| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
10/03/2014 - 10/06/2014 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 50356 | Facility: PILGRIM
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: JOHN WHALLEY
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 08/12/2014
Notification Time: 10:32 [ET]
Event Date: 08/12/2014
Event Time: 02:38 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/03/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
SILAS KENNEDY (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text HPCI POTENTIAL INOPERABILITY DISCOVERED DURING POST MAINTENANCE TESTING
"At 0238 hours [EDT] on Tuesday, August 12, 2014, with Pilgrim Station at 100 percent power in the Run Mode with reactor coolant pressure at approximately 1025 psig and the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System previously removed from service for maintenance, a condition with the potential to impact the operability of the HPCI System was discovered. The HPCI System was being operated in accordance with plant procedures to complete post maintenance test requirements. Upon HPCI initiation, the indicated flow on HPCI Flow Indicator FI-2340-1-1 was 0 Gallons Per Minute (GPM) with the flow controller in the manual mode. The indicated flow on HPCI Flow Indicator Fl-2340-1-1 remained at 0 GPM throughout the duration of the surveillance. Alternate flow indication indicated the expected HPCI flow rate. The flow controller in manual was capable of controlling at the demanded HPCI turbine speed. The HPCI turbine speed was manually varied with a corresponding change in the HPCI flow computer point reading. Activities to restore the flow indicator capability are in progress.
"The plant is in a safe condition and plant personnel are investigating the cause of the flow indicator issue.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this notification.
"This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)."
The licensee will be notifying the state.
* * * RETRACTION FROM O'ROURKE TO KLCO ON 10/03/2014 AT 1254 EDT * * *
"Subsequent investigation determined that HPCI Flow Instrument SQRT-2340-10 output signal was 0 mA and did not change in response to the actual HPCI flow rate. With the SQRT-2340-10 output signal at 0 mA, the HPCI Flow controller would demand maximum HPCI injection flow in the AUTOMATIC control mode. Circuitry within the control system limits the maximum HPCI flow to 5250 GPM at a turbine speed of 4165 RPM. Engineering analysis has concluded that the HPCI pump operating limits (net positive suction head and low pressure suction trip) would not be exceeded in a maximum HPCI flow state. Therefore, the HPCI System was operable and capable of performing its residual heat removal and accident mitigation functions.
"Therefore, the initial 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) report is being retracted.
"The [NRC] Resident Inspector has been informed of this notification retraction."
Notified the R1DO (Krohn). |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 50493 | Rep Org: NE DIV OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS
Licensee: OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT
Region: 4
City: OMAHA State: NE
County:
License #: 01-39-04
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: HOWARD SHUMAN
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS | Notification Date: 09/25/2014
Notification Time: 09:27 [ET]
Event Date: 09/23/2014
Event Time: 11:50 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/25/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
JAMES DRAKE (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FAILURE OF A PROCESS GAUGE SHUTTER
The following was received from the State of Nebraska via email:
"The Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services, Radioactive Materials Program, was notified at 0803 CDT on 9/25/2014 by a representative of the Omaha Public Power District that a Kay Ray fixed gauge Model Number 7080 source shutter failed to close. The device contains approximately 6 millicuries of Cesium-137 originally installed in 1984 with approximately 50 millicuries. The gauge is mounted between two fly ash hoppers approximately 20 feet above the floor. The source closure mechanism on the gauge is connected to a handle located at floor level by a flexible cable. The closure cable is secured so that when the floor handle is operated, the control cable slides inside of the sheath opening/closing the shutter. The outer sheath for the cable became separated from the capture mechanism at the source. The handle on the floor would move but the linkages at the source would only move approximately � inch and then the sheath would move away from the compression fitting. The reason for operating the source shutter was to perform the semiannual function check.
"This type of failure has been seen in the past and is easily fixed by tightening the screw which secures the end of the cable to the structure. This requires a scaffold to be built up to the source level."
NE Incident ID #: NE140005 |
| Non-Agreement State | Event Number: 50494 | Rep Org: MALLINCKRODT
Licensee: MALLINCKRODT
Region: 3
City: MARYLAND HEIGHTS State: MO
County:
License #: 24-04206-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SCOTT SUROVI
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS | Notification Date: 09/25/2014
Notification Time: 10:57 [ET]
Event Date: 09/18/2014
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/25/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
| Person (Organization):
MEL GRAY (R1DO)
NICK VALOS (R3DO)
JAMES DRAKE (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
MEXICO (EMAI)
CANADA (EMAI)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3 " level of radioactive material. | Event Text LOST DEPLETED URANIUM SHIELDS
Mallinckrodt reported the loss of six (6) depleted Uranium shields used as shielding for Tc-99m generators. The licensee believes that the shields were lost in transit between 5/2013 and 9/2013. Five of the shields were in transit between Mallinckrodt and Triad Isotopes (locations in Texas and Hicksville, NY) shipped by "Associated Couriers." One of the shields was in transit between Mallinckrodt and Cardinal Health (Plainville, NY) shipped by "Medical Delivery Services." Each shield is roughly 12 inches in height, 8 inches in diameter, 65 pounds in weight, and contains 8.1 mCi of Uranium. The dose rate on contact would be roughly 3.1 mrem/hr, and the dose at 1 foot would be roughly 1.2 mrem/hr.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| Part 21 | Event Number: 50504 | Rep Org: ELECTROSWITCH
Licensee: ELECTROSWITCH
Region: 1
City: WEYMOUTH State: MA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: LARRY FRIEDMAN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 10/03/2014
Notification Time: 10:15 [ET]
Event Date: 09/30/2014
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/03/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
| Person (Organization):
PAUL KROHN (R1DO)
STEVEN VIAS (R2DO)
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3DO)
JACK WHITTEN (R4DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)
| Event Text PART 21 REPORT - SERIES 20 MODULE MAY ALLOW THE SIDE COVER TO TOUCH THE WIRE INSULATION
The following information was excerpted from report received via email:
"The orientation (90 degrees) of the placement (soldering) of the internal wire on the resistor terminal used in the above referenced Series 20 modules may allow the side cover screw to touch the wire insulation. The engineering drawing nor manufacturing assembly instructions did not clearly describe the correct orientation.
"On the basis of our evaluation, it was determined on September 30, 2014, that Electroswitch does not have the capability to perform the evaluation to determine if a defect, which could create a substantial safety hazard, exists.
"Purchasers are being advised to perform testing to verify operation or return the product to Electroswitch.
"The following personnel may be contacted regarding this notification:
Larry Friedman
Quality Assurance Manager
781-607-3309
Ed Reszenski
Engineering Manager
781-607-3341" |
| Part 21 | Event Number: 50507 | Rep Org: AREVA INC.
Licensee: AREVA INC.
Region: 4
City: RICHLAND State: WA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ALAN B. MEGINNIS
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 10/03/2014
Notification Time: 16:48 [ET]
Event Date: 08/28/2014
Event Time: [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/03/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
| Person (Organization):
STEVEN VIAS (R2DO)
JACK WHITTEN (R4DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)
| Event Text PART 21 - DEFECT IN THE INPUT TO CALCULATE THERMAL LIMITS
The following was received via email by Areva Inc.:
"(i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission.
Alan B. Meginnis, AREVA Inc., 2101 Horn Rapids Road, Richland, WA 99354.
"(ii) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect.
The defect is in the input to a program that calculates the minimum critical power ratio (MCPR) and linear heat generation rate (LHGR) thermal limits for Browns Ferry Unit 2 Cycle 18.
"(iii) Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.
AREVA Inc.
"(iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.
This issue is a defect as defined in 10 CFR 21.3. The error is an omission in the POWERPLEX core monitoring software system input that could result in the application of non-conservative nuclear fuel operating thermal limits when the reactor is operated at 25 to 30% power. In the event of an abnormal operational occurrence while operating in this power range, a fuel thermal safety limit could be exceeded.
"(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.
August 28, 2014
"(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for, being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured, or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part.
The defect exists only for Browns Ferry Unit 2 Cycle 18.
"(vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action.
AREVA Inc. recommended plant operations be restricted to provide enough margin to the MCPR and LHGR thermal limits anytime power is in the range 25% < P < 30%. AREVA has also provided revised POWERPLEX input to TVA for Browns Ferry Unit 2 Cycle 18 to correct the error permanently.
"(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees.
This defect only had the potential to exceed the safety limit minimum critical power ratio (SLMCPR) and/or one of the Specified Acceptable Fuel Design Limits if an AOO [anticipated operational occurrence] occurred during the brief periods the plant was at power levels in the range 25% < P < 30% during Cycle 18. The plant has not had any such events in Cycle 18. The identified defect is a human performance error impacting only Browns Ferry Unit 2 Cycle 18. It does not affect other operating cycles, Browns Ferry Units, or other nuclear plants." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 50508 | Facility: SALEM
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: THOMAS MULHOLLAND
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 10/03/2014
Notification Time: 17:44 [ET]
Event Date: 10/03/2014
Event Time: 13:40 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/03/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
| Person (Organization):
PAUL KROHN (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text FITNESS FOR DUTY - CONTRACT SUPERVISOR IN VIOLATION OF FITNESS FOR DUTY POLICY
"A Supplemental Supervisor failed a random Fitness For Duty test as determined by the Medical Review Officer. Unescorted access has been revoked pending review. Work performance investigation will be conducted. This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR26.719(b)(2)(i)."
The licensee will notify the State of New Jersey and Delaware. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 50509 | Facility: FITZPATRICK
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVE RICHARDSON
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 10/04/2014
Notification Time: 22:02 [ET]
Event Date: 10/04/2014
Event Time: 14:08 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/04/2014 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
PAUL KROHN (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown | Event Text CONTAINMENT LEAKRATE EXCEEDS ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA
"The total as-found Minimum Pathway Leakage Rate for the Primary Containment exceeded Level 1 acceptance criteria. Acceptance criteria of 321 (Standard Liters per Minute) SLM was not met. This criteria is equivalent to 1.0 La, the maximum allowable Primary Containment Leakage rate as prescribed by Technical Specification 5.5.6.c.1.
"This is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) as 'The condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded .. ' All other Level 1 acceptance criteria were met.
"All as-left containment leakage requirements for startup have been met."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. | |