| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
7/5/2018 - 7/6/2018 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 53478 | Rep Org: TEXAS DEPT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES
Licensee: IIA FIELD SERVICES
Region: 4
City: ABILENE State: TX
County:
License #: L06933
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ARTHUR TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO | Notification Date: 06/28/2018
Notification Time: 10:10 [ET]
Event Date: 06/27/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/28/2018 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
RYAN ALEXANDER (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL) | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA SOURCE DISCONNECT
The following information was received from the State of Texas via email:
"On June 27, 2018, the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] was notified by the licensee's corporate radiation safety officer (CRSO) that one of his radiography crew had experienced a source disconnect. The crew was using a QSA 880D exposure device containing a 113.1 Curie iridium - 192 source. After completing the first shot on a new location on the pipeline, the crew could not get the source to return to the exposure device. The crew contacted the CRSO and set up new barriers at 2 millirem. The CRSO and a second individual qualified for source retrieval arrived at the site at 1743 hours. The retrieval team (RT) surveyed the guide tube and determined the source was in the collimator. The RT removed the guide tube from the exposure device and removed the camera from the area. Using a set of long tongs, the guide tube was removed from the pipe and the source slid down the guide tube until the connector was exposed. They could see the drive cable had broken near the connector. The source was shielded with bags of lead shot. The CRSO disconnected the broken drive cable from the source pigtail and connected the pigtail to a new drive cable that had been installed on the camera. The source was retracted to the shielded position in the camera. The camera and crank out device and drive cable will be sent to the manufacturer for inspection. No overexposures occurred as a result of this event. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident # - 9590 |
| Part 21 | Event Number: 53489 | Rep Org: FISHER CONTROLS INTERNATIONAL
Licensee: FISHER CONTROLS INTERNATIONAL
Region: 3
City: MARSHALLTOWN State: IA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KIM SAGAR
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 07/05/2018
Notification Time: 20:41 [ET]
Event Date: 05/07/2018
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/05/2018 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
| Person (Organization):
LAURA KOZAK (R3DO)
- PART 21/50.55 REACTORS (EMAIL) | Event Text PART 21 NOTIFICATION - HEX NUTS AND CAP SCREWS ON CERTAIN VEE-BALL VALVES NOT PROPERLY DEDICATED
Fisher Controls issued FIN 2018-02 for hex nuts and caps screws for securing the valve body-to-actuator on eight valves (six purchased by D.C. Cook Nuclear and two purchased by Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power) that were not commercial grade dedicated. Fisher became aware of this issue on May 7, 2018.
For technical questions, please contact:
Jacob Clos
Quality Manager
Emerson Automation Solutions
Fisher Controls International LLC
301 South First Avenue
Marshalltown, IA 50158
Phone: (641) 754-2108
Jacob.Clos@Emerson.com |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 53491 | Facility: BYRON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MACE DAVIS
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 07/06/2018
Notification Time: 15:36 [ET]
Event Date: 07/06/2018
Event Time: 12:01 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/06/2018 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
ROBERT ORLIKOWSKI (R3DO) | | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text TRANSFORMER FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER TO UNIT 2
"At 1201 [CDT], Station Auxiliary Transformer 242-2 experienced a bushing failure, resulting in a loss of offsite power to Unit 2. The 2A and 2B Diesel Generators started and sequenced loads onto the Unit 2 ESF buses appropriately. All other buses normally powered from the Station Auxiliary Transformers automatically transferred to the Unit Auxiliary Transformers. ESF Bus 241 and 242 Undervoltage Relays actuated to start the Diesel Generators and the 2A Auxiliary Feedwater Pump started on the 2A Diesel Generator sequencer. ESF Battery Charger 212 tripped at the same time, which was an unexpected condition. DC Bus 212 was cross-tied with DC Bus 112.
"This notification is being made under 10 CFR 50.72(b)3(iv)(A) due to the actuation of both Unit 2 Diesel Generators and the 2A Auxiliary Feedwater Pump.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."
Currently, offsite power was restored via the Unit 1 Unit Auxiliary Transformer. Both Unit 2 Emergency Diesel Generators have been secured. DC Busses are still cross-tied.
The licensee is currently in a 72-hour shutdown action statement for the loss of offsite power and a 7-day action statement for having the Unit 2 DC Bus cross-tied to Unit 1. | |