U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Reports For 5/7/2018 - 5/8/2018 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
Agreement State | Event Number: 53339 | Rep Org: ILLINOIS EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY Licensee: GE HEALTHCARE Region: 3 City: ARLINGTON HEIGHTS State: IL County: License #: IL-01109-01 Agreement: Y Docket: NRC Notified By: GRAY FORSEE HQ OPS Officer: STEVEN VITTO | Notification Date: 04/16/2018 Notification Time: 16:36 [ET] Event Date: 04/16/2018 Event Time: 14:15 [CDT] Last Update Date: 05/07/2018 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: AGREEMENT STATE | Person (Organization): ANN MARIE STONE (R3DO) NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL) ADAM TUCKER (ILTAB) | This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - TECHNETIUM-99m GENERATOR LOST IN TRANSIT
The following was received from the State of Illinois via E-mail:
"The Agency [Illinois Emergency Management Agency] received a call on 4/16/18 from GE Healthcare (IL-01109-01, Arlington Heights) stating that a Mo/Tc generator in transit to their facility was unaccounted for. The generator was one of eight being returned from pharmacies in Michigan and was shipped as a Yellow-II package through [common carrier]. The Mo-99 activity was estimated to be 10.35 GBq on 4/11/18. GE Healthcare stated the empty packaging for the generator was returned in the shipment with the bottom of the box having been re-taped. [The common carrier] is working to search their hubs (Grand Rapids, Chicago Heights, and Wheeling). The shipping pharmacies have been interviewed and provided signed manifests.
"Details will be provided as they become available. There is currently no reason to believe a deliberate intent to misplace the device [occurred]."
GE Healthcare (Emile Poisson) also notified the NRC Operations Center regarding this event. The package was initially shipped from the Kentwood Michigan GE Healthcare location. The outer package was delivered to the correct location at 1415 CDT.
GE Healthcare Michigan Licensee Number: 21-26707-01MD.
Illinois Item Number: IL180027.
* * * UPDATE FROM EMILE POISSON TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1752 EDT ON 4/17/18 * * *
GE Healthcare notified the NRC Operations Center that the missing generator had been located. When the shipping box broke, the generator fell into a box of office chairs that was shipping to St. Mary's Hospital in South Dakota. Personnel at the hospital recognized the generator as radioactive material and turned it over to the hospital's radiology department. The radiology department notified GE Healthcare. GE Healthcare is making arrangements to have the generator shipped to its Illinois facility. There were no reported overexposures.
* * * The following additional information was received from the State of Illinois (Foresee) via email:
"On 4/17/18, at approximately 1630 CDT, [GE Healthcare] notified IEMA that the package had been located at St. Mary's Hospital in Pierre, SD. Reportedly, hospital staff opened boxes of steel chairs and the generator had been packaged inside. It is unknown if the chairs/associated packaging has been assessed for removable contamination. GE Healthcare is unsure if the hospital is authorized for possession of the generator. GE Healthcare and IEMA are notifying NRC Region IV staff concurrently. The generator arrived in shrink wrapped boxes, delivered by a secondary carrier. GE Healthcare and [the original common carrier] are retracing the shipment to determine at what point the packages were comingled. Terminals at Kentwood, Ml, Chicago Heights, IL and St. Paul, MN are in question. There is currently no reason to believe a deliberate intent to misplace the device [occurred]. GE Healthcare is working to take possession of the generator at this time. Additional details will be provided as they become available."
Notified R3DO (Riemer), R4DO (O'Keefe), ILTAB (E-mail) and NMSS Events Notification (E-mail).
* * * UPDATE FROM DAN KANE TO STEVEN VITTO AT 1317 EDT ON 4/18/18 * * *
Associates In Medical Physics, LLC notified the NRC on behalf of Avera St. Mary's Hospital, South Dakota, regarding the receipt of the generator. Upon receiving the package the hospital surveyed the device and determined no surface contamination was present. The device was shielded and locked within the hospital's hot lab. Arrangements are being made with GE Healthcare to retrieve the generator.
Notified R3DO (Riemer), R4DO (O'Keefe), ILTAB (E-mail) and NMSS Events Notification (E-mail).
* * * UPDATE FROM EMILE POISSON TO DONG PARK AT 1344 CDT ON 5/7/18 * * *
GE Healthcare has taken possession of the generator.
Notified R3DO (Kozak), R4DO (Haire), ILTAB (E-mail) and NMSS Events Notification (E-mail).
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
Non-Agreement State | Event Number: 53367 | Rep Org: DESERT NDT LLC DBA SHAWCOR Licensee: DESERT NDT LLC DBA SHAWCOR Region: 4 City: ABILENE State: TX County: License #: 42-35224-01 Agreement: Y Docket: NRC Notified By: LANE WATTS HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE | Notification Date: 04/27/2018 Notification Time: 12:48 [ET] Event Date: 04/26/2018 Event Time: 12:30 [CDT] Last Update Date: 04/27/2018 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE | Person (Organization): DAVE WERKHEISER (R1DO) MICHAEL VASQUEZ (R4DO) NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL) | Event Text UNABLE TO RETRACT SOURCE DUE TO GUIDE TUBE DAMAGE
The following report was excerpted using information provided via email:
"On Thursday, April 26, 2018, a crew was performing radiographic operations. At approximately 12:30 p.m. (CST), the crew experienced an incident wherein a 2-inch diameter, 8-foot long pipe rolled off a 2-1/2-foot tall table, resulting in the guide tube being used by the crew to be smashed [under the] pipe. The dent in the guide tube prevented the source from being returned to the fully shielded position.
"Exact Location of Event: Pennsboro, WV
"Licensed Material Involved: SPEC-150 Exposure Device (s/n 2056) SPEC G-60 Source (s/n ZA0905) lr-192 45 curies
"Corrective Action Taken/Planned: To immediately correct the problem and retrieve the source, allowing it to be returned to the fully shielded position, the black sheathing on the outside of the guide tube was removed in the damaged area. Using a hammer, the damaged area was rounded out enough to allow the source to be returned to the fully shielded position.
"The guide tube involved in this incident has been removed from service and will be destroyed as to prevent it from being reused.
"Retraining on these types of situations will be provided to all employees, and this incident specifically, will be discussed during this quarter's safety meetings within all company locations.
"To prevent a reoccurrence of an incident of this type, we have made plans with the company for whom we were providing radiography for to stage and brace piping moving forward.
"Extent of Exposure: The personnel responsible for performing source retrieval recorded a total dose of 60 mR during the retrieval.
"As soon as this event occurred, the crew performing radiographic operations immediately reassessed and set up appropriate 2 mR/hr boundaries, notified their Site RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] and Branch Manager, and maintained constant visual surveillance until source retrieval personnel arrived at the jobsite. At no time were any unmonitored employees in any immediate danger of being overexposed, nor were any of our company personnel, all of whom were utilizing proper radiation detection equipment." |
Agreement State | Event Number: 53368 | Rep Org: TEXAS DEPT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES Licensee: ALPHA TEST INCORPORATED Region: 4 City: DALLAS State: TX County: License #: L 03411 Agreement: Y Docket: NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE | Notification Date: 04/28/2018 Notification Time: 15:18 [ET] Event Date: 04/28/2018 Event Time: 00:00 [CDT] Last Update Date: 04/28/2018 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: AGREEMENT STATE | Person (Organization): MICHAEL VASQUEZ (R4DO) ILTAB (EMAIL) NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL) CNSNS (MEXICO) (EMAIL) | This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
The following information was obtained from the state of Texas via email:
"On April 28, 2018, the Agency was notified by the licensee's radiation safety officer (RSO) that a Troxler model 3430 moisture/density gauge had been stolen from a company truck [in Houston, TX]. The gauge contains a 40 milliCurie cesium - 137 source and an 8 milliCurie americium source. The gauge was not in the transport case. The RSO did not know if the source rod was locked in the shielded position. The technician who had checked the gauge out had taken the gauge to his apartment (against company policy) and had placed it in the front seat of the truck to recharge it. When the technician came down the next morning to leave, they found a front window of the truck broken and the gauge gone. Local law enforcement has been notified of the theft. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."
TX Incident #: 9565
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
Agreement State | Event Number: 53369 | Rep Org: LOUISIANA RADIATION PROTECTION DIV Licensee: SLIDELL MEMORIAL HOSPITAL Region: 4 City: SLIDELL State: LA County: License #: LA-0783-L02, AI 2970 Agreement: Y Docket: NRC Notified By: JOE NOBLE HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 04/30/2018 Notification Time: 12:34 [ET] Event Date: 04/12/2018 Event Time: 00:00 [CDT] Last Update Date: 04/30/2018 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: AGREEMENT STATE | Person (Organization): JAMES DRAKE (R4DO) NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL) | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - WRONG RADIOPHARMACEUTICAL USED
The following is information received via e-mail:
"April 19, 2018, [the licensee] called to inquire if one of his facilities had a 'Recordable Event' or if the facility had a 'Reportable Medical Event.' The report and attachments were left in a voice mail at 8:18 pm [CDT]. The event occurred under the [Slidell Memorial Hospital] SMH Therapeutic and Diagnostic Radioactive Material License, LA-0783-L02. The event involved 5.4 mCi Tc-99m-Myoview administered to a patient who was scheduled for a lung scan utilizing [approximately] 5.4 mCi Tc-99m-MAA. The technologist depended on the unit dose for 'STAT' used to be MAA and did not verify the unit dose label. This medical event occurred on 04/12/2018.
"The technologist states that a Myoview cardiac dose was in a pig labelled MAA for a lung scan. The pharmacy pulled the dose records, verified the bar coding and determined the technologist was at error.
"[The licensee] provided dose calculations for the heart scan dose utilizing 5.4 mCi Tc-99m-Myoview as 0.224 rad effective dose equivalent and highest organ dose of 0.972 rad to the wall of the gallbladder.
"There were corrective actions [to] retrain the technologist in patient dose verification prior to injection and request their pharmacy change their label fonts to magnification and bolding the unit dose labels. The referring physician and the patient were notified of the error.
"LDEQ [Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality] considers this incident still open and subject to investigation to determine if this event was caused by the facility personnel or if it is an error caused by the pharmacy personnel."
Louisiana Event Report ID No.: LA-180007, T 184299 |
Agreement State | Event Number: 53370 | Rep Org: TEXAS DEPT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES Licensee: ALPHA TESTING INCORPORATED Region: 4 City: DALLAS State: TX County: License #: L 03411 Agreement: Y Docket: NRC Notified By: KAREN BLANCHARD HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 04/30/2018 Notification Time: 14:18 [ET] Event Date: 04/29/2018 Event Time: 05:30 [CDT] Last Update Date: 05/02/2018 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: AGREEMENT STATE | Person (Organization): JAMES DRAKE (R4DO) ILTAB (EMAIL) NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL) CNSNS (MEXICO) (FAX) | This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
The following information was obtained from the state of Texas via email:
"On April 30, 2018, the licensee reported that sometime during the overnight hours of April 28-29, 2018, a Humboldt model 5001 moisture density gauge had been stolen from the back of a company vehicle. The licensee's technician had taken the vehicle with gauge home [to Arlington, TX], contrary to company policy, and had left the gauge chained with locks in the truck. The source rod handle was locked with a padlock. At 0530 [CDT] on April 29th, he discovered the chains had been cut and the gauge stolen. Local law enforcement was notified and the licensee has checked the surrounding area. The licensee will begin checking local pawn shops. More information will be provided as it is obtained in accordance with SA-300.
"Device: Humboldt Model 5001 - SN: 2821 Sources: Americium-241 - 40 milliCuries - SN: 0379CX; Cesium-137 - 10 milliCuries - SN: NJ-04061"
TX Incident #: 9566
* * * UPDATE ON 5/2/2018 AT 1452 EDT FROM KAREN BLANCHARD TO DONG PARK * * *
The following was received via e-mail:
"This gauge was recovered today and is being returned to the licensee."
Notified R4DO (Azua), ILTAB, NMSS Events Notification, and Mexico via email.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
Agreement State | Event Number: 53372 | Rep Org: WA OFFICE OF RADIATION PROTECTION Licensee: INTERMOUNTAIN MATERIAL TESTING Region: 4 City: RICHLAND State: WA County: License #: I0578 Agreement: Y Docket: NRC Notified By: JON NAPIER HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 04/30/2018 Notification Time: 19:21 [ET] Event Date: 04/27/2018 Event Time: 16:30 [PDT] Last Update Date: 04/30/2018 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: AGREEMENT STATE | Person (Organization): JAMES DRAKE (R4DO) NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICATION (EMAIL) ILTAB (EMAIL) CNSC (CANADA) (FAX) | This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST PORTABLE GAUGE
The following information was obtained from the state of Washington via email:
"Today, April 30, 2018, the Washington State Department of Health Radioactive Materials Section was notified of a lost portable gauge. The gauge owner, Intermountain Materials Testing (WA RadMat licensee I0578), notified the Emergency Response Duty Officer at 10:15 am [PDT] about the lost gauge. The company RSO was notified of the incident by an employee earlier today. The employee determined the gauge (CPN MC3 S/N M300405776) was missing at approximately 2:35 pm [PDT] Friday, April 27, 2018. This gauge has a 10 mCi (370MBq) Cs-137 source and 50 mCi (1.85 GBq) Am-241 source. The employee searched for the gauge until 4:30 pm [PDT] before he notified the local Richland, WA Police Department. The gauge was presumed to be left on the ground at a job site near the intersection of Queensgate Dr. and Gala Way in Richland, WA, because it was determined to not be in its storage location at a different job site. This incident has been given the Incident ID WA-18-015 and is reportable under 10 CFR 20.2201(a)(1)(ii) and is a 30 day reportable event. Follow up will be supplied as needed."
Washington State Incident Number WA-18-015
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
Power Reactor | Event Number: 53386 | Facility: SALEM Region: 1 State: NJ Unit: [] [2] [] RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP NRC Notified By: MATT MOG HQ OPS Officer: STEVEN VITTO | Notification Date: 05/07/2018 Notification Time: 05:23 [ET] Event Date: 05/07/2018 Event Time: 03:25 [EDT] Last Update Date: 05/07/2018 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION | Person (Organization): MATT YOUNG (R1DO) | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | 2 | M/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text MANUAL REACTOR TRIP
"This 4 and 8 hour notification is being made to report that Salem Unit 2 initiated a manual reactor trip and subsequent automatic Auxiliary Feedwater system actuation. The trip was initiated due to a 21 Reactor Coolant Pump reaching its procedural limit for motor winding temperature of 302F.
"Salem Unit 2 is currently stable in Mode 3. Reactor Coolant system pressure is 2235 PSIG and Reactor Coolant System temperature is 547 F with decay heat removal via the Main Steam Dump and Auxiliary Feedwater Systems. Unit 2 has no active shutdown technical specification action statements in effect. All control rods inserted on the reactor trip. All ECCS [emergency core cooling systems] and ESF [emergency safety function] systems functioned as expected.
"No safety related equipment or major secondary equipment was tagged for maintenance prior to this event. No personnel were injured during this event."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. The Lower Alloways Creek Township will be notified. |
Power Reactor | Event Number: 53387 | Facility: COOK Region: 3 State: MI Unit: [] [2] [] RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP NRC Notified By: JIM HABLIK HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA | Notification Date: 05/07/2018 Notification Time: 06:42 [ET] Event Date: 05/07/2018 Event Time: 03:36 [EDT] Last Update Date: 05/07/2018 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION | Person (Organization): BILLY DICKSON (R3DO) | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | 2 | M/R | Y | 30 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text MANUAL RX TRIP DUE TO HIGH-HIGH LEVEL IN MOISTURE SEPARATOR DRAIN TANK
"On May 7, 2018 at 0336 [EDT], DC Cook Unit 2 Reactor was manually tripped due to a high-high level experienced in the East Moisture Separator Drain Tank (MSDT) of the Moisture Separator Reheater (MSR).
"This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation as a four (4) hour report, and under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), specified system actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System, as an eight (8) hour report. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
"Unit 2 is being supplied by offsite power. All control rods fully inserted. All Aux Feedwater Pumps started properly. Decay heat is being removed via the Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valves following Main Steam Stop Valve closure at 0431 due to a slow RCS [Reactor Coolant System] cooldown. Preliminary evaluation indicates all plant systems functioned normally following the Reactor Trip. DC Cook Unit 2 remains stable in Mode 3 while conducting the Post Trip Review. No radioactive release is in progress as a result of this event." |
Power Reactor | Event Number: 53388 | Facility: CALLAWAY Region: 4 State: MO Unit: [1] [] [] RX Type: [1] W-4-LP NRC Notified By: JEREMY MORTON HQ OPS Officer: DAN LIVERMORE | Notification Date: 05/07/2018 Notification Time: 16:31 [ET] Event Date: 05/07/2018 Event Time: 13:35 [CDT] Last Update Date: 05/07/2018 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION | Person (Organization): MARK HAIRE (R4DO) | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text DISCOVERY OF A CONDITION THAT COULD HAVE PREVENTED FULFILLMENT OF A SAFETY FUNCTION
"On May 7, 2018, during an engineering review of mission time requirements for Technical Specification related equipment, a deficiency was discovered regarding the Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) guidance for natural circulation cooldown with a stagnant loop. This condition could be the result of a postulated Main Steam Line Break with a loss of offsite power.
"During a natural circulation cooldown with a faulted steam generator, flow in the stagnant reactor coolant system (RCS) loop associated with the isolated faulted steam generator (SG) could stagnate and result in elevated temperatures in that loop. This becomes an issue when RCS depressurization to residual heat removal system (RHR) entry conditions is attempted. The liquid in the stagnant loop will flash to steam and prevent RCS depressurization. In this condition, the time required to complete the cooldown would be sufficiently long that the nitrogen accumulators associated with Callaway's atmospheric steam dumps and turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump flow control valves would be exhausted. The atmospheric steam dumps and turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump would not be capable of performing their specified safety functions of cooling the plant to entry conditions for RHR operation. This issue has been analyzed by Westinghouse in WCAP-16632-P. This WCAP determined that to prevent loop stagnation, the RCS cooldown rate in these conditions should be limited to a rate dependent on the temperature differential present in the active loops.
"The WCAP analysis was used to support a revision to the generic Emergency Response Guideline (ERG) for ES-0.2 "Natural Circulation Cooldown." Figure 1 in ES-0.2 provides a curve of the maximum allowable cooldown rate as a function of active loop temperature differential which is directly proportional to the level of core decay heat. At the time of discovery of this condition, Callaway's EOP structure did not ensure that the ES-0.2 guidance would be implemented for a natural circulation cooldown with a stagnant loop.
"Callaway has issued interim guidance to the on-shift personnel regarding this concern and is in the process of revising the applicable EOPs.
"This condition is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) for any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to (A) Shutdown the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, (B) Remove residual heat, or (D) mitigate the consequences of an accident."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector of this condition. |
Power Reactor | Event Number: 53389 | Facility: WATERFORD Region: 4 State: LA Unit: [3] [] [] RX Type: [3] CE NRC Notified By: ARVEL HALL HQ OPS Officer: RICHARD SMITH | Notification Date: 05/07/2018 Notification Time: 17:40 [ET] Event Date: 05/07/2018 Event Time: 10:22 [CDT] Last Update Date: 05/07/2018 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY | Person (Organization): MARK HAIRE (R4DO) FFD GROUP (EMAIL) | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text FITNESS FOR DUTY - NON-LICENSED SUPERVISOR CONFIRMED POSITIVE FOR ALCOHOL
"A non-licensed supervisor had a confirmed positive result for alcohol during a random fitness for duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." |
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED.THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | Power Reactor | Event Number: 53392 | Facility: FARLEY Region: 2 State: AL Unit: [1] [] [] RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP NRC Notified By: BLAKE MITCHELL HQ OPS Officer: STEVEN VITTO | Notification Date: 05/08/2018 Notification Time: 01:39 [ET] Event Date: 05/07/2018 Event Time: 23:00 [CDT] Last Update Date: 06/27/2018 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION | Person (Organization): BINOY DESAI (R2DO) | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | 1 | N | N | 0 | Hot Standby | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text UNANALYZED CONDITION
"On May 7, 2018 at 1041 CDT, Unit 1 performed an RCS (reactor coolant system) leakrate procedure that calculated an unidentified RCS leakrate of 0.202 gpm. The leak source investigation concluded at 2150 that the packing for the charging flow control valve (FCV) was the source of the RCS leakage when it was bypassed, which isolated the leakage. A second RCS leakrate calculation was performed after the charging flow control valve was isolated which calculated an acceptable leakrate of 0.00 gpm.
"The packing leakage from the charging flow control valve represented leakage external to containment which would result in a greater that 5 Rem dose projection to control room personnel during accident conditions which does not satisfy the GDC19 criteria described in Technical Specification Bases 3.7.10. Therefore the control room emergency filtration system would not be able to fulfill its design function resulting in an unanalyzed condition.
"This condition is being reported pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii) for a 'condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety'.
"The packing leak from the charging flow control valve will remain isolated until repaired under work order SNC944374."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
* * * RETRACTION FROM BLAKE MITCHELL TO ANDREW WAUGH AT 2151 EDT ON 6/27/2018 * * *
"Retraction - There was sufficient margin in the analysis of record to account for the increased leakage in the charging flow control valve that was not known at the time of reporting. Doses at the site boundary and in the Main Control Room would have remained less than the legal limits had a Loss of Coolant Accident occurred based on plant conditions at the time."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R2DO (Michel). |
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED.THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | Power Reactor | Event Number: 53393 | Facility: FARLEY Region: 2 State: AL Unit: [1] [] [] RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP NRC Notified By: DOUGLAS HOBSON HQ OPS Officer: DAN LIVERMORE | Notification Date: 05/08/2018 Notification Time: 10:38 [ET] Event Date: 05/08/2018 Event Time: 01:39 [CDT] Last Update Date: 06/27/2018 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION | Person (Organization): BINOY DESAI (R2DO) | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | 1 | N | N | 0 | Hot Standby | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text CONTAINMENT LEAK RATE GREATER THAN TECH SPEC
"On May 8, 2018 at 0139 Central Daylight Time, Farley Nuclear Plant Unit 1 declared containment inoperable due to total containment leak rate greater than technical specifications. The 1B containment cooler had seat leakage of approximately 30 gallons per minute from a service water drain valve.
"Though the containment cooler service water supply is not tested per the Appendix J program, a loss of the containment barrier is possible under accident conditions.
"The service water flow path to the 1B containment cooler has been isolated to exit the condition."
The licensee will notify the NRC resident inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM BLAKE MITCHELL TO ANDREW WAUGH AT 2151 EDT ON 6/27/18 * * *
"During the time of the leakage reported in event notification 53393 the system was under administrative control. The containment isolation valves for the 1B containment cooler were closed as restoration of the containment cooler was still in progress following the outage. With the system isolated, operations had identified a 50 drop per minute (dpm) leak downstream of a service water drain valve to the 1B containment cooler. To quantify the leak, operations removed the downstream pipe cap and piping to better measure the leak under system pressure. Upon opening the service water containment isolation valves the leak rate was measured at 30 gpm. Operations re-closed the service water containment isolation valves per the pre-briefed contingency actions. It was determined that the service water drain valve (a ball valve) was not properly seated. This was all performed with operations personnel on station in the containment and in the Main Control Room. At no time were the containment isolation valves degraded. Following closure of the containment isolation valves they were also powered down to prevent inadvertent opening."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R2DO (Michel). | |