| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
12/30/2014 - 12/31/2014 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Part 21 | Event Number: 50480 | Rep Org: QUALTECH NP
Licensee: QUALTECH NP
Region: 1
City: HUNTSVILLE State: AL
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JIM TUMLINSON
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 09/22/2014
Notification Time: 17:17 [ET]
Event Date: 09/22/2014
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 12/30/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
| Person (Organization):
MEL GRAY (R1DO)
MARVIN SYKES (R2DO)
NICK VALOS (R3DO)
JAMES DRAKE (R4DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)
| Event Text PART 21 NOTIFICATION - DISCREPANCY BETWEEN QUALIFICATION REPORT AND INSTALLATION INSTRUCTIONS
The following information was obtained from the vendor via facsimile:
"To whom it may concern:
"This letter is issued to provide notification of a documentation defect concerning QualTech NP Generation 3 Quick Disconnect Connectors (Gen 3 QDC). Specifically, there is a discrepancy concerning o-ring replacement between the 1/2 Inch Gen 3 QDC Qualification Report (EGS-TR-23009-14, through Revision B) and the Instructions for Installation (EGS-TR-23066-04, Revision Original), the 3/4 Inch Gen 3 QDC Qualification Report (EGS-TR-23067-01, Revision A) and the 1-1/2 Inch Gen 3 QDC Qualification Report (EGS-TR-23068-01, Revision A).
"Section 5.0 of the 1/2 Inch Qualification Report (EGS-TR-23009-14, through Revision B) states in part that 'whenever the connector is disconnected after one week or more installed service, the used o-ring must be discarded and a new o-ring installed prior to reconnection.' Contrary to this requirement, Section 9.0 of the Instructions for Installation (EGS-TR-23066-04, Revision Original) states in part that, 'whenever the QDC is disconnected after one week or more installed service, it is recommended that the o-ring be discarded and a new o-ring installed prior to reconnection. This action, while not mandatory, will maintain the o-ring seal in a superior condition' and Section 6.0 of both the 3/4 Inch Qualification Report (EGS-TR-23067-01, Revision A) and 1-1/2 Inch Qualification Report (EGS-TR-23068-01, Revision A) states in part that, 'whenever the connector is disconnected after one week or more, it is recommended that the used o-ring be discarded and a new o-ring installed prior to reconnection.'
"To prevent confusion and inconsistency between the 1/2 Inch Qualification Report (EGS-TR-23009-14), the 3/4 Inch Qualification Report (EGS-TR-23067-01), the 1-1/2 Inch Qualification Report (EGS-TR-23068-01) and the Instructions for Installation (EGS-TR-23066-04), the documents have been revised to require that the o-ring must be discarded and a new o-ring installed prior to reconnection. The new revision level of each document is as follows:
- EGS-TR-23067-01, Revision B - 3/4 Inch Qualification Report
- EGS-TR-23068-01, Revision B - 1-1/2 Inch Qualification Report
- EGS-TR-23066-04, Revision A - Instructions for Installation
"The revised Qualification Reports and the Instructions for Installation have been or will be distributed to all customers who have received 1/2 Inch, 3/4 Inch, and/or 1-1/2 Inch Gen 3 QDC connectors.
"Should any Gen 3 QDC connectors be currently installed in service, it is required that a determination be made as to whether or not the connector has been disconnected after one week of installed service and if the o-ring was replaced. If the o-ring was replaced, no further action is required. If the connector was disconnected and the o-ring was not replaced, the o-ring must be discarded and a new o-ring installed.
"QualTech NP will provide replacement o-rings, free of charge, to customers who identify replacement o-rings are required for Gen 3 QDC connectors that have been installed in service.
"As a point of interest, please note that this notification does not apply to the original EGS QDC connectors (Gen 1 QDC). QualTech/EGS QDC connectors certified to Qualification Reports PEI-TR-880701-04, Revision A (1/2 Inch Gen 1 QDC), EGS-TR-913601-01. Revision B (3/4 Inch Gen 1 QDC) and/or EGS-TR-913602-01, Revision B (1-1/2 Inch Gen 1 QDC) are not impacted by this notification as these Qualification Reports require the o-ring be discarded and replaced if the connector is disconnected after one week of installed service.
"If you require additional details or would like to discuss this further please contact the undersigned or Tony Gill (QualTech NP Quality Assurance Manager) at 256-924-7438 (office), 256-426-4558 (mobile) or tgill@curtisswright.com.
"Jim Tumlinson
Products Engineering Manager
QualTech NP, Huntsville Operations
Curtiss-Wright Corporation
256-924-7429 (office)
256-425-8037 (mobile)
jtumlinson@curtisswright.com"
* * * UPDATE ON 12/30/14 AT 1528 EST FROM JIM TUMLINSON TO DANIEL MILLS * * *
The following information was obtained from the vendor via facsimile:
"To whom it may concern:
"This letter provides for the formal close out of notification QTHuntsville 10 CFR 21-2014-05. The initial notification was made on September 22, 2014 . All corrective actions have been completed and revised documents have been provided to customers of Generation 3 Quick Disconnect Connectors (Gen 3 QDC) and 3/8 Inch QDC.
"The corrective actions include revision of the following documents to clarify O-ring replacement:
"EGS-TR-23067-01 - 3/4 Inch Qualification Report
EGS-TR-23068-01 - 1-1/2 Inch Qualification Report
EGS-TR-23066-04 - Instructions for Installation (Gen 3 QDC)
EGS-TR-23062-0002-01 - 3/8 Inch QDC Qualification Report
EGS-TR-23062-04 - 3/8 Inch QDC Generic Qualification Report
EGS-TR-23062-06 - Instructions for Installation (3/8 Inch QDC)
"The revised Qualification Reports and the Instructions for Installation have been distributed to all customers who have received 1/2 Inch, 3/4 Inch and/or 1-1/2 Inch Gen 3 QDC connectors as well as the customers for 3/8 Inch QDC connectors. Based on the above information and corrective actions, this Part 21 file is considered closed. If you would like to discuss this further, please contact the undersigned or Tony Gill (QualTech NP Quality Assurance Manager) at 256-924-7438 (office), 256-426-4558 (mobile) or tgill@curtisswright.com.
"Jim Tumlinson
Products Engineering Manager
QualTech NP, Huntsville Operations
Curtiss-Wright Corporation
256-924-7429 (office)
256-425-8037 (mobile)
jtumlinson@curtisswright.com"
Notified R1DO (Dimitriadis), R2DO (Hopper), R3DO (Cameron), R4DO (Hay), Part 21 Group (email) |
| !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 50662 | Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: STANLEY STONE
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA | Notification Date: 12/09/2014
Notification Time: 20:02 [ET]
Event Date: 12/09/2014
Event Time: 18:25 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/30/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
BINOY DESAI (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text NON-FUNCTIONAL FIRE BARRIER DISCOVERED AFFECTING BOTH SAFE SHUTDOWN PATHS
"During an inspection of a fire penetration between Fire Area 1404, Switchgear Room 1G and Fire Area 1408, Switchgear Room 1F in the diesel generator building, the penetration was determined to be non-functional as a 3 hour fire barrier. In the event of a postulated fire in the affected areas, both safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 could be compromised. Given this information, the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).
"Compensatory measures were established in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA). The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in the fire areas ensure that the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded condition can be repaired.
"[Condition report No.] CR904013"
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector
* * * RETRACTION PROVIDED BY KENNY HUNTER TO JEFF ROTTON AT 0915 EST ON 12/30/2014 * * *
"Further investigation revealed that after removing the outermost two inches of loose silicone foam material, and taking additional measurements there remained adequate silicone foam material to provide 10 inches of silicone foam sealing the penetration. Plant design shows that the wall in question is 18 inches thick and also that 9 inches of silicone foam is required in the penetration in order maintain a 3 hour fire rating for the wall/penetration. Since there is adequate foam in the penetration to maintain the 3 hour fire rating the penetration is fully functional.
"Based on this information, this penetration in its 'as found' state does NOT represent a condition that seriously degrades a principal safety barrier. As such this condition has been determined to no longer meet reporting requirement 10CFR50.72(b)(3) and is therefore NOT reportable. Based on this information the previous notification for Event 50662 is being retracted."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Bartley) |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 50698 | Rep Org: KENTUCKY DEPT OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: BIG RIVERS ELECTRIC CORPORATION
Region: 1
City: WEST CENTERTOWN State: KY
County:
License #: 201-277-56
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ERIC PERRY
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 12/22/2014
Notification Time: 13:05 [ET]
Event Date: 11/24/2014
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/22/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
MARC FERDAS (R1DO)
NMSS EVENTS NOTIFICA (EMAI)
| Event Text KENTUCKY AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FAILURE OF FIXED GAUGE ACTUATORS
The following information was obtained from the Commonwealth of Kentucky via facsimile:
"Failure of on/off mechanisms on three fixed gauges to function as designed. Failure discovered during routine testing of on/off mechanism by [the] licensee. The licensee has contacted the manufacturer to schedule removal/repair."
The fixed gauges are in a normally inaccessible area and don't present a personnel exposure concern. The gauges contain Cs-137 with 100 mCi, 25 mCi, and 10 mCi respectively and are used at a coal fired facility.
Kentucky Event Report ID: KY-14-0005 |
| Non-Agreement State | Event Number: 50699 | Rep Org: DASSAULT AIRCRAFT SERVICE
Licensee: DASSAULT AIRCRAFT SERVICE
Region: 1
City: NEW CASTLE State: DE
County:
License #: GL
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KEN HEAVLOW
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 12/22/2014
Notification Time: 15:15 [ET]
Event Date: 12/03/2014
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/22/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
| Person (Organization):
MARC FERDAS (R1DO)
NMSS EVENTS NOTIFICA (EMAI)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material. | Event Text LOST STATIC ELIMINATOR
"Dassault Falcon Jet Wilmington Corp. has lost a leased piece of equipment that contains radioactive materials. The tool in question is an air blow gun leased from NRD, LLC. The blow gun model number is P-2021-1000, Serial number A2JT781 and was on lease number 055641 shipped on 12/03/2013. The blow gun [contains] 1.7 mCi (61 MBq) [of Po-210].
"The tool was used to remove static from aircraft interior windows and also to remove static from interior wood paneling between decorative finish coats. It was used primarily in the cabinet department of the company for the purposes described above. The tool was believed to last be used in June of 2014.
"Since discovering the tool was lost, every effort has been made to locate it by posting lost tool messages throughout the company and searching all tool storage locations and employee tool boxes. To prevent this from happening again, the company has placed tools like this into our inventory tool control program where employees will be required to sign out tools and return them after jobs are complete."
The tool was in use at the company's New Castle, DE facility.
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 50701 | Rep Org: TEXAS DEPT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES
Licensee: TEXAS GAMMA RAY, LLC
Region: 4
City: PASADENA State: TX
County:
License #: L-05561
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KAREN BLANCHARD
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 12/23/2014
Notification Time: 12:31 [ET]
Event Date: 12/23/2014
Event Time: 03:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/23/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4DO)
NMSS EVENTS NOTIFICA (EMAI)
| Event Text TEXAS AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SOURCE DISCONNECTED ON A RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA
The following information was obtained from the State of Texas via email:
"On December 23, 2014, the licensee notified the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] that one of its radiography crews, who was performing radiographic operations at one of its licensed sites in Houston, Texas, had experienced a source disconnect.
"After completing an exposure, the radiographers cranked the 79 curie cobalt-60 source back into the SPEC300 exposure device. However, as they started to walk toward the end of the guide tube, their survey meter and alarming rate meters indicated the source was still in the guide tube. They moved their boundaries back, secured the area, and called their supervisor. The licensee's radiation safety officer and two employees who are approved on the license for source retrieval responded to the site. They found that the source assembly (pigtail) cable had broken a couple of inches back from the source. The source was retrieved from the guide tube and placed back inside the exposure device. A survey confirmed the source was in the shielded position. The licensee is sending the exposure device and all associated equipment from this event to the manufacturer for evaluation. No member of the public received any exposure and there were no overexposures to any of the radiographers or source retrieval team.
"An investigation into this event is ongoing. More information will be provided in accordance with SA-300 as it is obtained."
Texas Incident No: I-9263 |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 50707 | Facility: LASALLE
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: MARK SMITH
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 12/30/2014
Notification Time: 03:51 [ET]
Event Date: 12/29/2014
Event Time: 23:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/30/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
JAMNES CAMERON (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO LEAK ON DIVISION 3 DIESEL GENERATOR COOLING WATER PUMP
"This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Event or Condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a Safety Function needed to Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident. During routine surveillance testing of the Unit 2 Division 3 Emergency Diesel Generator (LOS-DG-M3) a small pinhole leak was identified in the pump casing of the Division 3 Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pump. This condition has been evaluated and the Division 3 Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pump has been declared inoperable. The Division 3 Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pump is a support system for the Division 3 Emergency Diesel Generator and the High Pressure Core Spray System (HPCS). The required actions of Technical Specification (TS) 3.5.1 were entered on 12/29/14 at 2330 [CST] when the HPCS system was determined to be inoperable. This condition could have prevented the High Pressure Core Spray System (HPCS), a single train safety system, from performing its design function."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 50708 | Facility: QUAD CITIES
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: MARK BRIDGES
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 12/30/2014
Notification Time: 10:03 [ET]
Event Date: 12/30/2014
Event Time: 08:16 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/30/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
JAMNES CAMERON (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text PLANNED TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER MAINTENANCE AFFECTING THE AIR HANDLING SYSTEM
"Planned maintenance activities will commence today (December 30, 2014) on the Quad Cities Station TSC. The activity involves maintenance on the TSC Air Handling Unit (AHU). Work on the AHU affects the TSC habitability during a declared emergency requiring activation since the AHU supports habitability. The duration of maintenance is currently unknown, and is dependent on the conditions discovered during maintenance. Restoration from maintenance is expected to take longer than the required activation time of the TSC.
"If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Station Emergency Director will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures. This event is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) since the maintenance activity affects an emergency response facility.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The licensee will be notifying the onsite Illinois Emergency Management Agency representative.
* * * UPDATE FROM CHAD BRITTON TO DANIEL MILLS AT 1527 EST ON 12/30/2014 * * *
"At 1230 CST on December 30, 2014, the maintenance activity was completed and the TSC ventilation was restored.
"The NRC Resident Inspector was notified."
Notified R3DO (Cameron). | |