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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
01/07/2016 - 01/08/2016
** EVENT NUMBERS **
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| Part 21 |
Event Number: 48591 |
Rep Org: SHAW/AREVA MOX SERVICES, LLC
Licensee: FLANDERS CSC
Region: 1
City: AIKEN State: SC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DOUG YATES
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN |
Notification Date: 12/14/2012
Notification Time: 09:18 [ET]
Event Date: 10/18/2012
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/07/2016 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE |
Person (Organization):
ALAN BLAMEY (R2DO)
PART 21 MATERIALS (EMAI) |
Event Text
PART 21 REPORT INVOLVING NONCONFORMING WELDS ON A PELLET HANDLING TRANSFER GLOVE BOX
The following information was provided by Shaw/AREVA via fax:
(i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission.
"Kelly D. Trice
President and Chief Operating Officer
Shaw AREVA MOX Services
Savannah River Site
P.O. Box 7097
Aiken, SC 29804-7097
(ii) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility which fails to comply or contains a defect.
"The Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility is addressing nonconforming welds and a weld process associated with the procurement of a pellet handling transfer glove box PML*GB100C.
(iii) Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.
"The pellet handling glove box is being supplied to MOX Services as a basic component by Flanders CSC.
(iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.
"PML*GB100C has a total of 32 welds that will need repair which will require adding additional fillet welds on top of the current weld such that the weld is large enough to satisfy structural requirements. Each weld will have to have at least a 3mm fillet weld added. Adding these additional welds will most likely have to be applied in two or three weld passes per location to create the needed weld dimension.
"The boss was attached to the glove box using a fillet weld on top (Outer) and a single bevel weld on the inside. This does not allow for complete joint penetration between the fillet and bevel welds resulting in a weld with incomplete fusion. weakening the joint significantly and creating the possibility for high stress concentration areas in the weld joint.
"Furthermore, using the GMAW (Gas Metal Arc Welding) short circuit arc process in this joint design produces a joint that cannot be counted on to carry load. When the GMAW short circuit arc weld process is used on material of ¬" or less in thickness, it allows for adequate heat to be transferred into the material to provide proper fusion of the filler material into the base material. When using the GMAW short circuit arc weld process on material over ¬", the mass of the base material results in a heat sink that is too large for the process to adequately fuse the filler material with the base material creating a weld that looks acceptable but could fail under small loads. In the PML boxes, these bosses support internal equipment and also support the glove box itself. Under this condition during a seismic event, the bosses could break away from the glove box shell breaking the confinement boundary as well as the flanges on each end, possibly causing the box to fall which could affect its static confinement barrier safety function. An additional seventeen glove boxes previously received are being reviewed for similar issues.
(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.
"The deviation was identified in a non-conformance report on October 18, 2012.
(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply. the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for, being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured, or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part.
"MOX Services does not possess information as to whether other facilities have been supplied a similar basic component by Flanders CSC.
(vii) The corrective action. which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action.
"Non-Conformance Report NCR 12-4583 will disposition the repairs associated with Flanders glove box PML* GB100C. MOX Services will ensure repairs are performed by either the vendor, MOX Services or a third party. These repairs will be performed in support of the construction schedule.
(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees.
"None.
(ix) In the case of an early site permit, the entities to whom an early site permit was transferred.
"This is not an early site permit concern."
* * * UPDATE ON 1/7/16 AT 0921 EST FROM DOUG YATES TO DONG PARK * * *
The following information was provided by CB&I AREVA MOX Services via fax:
(i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission.
"David Del Vecchio
President and Project Manager
CB&I AREVA MOX Services
Savannah River Site
P.O. Box 7097
Aiken, SC 29804-7097
(ii) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility which fails to comply or contains a defect.
"The Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility is addressing the discovery of foreign liquid within the structural tube steel frames of ball milling gloveboxes NBX*GB1000 and NBY*GB1000.
(iii) Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.
"Ball milling gloveboxes NBX*GB1000 and NBY*GB1000 were being supplied to MOX Services as a basic component by Flanders CSC.
(iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.
"Ball milling gloveboxes NBX*GB1000 and NBY*GB1000 were two of the seventeen additional gloveboxes that were identified in a December 14, 2012 Part 21 Report issued by MOX Services due to use of an incorrect welding process (Gas Metal Arc Welding) for certain welded connections during glovebox fabrication.
"During weld repairs associated with the earlier Part 21 report, MOX Services' third party vendor discovered foreign liquid trapped within a portion of the tube steel frames of the NBX and NBY gloveboxes. The foreign liquid and dried substances (remnants of the original fabrication processes) were determined to contain contaminates not allowed to be present during welding operations. Due to the presence of contaminants potentially in the vicinity of most of the structural weld heat affected zones, MOX Engineering determined it necessary to metallurgically examine, through additional sampling, some of these welds in order to obtain reasonable assurance the welds can perform their design function. However, MOX Services has concluded that removal of these welds as part of the sampling process would damage the structure of these GBs beyond practical repair. Therefore the decision was made to rebuild these gloveboxes rather than sample the welds to determine their adequacy.
"Although the NBX and NBY gloveboxes were part of the earlier 2012 Part 21 report, they are being reported as a defect herein because of the indeterminate nature of the glovebox welds and associated potential degradation of the gloveboxes confinement function. This functional degradation would not result from use of an improper weld process as identified in the earlier report but instead would result from the lack of maintaining cleanliness controls during fabrication.
(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.
"Information related to the foreign liquid sampling was provided to MOX Services on November 12, 2015.
(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for, being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured, or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part.
"MOX Services does not possess information as to whether other facilities have been supplied a similar basic component by Flanders CSC.
(vii) The corrective action, which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action.
"It is anticipated that ball milling gloveboxes NBX*GB1000 and NBY*GB1000 will be rebuilt rather than continuing with repairs by MOX Services' third party vendor. MOX Services anticipates that rebuild of the NBX and NBY glove boxes will be completed during fiscal year 2018.
(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees.
"None at this time.
(ix) In the case of an early site permit, the entities to whom an early site permit was transferred.
"Not applicable."
Notified R2DO (Masters) and Part 21 Group via Email. |
| !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 51584 |
Facility: BEAVER VALLEY
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: SAMANTHA BALDWIN
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ |
Notification Date: 12/04/2015
Notification Time: 01:33 [ET]
Event Date: 12/03/2015
Event Time: 21:07 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/07/2016 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION |
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM COOK (R1DO) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
| 2 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
EXCESSIVE CONTROL ROOM IN-LEAKAGE IDENTIFIED
"On December 3, 2015 at 2107 [EST], the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) was declared inoperable due to a higher than allowed identified in-leakage rate for the Control Room Envelope (CRE) when in the Normal Operating Mode. Both Unit 1 & Unit 2 remain at 100 percent power and they share a common CRE.
"At the time of discovery, there is a reasonable expectation this condition could prevent the fulfillment of the safety function of a system that is required to mitigate the consequences of an accident, thus satisfying the reporting criteria for 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).
"Actions to implement mitigating actions were immediately initiated in accordance with Technical Specification 3.7.10. CREVS has been placed in Recirculation Ventilation Mode, isolating the control room from outside air.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of the condition."
* * * RETRACTION ON 1/7/16 AT 1110 EST FROM SHAWN SNOOK TO DONG PARK * * *
"Following the 8-hour 10CFR50.72 notification made on 12/4/2015 (EN 51584) regarding the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) inoperability, an engineering evaluation determined inleakage did not exceed limits described in the Beaver Valley licensing basis. Therefore, the degraded Control Room Emergency Ventilation System remained Operable with the identified air inleakage as determined by the Control Room
Envelope Habitability Program. As such, the safety function was never lost and the event notification is being retracted as it is not reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). FENOC is planning to repair the degraded components of the system.
"The NRC Resident [Inspector] has been notified." Notified R1DO (Dimitriadis). |
| Agreement State |
Event Number: 51629 |
Rep Org: PA BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: PENNSY SUPPLY, INC.
Region: 1
City: HARRISBURG State: PA
County:
License #: PA-1252
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOSEPH MEINIC
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER |
Notification Date: 12/31/2015
Notification Time: 10:34 [ET]
Event Date: 12/22/2015
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/31/2015 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE |
Person (Organization):
RAY MCKINLEY (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI) |
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material. |
Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RECOVERED TROXLER DENSITY GAUGE REPORTED STOLEN IN 1998
The following report was received from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania via facsimile:
"On December 22, 2015, the Department [PA Department of Radiation Protection] was notified by Troxler Electronic Laboratories Inc. that a nuclear density gauge was found at a facility in York, Pennsylvania. [The gauge] was initially reportable per 10 CFR 20.2201 (a)(1)(ii) [EN #34669 - dated 8/27/1998].
"On August 21, 1998, McMinn's Asphalt Co., Inc., NRC License No. 37-19659-01, reported that a Troxler density gauge was stolen from their storage area in Petersburg, PA. Local law enforcement was notified, as well as the NRC (NMED Item Number 980902). Seventeen years later, on December 22, 2015, Zech's Towing from York, Pennsylvania called Troxler informing them that while cleaning out a storage shed a gauge was found. Troxler's RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] called the Department and a follow-up call was made to NRC Region 1. It was learned that McMinn's license was purchased by Pennsy Supply, Inc. (NRC License No. 23-2729496) on March 11, 2008. Pennsy Supply currently has an active Pennsylvania license, PA-1252.
Gauge information:
"Radionuclide: Cs-137
Manufacturer: Troxler
Model: 4640-B
Serial Number: 1112
Activity: 8.0 mCi (measure date 10/10/1991)
"Two PA [Department] inspectors performed a reactive inspection on December 23, 2015, verifying the details of the gauge. All indications are that the gauge has been isolated in storage since close to the time it was reported stolen. Pennsy Supply took possession of the gauge and will add it to their Pennsylvania license."
Pennsylvania Event Report ID No: PA 150038
Previous NRC EN #34669, dated 8/27/1998.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 51639 |
Facility: COMANCHE PEAK
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JAY LLOYD
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON |
Notification Date: 01/07/2016
Notification Time: 14:16 [ET]
Event Date: 01/07/2016
Event Time: 07:59 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/07/2016 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE |
Person (Organization):
VIVIAN CAMPBELL (R4DO) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
| 2 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
LOSS OF BOTH METEOROLOGICAL TOWERS DUE TO POWER SYSTEM FAILURE
"At 0759 CST on 01/07/2016, a partial loss of the 25kV Plant Support Power Distribution System caused an unplanned loss of both primary and backup meteorological towers at Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant. Loss of both meteorological towers constitutes a major loss of emergency assessment capabilities in regard to meteorological conditions. During the power loss, the National Weather Service was available to compensate for the on-site data loss. The 25kV system and both meteorological towers were restored at 0923 CST on 01/07/2016.
"The 25kV Plant Support Power Distribution System feeds non-safety related equipment and does not affect plant operation, with the exception already described. The fault occurred due to an aged stress cone and faulty lightning arrestor. The fault was isolated and power was restored."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 51642 |
Facility: PRAIRIE ISLAND
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: TOM HOLT
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH |
Notification Date: 01/08/2016
Notification Time: 00:03 [ET]
Event Date: 01/07/2016
Event Time: 19:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/08/2016 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION |
Person (Organization):
KARLA STOEDTER (R3DO) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
| 2 |
N |
N |
0 |
Hot Standby |
0 |
Hot Standby |
Event Text
UNANALYZED CONDITION - APPENDIX R CREDITED PROCEDURES NOT IN PLACE
"Prairie Island's Appendix R calculations credit a procedurally established repair instruction to the Train B Pressurizer Vent valves for a postulated fire in Fire Area 59 (Unit 1) and Fire Area 74 (Unit 2) to obtain Mode 5 during a postulated fire in the affected areas. At 1900 [CST] on 1/7/2016, during a review of corrective actions associated with Prairie Islands NFPA 805 transition, it was identified that the required procedures are not in place to make the analyzed repairs.
"It has been determined that this condition is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.
"As compensatory measures, hourly fire watches are in place in the affected areas of the Auxiliary Building. The operating crew and Fire Brigade have been briefed on the impact of a fire in the affected area. This brief will continue to future operating shifts via a standing instruction. Fire detection equipment for the affected zones has been protected to ensure availability and operating crews are walking down the affected areas to verify any required transient combustibles in the affected areas are controlled in accordance with plant procedure. These compensatory measures, in addition to automatic fire detection and suppression capability in these fire areas, ensure protection of the potentially affected equipment until corrective actions can be completed.
"This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or station employees.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." |
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