXED GAUGE
The Clorox Company discovered a missing fixed gauge containing radioactive material. The gauge was a Filtec, model FT-2 containing 100 microCuries of Americium-241. Gauge S/N: 105382; Source S/N: 1786.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Non-Agreement State | Event Number: 53670 | Rep Org: EXXON MOBIL REFINING & SUPPLY CO.
Licensee: EXXON MOBIL REFINING & SUPPLY CO.
Region: 4
City: BILLINGS State: MT
County:
License #: 25-03375-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BRENT HADDOW
HQ OPS Officer: PHIL NATIVIDAD | Notification Date: 10/16/2018
Notification Time: 18:41 [ET]
Event Date: 10/16/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 10/16/2018 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
| Person (Organization):
GREG PICK (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL) | Event Text INABILITY TO RETRACT A SOURCE TO ITS SHIELDED POSITION
The following information was received via email:
"On October 16th 2018, The ExxonMobil RSO at the Billings Montana Refinery (License # 25-03375-01) notified USNRC of one (1) device (insertion type nuclear gauge) that failed to function as designed (10 CFR 30.50.Section B.2).
"Device Information: Ohmart device, model MT-93-439-001 with 10 mCi. of Cs-137; S/N: 0692GK; Source capsule model: A-2102 (X38/2); Manufacture date: Nov 7th, 1994
"Upon locking out the nuclear gauge at approximately 11:00am, the nuclear gauge user identified that the cable connecting the source capsule housing (torpedo) to the source holder retrieval mechanism had become detached. The source capsule housing appears to be in its normal operating location at the bottom of the equipment guide tube in the boot of the vessel, however, due to the disconnected cable it cannot be retrieved. The following precautionary measures were taken to ensure minimal potential for exposure (1) no vessel entry permits will be issued for the vessel (2) the area around the boot was barricaded to restrict entry.
"There is no additional risk of radiation exposure to members of the general public or radiation workers due to the failure of the equipment function.
"The source capsule housing is scheduled to be retrieved, shielded, and shipped for transfer to QSA Global by VEGA Americas, Inc. on 10/18/18." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 53688 | Facility: MILLSTONE
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN MAGYARIK
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 10/23/2018
Notification Time: 04:17 [ET]
Event Date: 10/22/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/23/2018 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
DONNA JANDA (R1DO) | | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | Event Text INOPERABLE CONTROL ROOM ENVELOPE DUE TO FAILED SURVEILLANCE
"On October 22, 2018 at 2241 hrs. EDT, a loss of Control Room Envelope (CRE) was declared due to failing to meet the requirements of (surveillance requirement) SR 4.7.6.1h during 72-month surveillance testing. Measured in-leakage exceeded the SR acceptance value.
"Abnormal Operating Procedure 2588A, 'Mitigating Actions for Control Room Envelope Boundary Breach', have been implemented."
The licensee has notified Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection, Connecticut dispatch, Waterford dispatch, and the NRC Resident Inspector of this event. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 53690 | Facility: SURRY
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: CLEON LONG
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE | Notification Date: 10/23/2018
Notification Time: 15:43 [ET]
Event Date: 10/23/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/23/2018 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
ERIC MICHEL (R2DO)
MICHAEL F. KING (NRR EO)
WILLIAM GOTT (IRD) | | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text OFFSITE NOTIFICATION TO OSHA DUE TO SUPPLEMENTAL EMPLOYEE FATALITY
"On October 23, 2018 at 1510 EDT, a notification to OSHA (Occupational Safety and Health Administration) was initiated due to a supplemental employee experiencing a non-work related medical event that resulted in the supplemental employee passing. When the issue was identified, the station first aid team responded to administer first aid. The supplemental employee was transported to a local hospital for additional medical support. Subsequent to the employee passing, a report was made to OSHA in accordance with federal requirements. This event is reportable to the NRC per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) since another governmental agency was notified of this employer medical event.
"The supplemental employee was in a building within the owner controlled area and was not contaminated.
"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 53691 | Facility: SALEM
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ERIC POWELL
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE | Notification Date: 10/23/2018
Notification Time: 19:24 [ET]
Event Date: 10/23/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/23/2018 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
DONNA JANDA (R1DO) | | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text NOTIFICATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT TO ANOTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCY
"At 1616 EDT on 10/23/18, Salem reported to the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection a sheen on ground water discovered during excavation in the Salem Switchyard. This discovery did not violate any NRC regulations or reporting criteria. This notification is being made solely as a four-hour, non-emergency notification for a Notification of Other Government Agency. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi).
"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify Lower Alloway Creek Township. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 53693 | Facility: QUAD CITIES
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: JEFF KOSCIK
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE | Notification Date: 10/24/2018
Notification Time: 17:45 [ET]
Event Date: 10/24/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/24/2018 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
| Person (Organization):
MICHAEL KUNOWSKI (R3DO) | | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text 1/2 EDG AUTO STARTED AND LPCI/CORE SPRAY INOPERABLE DUE TO LOSS OF SAFETY BUS
"On October 24, 2018 at 0901 CDT, during performance of the 'Functional Test of Unit 1 Second Level Undervoltage,' a loss of Bus 13-1 and Bus 18 occurred. The 1/2 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) automatically started due to a valid actuation on loss of power to Bus 13-1, but did not load due to required testing alignment.
"The loss of Bus 13-1 caused the loss of the 1A loop of Core Spray, both loops of Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI), and Bus 18. All equipment responded as expected.
"Bus 13-1 and Bus 18 were restored at 0911[CDT] on 10/24/18. Other affected systems are in the process of being restored. An investigation as to the cause of the event has been initiated.
"This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv), 'Event or Condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B),' because the 1/2 EDG auto started due to the loss of power condition.
"This notification is also being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B), 'Event or Condition that Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function,' because both loops of LPCI were inoperable for a short time period."
During the ten minutes where LPCI was unavailable, Unit 1 was in Technical Specification LCO 3.0.3. Unit 1 is currently in LCO 3.8.1(b) until the EDG is restored. Unit 2 was not affected by this event.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. | |