| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
09/15/2015 - 09/16/2015 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Non-Agreement State | Event Number: 51376 | Rep Org: KAKIVIK ASSET MANAGEMENT, LLC
Licensee: KAKIVIK ASSET MANAGEMENT, LLC
Region: 4
City: ANCHORAGE State: AK
County:
License #: 50-27667-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: PATTON PETTIJOHN
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 09/08/2015
Notification Time: 16:41 [ET]
Event Date: 09/07/2015
Event Time: 12:05 [YDT]
Last Update Date: 09/08/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
| Person (Organization):
JAMES DRAKE (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
| Event Text FAILURE OF CAMERA SOURCE LOCK SLIDE TO LOCK
The following event occurred at the Kuparuk Oil Field on the North Slope of Alaska: After performing a routine exposure with a QSA model 880D camera containing a 65.8 curie Iridium-192 source, the source was cranked back into the camera. The radiographer noted that the lock slide did not lock the source as it should have. While using a survey meter, the radiographer then approached the camera. After noting that the source was fully shielded, the radiographer was able to manually lock the slide into the locked position. Supervision was then called. The camera was taken out-of-service. The camera locking mechanism was cleaned and tested. After determining that the locking mechanism was operating properly, the camera was returned to service. |
| Non-Agreement State | Event Number: 51377 | Rep Org: UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME
Licensee: UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME
Region: 3
City: NOTRE DAME State: IN
County:
License #: 13-01983-15
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ANDREW WELDING
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 09/08/2015
Notification Time: 16:52 [ET]
Event Date: 09/08/2015
Event Time: 09:35 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/09/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
| Person (Organization):
PATTY PELKE (R3DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
| Event Text LEAKING NI-63 SOURCE
While preparing a Varian Ni-63 source for shipment, the Radiation Safety Specialist was performing wipes for a leak test. After multiple attempts, the leak test kept returning the same results, which were 0.012 milliCi and the limit is 0.005 milliCi. The source is part of a Hewlett-Packard gas chromatograph, model number 0201972-00. The source is a Varian Ni-63 15 milliCi source with a current activity of 14.1 milliCi. The source serial number is A-15296. The source has been wrapped and stored in a sealed bag and placed in the facilities waste building.
* * * UPDATE ON 9/9/15 AT 0823 EDT FROM ANDREW WELDING TO DONG PARK * * *
The leak test results were 0.012 microCi and the limit is 0.005 microCi; not 0.012 milliCi and 0.005 milliCi.
Notified the R3DO (Pelke) and NMSS Events Resource via e-mail. |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 51378 | Rep Org: UTAH DIVISION OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Region: 4
City: SALT LAKE CITY State: UT
County:
License #: UT 1800131
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: PHILIP GRIFFIN
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD | Notification Date: 09/08/2015
Notification Time: 17:59 [ET]
Event Date: 09/04/2015
Event Time: 14:45 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 09/14/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
JAMES DRAKE (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED PORTABLE DENSITY GUAGE
The following information was received via facsimile:
"The RSO of the Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT), called [the State of Utah, Department of Environmental Quality, Division of Waste Management and Radiation Control] to report an incident involving one of their thin lift, Troxler 4640 gauges containing a 9 mCi Cs-137 source. The incident occurred at about 1400 MDT on Friday, September 4, 2015, at a construction site on eastbound I-215 at Redwood Road. A survey vehicle entered the construction zone at freeway speeds and ran over the gauge while the operator was making a measurement. The gauge was 'destroyed,' but the sealed source remained intact. However, the gauge's shielding for the source was demolished.
"The licensee performed surveys of the accident site and of the vehicle involved. No contamination was found. The licensee transported the damaged gauge and source back to the licensee's gauge storage room. The licensee has ordered a replacement base for the gauge to provide shielding for the source so that the source can be safely shipped back to the gauge manufacturer.
"The licensee has a report from the gauge operator, reports from eyewitnesses to the incident, and a report from the Highway Patrol. It will take the licensee about a week to compile all of the information into a written report to send to the Division [of Waste Management and Radiation Control]."
Utah Event Report ID No.: UT150004
* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY PHILIP GRIFFIN TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1347 EDT ON 09/14/2015 * * *
The following information was provided by the State of Utah via email:
The event took place at 1445 MDT on September 4, 2015 versus 1400 initially reported. The gauge contains 8 mCi Cs-137 versus the 9 mCi that was originally reported and the gauge serial number is 65867. A black 4 door car entered the construction zone and ran over the gauge followed by two other vehicles. The manufactured is sending an appropriate shipping container for the licensee to use when returning the source to the manufacturer.
"The licensee is authorized to remove portable gauge source rods from their gauges to perform non-routine maintenance on their gauges. Because of this, the licensee has a source rod shield that will be used (per the manufacturer's instructions) to shield the source rod taken from the damaged gauge during transport to the manufacturer."
Notified R4DO (Farnholtz) and NMSS Events Notification group via email. |
| Part 21 | Event Number: 51394 | Rep Org: EMERSON PROCESS MANAGEMENT
Licensee: EMERSON PROCESS MANAGEMENT
Region: 3
City: MARSHALLTOWN State: IA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: GEORGE BAILINGER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 09/15/2015
Notification Time: 07:12 [ET]
Event Date: 07/16/2015
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/15/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(a)(2) - INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION
| Person (Organization):
SILAS KENNEDY (R1DO)
BINOY DESAI (R2DO)
KENNETH RIEMER (R3DO)
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI)
| Event Text INTERIM PART 21 REPORT - ACTUATOR FAIL MODE DEVIATION AND POTENTIAL NON-CONSERVATIVE ACTUATOR SIZING
The following information was received via fax:
"Pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21(a)(2), Fisher Controls International LLC ('Fisher') is providing required written interim notification of a deviation or failure to comply in product shipped to the Krsko Nuclear Station ('Krsko') located in Slovenia.
On July 16, 2015, Fisher became aware of an issue with an actuator fail mode for an 8 [inch] 2052- Control Disc valve, Serial Number 19443837. The affected valve was supplied in a 'Fail Closed' configuration rather than the desired 'Fail Open' configuration. Fisher has corrected the configuration and retested the affected valve at the Krsko site. Krsko has since accepted the valve for installation.
"During the investigation, it was also noted there was an increase in one of the sizing factors for the valve that may have led to a non-conservative actuator sizing for this and other valves provided to this Krsko site. Fisher is currently performing an extent-of-condition review of safety-related rotary orders in order to confirm that correct orientations and actuator sizing were provided. Any identified deficiencies will be reported per the requirements of 10 CFR21.21(b). This review is expected to be completed by October 23, 2015. Additionally, all current safety related rotary orders in-house are being reviewed prior to shipment. This notice affects only rotary valves with Fisher factory mounted actuators.
Corrective Action CAR 1756 has been opened to document corrective actions taken to prevent reoccurrence.
Should there be any further questions concerning this matter, please contact Benjamin Ahrens, Manager, Quality by email at Benjamin.Ahrens@Emerson.com or via phone at 641-754-2249. |
| Part 21 | Event Number: 51395 | Rep Org: WESTINGHOUSE
Licensee: EATON CORPORATION
Region: 1
City: CRANBERRY TOWNSHIP State: PA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES A GRESHAM
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA | Notification Date: 09/15/2015
Notification Time: 09:14 [ET]
Event Date: 09/15/2015
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/15/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
| Person (Organization):
KENNETH RIEMER (R3DO)
PART 21/50.55 REACT (EMAI)
| Event Text PART 21 REPORT - POTENTIALLY AFFECTED COILS USED IN FREEDOM SIZE 1 AND SIZE 2 STARTERS AND CONTACTORS
The following information was excepted from a facsimile:
"The Basic component that contains the potential defect is manufactured by Eaton Corporation and commercially dedicated by Westinghouse. The coil (part number 9-3285-19) is used in Freedom Size 1 and Size 2 starters and contactors. Westinghouse has delivered potentially affected parts to the LaSalle generating station.
"These coils are to be manufactured using high temperature wire as dictated in the Westinghouse qualification program and per Eaton's manufacturing documentation. After the in-service failure at the plant, a sample was taken and subjected to Fourier Transform Infrared Spectroscopy to verify the correct wire was used during manufacturing. This analysis resulted in the finding that the coil windings were not manufactured using the required high temperature wire and were manufactured from a lower temperature class of wire that was not qualified for use in full voltage non-reversing (FVNR) applications. These coils are manufactured by Eaton at their Haina, Dominican Republic facility.
"The lower temperature wire is acceptable in full voltage reversing (FVR) applications, but not in FVNR applications as dictated by the Westinghouse qualification The safety concern is if these coils were used in redundant safety related applications and were to fail, that safety function may not be available. The failure is due to heat and would not likely occur simultaneously, but more likely would occur at random times. Due to the limited data available on these coil failures, the possibility of simultaneous failures cannot be eliminated.
"Forty-three potentially affected coils were delivered to LaSalle. Forty one were supplied as spare parts and were never installed in the plant. One coil was supplied and installed at the plant and failed after 6 weeks of service. An alarm was annunciated in the control room and the part was replaced. One additional coil was supplied and installed at the plant. This was removed from service and the coil was sent for testing. The coil in this starter was made from the correct material.
"Eaton has confirmed to Westinghouse that this issue may affect coils made between May 29, 2014 and November 3, 2014. Westinghouse has informed its customer and identified the potentially affected coils to them. The customer has identified the affected parts and has returned them to Westinghouse for replacement. Westinghouse has purchased a lot of new coils and sent samples to have the coil wire verified (destructive testing). Future deliveries will be supplied from these dedicated coils. There are currently no potentially affected parts in service."
For additional information, contact Mr. James A. Gresham, Regulatory Compliance, Westinghouse Electric Company, 1000 Westinghouse Drive, Suite 310, Cranberry Township, Pennsylvania 16066. Phone number: (412) 374-4643 |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 51397 | Facility: PALISADES
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: KRIS RUETZ
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 09/16/2015
Notification Time: 03:59 [ET]
Event Date: 09/16/2015
Event Time: 01:17 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/16/2015 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
KENNETH RIEMER (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | A/R | Y | 85 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO TURBINE TRIP
"At 0117 [EDT] on 9/16/2015 a reactor trip occurred (4-hr non-emergency). The plant was at approximately 85% power performing a coastdown in preparation for a refueling outage when a Digital Electro-Hydraulic (DEH) alarm was received in the control room. Shortly following receipt of the alarm the turbine tripped. This resulted in an RPS actuation and a reactor trip on Loss of Load. The crew entered EOP-1 Standard Post Trip Actions and completed all required actions. The crew subsequently entered EOP-2 Reactor Trip Recovery.
"All full-length control rods inserted fully. Auxiliary Feedwater System actuated in response to low steam generator water levels (8-hr non-emergency). Steam generator water levels are in progress of being returned to normal operating levels. No known primary to secondary leakage. Atmospheric Steam Dump Valves lifted after the trip and subsequently reseated.
"The plant is currently stable in Mode 3 at NOP/NOT being maintained by the Turbine Bypass Valve.
"Initial investigation into the cause of the turbine trip appears to be from a DEH power supply failure.
"The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of the reactor trip at 0139 on 9/16/2015." | |