| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
12/12/2014 - 12/15/2014 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Agreement State | Event Number: 50335 | Rep Org: MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM
Licensee: ECO RECYCLING
Region: 1
City: BROCKTON State: MA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ANTHONY CARPENITO
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 08/01/2014
Notification Time: 11:22 [ET]
Event Date: 09/12/2012
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 12/12/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - ALPHATRON IONIZATION VACUUM GAUGE FOUND IN LOAD OF SCRAP METAL
The following information was obtained from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts via email:
"On 9/12/12, a scrap metal load shipped by ECO Recycling of Brockton, MA, was rejected by Metal Recycling of Providence, RI, for triggering the site's radiation detectors. The highest vehicle radiation reading was < 0.2 mR/hr. The vehicle returned to Brockton where, on 9/13/12, one device (described as an Alphatron ionization vacuum gauge containing approximately 500 microCuries Radium-226 manufactured by National Resources of Newton, MA approximately 40 years ago) was located and removed from the load by an independent consultant and isolated in secure storage on-site in Brockton for future disposition. The consultant indicated < 0.5 mR/hr readings in accessible areas near the storage container. The original owner not determined. The device continues to be secured at Brockton site as of 8/1/14.
"The Agency [Massachusetts Radiation Control Program] considers this event to still be OPEN."
Event Docket #: 19-1408
* * * UPDATE AT 1441 EDT ON 9/2/2014 FROM TONY CARPENITO TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
The following information was received via e-mail:
"9/12/14 Update - Agency conducted on-site inspection 8/1/14. No significant change to previously reported information. Agency [Massachusetts Radiation Control Program] review ongoing.
"The Agency considers this matter to still be OPEN."
Notified the R1DO (Ferdas) and FSME Event Resources (via e-mail).
* * * UPDATE ON 10/7/14 AT 1512 EDT FROM ANTHONY CARPENITO TO DONG PARK * * *
The following was received from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts via email:
"ECO Recycling in process of soliciting / collecting quotes from waste brokers for proper disposal.
"Agency review ongoing. Agency considers this event to still be OPEN."
Notified R1DO (Bower) and FSME Events Resource via email.
* * * UPDATE ON 11/6/14 AT 1151 EDT FROM ANTHONY CARPENITO TO DONG PARK * * *
The following was received from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts via email:
"ECO Recycling continuing process of soliciting / collecting quotes from waste brokers for proper disposal.
"Agency review ongoing. Agency considers this event to still be OPEN."
Notified R1DO (Gray), FSME Events Resource, and NMSS Events Resource via email.
* * * UPDATE ON 12/12/14 FROM ANTHONY CARPENITO TO HOWIE CROUCH VIA EMAIL ON 12/12/14 AT 1424 EST * * *
"ECO Recycling arranged for source to be removed by registered waste broker. Upon Agency [State of Massachusetts] contact and inquiry, waste broker confirmed source pick-up scheduled for third week in January 2015. Agency considers this event to still be OPEN. Agency will close this event when source is removed from Brockton site."
Notified R1DO (Rogge) and NMSS Events Notification via email. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 50351 | Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: KENNY HUNTER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 08/07/2014
Notification Time: 20:00 [ET]
Event Date: 08/07/2014
Event Time: 17:07 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 12/12/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
REBECCA NEASE (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text UNANALYZED CONDITION DUE TO DISCOVERY OF DEGRADED FIRE BARRIER WALLS
"During a fire inspection activity involving inspection of fire walls that serve as Appendix R barriers, degradation of some fire walls was identified that was sufficient to prevent these walls from meeting Appendix R requirements as 3-hour fire barriers. In the event of a postulated fire in the affected areas, both safe shutdown paths on the affected unit could be compromised. Given this information, the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).
"Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded penetrations in these same fire areas. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in these fire areas ensure that the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions can be corrected.
"Condition Reports: 850802, 850819"
In addition to automatic fire protection features, the licensee has posted fire watches as a compensatory measure.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM STANLEY STONE TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1814 EST ON 11/24/2014 * * *
"As part of the 'extent of condition' corrective action for the condition identified in EN 50351, an inspection activity is in progress to inspect the remaining fire walls for conditions similar to those reported on 8/7/2014. During this inspection, another condition was identified involving some degradation of the fire wall between Fire Area 1023 - RPS MG Set Room and Fire Area 1015 - Annunciator Room. In the event of a postulated fire in the affected areas both safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 could be compromised. Given this information, the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).
"Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded penetrations in these same fire areas and will remain in place until the wall is repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in these fire areas ensure that the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded condition is repaired. The inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS update report and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.
"Condition Report: 898908."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R2DO (Ehrhardt).
* * * UPDATE FROM KENNY HUNTER TO DANIEL MILLS AT 1758 EST ON 11/25/2014 * * *
"As part of the 'extent of condition' corrective action for the condition identified in EN 50351, an inspection activity is in progress to inspect the remaining fire walls for conditions similar to those reported on 8/7/2014. During this inspection, another condition was identified involving some degradation of the fire wall between Fire Area 1016 - 600 Volt Switchgear Room 1C and Fire Area 1017 - 600 Volt Switchgear Room 1D. In the event of a postulated fire in the affected areas, both safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 could be compromised. Given this information the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).
"Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded penetrations in these same fire areas and will remain in place until the wall is repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in these fire areas ensure that the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded condition is repaired. The inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS update report and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R2DO (Ernstes).
* * * UPDATE FROM SCOTT BRITT TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1706 EST ON 12/4/2014 * * *
"As part of the 'extent of condition' corrective action for the condition identified in EN 50351, an inspection activity is in progress to inspect the remaining fire walls for conditions similar to those reported on 8/7/2014. During this inspection, additional conditions were identified involving multiple fire barriers in the control building that affected both safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 and Unit 2 based on the respective inspection results. In the event of a postulated fire in the affected areas both safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 and 2 could be compromised.
"Given this information the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded penetrations in these same fire areas and will remain in place until the wall is repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in these fire areas ensure that the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded condition is repaired. The inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS update report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R2DO (Freeman).
* * * UPDATE AT 1842 EST ON 12/12/2014 FROM G.S. GRIFFIS TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
"As part of the 'extent of condition' corrective action for the condition identified in EN# 50351, an inspection activity is in progress to inspect the remaining fire walls and associated penetrations for conditions similar to those reported on 08/07/2014. During this inspection, nonconformances of multiple fire barriers were identified that bring into question the functionality of the affected fire barriers that can compromise safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 and 2 based on the respective inspection results. Since additional time is required to further evaluate each nonconformance to conclusively determine if the nonconformance is sufficient to consider the barrier nonfunctional, interim conservative fire actions were taken by considering these fire barriers as nonfunctional. Based on this conservative conclusion, in the event of a postulated fire in the affected areas both safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 and 2 could be compromised. Given this information the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).
"Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded penetrations and fire walls in most of these same fire areas and will remain in place until the barrier(s) are repaired. Additional fire actions were taken as required to address the additional fire areas identified. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in these fire areas ensure that the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded condition is repaired. The inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.
"Unit 1 is entering a planned outage due to unrelated activities."
Condition Report: 10000607
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R2DO (Desai). |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 50655 | Rep Org: LOUISIANA RADIATION PROTECTION DIV
Licensee: SCHLUMBERGER TECHNOLOGY CORP. (STC)
Region: 4
City: CAMERON PARISH State: LA
County:
License #: LA-2783-LOI,
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOE NOBLE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 12/04/2014
Notification Time: 15:08 [ET]
Event Date: 10/27/2014
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/04/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
RAY KELLAR (R4DO)
NMSS EVENTS NOTIFICA (EMAI)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK AND ABANDONED SOURCE
The following report was received from the State of Louisiana via fax:
"The source became stuck/lost down a strategic oil reserve cavern belonging to US DOE. Cavern named WH 9A, in West Hackberry field, Cameron/Cameron Parish, LA.
"STC [the licensee] was logging/taking measurements in/down a strategic oil reserve cavern for the Department of Energy when the 125 mCi source became lost down cavern, STC abandoned in place the Cs-137 source and applied all practical applicable P/A procedures pertaining to a cavern. The source was declared irretrievable November 11, 2014, and requested approval of the information on the plaque. The source is believed to be on the bottom of the cavern at depth of 3,575 ft. Schlumberger, after several 'fishing' attempts, decided to 'cap'/abandon the location and move on.
"LDEQ [Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality] was notified of the lodged source on October 27, 2014 [approximately] 1720 CDT. At that time, Schlumberger requested direction to abandon the irretrievable source. The request was granted by [LDEQ].
"On October 27, 2014, STC contacted LDEQ with a preliminary notification reporting that a well-logging source was lost down-hole in a DOE Strategic Oil Reserve Cavern in Cameron Parish, LA. The source, a Gulf Nuclear, 125 mCi Cs-137 source, S/N CSV-129. This incident was reported and will be abandoned and maintained by the requirements of LAC 33: XV. 2051 and 2099, Appendix B.
"LDEQ considers this event closed."
Louisiana Event Report ID No.: LA - 140012
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
Note: This device is assigned an IAEA Category 3 value based on the actual radioactivity of the source, not on the device type. (Reference IAEA RG-G-1.9) |
| Non-Agreement State | Event Number: 50656 | Rep Org: FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS
Licensee: FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS
Region: 3
City: DULUTH State: MN
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: PAUL WERNKE
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 12/05/2014
Notification Time: 11:21 [ET]
Event Date: 11/17/2014
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/05/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
| Person (Organization):
ERIC DUNCAN (R3DO)
NMSS EVENTS NOTIFICA (EMAI)
ILTAB (EMAI)
CANADA (FAX)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material. | Event Text MISSING TRITIUM EXIT SIGNS
The Federal Bureau of Prisons in Duluth, Minnesota reported the loss of generally licensed devices (self-illuminating tritium exit signs) as required by 10 CFR 31.5(a)(10) and 10 CFR 20.2201(a)(1). Four (4) tritium exit signs are assumed to be missing. A thorough search was conducted but failed to locate the missing signs.
The serial numbers are known for 3 of the 4 missing signs; 309482 - 11.47 Ci, 309489 - 11.47 Ci, C601373 - 20 Ci.
The licensee has notified R3 (Piskura).
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 50657 | Rep Org: UTAH DIVISION OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: EARTHTEC ENGINEERING
Region: 4
City: SALT LAKE CITY State: UT
County:
License #: UT 2500300
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MIKE GIVENS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 12/05/2014
Notification Time: 17:15 [ET]
Event Date: 12/04/2014
Event Time: 16:00 [MST]
Last Update Date: 12/05/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
RAY KELLAR (R4DO)
NMSS EVENTS NOTIFICA (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED PORTABLE GAUGE
The following report was received from the State of Utah via email:
"A portable gauge was run over by a compactor at a construction site [located at the University of Utah Business Loop Parking Garage]. The gauge was damaged and required disassembly to withdraw the source. The source was withdrawn to the shielded position. Leak test wipes were taken and sent to a laboratory for analysis. The [Licensee] RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] placed the gauge inside the transport case. The RSO verified transport index readings were normal. The RSO transported the gauge to the licensee's facility and stored it until the leak test results were verified to be below 0.005 microcuries. Additional information and photographs will be forthcoming."
Utah Event Report ID: UT140005 |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 50672 | Facility: PRAIRIE ISLAND
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: MARK LOOSBROCK
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 12/12/2014
Notification Time: 11:34 [ET]
Event Date: 12/12/2014
Event Time: 02:48 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/12/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text AUXILIARY BUILDING NORMAL VENTILATION RADIATION MONITOR FAILED
"At 0248 CST on December 12, 2014, 2R-30, Auxiliary Building Normal Vent Radiation Monitor, failed. This monitor was the redundant monitor for 2R-37, Auxiliary Building Normal Vent Radiation Monitor, which was previously taken out of service for planned maintenance. With 2R-30 and 2R-37 out of service, there are no monitors that will allow for timely classification of two Emergency Action Levels (EALS) - NUE (Notification of Unusual Event) and Alert Classifications. This results in a loss of emergency assessment capability while 2R-30 and 2R-37 are out of service. This is a reportable condition in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"The Auxiliary Building ventilation effluent monitor readings were normal and there were no elevated readings in Auxiliary Building area monitors prior to the unavailability of these monitors.
"The health and safety of the public was not affected by this issue.
"The activity to repair and return one of the monitors to service is continuous until restored.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 50674 | Facility: LASALLE
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: TERRY MARTIN
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 12/12/2014
Notification Time: 18:20 [ET]
Event Date: 12/12/2014
Event Time: 13:24 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/12/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text BOTH SECONDARY CONTAINMENT AIRLOCK DOORS OPENED SIMULTANEOUSLY
"This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), 'Event or Condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a Safety Function needed to Control the Release of Radioactive Material' and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), 'Event or Condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a Safety Function needed to Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident.' Unit 1 and Unit 2 were in Mode 1 and no movement of irradiated fuel, core alterations, or OPDRVs [Operations with the Potential to Drain the Reactor Vessel] were in progress in the secondary containment.
"An employee entered a secondary containment interlock and identified that both doors of the interlock opened simultaneously when the door on the reactor building side was opened. The employee immediately secured both doors in the interlock and notified the Main Control Room Supervisor. Both doors in the interlock were open for approximately 10 seconds. With both doors open, TS SR 3.6.4.1.2 was not met. This rendered secondary containment inoperable per TS 3.6.4.1. Reactor building differential pressure, as observed in the Main Control Room, has remained less than -0.25 inches of water column at all times. Initial investigation determined that the interlock for the doors was malfunctioning. Administrative controls [barricades and signs] have been put in place to ensure the doors remain closed pending repairs to the interlock."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 50675 | Facility: LASALLE
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: WAYNE CLAYTON
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 12/12/2014
Notification Time: 21:15 [ET]
Event Date: 12/12/2014
Event Time: 15:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/12/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text UNANALYZED CONDITION WITH REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING
"Engineering identified fuse and breaker coordination issues with Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) valves operated at the Remote Shutdown Panel (RSDP). The coordination issues are such that, given a fire in the main control room, it is possible that RCIC valve power supply breakers could trip prior to tripping control power fuses. Operation of RCIC from the RSDP could be impaired in this scenario without compensatory actions to reset breakers. RCIC is the single credited source of makeup to the reactor pressure vessel during this scenario. The current licensing basis (Fire Protection Report) does not identify the compensatory actions required to reset breakers prior to RCIC operation at the RSDP. This condition is applicable to Unit 1 and Unit 2.
"This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), 'Event or Condition that results in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety'."
Actions are being taken to amend the appropriate operating procedures to take the required steps to ensure proper operation of RCIC in the postulated scenario.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 50676 | Facility: MILLSTONE
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [ ] [ ] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MICHEL CICCONE
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 12/12/2014
Notification Time: 22:27 [ET]
Event Date: 12/12/2014
Event Time: 09:57 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/12/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
JOHN ROGGE (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAK ISOLATION DOOR INOPERABLE
The boundary door between the A and B safety related switchgear rooms was found not to be latching. This door is credited in the high energy line break (HELB) analysis. Both trains of safety related switchgear were affected for approximately 36 minutes. The technical specification action statement was entered, the door was repaired, and the action statement was exited.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 50677 | Facility: FARLEY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: CHARLES BAREFIELD
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS | Notification Date: 12/13/2014
Notification Time: 10:00 [ET]
Event Date: 12/13/2014
Event Time: 01:52 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/13/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
BINOY DESAI (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text MALFUNCTION OF SMOKE DETECTION SYSTEM IN CONTAINMENT DUE TO HIGH HUMIDITY
"At 0152 CST on December 13, 2014, both strings of the Unit 2 containment smoke detection system were declared non-functional due to a non-radioactive steam leak inside containment. The steam leak was causing spurious alarms to the smoke detection system. This condition prevents identification and assessment of a fire in containment. Required compensatory measures have been established. Since a fire in the containment building is an entry condition for the site's emergency plan, this is considered a loss of emergency assessment capability and is being reported per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed."
The steam leak was caused by a faulty main steam flow detector. The licensee has shut down the reactor to effect repairs. | |