| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
01/19/2017 - 01/23/2017 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 52419 | Facility: PEACH BOTTOM
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: CRAIG TAULMAN
HQ OPS Officer: KARL DIEDERICH | Notification Date: 12/09/2016
Notification Time: 05:29 [ET]
Event Date: 12/08/2016
Event Time: 22:37 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/19/2017 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
ART BURRITT (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text HPCI SURVEILLANCE FAILURE
"On 12/08/16 at approximately 2237 [EST], the Unit 2 HPCI [High Pressure Coolant Injection] system failed to meet surveillance testing requirements for achieving rated flow at greater than or equal to a minimum test pressure established per the surveillance. Operations declared the HPCI system inoperable and entered Technical Specification 3.5.1 Condition C for HPCI being inoperable. Other standby systems (Reactor Core Isolation Cooling and low pressure emergency core cooling systems) are operable.
"HPCI is a single train system. Therefore, per NUREG-1022, this condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of a system required to mitigate the consequences of a design event.
"This condition has been entered into the Corrective Action program (IR 3951006). Investigation of the exact failure condition is in progress so that repairs can be made."
At the surveillance flow of 5,000 gpm, the system was approximately 80 psi below the required pressure of 1,278 psi.
Technical Specification 3.5.1, Condition C, is a 14-day Limiting Condition of Operation.
The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.
* * * RETRACTION AT 1440 EST ON 01/19/17 FROM ELMER KAUFFMAN TO S. SANDIN * * *
The licensee provided the following information as the basis for retracting this report:
"This is a retraction of an event notification made on 12/09/16 at 0529 EST (EN #52419). This event was initially reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that, at the time of discovery, was believed to have prevented the fulfillment of the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system safety function.
"On 12/08/16 at 2237 EST, the Unit 2 HPCI system was declared inoperable due to failing to meet surveillance testing requirements for achieving rated flow at greater than or equal to a minimum test pressure established per the surveillance. Prompt troubleshooting was performed and it was determined that an adjustment to the HPCI turbine governor control system was required. This adjustment was performed and HPCI was returned to an operable status on 12/09/16.
"Subsequent to this occurrence, Engineering has completed an evaluation that concluded that HPCI was capable of fulfilling its safety function and that the associated Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.5.1.8 was met. The evaluation concluded that HPCI was degraded, but met the threshold for TS operability.
"The NRC Senior Resident has been informed of this retraction."
Notified R1DO (Kennedy). |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 52483 | Rep Org: NEW YORK STATE DEPT. OF HEALTH
Licensee: THE ALC GROUP, LLC dba ALC ENVIRONMENTAL
Region: 1
City: NEW YORK State: NY
County:
License #: C2734
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DESMOND GORDON
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 01/11/2017
Notification Time: 16:06 [ET]
Event Date: 11/23/2016
Event Time: 10:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/11/2017 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
DESIREE DAVIS (ILTA)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN THEN RECOVERED LICENSED MATERIAL
The following information was received via facsimile:
"Licensee notified the Department on 11/23/16, of the theft of an RMD LPA-1 Lead-Paint Analyzer containing 12 milliCuries of Cobalt-57 (Device S/N 3447R). The theft occurred at approximately 1030 EST on 11/23/2016 at a temporary jobsite located at 40-01 Vernon Boulevard, Queens, New York 11101.
"According to the licensee, the authorized user realized the device was missing shortly after departing the jobsite. He recalled putting the protective case containing the XRF [X-Ray Fluorescence Lead Paint Spectrum Analyzer] on the ground next to his vehicle to access his vehicle keys. Soon after, he was distracted by a pedestrian asking for directions and stepped into his vehicle to travel to the next jobsite without the device. He immediately returned to the previous site to search for the device. He was unsuccessful in his search.
"After filing a report at the local police department, the authorized user returned to the jobsite. He was informed by the maintenance department that there was video surveillance at that location and was provided a copy of the tape. This video showed two men walking away with the XRF protective case from the location where the authorized user's vehicle was originally parked. The licensee indicated that fliers were put up in the neighborhood where the device was originally stolen with a reward for the safe return of the XRF.
"On December 8, 2016, the Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) notified the Department [New York State Department of Health] that someone had contacted their office claiming to have the stolen XRF in their possession. The RSO verified it was the correct device by the S/N and arranged to retrieve the device the next day. Two of the Licensee's authorized users met the individual at the previously agreed upon location, paid the negotiated reward, and retrieved the device. The XRF and XRF accessories appeared to be in perfect condition."
New York Event Report ID No: NY-17-02
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 52485 | Rep Org: COLORADO DEPT OF HEALTH
Licensee: WIBBY ENVIRONMENTAL, INC.
Region: 4
City: GOLDEN State: CO
County:
License #: CO General Li
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: LINDA BARTISH
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 01/12/2017
Notification Time: 16:35 [ET]
Event Date: 01/12/2017
Event Time: 13:00 [MST]
Last Update Date: 01/12/2017 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
NICK TAYLOR (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (E-MA)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST GAS CHROMATOGRAPH
The following report was received from the State of Colorado via email:
"Detail: Wibby Environmental sold the business to Phenova in 2010. Through a long process of trying to reach the company contact at Wibby, contact with Phenova was made in February of 2016. After several attempts to discover what occurred with the assets of Wibby Environmental, one device is being reported as lost/abandoned. According to Phenova they do not see the gas chromatograph as being on the asset sheet at the time of purchase.
"It is unknown as to what Wibby Environmental did with the device or if the device was returned for disposal. Our office has received no records from manufactures including CJ Bruyn & Company, showing the Gas Chromatograph was returned.
"Device information: Model # N610-0133 Source SN# 0767, NI-63, 15 mCi, Date shipped from CJ Bruyn 02-27-2004.
"Event Description: Due to the length of time for discovery this case is closed."
Colorado Event Report ID No.: CO 17-0002
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 52488 | Rep Org: UTAH DIVISION OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: ENERGY FUELS RESOURCES, INC.
Region: 4
City: KANAB State: UT
County:
License #: UT1900479
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: GWYN GALLOWAY
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 01/13/2017
Notification Time: 15:32 [ET]
Event Date: 01/12/2017
Event Time: 13:00 [MST]
Last Update Date: 01/13/2017 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
NICK TAYLOR (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LEAKING BARRELS CONTAINING RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
The following report was received from the State of Utah via email:
"DWMRC [Division of Waste Management and Radiation Control] was notified of the event at about 1500 MST, on January 12, 2017. The licensee indicated that the shipper, Honeywell (Converdyne) had notified the NRC and the US DOT. This incident report is the initial notification of the NRC Operations Center from the DWMRC.
"The following description is the initial information received by DWMRC. The information will be updated as the Division obtains more information.
"A van carrying [three] barrels of [solid and wet] radioactive materials was received at the White Mesa Mill. When the employees were unloading the van they realized that a barrel, maybe two, had rusted bottoms and was leaking. Although the bottom of the barrels were not rusted through, they were characterized as 'being soft'. The barrels were on plastic sheeting that should have restricted the leaking materials to the plastic; however, when the barrels were unloaded, the employees noted that there was a hole in the sheeting. When the RSO was informed of the incident and arrived at the van, he noted that there was visible leakage on the girders and the siding of the van. Unfortunately, he was unable to take measurements of the area where the leak occurred to determine the radiation levels. The RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] stated that the van had been pulled in and cleaned prior to any measurements being taken, so the only measurements were taken after the van was cleaned."
* * * UPDATE FROM GWYN GALLOWAY TO JOHN SHOEMAKER, VIA EMAIL, AT 1830 EST ON 1/13/17 * * *
"On January 12, 2017, at approximately 1142 MST, a TAM International van carrying barrels of KOH alternate feed materials from Honeywell International arrived at the White Mesa Mill Scale house. According to Honeywell the materials are basically uranium ore concentrates. The White Mesa employees began unloading the van, but as they began offloading some of the last barrels, they noticed that some of the barrels were leaking. From what they could tell, three barrels were potentially leaking . The barrels were not rusted through, but were 'soft' and allowed liquid contained in the solid materials to leak from the barrel. The material leaked from the barrel onto a plastic sheet; however, the plastic sheet had an opening (rip, tear) through which the material was able to pass. The RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] was notified of the event at about 1300 MST.
"When the RSO reached the van, the employees had completed emptying the van and had 'cleaned' the van. The RSO indicated he was able to see visible evidence that the material had been able to leak from the van, but the area had been cleaned and no valid measurements or samples of the materials leaked from the van were able to be taken. Pictures were taken and from the pictures provided to the Division [Utah Division of Waste Management and Radiation Control], it appears that only a small quantity of liquid material was leaking from the barrels. Because the contents of the barrels are primarily solid and only contain small amounts of liquid and the liquid contents in the barrels were leaking through the bottom of the barrel, through a plastic sheet, across the van floor and out of the van along a girder and the siding, it is likely that only small quantities of materials were leaking from the van. The weather across the nation has been fairly stormy this past week and has included both rain and snow. Because of the rain and snow that has been occurring while the vehicle was traveling to the Mill site, it is likely that any small amounts of materials that leaked from the van were subsequently washed away and diluted. The Mill analyzes each alternate feed stream annually to verify the isotopic content of the alternate feed. At the last verification, the Honeywell KOH material contained, approximately 633,000 mg/kg uranium (about 61% uranium), 39 pCi/g Pb-210, 44.6 pCi/g Ra-226, 358 pCi/g Th-230, and 27 pCi/g Th-232."
This event was also reported by National Response Center to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission , Report # 1168447, on 01/12/17 at 1720 EST.
Utah Event Number: UT170001 |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 52489 | Rep Org: LOUISIANA RADIATION PROTECTION DIV
Licensee: EAGLE US 2, LLC
Region: 4
City: LAKE CHARLES State: LA
County:
License #: LA-2257-L01,
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOE NOBLE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 01/13/2017
Notification Time: 16:46 [ET]
Event Date: 01/10/2017
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/13/2017 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
NICK TAYLOR (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DENSITY GAUGE WITH STUCK OPEN SHUTTER
The following report was received from the State of Louisiana via email:
"Event type: Level density gauge on a process had a shutter malfunction. Eagle was performing their annual operational checks when the malfunction was discovered. The malfunction is the gauge shutter is stuck in the open position on an active process. The gauge Service Company, BBP Sales will make the repair or replacement after the assessment of the device. They discovered the shutters would not close. The Gauge is a RONAN SA1-C-10 device/source holder, S/N 9527GG, loaded with a 200 mCi Cs-137 source.
"Notifications: LDEQ [Louisiana Department of Environmental Control] was notified by Eagle US 2 in a message on the voice mail system on 1/10/2017. The notice was sent to the Compliance Radiation Assessment Section of LDEQ. The notification was readdressed when Eagle was contacted on 1/12/2017, to get the preliminary information report. Eagle US 2 will send LDEQ a corrective action and a final report no later than 30 days of the corrective action. The Eagle US 2 preliminary written report was received 1/12/2017 at 1457 CST.
"Event description: On 1/10/2017, Eagle US 2 was performing their annual inventory and operational checks of their licensed devices. During their routine annual maintenance checks, the shutter malfunction was discovered. The gauge shutter would not close.
"Eagle US 2 called a service contractor, BBP Sales, to evaluate the situation and determine the best course of action to correct the problem. [The contractor] was unable to close the shutter and will determine the course of corrective action. The cause appears to be the corrosive environment where it [the gauge] is installed and used.
"The source and device with shutter stuck open will remain installed and utilized on the process until the repairs are made. This is not a radiation exposure hazard and does not pose a health and safety situation for the Eagle US 2 employees or the general public.
"This event is considered closed by LDEQ. This event is being reported to the NRC as required by Regulatory Requirement 10 CFR 30.50(b)(2)."
Event Report ID No.: LA-17001. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 52496 | Facility: LASALLE
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL LEE
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 01/19/2017
Notification Time: 00:39 [ET]
Event Date: 01/18/2017
Event Time: 20:56 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/19/2017 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
AARON McCRAW (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text BOTH SECONDARY CONTAINMENT AIRLOCK DOORS OPEN SIMULTANEOUSLY
"This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. An employee entered a secondary containment interlock [airlock] and identified that both doors of the interlock opened simultaneously when the door on the reactor building side was opened. The employee immediately secured both doors in the interlock and notified the Main Control Room Supervisor. Both doors in the interlock were open for approximately five seconds. With both doors open, TS SR 3.6.4.1.2 was not met. This rendered secondary containment inoperable per TS 3.6.4.1. Reactor Building differential pressure, as observed in the Main Control Room has remained less than -0.25 in. H2O at all times. Initial investigation determined that the interlock for the doors was malfunctioning. Administrative controls have been put in place to ensure the doors remain closed pending repairs to the interlock."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R3DO (McCraw). |
| Research Reactor | Event Number: 52497 | Facility: MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECH
RX Type: 6000 KW TANK RESEARCH HW
Comments:
Region: 0
City: CAMBRIDGE State: MA
County: MIDDLESEX
License #: R-37
Agreement: Y
Docket: 05000020
NRC Notified By: AL QUEIROLO
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 01/19/2017
Notification Time: 10:12 [ET]
Event Date: 01/18/2017
Event Time: 11:34 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/19/2017 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
RESEARCH AND TEST REACTOR EVENT
| Person (Organization):
PATRICK BOYLE (RTRP)
ANTHONY MENDIOLA (PROB)
ALEXANDER ADAMS (PRLB)
| Event Text VIOLATION OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
During startup of the reactor with reactor power less than one kilowatt, one of the two required reactor period channels was deenergized. Technical Specification 3.2.3 requires that the reactor shall not be made critical unless there are two such operable channels. For a period of approximately 10 seconds one of the operators inadvertently lifted the wrong cable. The operator identified the error and realized Technical Specifications had been violated. The reactor was shutdown at 1134 EST.
An evaluation was performed to identify corrective actions. A labeling issue was identified which contributed to the incident.
The licensee notified the NRC RTR Project Manager. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 52501 | Facility: MILLSTONE
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [ ] [ ] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: WALTER ORF
HQ OPS Officer: STEVEN VITTO | Notification Date: 01/20/2017
Notification Time: 16:02 [ET]
Event Date: 01/20/2017
Event Time: 08:35 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/20/2017 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
SILAS KENNEDY (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text FAILURE OF A SECONDARY CONTAINMENT DOOR TO CLOSE
"At 0835 [EST] on January 20, 2017, at Millstone Power Station Unit 3, subsequent to personnel passage through a door in the auxiliary building, the door failed rendering it unable to completely close. At this time, in accordance with Technical Specification 3.6.6.2 "Secondary Containment," the Shift Manager declared the secondary containment inoperable. The door was repaired and the door completely closed at 1256 [EST] on January 20, 2017, and secondary containment was declared operable.
"Since Secondary Containment was rendered inoperable, Dominion is reporting that this condition could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function to control the release of radioactive material and mitigate the consequences of an accident.
"This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified." |
| Part 21 | Event Number: 52502 | Rep Org: C&D TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
Licensee: C&D TECHNOLOGIES
Region: 1
City: BLUE BELL State: PA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ARMAND LAUZON
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA | Notification Date: 01/20/2017
Notification Time: 16:01 [ET]
Event Date: 11/23/2016
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/20/2017 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(a)(2) - INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION
| Person (Organization):
SILAS KENNEDY (R1DO)
LADONNA SUGGS (R2DO)
AARON McCRAW (R3DO)
GREG WERNER (R4DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI)
PART 21 MATERIALS (EMAI)
| Event Text PART 21 - PLASTIC JAR DEDICATION SAMPLING
The following is an excerpt of a part 21 received via email:
"The purpose of this letter is to provide the NRC an interim report in general conformity to the requirements of 10CFR Part 21.21 (a)(2). During an internal audit in November 2016, the sampling plan for dedication of plastic jars used in 1E battery cells was reviewed. Two lot numbers are associated with each plastic jar, a material lot number and a molding number. A material lot may encompass several molding lots. The dedication sampling plan was based on the material lot, and may not have properly sampled variations in critical characteristics generated by molding lots. An analysis of historical data is underway to determine whether any deviations to specifications for critical characteristics may have occurred, and whether these possible deviations could represent a defect as defined by Part 21. C&D expects that this analysis will be completed by March 20, 2017.
The facilities where the components have been supplied are:
Arkansas Nuclear One, Limerick, Beaver Valley, Millstone, Braidwood, Monticello, Browns Ferry, Nine Mile Point, Byron, Oconee, Clinton, Palisades, Columbia, Perry, Cook, Point Beach, Cooper, Prairie Island, Crystal River, River Bend, Diablo Canyon, Robinson, Duane Arnold, Salem, Farley, Sequoyah, Fermi, St. Lucie, Fitzpatrick, Summer, Ft. Calhoun, Susquehanna, Grand Gulf, Three Mile Island, Harris, US Navy, Hatch, Vogtle, Hope Creek, Vermont Yankee, Indian Point, Waterford, Watts Bar, LaSalle
"If you have any questions or wish to discuss this matter or this report, please contact
"Robert Malley
VP Quality and Process Engineering
bmalley@cdtechno.com
(215) 619-7830" |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 52503 | Facility: FITZPATRICK
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: THOMAS YURKON
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 01/22/2017
Notification Time: 16:19 [ET]
Event Date: 01/22/2017
Event Time: 14:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/22/2017 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
SILAS KENNEDY (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | Event Text WELD DEFECT FOUND DURING A SHUTDOWN INSPECTION
"Information from a Manual Phased Array UT (Ultrasonic Testing) examination of the 'A' RHR LPCI [Residual Heat Removal Low Pressure Coolant Injection] Injection Loop indicates an axially oriented indication 0.95 inch in length and 0.81 inch through wall. This is on weld number 24-10-130 (T to Valve dissimilar metal weld).
"This event is being reported as a degraded condition pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) based on the fact that the indications result in a defect in the primary coolant system which cannot be found acceptable under ASME Section XI.
"The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector."
The weld is located where the RHR piping taps into the reactor vessel. The wall thickness at this location is 1.15 inches. | |