| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
11/16/2016 - 11/18/2016 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Part 21 | Event Number: 50691 | Rep Org: ABB GROUP
Licensee: ABB GROUP
Region: 1
City: CORAL SPRINGS State: FL
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DENNIS BATOVSKY
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 12/17/2014
Notification Time: 17:38 [ET]
Event Date: 12/17/2014
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/17/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
| Person (Organization):
DONNA JANDA (R1DO)
KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE (R2DO)
AARON MCCRAW (R3DO)
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)
| Event Text PART 21 REPORT - POTENTIAL DEFECT REGARDING KF RELAYS
"Recent seismic testing results of the above Class 1E KF under-frequency relays uncovered inaccurate qualification by similarity to the tested relay 1328D72A03 (qualified in 2011). The subject relays do not meet the previously published ZPA rating, but meet a rating of 1.7g in accordance with IEEE C37.98-1987 requirements.
"Records show a total of 37 suspect relays were provided to seven customers. ABB does not have the capability to perform the evaluation to determine if a defect exists, thus we are notifying the purchasers or affected licensees of this determination so that they may evaluate the deviation, pursuant to 10 CFR. 21.21(b).
"If you have any questions regarding this notice, please contact the ABB Technical Support 954-752-6700.
"Dennis Batovsky
Managing Director"
* * * UPDATE FROM DENNIS BATOVSKY TO HOWIE CROUCH VIA FAX ON 3/5/15 AT 1522 EST * * *
"This letter is an update to the Part 21 Notification submitted on December 17, 2014, 'Potential defect regarding KF relay zero period acceleration (ZPA) rating'.
"ABB reminds all licensees, that per ABB KF Under-frequency relays, Instruction Leaflet 41-503.21A effective April 1997, 'the normally closed contact at terminal number 2 should not be used for critical circuits due to a low fragility rating'.
"ABB [has] conducted the following actions:
-ABB has performed an initial extent of condition evaluation to determine if this situation exists in other electromechanical IE qualified relays. There are no additional findings at this time.
-ABB issued a corrective action to improve existing engineering qualification procedures that govern qualification by similarity.
"If you have any questions regarding this notice, please contact the ABB Technical Support 954-752-6700."
Notified R1DO (Burritt), R2DO (Sykes), R3DO (Cameron), R4DO (Kellar) and Part 21 Group (via email).
* * * UPDATE FROM DENNIS BATOVSKY TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1621 EST ON 11/17/2016 VIA FAX * * *
The following is a synopsis of the updated information received:
The seismic testing results for 1328D72A01 and 1328D72A02 Class 1E KF Under-frequency relays met a ZPA rating of 1.72g. This was previously communicated as 1.7g.
In lieu of previously communicated actions, future orders for 1328D72A01 and 1328D72A02 Class 1E KF Under-frequency relays will be only available at the published ZPA rating of 1.72g. Customers requiring higher ZPA will need to procure Class 1E KF style 1328D72A03 or 1328D72A04, as appropriate.
Notified R1DO (Bickett), R2DO (Lopez), R3DO (Peterson), R4DO (Azua) and Part 21 Group (via email). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 52239 | Facility: COMANCHE PEAK
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN ALEXANDER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 09/13/2016
Notification Time: 22:28 [ET]
Event Date: 09/13/2016
Event Time: 17:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 11/17/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
RAY AZUA (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text UNANALYZED CONDITION INVOLVING STATION SERVICE WATER TRAINS
"Based on a walk down in the Service Water Intake Structure (SWIS) with the NRC Resident [Inspector], it was observed that a vertical section of 4 inch Fire Protection pipe that provides a normally pressurized source of fire water supply to the overhead sprinkler system in the SWIS is not Moderate Energy Line Break (MELB) shielded similar to the horizontal segment of the same line near the ceiling. In the event of a MELB crack along any portion of the unshielded pipe, the MELB has a potential impact to the function of any one of the 4 Service Water pumps. Only one train at a time would be affected during the event. This is due to the physical characteristics of the postulated MELB and the configuration/separation relative to the source line and target pumps and/or associated Motor Control Centers (MCCs) that support pump operation.
"Since the Service Water trains have been periodically declared inoperable at various times in the last three years for surveillance testing or maintenance, if the MELB were to have occurred during these times and affected the opposite train, then two Service Water trains could have been inoperable and this represents an unanalyzed condition. At the time of discovery, all four Service Water trains were operable, therefore, this condition is not reportable as a loss of safety function per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(vi).
"Currently, Service Water Train B on each Unit has been declared inoperable per Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.8. This condition will be corrected within the 72-hour Completion Time of TS 3.7.8.
"Currently, Emergency Diesel Generator B on each Unit has been declared inoperable per Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1. This condition will be corrected within the 72-hour Completion Time of TS 3.8.1.
"The NRC Resident Inspector was informed."
* * * UPDATE ON 10/6/2016 AT 2009 EDT FROM DAMON SCHROEDER TO DONG PARK * * *
"This is an update to Event Number 52239. On September 13, 2016 at 2228 EDT, Comanche Peak reported an unanalyzed condition involving station service water trains per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Specifically, the reported condition involved a vertical section of 4 inch Fire Protection pipe in the SWIS that was not adequately shielded for a Moderate Energy Line Break (MELB). In the event of a MELB crack along any portion of the unshielded pipe, the MELB had a potential impact to the function of any one of the 4 Service Water pumps.
"On October 6, 2016 at 1410 hours CDT, a section of eyewash station pipe in the Unit 2 Safeguards Building was identified as a result of extent of condition walkdowns that was not adequately shielded for a Moderate Energy Line Break (MELB). In the event of a MELB crack along any portion of this unshielded pipe, the MELB had the potential to impact Unit 2 Train B 480V Motor Control Center (MCC) 2EB2-1. This MCC provides power to Unit 2 Train B Emergency Core Cooling, Battery Charger, Containment Spray, and Containment Isolation Valve equipment. The affected eyewash station pipe was isolated shortly after it was discovered to not be adequately shielded for a MELB.
"Since 480V MCC 2EB1-1 and the Unit 2 Train A Emergency Core Cooling, Battery Charger, Containment Spray, and Containment Isolation Valve equipment trains have been periodically declared inoperable at various times in the last three years for surveillance testing or maintenance, if the MELB were to have occurred during these times and affected the opposite train, then 2EB1-1, 2EB2-1 and both trains of the Unit 2 Emergency Core Cooling, Battery Charger, Containment Spray, and Containment Isolation Valve equipment could have been inoperable and this represents an unanalyzed condition. At the time of discovery, 2EB1-1 and the Unit 2 Train A Emergency Core Cooling, Battery Charger, Containment Spray, and Containment Isolation Valve equipment was operable. Therefore, this condition is not reportable as a loss of safety function per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(vi).
"The NRC Resident Inspector was informed."
Notified R4DO (Werner).
* * * UPDATE FROM ROBERT DANIELS TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 2233 EDT ON 10/10/2016 * * *
"This is an additional update to Event Number 52239. On September 13, 2016 at 2228 EDT and again on October 6, 2016 at 2009 EDT, Comanche Peak reported unanalyzed conditions involving Station Service Water System trains and a 480V Motor Control Center (MCC) per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). The reported conditions involved sections of piping that were not adequately shielded for a Moderate Energy Line Break (MELB). In the event of a MELB crack along any portion of the unshielded piping, the MELB had a potential impact to the function of safety-related equipment in the Service Water Intake Structure and the Unit 2 Safeguards Building.
"On October 10, 2016 at 1708 CDT, as a result of ongoing extent of condition walkdowns, a section of fire protection pipe in the Unit 1 Safeguards Building was identified that was not adequately shielded for a MELB. In the event of a MELB crack along any portion of this unshielded pipe, the MELB had the potential to impact Unit 1 Train B Switchgear 1EA2, Unit 1 Train B 480V MCC 1EB4-2, and Unit 1 Train B Distribution Panel 1ED2-2. Only one of these power supplies at a time would be affected. 1EA2 provides 6.9KV electrical power to various Unit 1 Train B safety-related pumps, panels, sequencer, and transformers. 1EB4-2 provides 480V electrical power to various Unit 1 Train B safety-related pumps, valves, fans, panels, and transformers. 1ED2-2 provides 125VDC electrical power to EDG 1-02 channel 1 starting circuit. The affected fire protection pipe was isolated shortly after it was discovered to not be adequately shielded for a MELB.
"Since Unit 1 Train A Switchgear 1EA1, Unit 1 Train A 480V MCC 1EB3-2, and Unit 1 Train A Distribution Panel 1ED1-2 have been periodically declared inoperable at various times in the last three years for surveillance testing or maintenance, if the MELB were to have occurred during these times and affected the opposite train, then both trains of Unit 1 6.9KV power (1EA2 and 1EA1), both trains of Unit 1 480V power (1EB4-2 and 1EB3-2), and both trains of Unit 1 125VDC power (1ED2-2 and 1ED1-2) along with the safety-related equipment they supply could potentially have been inoperable and this represents an unanalyzed condition per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). At the time of discovery, none of the affected Train A equipment was inoperable. Therefore, this condition is not reportable as a loss of safety function per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v).
"The NRC Resident Inspector was informed."
Notified R4DO (Werner).
* * * UPDATE FROM HUNTER SCHILL TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1457 EST ON 11/7/2016 * * *
"This is an update to Event Number 52239. On November 17, 2016 at 0730 CST, during ongoing extent of condition walkdowns in the Boric Acid Transfer Pump Area of the Auxiliary Building, two pressurized fire protection pipe segments were identified that did not contain Moderate Energy Line Break (MELB) shielding. In the event of a MELB crack along the unshielded portion of these pipes, the MELB had the potential to impact Unit 1 Train B 480V Motor Control Center (MCC) 1 EB4-1. This MCC provides 480V electrical power to various Unit 1 Train B safety-related pumps, valves, fans, battery chargers, and transformers.
"At 0743 CST, Technical Specification 3.8.9 Condition A was entered for one AC electrical power distribution subsystem inoperable. At 1021 CST, MCC 1 EB4-1 was declared Operable after MELB shielding was installed on the affected fire protection lines.
"Since Unit 1 Train A 480V MCC 1 EB3-1 and the associated Unit 1 Train A safety-related pumps, valves, fans, battery chargers, and transformers have been periodically declared inoperable at various times in the last three years for surveillance testing or maintenance, given the MELB condition, 1 EB4-1, 1 EB3-1 and both trains of the Unit 1 safety-related pumps, valves, fans, battery chargers, and transformers they supply could have been inoperable and this represents an unanalyzed condition. At the time of discovery, 1 EB3-1 and the associated Unit 1 Train A safety-related pumps, valves, fans, battery chargers, and transformers were operable. Therefore, this condition is not reportable as a loss of safety function per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v).
"The NRC Resident Inspector was informed."
Notified R4DO (Azua). |
| Fuel Cycle Facility | Event Number: 52358 | Facility: NUCLEAR FUEL SERVICES INC.
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: HEU CONVERSION & SCRAP RECOVERY
NAVAL REACTOR FUEL CYCLE
LEU SCRAP RECOVERY
Region: 2
City: ERWIN State: TN
County: UNICOI
License #: SNM-124
Agreement: Y
Docket: 07000143
NRC Notified By: RON RICE
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 11/09/2016
Notification Time: 17:42 [ET]
Event Date: 11/09/2016
Event Time: 11:15 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/09/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
70.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
| Person (Organization):
STEVE ROSE (R2DO)
FUELS GROUP (EMAI)
| Event Text INSUFFICIENT ALARM AUDIBILITY
"On November 9, 2016, at approximately 1115 hours (EST), the speaker system in Buildings 302, 303, and 306 West was identified as non-operational while performing a functional test of the system. This speaker system is designed to annunciate alarms generated from the Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) required by 10CFR70.24, alarms generated from the Fire Alarm Control Panel and Public Address System announcements. Additional functional testing identified that no redundant speakers could adequately provide speaker coverage for all affected areas of these buildings. Special Nuclear Material (SNM) is processed, handled, or stored within the areas where the speaker system failed; these areas require evacuation in the unlikely event of a nuclear criticality accident as described in the NFS Emergency Plan.
"There were no actual radiological or other nuclear safety consequences. The potential consequence was that in the event of a nuclear criticality accident, evacuation could have been delayed for those personnel within these areas with a resultant increase of postulated doses. Additionally, awareness of a fire event could have been delayed for these same personnel. A series of compensatory actions were taken including implementing a plant-wide stop-movement of SNM, limiting access to the affected areas to essential personnel, and establishing radio communications between the personnel in these areas and the personnel continuously monitoring the alarm station panel.
"On November 9, 2016, at approximately 1725 hours (EST), full compliance was restored by repairing a damaged cable and by successfully performing a speaker system test in the affected areas.
"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector on November 9, 2016."
NFS Event Number: 55579 |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 52360 | Rep Org: GEORGIA RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL PGM
Licensee: THERAGENICS CORPORATION
Region: 1
City: BUFORD State: GA
County:
License #: UNKNOWN
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MONICA JOHNSON
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 11/10/2016
Notification Time: 10:33 [ET]
Event Date: 10/12/2016
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/10/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
RAY MCKINLEY (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (INES)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POTENTIAL OVEREXPOSURE
The following information was excerpted from a report received from the State of Georgia via email:
"On Wednesday, November 9th, it was reported to the Department [Georgia Radioactive Materials Program] by Theragenics Corporation in Buford, GA that an employee's dosimetry report indicated that she had exceeded the annual whole body dose limit of 5000 mRem. An investigation has been conducted by the employer and no possible explanation has been found as of yet. Our office has an ongoing investigation and further details will be provided as we receive them.
"[The licensee reports receiving] notification from their dosimetry processor, on October 12, an individual received a whole body dose of 5,215 mRem. [The licensee] spent the last month trying to recreate a situation that could have exposed this worker to a dose of this magnitude and can't make it happen. According to discussions, with the worker, she never left her dosimetry in a lab where it could have been exposed to an unshielded source of radiation. According to her supervisor, team leads in the lab in which she worked, and HP [Health Physics], she is a very good radiation worker and, there is never anything out of the normal at her work station.
"[The worker] did take her whole body dosimeter and both finger rings home with her one evening. Even more baffling is her ring dose is less than 200 mRem. [The licensee has] tried to recreate that scenario of taking the dosimeters home as well and have not had a dosimeter come back from processing that is above its minimal level of detection.
"It is [licensee's] interpretation of [the CFR,] Reportable Events, that this report of an overexposure is due to [the State of Georgia] 30 days after notification, or Friday, 11/11/16. [The licensee is] waiting on additional information [from the dosimetry processor] prior to report submittal." |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 52361 | Rep Org: OK DEQ RAD MANAGEMENT
Licensee: BUILDING AND EARTH SCIENCES
Region: 4
City: TULSA State: OK
County:
License #: OK-31032-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KEVIN SAMPSON
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 11/10/2016
Notification Time: 15:30 [ET]
Event Date: 11/10/2016
Event Time: 14:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/10/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
VIVIAN CAMPBELL (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFICA (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
The following report was received via e-mail:
"Building and Earth Sciences had a Troxler Model 3430 portable gauge run over by construction equipment at a temporary job site in Tulsa, OK. The source rod has been retracted and the sources are shielded. A leak test has been collected and will be counted as soon as possible. The gauge will be returned to Troxler for repair or disposal." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 52368 | Facility: QUAD CITIES
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: TOM DALE
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA | Notification Date: 11/16/2016
Notification Time: 14:32 [ET]
Event Date: 11/16/2016
Event Time: 10:10 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/16/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
HIRONORI PETERSON (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text INADVERTENT ACTIVATION OF EMERGENCY SIRENS AND NEWS RELEASE DURING EMERGENCY PLANNING EXERCISE
"On November 16, 2016 at approximately 1010 CST, a local government agency (Whiteside County, Illinois) inadvertently activated emergency response sirens for less than one minute. The inadvertent actuation occurred during the scheduled Quad Cities Station emergency planning graded exercise while local government agencies were participating.
"A related news release and radio message was subsequently issued by Whiteside County to report that Whiteside County was participating in a drill in coordination with the Quad Cities Exelon Generating Station that the emergency response sirens were inadvertently activated, and that there is no emergency at this time and no action is required.
"There was no impact to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event as the offsite response capabilities remain functional. The site is operating normally with no emergency conditions present.
"This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), as an inadvertent activation of emergency response sirens and news release.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 52369 | Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MANU SIVARAMAN
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE | Notification Date: 11/16/2016
Notification Time: 17:13 [ET]
Event Date: 11/16/2016
Event Time: 10:45 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/16/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
BRICE BICKETT (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text FAILURE OF UNIT 2 B ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM BUS SYNC SELECTOR SWITCH
"On November 16, 2016 at 1045 [EST], Unit 2 B ESS [Engineered Safeguards System] Bus Sync Selector switch failed and was unable to be switched out of the ON position. The failure rendered all other sync selector switches associated with Emergency Diesel Generators and Off-Site supplies to the ESS buses unable to fulfill their intended function of allowing manual transfer between power supplies to the ESS buses. This resulted in the inability of Unit 1 and Unit 2 to comply with SR [Surveillance Requirements] 3.8.1.8 and 3.8.1.16 thus requiring declaration of Operating AC Sources inoperable. This condition could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of systems required to maintain the reactor in a safe shutdown condition, remove residual heat, control the release of radioactive material, and mitigate the consequences of an accident. Subsequent actions were taken in accordance with station procedures to remove fuses for the affected sync circuit, restoring the manual transfer function to all but the Unit 2 B ESS bus. One Emergency Diesel and one offsite source remain inoperable with the fuses removed.
"At no time were any ESS buses disconnected from offsite power. All ESS buses remained capable of being automatically energized from their respective emergency diesel in an emergency."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 52370 | Facility: DRESDEN
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [ ] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: RICK GALLAGHER
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE | Notification Date: 11/16/2016
Notification Time: 18:22 [ET]
Event Date: 11/16/2016
Event Time: 11:05 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/17/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
HIRONORI PETERSON (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 3 | N | Y | 0 | Startup | 0 | Startup | Event Text TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER VENTILATION SYSTEM INOPERABLE
"At 1105 CST on Wednesday, November 16th, 2016, the Dresden Nuclear Power Station (DNPS) Technical Support Center (TSC) Emergency Ventilation System was emergently declared inoperable due to an unplanned loss of the pneumatic air supply compressor. The loss of the air compressor resulted in the emergency air filtration unit flow control damper failing to the full open position. In this condition, the emergency air filtration unit could exceed the max flow rate of 1100 SCFM and the max differential pressure of 6 inches H2O at rated flow rate resulting in degraded performance. This results in a potential loss of protective action function provided by the emergency ventilation filtration system and could impede the ability to perform Emergency Assessments should a radiological emergency event occur requiring the system to be in service.
"Actions are being taken to repair the pneumatic air system to restore functionality of the TSC ventilation system. In the interim, contingency actions are being developed to manually control the emergency air filtration unit flow control damper in a degraded condition. In the event that ventilation cannot be restored, Station Procedures provide guidance to relocate the TSC to an alternate facility. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), 'Any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability (e.g., significant portion of control room indication, Emergency Notification System, or offsite notification system).'"
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM ADAM SCHUERMAN TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 0812 EST ON 11/17/16 * * *
The pneumatic air supply compressor has been repaired and tested satisfactorily. The Technical Support Center is now considered operable.
The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R3DO (Peterson). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 52371 | Facility: WOLF CREEK
Region: 4 State: KS
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BRET DAVIS
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE | Notification Date: 11/16/2016
Notification Time: 23:39 [ET]
Event Date: 11/16/2016
Event Time: 21:09 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/17/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
RAY AZUA (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown | Event Text EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR STARTED ON VALID UNDERVOLTAGE SIGNAL
"While in Mode 5, power from the switchyard east bus was lost. AC Emergency Bus NB01 is fed from east or west buses through [breakers] 345-80 or 345-90. Both breakers tripped. The 'A' train emergency diesel generator started on the undervoltage signal and powered NB01. All other systems functioned normally including the Shutdown Sequencer. Shutdown cooling was being provided by train 'B' RHR [residual heat removal] and was uninterrupted.
"Initial reports are that the #6 transformer brought in an air/gas trouble alarm.
"The plant is still in Mode 5. The 'A' emergency diesel generator is supplying power to NB01. The switchyard west bus and NB02 remain stable. Transmission reports that the grid is stable.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 52374 | Facility: FARLEY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: CHUCK BAREFIELD
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 11/17/2016
Notification Time: 20:51 [ET]
Event Date: 11/17/2016
Event Time: 18:59 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/17/2016 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
| Person (Organization):
OMAR LOPEZ (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 99 | Power Operation | 93 | Power Operation | Event Text TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN INITIATED
"At 1859 CST on November 17, 2016, Farley Nuclear Plant Unit 1 initiated a shutdown from approximately 99 percent reactor power. The shutdown was initiated per Technical Specification LCO 3.0.3. This LCO entry was based on having no operable steam flow channels on the C loop for Farley Nuclear Plant Unit 1.
"Unit 2 as not affected.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." | |